1 CGHC010354802026 2026:CGHC:39909 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 4639 of 2026 1 - Laxman Manikpuri S/o Late Purukhu Aged About 64 Years Residents Of Devrikhud, Near Bahora Hotel, Colony Chowk, Bilaspur, Tehsil And District Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh) 2 - Smt. Uttara Manikpuri W/o Lakshman Manikpuri Aged About 51 Years Residents Of Devrikhud, Near Bahora Hotel, Colony Chowk, Bilaspur, Tehsil And District Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Secretary, Revenue Department, Mantralaya, New Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Chhattisgarh Board Of Revenue, Bilaspur Through The Registrar, C.G. Board Of Revenue, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh Tehsil-Post- Bilaspur, P.S.- Civil Line- Bilaspur (C.G.) 3 - Divisional Commissioner Bilaspur (C.G.) Koni, District Bilaspur (C.G.) 4 - Tehsildar, Bilaspur Tehsil And District Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh), P.S.- Civil Line- Bilaspur (C.G.) RUCHI YADAV Digitally signed by RUCHI YADAV 2 5 - D.P. Tiwari S/o Late J.L. Tiwari Resident Of Devrikhud, Colony Chowk, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh) P.S.- Sarkanda- Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause title taken from CIS System) For Petitioner : Mr. Sunil Kumar Soni , Advocate For Respondent/State : Dr. Arham Siddiqui, P.L. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 11.09.2026 1. The petitioners have filed the instant writ petition seeking the following reliefs:- “(i) Issue a writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order, or direction, quashing the Impugned Order dated 18.09.2025 passed by the Board of Revenue, Bilaspur(ANNEXURE P/10) ;(ii) Declare that the order dated 20.06.2022 passed by the Tehsildar, Bilaspur is without jurisdiction, illegal, void ab initio, and has zero legal value; (iii) Declare that the proceedings conducted by the Tehsildar manually after 01.10.2020 are in violation of the Government Circular dated 15.06.2020 and are null and void; (iv) Declare that the Tehsildar, having conducted manual proceedings in contravention of the Government mandate, was liable to have his revenue court powers ceased for a period of three years and 3 consequently lacked authority to pass the order dated 20.06.2022; (v) Declare that the Board of Revenue failed to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Section 8 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 and mechanically dismissed the Petitioners' application. (vi) Pass any other order or direction which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the interest of justice and equity. It is Further Prayed to Issue a writ of Mandamus directing the Divisional Commissioner, Bilaspur to immediately issue a valid Power of Attorney (POA) under Rule 106 to the Government Advocate for all future appearances before the Board of Revenue. (vii) Issue a writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order, or direction, quashing the Impugned Order dated 18.09.2025 passed by by the the Bo Board of Revenue, Bilaspur (ANNEXURE P/10), on the ground that the proceedings were conducted and orders were passed by Members of the Board of Revenue who illegally and without any statutory authority used the Seal of the Chairman, thereby rendering the entire proceedings void ab initio; (viii) Declare that all interlocutory orders passed by Member Reeta Shandilya on 15.03.2023, 06.04.2023, 08.06.2023, 20.07.2023, 08.02.2024, 16.11.2023, 16.08.2023, 02.05.2024, 03.07.2024, and 18.09.2024, and by Member Topeshwar Verma on 4 02.01.2025 and 02.04.2025, using the Seal of the Chairman, Board of Revenue, are without jurisdiction, illegal, void ab initio, and have zero legal value; (ix) Declare that the use of the Seal of the Chairman by a Member of the Board of Revenue, who is not the duly appointed Chairman, constitutes a usurpation of judicial power and a fundamental jurisdictional error, and that any proceedings conducted or orders passed under the said seal are ultra vires the statutory provisions governing the Board of Revenue; (x) Declare that the doctrine of merger cannot and does not operate to cure the fundamental jurisdictional defect arising from the misuse of the Chairman's seal, and that the final order dated 18.09.2025, being the culmination of tainted proceedings, is equally void and cannot be sustained in law; (xi) Issue a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order, or direction, commanding the Respondents to produce before this Hon'ble Court the valid authorization, notification, or order of appointment empowering Member Reeta Shandilya and Member Topeshwar Verma to use the Seal of the Chairman, Board of Revenue, during the periods when they were functioning merely as Members; (xii) Issue a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order, or direction, commanding the 5 Respondents to strictly comply with the statutory provisions governing the constitution and composition of the Board of Revenue, and to ensure that the Seal of the Chairman is used only by the duly appointed Chairman or by an officer expressly authorized in writing by the competent authority under the relevant statutory provisions; (xiii) Declare that the actions of the Respondents in misusing the Seal of the Chairman constitute a gross abuse of process, a violation of the principles of natural justice, and a systemic maladministration that undermines the rule of law and erodes public confidence in the judicial system; (xiv) Issue any other writ, order, or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, including but not limited to: (a) Directing the Board of Revenue to re-hear the matter from the stage of admission before a properly constituted Board in accordance with law; (b) Directing the Respondents to place on record a complete list of all cases where the Seal of the Chairman was used by unauthorized Members; (c) Directing the Respondent authorities to take appropriate corrective and disciplinary action against the officers who have been found to have misused the Seal of the Chairman; 6 (d) Granting costs of the present proceedings to the Petitioner; and (xv) Pass such other and further relief(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem just, proper, and equitable in the circumstances of the case.” 2. At the outset, learned counsel appearing for the parties submit that the issue concerning the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court to entertain proceedings and grant an injunction in respect of a residential property has already been considered by this Court in Neeraj Jain and another Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, WPC No.2476 of 2022, decided on 07.09.2026. Learned counsel refer to paragraphs 11 to 15 of the said order and submit that the controversy, to the extent it relates to the jurisdiction of the Tehsildar to entertain the proceedings and pass the order dated 20.06.2022, stands covered by the aforesaid decision. 3. Paragraphs 11 to 15 of the said order read as under:- “11. It is trite law that Revenue Courts lack jurisdiction to entertain any application or to initiate proceedings or to grant interim injunctions with respect to a house constructed over a residential land. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and again held that the jurisdiction of Revenue Courts is confined to agricultural or revenue assessed land and does not extend to residential land over which constructions have been erected. Once the property in dispute includes a permanent structure or built up area, the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court is ousted. 7 The Civil Court alone possesses exclusive jurisdiction to determine title under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act as well as to grant temporary and permanent injunctions under Sections 37 and 39 of the said Act read with Order 39 Rule 1& 2 of the CPC. A Coordinate Bench of this Court has affirmed this view in WP227 No.800/2015 (decided on 19.07.2018), relying upon the principle laid down in Maya Lalchandani (Mrs) and others Vs. Board of Revenue and others reported in (2009) 3 MPLJ 660. In light of this settled legal position, the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners that the Tahsildar has acted in excess of jurisdiction are well founded and the contention raised by respondent No.4 is not in accordance with law. 12. This Court in Seraj Ahmad Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & others 2017 (4) C.G.L.J. 559 has held that the order to grant injunction is surely vested in the jurisdictional Civil Court and the Revenue Courts cannot grant the order of injunction and it was held that the revenue order granting temporary injunction restraining the transfer would be without jurisdiction and without authority of law. The said judgment was based on Maya Lalchandani (supra). Relevant part of 8 the decision is reproduced herein below: "2 Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) has passed order on 10.03.2016 granting temporary injunction for which he has no jurisdiction, therefore, the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) is without jurisdiction and without authority of law. He relies upon a decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Maya Lalchandani (Mrs.) and others Vs. Board of Revenue and others in which the M.P. High Court has held as under:- 4. After going through the order passed by the learned President, Board of Revenue and taking into consideration the legal provisions, we are of the opinion that the directions issued in paragraph 7 of the order passed by the Board of Revenue cannot be allowed to stand. Section 32 of the Land Revenue Code talks of the inherent powers of the Revenue Authorities while Section 43 talks of applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is to be seen from Section 32 that nothing in the Land Revenue Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Revenue Court to make such orders as may be necessary to meet the ends. of justice or as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of Court. Section 43 simply provides that unless otherwise expressly provided in the Code, the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure shall, so far as may be, followed in all proceedings under the Code. Section 43 in no case would authorise a Revenue Authority to grant an injunction. Section 43 simply provides that the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure so far as may be followed in all proceedings under the Code. It is also to be 9 seen from the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure that an injunction can be granted only by civil Court and by none else. Section 32 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code only talks of the inherent powers of the Revenue Courts where they are required to make such order as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. The powers under Section 32 can be exercised within the Code itself and not beyond the Code. If the Revenue Authority does not have the power to grant injunction then the Board of Revenue also could not grant injunction. 3. The order to grant injunction is surely vested in the jurisdictional civil court, revenue courts cannot grant order of injunction. Therefore, the order passed by the revenue authority granting temporary injunction restraining transfer following the principle of law laid down in Maya Lalchandani (Supra) is without jurisdiction and without authority of law. It is accordingly set aside. However, the Sub-Divisional officer (Revenue) is directed to take decision on merits after hearing the parties in accordance with law, expeditiously, within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 13. The aforementioned decision was referred with approval in the case of Vandana Gupta & Ors. Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. in WPC No. 235/2020 and has observed thus:- "9. Considering the nature of stay order, certainly it would show that the Tahsildar has exceeded its jurisdiction which is vested under the Land Revenue Code and therefore, the order of the nature would be without jurisdiction and without authority of law. Since the order is without 10 jurisdiction, as such, the petitioner even if has not availed the remedy of appeal, this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can look into such issue when jurisdictional issue is involved in view of the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1 wherein, it has been held as under: 14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo quarranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for "any other purpose". 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its. jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case law 11 on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field. 16. Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board Kairana AIR 1950 SC 163 laid down that existence of an adequate legal remedy was a factor to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs. This was followed by another Rashid case, namely, K.S. Rashid & Son V. Income Tax Investigation Commission AIR 1954 SC 207 which reiterated the above proposition and held that where alternative remedy existed, it 16. would be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse or to interfere in a petition under Article 226. This proposition was, however qualified by the significant words. "unless there are good grounds therefor", which indicated that alternative remedy would not operate as an absolute bar and that writ petition under Article 226 could still be entertained in exceptional cases. 14. Coming to the facts of the present case, in light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments and further in light of the findings recorded by the competent Civil Court in Civil Suit No.27-A/2009 (judgment dated 26.4.2016 passed by the Second Civil Judge Class-I, Mahasamund (CG)) filed by respondent No.4 (plaintiff therein), wherein the prayer for permanent injunction was refused and the finding under issue No.6 establishing the existence of a 12 permanent structure on the suit land attained finality, this Court is of the firm view that the Tehsildar possessed no power or jurisdiction to entertain an application for injunction in any manner whatsoever. Such disputes fall exclusively within the domain of the Civil Court and are non-amenable to the jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts. 15. As a result, the Petition is Allowed. The entire subject proceedings pending before the concerned Tehsildar together with the impugned interim order dated 25.4.2022, are hereby quashed. ” 4. Having considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material available on record, this Court finds that the controversy involved in the present petition, insofar as it relates to the jurisdiction of the Tehsildar to entertain the proceedings and pass the order dated 20.06.2022, is squarely covered by the judgment dated 07.09.2026 passed by this Court in Neeraj Jain and another Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, WPC No.2476 of 2022. 5. The ratio laid down therein is that where the dispute relates to a residential property having a permanent structure thereon and the relief sought before the Revenue Authority is, in substance, one of injunction or restraint, the Revenue Court cannot assume the jurisdiction vested in the competent Civil Court. 13 6. In the present case also, the challenge to the order dated 20.06.2022 proceeds on the ground that the Tehsildar lacked jurisdiction to pass such order. The petitioners have specifically challenged the jurisdiction of the Tehsildar as well as the consequential order passed by the Board of Revenue dated 18.09.2025. 7. Once the foundational proceedings before the Tehsildar are held to be without jurisdiction, the consequential order passed by the Board of Revenue, insofar as it sustains or proceeds upon such proceedings, cannot be permitted to stand. 8. In view of the aforesaid legal position and having regard to the judgment rendered by this Court in Neeraj Jain (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the order dated 20.06.2022 passed by the Tehsildar, Bilaspur, as well as the proceedings culminating in the said order, cannot be sustained in law. 9. Consequently, the impugned order dated 18.09.2025 passed by the Board of Revenue, Bilaspur, which arises out of the aforesaid proceedings, also cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. 10.The proceedings initiated before the Tehsildar, Bilaspur, culminating in the order dated 20.06.2022, are hereby quashed and set aside. 11.Consequently, the impugned order dated 18.09.2025 passed by the Board of Revenue, Bilaspur, is also quashed and set aside. 12. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the respective claims of the parties regarding title, ownership or possession over the subject property. The parties shall be at liberty 14 to avail such remedy as may be available to them in law before the competent forum. 13. In view of the aforesaid, the other reliefs claimed by the petitioners, including the reliefs concerning the alleged use of the Seal of the Chairman, constitution/authorization of the Board and consequential disciplinary or administrative directions, do not require separate adjudication in the present proceedings. 14. The writ petition stands allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms. 15. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Ruchi