1 CGHC010328752019 2026:CGHC:40517 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 670 of 2019 State of Chhattisgarh Through Its Station House Officer, Police Station Mangchuwa, District- Balod, Chhattisgarh., District : Balod, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus Khomanlal Dhankar S/o Kamta Prasad Dhankar Aged About 20 Years R/o Village Bhardakala, Police Station Arjunda, District- Balod, Chhattisgarh., District : Balod, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Rishi Raj Pithwa, Deputy Government Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Avinash Chand Sahu, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Judgment on Board 16/09/2026 1. Present is an acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/State against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 04.02.2019 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, In-charge, F.T.C., Balod, District Balod (C.G.) in Sessions Case No. 106/2017, whereby the respondent/accused has been acquitted of the offence under Section 354-D of the IPC and Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2026.09.17 18:37:31 +0530 2 Section 11(iv)/12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 28.09.2017, the victim PW-1 lodged a written complaint Ex.P/1 before the police against the respondent/accused with the allegation that the accused was regularly teasing her through mobile phone, which she informed to her father, and thereafter, the accused was cautioned by him. On 27.09.2017, when she was returning from her school at about 04:00 PM along with her friends, on the way, the accused came from behind, followed her and showed his intimacy. She informed about the incident to her uncle, who, in turn, informed her father, and thereafter, she lodged the report. The FIR Ex.P/2 was registered against the appellant for the offence under Section 354-D of the IPC and Sections 11(iv)/12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). Spot map Ex.P/3 was prepared by the police and Ex.P/4 was prepared by the Patwari. Statement of the victim under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded. With respect to the age and date of birth of the victim, the police seized the school records Ex.P/9 and Ex.P/10-C vide seizure memo Ex.P/7, and after retaining their attested true copies, the original register was returned to the school. The accused was arrested on 28.09.2017 and his motorcycle was seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/11. Statements of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. were recorded and, after completion of the usual investigation, charge- sheet was filed against the appellant before the learned trial Court for the offence under Section 354-D of the IPC and Sections 11(iv)/12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). 3 3. The learned trial Court framed charges against the accused for the offences under Section 354(D) of the IPC and Sections 11(iv)/12 of the POCSO Act. The accused denied the charges and claimed trial. 4. In order to prove the charge against the accused, the prosecution has examined as many as 7 witnesses. The statement of the accused/respondent under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. has also been recorded, in which he denied the circumstances appearing against him, pleaded innocence, and submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence. He further submitted that on the date of the incident, he had gone to his sister’s house and, while returning, he was seen by the father of the victim, who, on suspicion, took him to the police station after assaulting him and lodged a false report. 5. After appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondent/accused from the alleged offences. Hence, this acquittal appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has duly proved the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but for minor omissions or contradictions, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is reliable and sufficient to hold the respondent/accused guilty of the alleged offences. The victim PW-1 has duly supported the prosecution’s case that the respondent/accused was stalking her. The evidence of the victim has been duly supported by her friends PW-2 and PW-3; however, the minor omissions or contradictions have been considered by the learned trial Court while acquitting the respondent/accused. The victim was a minor and her age has also been proved by the Headmistress of the school, PW-6, and 4 the documents Ex.P/9 and Ex.P/10-C, which are the school records. There is no reason for the false implication of the accused, therefore, the impugned order suffers from material irregularity and perversity, which is liable to be set aside, and the respondent/accused is liable to be convicted for the alleged offences. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/accused supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the victim herself admitted that she was on talking terms with the accused and that there was no assault or force used by him against the victim. It is only a suspicion that the accused was stalking her. Even the evidence of PW- 2 and PW-3 did not support the prosecution’s case. If the accused had stalked the victim or used any force against her, she would have immediately resisted the action of the accused, but as per the evidence of her friends, PW-2 and PW-3, she did nothing. The consideration and judgment of the learned trial Court is one of the plausible views taken under the facts and circumstances of the case, and under the jurisdiction of an acquittal appeal, the plausible view taken by the learned trial Court cannot be set aside even if another view is possible. Therefore, the acquittal appeal filed by the State has no merit and is liable to be dismissed. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court. 9. From perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court, it transpires that the evidence of the victim PW-1 and other witnesses has been duly considered by it while acquitting the respondent/accused. The discrepancies in the evidence of the victim as well as other witnesses have been considered, and further, it has been 5 noticed that her father had seen the accused near the drainage, whereas the accused and his father were found at the police station when she had gone there for lodging the report. There is substantial discrepancy regarding the place of incident. The conduct of the victim has also been considered by the learned trial Court. 10. When this Court examines the evidence of the victim PW-1, it transpires that the victim was well acquainted with the respondent/accused. Though she stated in her evidence that the accused was stalking her when she was returning from school and that, on the date of the incident also, the accused stalked her and showed his intimacy, but in her examination-in-chief itself, she stated that she had a mobile phone at her house and that the accused made a telephonic call to her on the mobile phone and proposed to her, which was conveyed by her family members to him. In cross-examination, she admitted that when she had gone to her maternal grandmother’s house, she was introduced to the accused and she also made a telephonic call to him. She voluntarily stated that she made a telephonic call to him at his instance. She herself informed her father about it and thereafter, her father cautioned him. She further admitted that when she had seen the accused in the school ground, she had not made any complaint to anyone. She also had not made any complaint to any person whom she met on the way. She also admitted that after the meeting, her father warned him that if he again met his daughter, he would lodge a police report, and she further admitted that after that meeting, the accused had not met her. She further admitted that at the time when she had gone to the police station for lodging the report, the accused was present in the police station and her father was also there 6 in the police station. On the date when she lodged the report, there was a holiday in the school. Though she denied the suggestion that she had made the complaint under the pressure of her family members and parents, the entire circumstances which she admitted in her cross- examination reveal that the parents of the victim as well as her uncle had taken an active role in lodging the report against the accused. 11. PW-2, who is the friend of the victim, has stated in her evidence that when she and the victim were returning from school, near the drainage, the accused came on his motorcycle and asked the victim why she had not called him. The victim did not reply, and after some distance, she told the accused that she was calling her uncle, and thereafter, the accused went away. She admitted in her cross-examination that when they were returning, she was ahead of the victim, but the victim had not asked her to stop. She admitted that she did not know who was following her. 12. PW-3 is another friend of the victim. She too has stated that on the way, the accused came on a motorcycle and asked the victim why she had not made a phone call to him. When the victim told him that she was calling her uncle, the accused went away. She too has stated that the victim had not asked them to stop and that other students were also present on the way. 13. Considering these evidences, the learned trial Court has observed that the evidence led by the prosecution is not sufficient to hold the respondent/accused guilty of stalking the victim, as sufficient suspicious circumstances have surfaced from the evidence of the victim as well as her friends. By giving the benefit of doubt, the learned trial Court acquitted the respondent/accused from the alleged offences. 7 The consideration of the learned trial Court is one of the plausible views taken by it while acquitting the respondent/accused. 14. Applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram" reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 984, has held as follows:- "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all." 15. Further, in case of “Jafarudheen and Others Vs. State of Kerala”, reported in 2022 (8) SCC 440, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal in judgement at para 25, which reads as under :- “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.P.C., the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court’s view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that ensures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 16. After considering the material available on record as well as the well- reasoned judgment passed by the learned trial Court and being very much conscious of the existing legal position as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kistoora Ram (Supra) and 8 Jafarudheen (Supra), that in an appeal against acquittal, if the view taken by the trial Court is a possible and plausible view on the basis of the evidence available on record, the Appellate Court should be slow in interfering with the order of acquittal and the same cannot be reversed merely because another view is possible. In the present case, the learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, has rightly found that the prosecution has failed to establish by cogent and clinching evidence that the respondent/accused had driven the motorcycle in a rash and negligent manner so as to cause the alleged accident. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based upon proper appreciation of the evidence and constitute a plausible view. I, therefore, of the considered opinion that the judgment passed by learned trial Court is just and proper and does not call for any interference. 17. For the foregoing reasons, the acquittal appeal is devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Alok