24.08.2026 Court No.655 DL/Item No.–20 [Milan] CRA 115 of 2002 M/S. LEAD BETER SEEDS PVT. LTD. VS RANJIT GANGULY 1. None appears on behalf of the appellant when the appeal is taken up for hearing. 2. The respondent/opposite party is also not represented. 3. The present appeal has been preferred assailing the judgment and order of acquittal dated 29.11.2001 passed by the learned Trial Court in Case No. C-891 of 1999 (T.R. No. 218 of 1999), whereby the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused person/opposite party from the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order of acquittal, the present appeal came to be preferred in the year 2002. It appears from the record that, on several consecutive dates when the appeal was taken up for consideration, none appeared on behalf of the appellant to prosecute the appeal. The respondent/opposite party, despite service of notice, has also chosen not to appear before this Court. 5. It further appears from the report submitted by the Department that an administrative notice was duly issued upon the appellant, namely, Mr. Bikas Kumar Kundu, under Memo No. 3176 Cr(A) dated 30.06.2025. In response thereto, the appellant submitted a written representation before the Department explaining his 2 difficulty in continuing with the present appeal and praying to be relieved from further pursuing the same. 6. In the said written submission, Mr. Bikas Kumar Kundu has categorically stated that he does not wish to proceed further with the present appeal challenging the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court. He has explained that he had already resigned from the concerned company with effect from 31.01.2023, as the local branch of the company had been closed. According to him, subsequent to his resignation and the closure of the local branch, he has had no further communication with the company and, in the circumstances; he is not in a position to effectively pursue the appeal any further. 7. The aforesaid circumstances are relevant for consideration of the present appeal. The appeal has remained pending for a considerable length of time, having been instituted in the year 2002 against the judgment of acquittal dated 29.11.2001. Despite repeated opportunities, the appellant has not taken effective steps for prosecuting the appeal. More importantly, the person who had been representing the interest of the concerned company has, by way of a written submission made pursuant to the administrative notice, expressly conveyed his inability and unwillingness to proceed with the appeal. The respondent/opposite party has also remained unrepresented despite service. 8. At the same time, an appeal against an order of acquittal cannot be disposed of merely on account of the absence of the appellant or his learned Advocate without examining whether the impugned judgment discloses any manifest illegality, perversity or 3 miscarriage of justice warranting interference by the appellate Court. An order of acquittal carries with it the statutory and judicial presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, and the appellate Court is required to examine the judgment on its own merits before declining to interfere. 9. Accordingly, I have carefully gone through the impugned judgment and order dated 29.11.2001 passed by the learned Trial Court, as well as the materials available on record. Upon such consideration, I find that the learned Trial Court has considered the evidence and materials placed before it and has arrived at a conclusion acquitting the accused/opposite party of the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. I do not find any material illegality, perversity, manifest error of appreciation of evidence, or any other compelling circumstance in the impugned judgment which would justify interference with the order of acquittal in the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. 10.It is also settled that while considering an appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court may reappraise the evidence, but interference is not warranted merely because another view of the evidence may be possible. Where the view taken by the learned Trial Court is a reasonably possible view on the evidence and the judgment does not suffer from perversity or manifest illegality, the acquittal ought not to be disturbed. In the present case, no such exceptional circumstance has been brought to the notice of this Court which would warrant interference with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court. 11.Having regard to the prolonged pendency of the appeal, the repeated non-appearance on behalf of the appellant, the written 4 submission of Mr. Bikas Kumar Kundu expressing his inability and unwillingness to pursue the appeal any further, the non- appearance of the respondent despite service, and, above all, upon independent consideration of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, I find no sufficient ground to interfere with the same. 12.Accordingly, the present appeal, being C.R.A. 115 of 2002, is hereby dismissed. 13.The judgment and order of acquittal dated 29.11.2001 passed by the learned Trial Court in Case No. C-891 of 1999 (T.R. No. 218 of 1999) is hereby affirmed. 14.Consequently, any connected application, if pending, is also dismissed. 15.Let the Trial Court Records, if received, be returned to the Court concerned forthwith. 16.Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order if applied for be given to the parties after payment of requisite fees. (Prasenjit Biswas, J.)