1 CGHC010352042026 2026:CGHC:39794 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 4638 of 2026 1 - Shamshad Hussain S/o Irshad Hussain, Aged About 37 Years R/o Shanti Nagar, Champa, Tahsil Champa Distt. Janjgir - Champa (C.G.) Presently R/o Ward No. 07, Laxmi Bai Nagar, Surabahar, Katghora, Distt. Korba (C.G.) 2 - Gulshan Bano Memon, W/o Mohd. Hanif Parekh, Aged About 32 Years R/o Near Kankalin Temple, Jamnipali, Korba Distt. Korba (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Transport, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, New Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Regional Transport Authority, 3rd Floor, Indravati Bhawan, Nava Raipur, Mantralaya, Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Devendra Sharma, S/o B. R. Sharma, Bus Operator, R/o Village Khadgava, Koria Distt. Koria (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Bharat Lal Dembra, Advocate. For Respondent(s)/State : Mr. Shreyansh Mehta, Panel Lawyer. RAGHVENDRA JAT Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT 2 Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 11/09/2026 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:- “10.1 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ or direction, calling for the records from the concerned authorities for its kind perusal. 10.2 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ or direction, quashing/set-aside the order dated 24.02.2025 in revision no. 06/2024 by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal Raipur and order dated 11.08.2023 passed by the RTA be restored. 10.3. That, the Hon'ble Court may further be pleased to stay the effect and operation of impugned order dated 24.02.2025 and petitioner no.2 may be allowed to operate vehicle as per permit no. CG20203-SC-267A from Pandopara to Korba till disposal of the petition. 10.4 Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deems fit and proper looking to the facts and circumstances of the case may also be awarded to the petitioner including the cost and expenses of this petition. An affidavit in support of this petition is filed herewith.” 3 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that petitioner No. 1 is a bus operator who has been plying his vehicle on the strength of a permit duly granted by the competent authorities. It is submitted that petitioner No. 1 had submitted an application dated 20.01.2023 for grant of a permanent stage carriage permit on the route from Patna to Jamnipali via Baikunthpur, Bachrapodi, Sirmina, Korbi, Chhotia, Katghora, Chhruri and back, with one return trip daily. After considering the objections raised and all other relevant aspects of the matter, the Regional Transport Authority (RTA), vide order dated 11.08.2023, granted the permanent stage carriage permit in favour of petitioner No. 1, pursuant to which the permit was duly issued. Learned counsel further submits that respondent No. 3, being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, preferred a revision petition before the learned State Transport Appellate Tribunal (STAT), Raipur, which, vide the impugned order dated 24.02.2025, allowed the revision petition and set aside the order passed by the RTA, primarily on the ground that petitioner No. 1 had remained ex parte in the proceedings and that the application submitted by him was incomplete. It is submitted that the learned STAT, particularly in paragraph 10 of the impugned order, has proceeded on the premise that the application submitted by petitioner No. 1 was incomplete and, on that basis, has held the order passed by the RTA to be unsustainable in law. Learned counsel submits that the learned STAT has committed a manifest error of law in passing 4 such a cryptic and non-speaking order, without properly appreciating the material available on record and the settled principles governing the grant of permits. It is further submitted that merely because an application is alleged to be defective or incomplete, the permit already granted by the competent authority cannot, as a matter of course, be quashed, particularly when the requisite documents had been furnished and the matter had been duly considered by the RTA. In this regard, learned counsel places reliance upon the judgment of this Court in M/s Rainbow Travels v. RTA & Others, passed in W.A. No. 260/2026, wherein it has been held that a permit cannot be denied merely on the ground of a defective application. Learned counsel further submits that petitioner No. 1 subsequently transferred the aforesaid permit in favour of petitioner No. 2, and, therefore, petitioner No. 2 has been impleaded as a party to the present petition. It is submitted that petitioner No. 2 has been continuously plying the vehicle pursuant to the permit transferred in her favour for the last about two years and, despite the impugned order having been passed by the STAT, neither petitioner received any notice regarding the said order nor any notice directing surrender of the permit. Learned counsel submits that petitioner No. 1 had remained ex parte before the STAT and, therefore, had no knowledge of the passing of the impugned order. Subsequently, petitioner No. 1 transferred the permit in favour of petitioner No. 2, and the petitioners thereafter submitted applications for extension of the route, which were duly 5 published and considered by the competent authority; however, no information regarding the passing of the impugned order was ever communicated to them. It is submitted that the petitioners came to know about the impugned order only on 31.08.2026, and hence the present petition has been filed without any deliberate or intentional delay. Learned counsel further submits that the order passed by the RTA was based upon proper consideration of the relevant facts and documents, as the petitioner had submitted all requisite documents, and only a partial stretch of approximately 10–15 kilometres of the route is common with that of respondent No. 3. It is further submitted that there is sufficient time gap between the services operated by the petitioners and respondent No. 3, and the same was duly considered and approved by the RTA while granting the permit. Learned counsel submits that, since no frequency of operation on the concerned routes has been formally formulated in the State of Chhattisgarh, the alleged difference in timing or frequency cannot, by itself, be treated as creating a conflict or clash between the services of the petitioners and respondent No. 3, particularly when sufficient time gap has already been approved by the competent authority. It is further submitted that the RTA has, on two occasions, allowed the applications submitted by the petitioners for extension of the route, which clearly demonstrates that the permit and subsequent route extensions were being acted upon by the competent authority; nevertheless, the petitioners were never informed about the order 6 passed by the STAT. Learned counsel further submits that, considering the fact that petitioner No. 2 has been operating the vehicle under the transferred permit for nearly two years and that the permit has been acted upon by the competent authorities, the same ought not to have been set aside merely on the ground of an alleged defect or incompleteness in the original application. It is also submitted that respondent No. 3 has only a limited common portion of approximately 10–15 kilometres with the route of the petitioners and, therefore, setting aside the entire permit granted in favour of the petitioners, on such a limited ground, is wholly disproportionate and legally unsustainable. Learned counsel lastly submits that the impugned order passed by the learned STAT suffers from material illegality, non-application of mind and failure to consider the relevant facts and settled principles of law, and that the Tribunal has exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction by passing a cryptic and non-speaking order. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned order dated 24.02.2025 deserves to be quashed and set aside and the permit granted in favour of petitioner No. 1 and subsequently transferred in favour of petitioner No. 2 deserves to be restored, particularly keeping in view the fact that the petitioners have been operating the vehicle pursuant thereto and also considering the larger public interest involved in the matter. 3. On the other hand, learned State Counsel appearing for respondents No.1 and 2 vehemently opposes the writ petition and 7 submits that the impugned order passed by the learned STAT does not suffer from any illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that the entire process for grant of permit was undertaken strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Chhattisgarh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994. The application submitted by respondent No.3 was duly received by the Regional Transport Authority, published in the prescribed manner, objections were invited from all interested persons and existing operators, and adequate opportunity of hearing was afforded to all stakeholders before any decision was taken. Therefore, the petitioner cannot contend that there has been any violation of the principles of natural justice or any procedural irregularity in the decision-making process. 4. Learned State Counsel further submits that the Regional Transport Authority, while considering the application for grant of stage carriage permit, had specifically examined the proposed route and timings in light of Rule 70-B of the Chhattisgarh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994. The objections raised by the petitioner and other operators with regard to the alleged clash of timings were also considered. Upon such consideration, the proposed timings were suitably modified so as to ensure compliance with the minimum interlude requirements prescribed under Rule 70-B(4). It is contended that the statutory provisions do not prohibit grant of 8 permit merely because a portion of the route overlaps with that of an existing operator. What is required is avoidance of impermissible timing conflicts and safeguarding public convenience, both of which were duly taken into account by the competent authority while granting the permit in favour of respondent No.3. 5. It is next submitted that the principal challenge raised by the petitioner pertains to the power of the learned STAT to remand the matter for fresh consideration. According to learned State Counsel, the contention is wholly misconceived. Referring to Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it is argued that the revisional authority has been conferred wide powers to pass such orders as it may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of a given case. Such powers necessarily include the authority to set aside an order and remit the matter to the original authority for fresh consideration whenever the revisional authority finds that certain aspects require reconsideration or that adequate opportunity has not been afforded to the parties. Therefore, the direction issued by the learned STAT remitting the matter to the Regional Transport Authority for a fresh decision after granting due opportunity to all concerned parties cannot be said to be beyond jurisdiction. 6. Learned State Counsel also submits that the learned STAT, after examining the record, found that except for objections relating to the proposed timings, no substantial objection had been raised 9 before the Regional Transport Authority. The Tribunal further found that the issue concerning the alleged deficiencies in the application required proper examination by the competent authority. In such circumstances, instead of finally adjudicating the matter on disputed factual aspects, the Tribunal adopted the course of remand so that the Regional Transport Authority could reconsider the matter comprehensively after hearing all concerned parties. Such an order, it is submitted, advances the cause of justice and ensures a fair adjudicatory process rather than causing prejudice to any party. 7. Lastly, learned State Counsel submits that both the Regional Transport Authority as well as the State Transport Appellate Tribunal are statutory authorities discharging quasi-judicial functions under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The findings recorded by such authorities are based on appreciation of factual aspects relating to route feasibility, public convenience, transport requirements and timing regulations. In the absence of any manifest arbitrariness, patent illegality or jurisdictional error, this Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, ought not to substitute its own view for that of the competent statutory authorities. It is therefore submitted that the impugned order has been passed in accordance with the statutory scheme governing grant of stage carriage permits and does not warrant interference. The writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 10 8. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment rendered by the Co- ordinate Bench of this Court in Harikrishna Ogare v. Regional Transport Authority (WPC No.4138/2025 decided on 27.01.2026) as well as the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in M/s Rainbow Travels v. Regional Transport Authority (WA No.260/2026 decided on 01.04.2026) to buttress his submissions. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed with the writ petition. 10. Before proceeding to examine the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, it would be apposite to refer to the relevant statutory provisions governing the controversy. 11. Section 72 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which deals with grant of stage carriage permits, empowers the Regional Transport Authority to grant a stage carriage permit subject to such conditions as may be specified therein. The provision contemplates consideration of an application made in accordance with law and authorizes the permit granting authority to impose conditions while granting such permit. 12. Section 80(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides as under:- “80. Procedure in applying for and granting permits.(1)*** (2) A Regional Transport Authority, State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority 11 referred to in sub-section (1) shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made at any time under this Act.” 13. Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which confers revisional jurisdiction upon the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, reads thus:- “90. Revision.-The State Transport Appellate Tribunal may, on an application made to it, call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority against which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the order made by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit and every such order shall be final.” 14. Equally relevant is Rule 70-B of the Chhattisgarh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994, which regulates determination of timings of stage carriage permits. Rule 70-B(1) provides that while considering and determining the time-cycle on any route in relation to grant of a new stage carriage permit or change of timings of an existing permit, the permit granting authority shall pay special attention to, inter alia, the following factors: (a) Benefit and convenience of the travelling public; (b) Interlude between timings and timing clashes with operators on overlapping routes; (c) Nature and distance of 12 service proposed; (d) Necessity of the proposed timings for the travelling public, particularly in remote and backward areas; (e) Coordination between road and rail transport and connectivity with tourist, religious and industrial centres; (f) Guidelines issued by superior Courts or authorities; and (g) Objections raised by existing operators and suggestions from the public. 15. Rule 70-B(4) prescribes the minimum permissible interlude between timings of stage carriages on overlapping routes. The Rule stipulates that the permit granting authority shall fix common stoppages and halting times on routes which overlap partly or wholly. The prescribed minimum time-gap is as follows: Place Ordinary Service Express/Deluxe Service District Headquarters 10 Minutes 5 Minutes Tehsil Headquarters 5 Minutes 3 Minutes Other Towns (Population below 10,000) 3 Minutes 2 Minutes Villages 1 Minute Nil 16. Rule 70-B(5) further prescribes the procedure for determination of timings and mandates publication of the summary of the application and invitation of objections. 17. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions would indicate that while the Motor Vehicles Act adopts a liberal approach towards 13 grant of permits, the same is nevertheless required to be undertaken against the statutory procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules. The permit granting authority is obligated to consider the application as presented before it, invite objections, examine the issue of timing conflicts and overlapping routes, and thereafter take a decision on the basis of the material available on record. 18. Once a statutory authority records a finding that an application is incomplete and suffers from defects going to its very maintainability, the rights of the parties are required to be adjudged on the basis of the application as it existed on the date of consideration. Permitting an applicant to subsequently cure deficiencies after the matter has already undergone adjudication would amount to allowing such applicant to improve upon his case and fill up lacunae which existed on the relevant date. Such a course not only militates against the principles of fairness and transparency governing the grant of permits but also causes prejudice to competing operators who had raised objections with reference to the application in its original form. The legality of an application has necessarily to be tested on the basis of the material available when the competent authority undertakes consideration thereof and not on the basis of material which may subsequently be brought on record. 14 19. This Court is also of the opinion that the learned Tribunal has not rendered any conclusive finding on various issues specifically raised before it by the petitioner, including the effect of the alleged deficiencies in the application, the legal consequences flowing therefrom, and the objections relating to overlapping routes and timing conflicts. Instead of adjudicating the issues arising in the revision petition on their own merits, the Tribunal has chosen to remit the matter to the Regional Transport Authority after permitting rectification of defects. Such a course has resulted in failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in the Tribunal in accordance with law. 20. Accordingly, and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the writ petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 24.02.2025 passed by the learned State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Chhattisgarh, Raipur in Revision Case No. 06/2024 is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded to the learned State Transport Appellate Tribunal for fresh adjudication of the revision petition on its own merits. 21. It is directed that the learned Tribunal shall reconsider and decide the revision petition afresh strictly in accordance with law and on the basis of the material which was available before the Regional Transport Authority at the time of consideration of the application. The Tribunal shall independently examine all contentions raised by the parties, including the legal effect of the alleged incompleteness 15 of the application, the objections relating to overlapping routes and timings, and all other issues arising from the record, without being influenced by any observation contained in the earlier order. It is further clarified that respondent No.3 shall not be permitted to supplement, improve, rectify or fill up any alleged deficiency in the original application for the purpose of adjudication of the revision proceedings, and the matter shall be decided on the basis of the record as it stood on the relevant date of consideration by the Regional Transport Authority. 22. Since this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival claims of the parties, all questions of fact and law are left open to be urged before and decided by the learned Tribunal. The learned State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall make an endeavour to decide the revision petition expeditiously, preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Sd/-/- - (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Raghu Jat