24.08.2026 Court No.655 DL/Item No.–16 [Milan] CRA 222 of 1998 THE CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION VS SUJIT KUMAR KAR Mr. Kusal Kumar Mukherjee, ….for the Appellant Mr. Sujit Kumar Kar (VC) ….for the Respondent Ms. Minoti Gomes, Ms. Subhra De ….for the Respondent Nos.1 & 2 1. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation is present. The learned Advocate representing the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is also present. 2. The instant appeal has been preferred by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation assailing the judgment and order of acquittal dated 30.07.1997 passed by the learned Senior Municipal Magistrate, Calcutta Metropolitan Magistrate and Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Calcutta, in connection with Case No. 7-D of 1991, whereby the accused person was acquitted of the charge punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, read with Section 7 of the said Act. 3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order of acquittal, the Corporation preferred the present appeal. At the very outset, however, it has been fairly submitted by the learned Advocates appearing for both sides that the appeal suffers from delay in its institution. 2 4. It appears from the record that, despite the statutory period of limitation, leave to prefer the appeal under Section 378(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was granted by a Co- ordinate Bench of this Court by order dated 24.07.1998. The grant of such leave, however, cannot, by itself, be construed as an order condoning the delay in preferring the appeal. The question of limitation, and the justification for any delay beyond the prescribed period, remains a separate matter requiring consideration in accordance with law. 5. The learned Advocates appearing for the parties have candidly submitted that there is no explanation forthcoming from the appellant-Corporation regarding the delay in preferring the present appeal. It is further submitted that neither the memorandum of appeal contains any satisfactory explanation accounting for the delay nor has the appellant filed any separate application under the applicable provisions of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of such delay. 6. Upon perusal of the materials available on record, it appears that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal was passed on 30.07.1997. The leave to prefer an appeal under Section 378(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was thereafter granted by the Co-ordinate Bench on 24.07.1998. Thus, the chronology of events itself demonstrates that the appeal was not presented within the prescribed period of limitation. 7. It is true that the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant has referred to a departmental report and submitted that, according to the Department, the appeal was filed within 3 the stipulated period. However, such a submission cannot override the undisputed dates appearing from the judicial record. The question of limitation has to be determined on the basis of the date of the impugned judgment, the period prescribed by law and the date on which the appeal was actually instituted. A departmental report, in the absence of supporting material demonstrating the filing of the appeal within the prescribed period, cannot cure or explain the delay apparent from the record. 8. More importantly, the appellant is a statutory Corporation and is expected to maintain its records and take appropriate steps within the period prescribed by law. When a criminal appeal against an order of acquittal is instituted beyond the prescribed period, the appellant cannot claim an automatic right to have the appeal entertained merely because leave to appeal under Section 378(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has subsequently been granted. The procedural requirement concerning limitation remains independent and must be duly complied with. 9. The order granting leave dated 24.07.1998, therefore, does not dispense with the requirement of explaining the delay in filing the appeal. In the absence of any application for condonation of delay and, more importantly, in the absence of any factual explanation constituting sufficient cause, this Court cannot overlook the period of limitation merely on equitable considerations. 10. Having regard to the materials on record and the submissions advanced by the learned Advocates for the parties, I am 4 satisfied that the present appeal has been preferred beyond the prescribed period of limitation and that the appellant has failed to furnish any satisfactory or legally acceptable explanation for such delay. No ground has been made out which would justify condonation of the delay or exercise of discretion in favour of the appellant. 11. In such circumstances, the question of entering into the merits of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal does not arise. The appeal, being barred by limitation and there being no application or sufficient cause shown for condoning the delay, cannot be entertained. 12. Accordingly, the instant appeal is hereby dismissed on the ground of delay and limitation. 13. Consequently, any application, if pending, filed in connection with the present appeal is also dismissed. 14. Let a photocopy of this order, along with the Lower Court Records, if received, be sent down to the learned Trial Court forthwith. 15. The parties are at liberty to obtain urgent photostat certified copies of this order, if applied for, upon compliance with all requisite formalities. (Prasenjit Biswas, J.)