1 CGHC010360082022 2026:CGHC:39258 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 267 of 2022 State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station, Tumgaon District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus Yogendra Kumar Verma @ Yogesh S/o Shri Tikendra Kumar Verma Aged About 24 Years R/o Aalesoor, Police Station Kharora, District Raipur Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant (s) : Mr. Atanu Ghosh, Dy. Govt. Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vinay Nigam, Advocate S.B. Hon’ble Justice Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Order on Board 07.09.2026 1. Present is an acquittal appeal under Section 378 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the impugned judgment dated 30.06.2022 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Mahasamund in Criminal Case No. 1787/2016, whereby the respondent/ accused has been acquitted from the offence of Section 279 and 338 of IPC. 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 30.10.2018, the complainant Roshan Yadav (PW-1) lodged a report at Police Station Tumgaon, District Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.09.16 10:41:38 +0530 2 Mahasamund, stating that on 17.08.2016 at about 19.00 hours, when he was standing on the side of the road, the accused dashed against the injured by driving his motorcycle bearing No. CG 04 CE 3392 rashly and negligently, as a result of which he received grievous injuries, including fracture of his mandible bone. The FIR (Ex-P/1) and (Ex-P/2) was registered under Sections 279 and 338 of the IPC against the respondent/accused. The injured Roshan Yadav was immediately taken to the hospital, where he remained hospitalized from 17.08.2016 till 28.08.2016. Spot map (Ex.P/3) was prepared by the Police. The respondent/accused was arrested, and the motorcycle, RC Book of the motorcycle, driving licence of the respondent/accused, and Insurance Certificate of the motorcycle were seized vide seizure memo (Ex-P/5). Statements of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. were recorded and, after completion of the usual investigation, the charge sheet was filed against the accused for the offences under Sections 279 and 338 of the IPC and Sections 146/196 of the Motor Vehicles Act before the learned trial Court. 3. The learned trial Court framed charges against the respondent/accused for the offences under Sections 279 and 338 of the IPC. The respondent/accused denied the charges and claimed trial. 4. In order to prove the charge against the accused, the prosecution has examined as many as 9 witnesses. The statement of the accused/respondent under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. has also been recorded, in which he denied the circumstances appearing against him, pleaded innocence, and submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence. 5. After appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the respondent/accused has been acquitted by the learned trial Court of the alleged offence, which is under challenge in the present acquittal appeal. 3 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and the involvement of the respondent/accused in the offence in question. However, for minor omissions or contradictions, the evidence of the complainant, who is injured in the accident, has duly supported the prosecution's case, which is sufficient to hold the respondent guilty of the offence in question. The evidence of PW-1 Roshan Yadav is duly corroborated by the evidence of PW-3 Hitesh Sahu and PW-7 Krishna Kumar, which has been further corroborated by the medical evidence of Dr. P.L. Dewangan (PW-8) regarding the rash and negligent driving of the motorcycle by the respondent/accused and the grievous injuries caused to the complainant, including fracture of his mandible bone. The learned trial Court has erroneously considered that there is no clinching or cogent evidence against the respondent/accused to establish that he drove the motorcycle rashly and negligently on the public way and caused grievous injuries to the complainant, and by giving the benefit of doubt, the respondent/accused was acquitted, whereas there is sufficient evidence which demonstrates that it is the respondent/accused who drove his motorcycle in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the complainant. The impugned order, therefore, suffers from material irregularity and perversity, which is liable to be set aside, and the respondent/accused is liable to be convicted for the alleged offence. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/accused opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and has submitted that, in the absence of cogent, clinching, and corroborative evidence against the respondent/accused, the learned trial Court has acquitted him of the alleged offence, which is strictly in accordance with law and needs no interference. 4 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court and gone through the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by learned trial Court. 9. From perusal of the impugned judgment of acquittal, it transpires that the learned trial Court has found that grievous injuries were caused to the complainant, as Dr. P.L. Dewangan (PW-8) has duly proved the medical reports and treatment provided to the complainant. He also proved the discharge slip (Ex.P/6), which was issued from Shreyansh Hospital and Research Centre, Raipur, where the complainant was treated for his injuries over the mandible region. While considering the involvement of the respondent/accused in causing injuries to the complainant by rash and negligent driving of his motorcycle, the learned trial Court has examined the evidence of PW-1 Roshan Yadav, who is the injured witness. PW-1 Roshan Yadav has stated in his evidence that on the date of the incident, he was standing on the side of the road and, at that time, the respondent/accused dashed against him with his motorcycle, which came from behind him. He fell down on the ground and became unconscious. His family members lodged the report and, after recovering from his injuries, when he was discharged from the hospital, he gave a written complaint to the Police, and thereafter, the FIR (Ex-P/1) and (Ex-P/2) was registered. In his examination-in-chief, he stated that he could not see the manner in which the motorcycle was being driven. When a leading question was put to him, he stated that he could not tell whether the respondent/accused had driven his motorcycle rashly and negligently. He voluntarily stated that he himself had not seen him driving the motorcycle. In cross-examination, he denied the suggestion that he was going on his motorcycle along with his friend and had suddenly turned his motorcycle, due to which the accident occurred. From the evidence of the complainant itself, he could not demonstrate any rash and negligent driving 5 of the motorcycle by the respondent/accused. In his evidence, he stated that his friend Hitesh was also with him at that time. 10. Hitesh was examined as PW-3. He stated in his evidence that on the date of the incident, he was standing on the side of the road near the Dhaba. At that time, the respondent/accused came there on his motorcycle and dashed against his friend Roshan Yadav from behind. He fell down on the ground and received injuries to his mandible bone. He informed the father of Roshan Yadav about the accident, and thereafter, he was taken to the hospital. The respondent/accused was driving the vehicle at that time and was in a drunken condition. In cross-examination, he stated that in his Police statement, he had disclosed that the respondent/accused was in a drunken condition at the time of the incident, and if the same was not mentioned therein, he could not tell the reason. He further stated that he was not acquainted with the respondent/accused and had seen him for the first time at the time of the accident. 11. PW-2, Rajesh Sahu, who is also claiming to be an eyewitness to the incident, stated in his evidence that at the time of the incident, Roshan Yadav was standing on the side of the road. At that time, the respondent/accused and his friend came there on a motorcycle, which was being driven by the respondent/accused. He was in a drunken condition and dashed against the complainant Roshan Yadav, due to which he received injuries on his face. In cross-examination, he admitted that he did not know the registration number of the vehicle by which the accident occurred. He also did not disclose the vehicle number to the Police, and if the vehicle number is mentioned in his Police statement, he did not know about it. He further stated that he had disclosed in his Police statement that the respondent/accused was in a drunken condition and, if the same was not mentioned in his Police statement, he could not tell the reason. 6 12. PW-4 Har Prasad is also a witness, who is the father of the complainant. He was informed by Hitesh (PW-3) about the accident, and when he reached the spot, his son had already been taken to the hospital. The motorcycle was lying there. He could not know about its driver. He lodged the report after about 10-15 days and explained the delay in lodging the report by stating that the respondent/accused had restrained him from lodging the report by assuring him that he would bear the expenses of the treatment, and when he did not pay the expenses, they lodged the report. In cross-examination, nothing specific has come against the respondent/accused regarding his involvement in the incident. 13. PW-5, Krishna Bai, is the owner of the motorcycle. She stated in her evidence that she had not given the subject motorcycle to the respondent/accused. When a leading question was put to her, she stated that the Police personnel obtained her signatures on blank papers, on which they prepared the document of her consent that the motorcycle was being driven by the respondent/accused. 14. After having gone through the evidence of the witnesses, the learned trial Court has considered and held that none of the witnesses have stated that the respondent/accused had driven the motorcycle in a rash and negligent manner, due to which the accident occurred, and thereby, by extending the benefit of doubt to the respondent/accused, the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondent/accused of the alleged offence. The consideration of the learned trial Court is one of the plausible views, which has rightly been taken by the learned trial Court while passing the impugned judgment dated 30.06.2022. 15. Recently, applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram" reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 984, has held as follows:- 7 "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all." 16. Further, in case of “Jafarudheen and Others Vs. State of Kerala”, reported in 2022 (8) SCC 440, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal in judgement at para 25, which reads as under :- “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.P.C., the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court’s view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that ensures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 17. After considering the material available on record as well as the well- reasoned judgment passed by the learned trial Court and being very much conscious of the existing legal position as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kistoora Ram (Supra) and Jafarudheen (Supra), that in an appeal against acquittal, if the view taken by the trial Court is a possible and plausible view on the basis of the evidence available on record, the Appellate Court should be slow in interfering with the order of acquittal and the same cannot be reversed merely because another view is possible. In the present case, the learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, has rightly found that the prosecution has failed to establish by cogent and clinching evidence that the respondent/accused had driven the motorcycle in a rash and negligent manner so as to cause the alleged accident. The findings recorded by the 8 learned trial Court are based upon proper appreciation of the evidence and constitute a plausible view. I, therefore, of the considered opinion that the judgment passed by learned trial Court is just and proper and does not call for any interference. 18. For the foregoing reasons, the acquittal appeal is devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge sagrika