24.08.2026 AD 29 Court No.12 (gc) MAT 1986 of 2025 CAN 1 of 2025 CAN 2 of 2025 Principal Secretary, Department of Urban Development and Municipal Affairs & Ors. Vs. Ananta Maji & Ors. Mr. D.N. Ray, Ld. G.P., Mr. Guddu Singh …for the Appellants. Re: CAN 1 of 2025 1. The appeal arises out of an order dated September 15, 2020 passed in WP 15434(W) of 2015 along with CPAN 1054 of 2016. The appeal is delayed by 1328 days. The other defects have been cured. 2. This is an application for condonation of delay of 1328 days in preferring the appeal. It is submitted that the appeal was filed on November 17, 2025 after obtaining the records from the office of the erstwhile learned Advocate for the State respondents who had suddenly expired. On such ground, the delay has been sought to be explained. 3. The learned Advocate for the appellants submits that the order was passed during the Covid Pandemic, i.e., on September 15, 2020. Thus, benefit of the order of the Hon’ble Apex Court with regard to the computation of limitation should be 2 available to the appellants. The appeal was filed on November 17, 2025, that is, three years eight months after the period of limitation started to run. The benefit of the said order was given to the appellants. The Stamp Reporter filed the report. It indicates that the appeal was delayed by 1328 days and should have been filed on March 30, 2022 i.e, within 30 days from March 1, 2022. 4. Coming to the explanations for the delay, it is averred that the certified copy of the impugned judgment and order was obtained on April 13, 2021. All relevant documents along with the certified copy of the judgment and order were communicated by e- mail dated May 25, 2021 to the then learned State Advocate, for taking necessary action. The Urban Development department on June 1, 2021 forwarded the e-file and the proposal for the engagement of a learned State Advocate. Thereafter, on June 7, 2021, the learned Legal Remembrancer engaged the erstwhile learned Government Pleader (since deceased) along with learned Advocate, Mr. Sayan Sinha to prepare appeal papers and defend the State in the appeal. As the learned Government Pleader expired the appeal had not been filed. Unfortunately, such explanations do not appear to be convincing. 3 Equally unconvincing is the plea that the first certified copy was lost. 5. Learned erstwhile Government Pleader expired sometime in October 2022 and this date has been omitted from the application. The period between June 2021 to October 2022, has not been explained. For the period between October 2022 to November 2025 also, there is no explanation. In paragraph 10 of the application it has been casually mentioned that the appellants again started their journey to set the legal process in motion in the year 2024. Disruption during the Covid Pandemic, has been set up as a plea. 6. We observe that, all disruptions during Covid Pandemic ended by February, 2022 and normalcy was restored in courts. 7. The averments in Paragraphs 8 to 11 of the connected application are inconsistent and there are material contradictions. From the averments in paragraph 12, it appears that only upon receipt of an application under the Contempt of Courts Act, another set of learned Advocates were engaged to file an appeal and the e-file was sent to the office of the learned Legal Remembrancer on September 25, 2025. Ultimately, on October 13, 2025, the erstwhile learned Additional Advocate General and a junior along with him, were engaged to prefer the 4 appeal. The appeal was then filed on November 17, 2025. 8. Upon harmoniously reading the relevant paragraphs of the application for condonation of delay, we find huge gaps in the unexplained periods and timelines. The delay extends to a couple of years. We do not find that the appellants were prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal. 9. We refer to the following decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Delay cannot be condoned as a matter of course. In this case, the excuse has been the untimely demise of the erstwhile learned Government Pleader. Not a single scrap of paper has been annexed, demonstrating that he had been engaged by the learned Legal Remembrancer. 10. In the matter of Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs v. Karnataka Housing Board and ors, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:- “ 37. When one reads the phrase “within such period” together with the expressions “after the prescribed period” and “for not preferring the appeal or making the application”, it becomes as clear as a noon day, that the said phrase i.e., “within such period” includes both the original period of limitation prescribed as-well as the period of delay leading up to the actual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be. There can be no question of construing “within such period” as making a reference either to only the original period of limitation or to only the actual period of delay after the expiry of limitation. 5 * * * * * * 101. From the above discussion, it is clear that the period which is being effectively extended is only ancillary to the “sufficient cause” that would have occasioned. Even the bare text of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, makes it abundantly clear that while “sufficient cause” has to be shown for the duration covered by the expression “within such period”, nowhere does the provision allude that the “period” which would be effectively extended by the court, in exercise of its discretion for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be the period for which “sufficient cause” is demonstrated. Rather, the expression “may be admitted after the prescribed period” clearly indicates that it is only that period, which has been subsumed after the expiry of limitation, as a result of the “sufficient cause” persisting, which would be effectively getting extended by way of condonation. Thus, while the expression “sufficient cause” and “within such period” are itself inextricably linked together, both these expressions have nothing to do with the manner in which the court proceeds to condone the delay i.e., the period which the court extends in exercise of its discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 102. If the contention is accepted that “sufficient cause” has to be demonstrated only for that length of the period that is required to be extended, in order to admit the appeal or application, as the case may be, then it would result in “extension” being conflated with “exclusion”. Although semantically both may appear to be one and the same, and even the end-result that would ensue if “extension” is read as “exclusion” would in substance be the same, as ultimately it would be that period after the expiry of limitation till the actual filing that would be extended or excluded to admit the appeal, yet there is very fine but discernible difference between the two, which if not appreciated, would completely warp the mechanism of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as envisaged by the legislature. 103. If the court in condoning the delay in exercise of its powers under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is construed as excluding that period which was consumed after the expiry of limitation, in order to bring it within the 6 “prescribed period of limitation”, for the limited purpose of admitting the appeal or application, as the case may be, then this would bring one significant change in how sufficient cause is to be demonstrated. 104. The net-effect of the aforesaid would be that, a litigant for seeking condonation of delay, would only be required to demonstrate that “sufficient cause” only for that amount of period which is necessary to be excluded so that it is able to bring its appeal or application, as the case may be, within the prescribed period of limitation. For illustration, say, the prescribed period of limitation was 90-days, and the actual date of filing took additional 10-days. Now, in such a scenario, if we read “extension” as “exclusion”, then “sufficient cause” only has to be shown for the 10-days so that, once it is excluded, his filing would be deemed as if it was filed on the 90th day. 105. Although the aforesaid, may not, on the surface seem like a drastic consequence if “extension” is read as “exclusion”, yet, it would have an underlying effect which would be contrary to the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which we shall now explain. If “extension” is read as “exclusion” and a party is required to demonstrate “sufficient cause” only for that duration necessary to be excluded, for the appeal or application, to once again fall within the prescribed period of limitation, for it to be admitted, then the entire exercise contemplated under Section 5, would in simple terms involve showing “sufficient cause” such that after the exclusion, the litigant is once again put back into the “prescribed period of limitation”. 106. In other words, if the above interpretation is adopted then the litigant would only have to show “sufficient cause” for that period, which after excluding would at the very least put him back into the outermost date on which he could have filed the appeal or application i.e., the last day on which the limitation would have expired. 107. However, the power that the court exercises in condoning the delay, is not for the purpose of putting the litigant back into the position he would have enjoyed during the prescribed period of limitation. This is because, during the prescribed period of limitation, the litigant is entitled, as a matter of right, to file the appeal or application, as the case may be, and 7 the courts cannot object or refuse to admit the same. 108. However, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, does not say that, once “sufficient cause” is established and the court is also satisfied about the same, then the appeal or application, has to be mandatorily be admitted. On the contrary, the provision, by use of the word “may” lays emphasis that even after the court is satisfied about the existence of a “sufficient cause”, it has the discretion to decide, whether to admit the appeal or application, as the case may be, or not. A catena of decisions of this Court including Rewa Coal Fields (supra) hold that “even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right … if sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay”. 109. If at all, what is contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is exclusion of the period consumed after the expiry of limitation for the filling of appeal or application, such that the litigant is put into the same position, he enjoyed on the last day of limitation, or any other day within the prescribed limitation, then where is the question of the courts still being able exercise discretion for deciding to admit or not admit such appeal or application. 110. 110. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, also does not speak that the discretion conferred to the courts is limited only for determining if sufficient cause exists or not, and where it has in its discretion decided that such “sufficient cause” existed, it has to then mandatorily condone the delay. As succinctly put in Rewa Coal Fields (supra), even “if sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay”. 111. The discretion that the courts have been conferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is two-fold, for determining if “sufficient cause” existed and where the former is answered in the affirmative, then whether the case is a fit one for it to condone the delay, to admit the appeal or application as the case may be. Which is why, the legislature consciously used the word “extension” rather than “exclusion” in marginal note to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 112. To say, that the purpose for demonstrating “sufficient cause” is to exclude 8 only that extent of period which would once again put the litigant back into the last day on which, he could have filed the appeal or application, would, in our opinion, gravely misconstrue the entire mechanism of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Thus, the expression “within such period” for this reason also cannot be possibly construed to mean the period from the last day of expiry of the limitation, till the actual date of filing of appeal or the application, as understood by Rewa Coal Fields (supra). The phrase “extension” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not a misnomer. 113. It is for this reason that the decisions of this Court in Ajit Singh Thakur (supra) and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra) held that “sufficient cause” for the delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, has to be established by some event or circumstance that had arisen before the limitation expired and that the party seeking condonation has to explain the delay the entire continuum commencing from the point at which the limitation period first began to run, until the eventual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be. 114. 114. We may, with a view to obviate any confusion, clarify that the observations made by this Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), particularly that “what events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence” should not be construed devoid of its context. When this Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra) said that events after the expiry of limitation till the date of actual filing would be of no consequence, the same was made in view of the well-established rule that “sufficient cause must be establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired”. The aforesaid observations of “what events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence” in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra) were made in the peculiar facts of that case, where the appellant had failed to assign any “sufficient cause” occasioning during the period of limitation, which rendered the events occurring after the expiry of limitation as irrelevant. 115. However, as is manifest from the entire discussion above, for the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay has to be explained by establishing the existence of “sufficient cause” for the entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of filing. In other words, if the 9 period of limitation is 90-days, and the appeal is filed belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation has to be given for the entire 100-days.” 11. We hold that the appellants have not been able to show sufficient cause for condonation of the delay. 12. State is not a privileged litigant, and cannot claim condonation as a matter of course. 13. In the matter of Union of India and Anr. v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, (D) Through His Lr, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:- “24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for 10 instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. 28. At this stage, we would like to quote few observations made by the High Court in its impugned order pointing towards lack of bona fides on the part of the appellants. The observations are as under:— “9. A perusal of paragraph 4 extracted hereinabove shows that on oath, solemn statement is made that notice of Darkhast No. 16 of 2014 for execution of the decree issued by the executing Court was received by the Department on 25.02.2019. As against this, in paragraph 3 of the additional affidavit dated 04.07.2019 made by Rajendra Rajaram Pawar, it is stated that the averments made in paragraph 4 as regards service of Darkhast on 25.02.2019 is factually incorrect. Notice of Darkhast No. 16 of 2014 was received by the defendants on 18.03.2016. The error in the application is out of inadvertence for which he tendered unconditional apology. It is further stated that inadvertent mistake on facts as to knowledge of execution proceedings was purely because of oversight in the light of possibilities of issuance of possession warrant by the executing court and requirement of 11 expeditious urgency of moving before this Court to save the proceeding in litigation since 1981 which otherwise would have got frustrated. He stated that the same is nothing beyond human error. xxxxxxxxx 12. The assertions made in paragraph 4 are bereft of any particulars and are totally vague. In fact the solemn statement made in paragraph 4 that notice of Darkhast for execution of the decree issued by the executing Court was received by the Department on 25.02.2019, to put it mildly, is incorrect statement. In view of paragraph 3 of the additional affidavit dated 04.07.2019 made by Rajendra Rajaram Pawar, it is evident that notice of Darkhast was received by the defendants on 18.03.2016. It is material to note that no particulars are given as to when the Department sought legal opinion. There is also no explanation as to why Department did not instruct lawyer in the High Court to apply for restoration of the Petition and why the Department defended execution proceedings. It is worthwhile to note that execution proceedings were filed by the respondents only because Writ Petition was dismissed. If the Writ Petition was restored, automatically the execution proceedings would have been stayed by the executing Court. Instead of adopting appropriate proceedings, the defendants unnecessarily went on defending the execution proceedings. In paragraph 4(b) though it is stated that Department was regularly following up with its panel lawyer till 2003, this statement is also not substantiated by producing any document. Even if I accept that the Department was regularly following up with its panel lawyer till 2003, there is no explanation worth the name as to why the Department did not follow up the matter between 2003 and 2006 when the Petition was dismissed in default. That apart, equally, there is no explanation as to why no follow up action was taken by the officers between 2006 and 2016 when Department acquired knowledge about dismissal of Writ Petition on 18.03.2016. 13. It is no doubt true that while considering the application for condonation of delay, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ has to be liberally construed. It, however, does not mean that without making any sufficient cause, the Court will condone the delay regardless of the length of the delay. In the present case, the delay is of 12 12 years and 158 days. A perusal of the application as also the additional affidavit hardly indicates any sufficient cause for condoning the unpardonable delay of 12 years and 158 days.” 29. In Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, (2010) 5 SCC 459, this Court rejected the application for condonation of delay of 4 years in filing an application to set aside an exparte decree on the ground that the explanation offered for condonation of delay is found to be not satisfied. 30. In Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563, this Court, while dismissing the application for condonation of delay of 427 days in filing the Special Leave Petition, held that condonation of delay is not an exception and it should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. In that case, this Court held that unless the Department has reasonable and acceptable reason for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process cannot be accepted. In Para Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 respectively, this Court dealt with the scope of ‘sufficient cause’ and held as follows: “25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. [(2009) 8 AD 201] as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-charge 13 has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and 14 commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 31. In the case of Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 4 SCC 363, this Court made the following observations: “20. In N. Balakrishnan, [(1998) 7 SCC 123] this Court again reiterated the principle that : (SCC p. 127, para 11) “11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that [the] parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly.” 21 to 27……… 28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. 29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.” 15 32. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) by LRs. v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448, this Court held as follows: “19. In Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat [(1981) 1 SCC 495 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 184] this Court observed : (SCC p. 497, para 6) “6. … it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute sufficient cause.” (emphasis supplied) This judgment squarely applies to the facts in hand. xxxxxxxxx 21. Shri Mohta, learned Senior Counsel relying on the decision of this Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123] submitted that length of delay is no matter and acceptability of explanation is the only criterion. It was submitted that if the explanation offered does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as a part of dilatory tactics, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. The very said decision upon which reliance has been placed holds that the law of limitation fixes a lifespan for every legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury suffered. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. The decision does not lay down that a lethargic litigant can leisurely choose his own time in preferring appeal or application as the case may be. On the other hand, in the said judgment it is said that court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It was observed : (SCC p. 128, para 11) “11. … It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their 16 remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.” 22. In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 361] this Court held that : (AIR pp. 363-65) “In construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause of excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone the delay and admit the appeal. It is further necessary to emphasise that even if the sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage the diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration.” (emphasis supplied) 23. On the facts and in the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the respondent beneficiary was not diligent in availing the remedy of appeal. The averments made in the application seeking condonation of delay in filing appeals do not show any acceptable cause much less sufficient cause to exercise courts' discretion in its favour.” 33. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, this Court made the following observations: “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and 17 purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be 18 based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 14. The State of West Bengal cannot take the plea that the delay in filing the appeal was on account of technical issues. Secondly, the explanation that the documents were sent to a learned Advocate in May/June 2021, who expired in October 2022, without filing the appeal is not corroborated by any contemporaneous documents. No communication between the appellants and the said learned Government Pleader has been annexed. This is an 19 unfortunate plea taken by the State of West Bengal to justify the wastage of time in preferring the appeal. We find that only when the contempt application was filed against the Chief Secretary, the State and its machinery woke up and started taking steps. Although, it has been explained that the original certified copy obtained in 2021 was lost, but a copy of the same has not been brought on record to show authenticity of such claim. Secondly, we find from the averments that all the documents were sent to the learned Advocate by e- mail, and not by way of hard copies. 15. Under such circumstances, we are not inclined to condone the delay. 16. The learned Advocate for the appellants submits that the Court should condone the delay upon appreciation of the merits. We find that this is a case where the learned Single Judge was of the view that the ratio of Secretary, State of Karnataka Vs. Umadevi (3) & Ors. reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 would not apply and His Lordship has given his reasons. 17. 18 writ petitioners approached the writ court challenging denial of their claim for regularization. His Lordship found on facts that, on an earlier occasion, 21 of casual workers (including the writ petitioners) who worked at Kulti Municipality, since 20 merged with the Asansol Municipal Corporation, had approached the writ court, challenging an order of termination. The said order of termination was set aside. Thereafter, the municipality regularized the service of the said writ petitioners as permanent employees, with effect from March 1, 1995 and appointment letters were issued to each of them. From time to time, they moved the writ petitions claiming arrear salary. The learned Single Bench, directed salary and allowance to be paid, which was modified by the Division Bench directing the municipality to invest the amount in a bank. The writ court recorded that a sum of Rs.82,07,603/- was deposited with the Bank of Baroda and was earning an interest at the rate of 6.5% p.a. Although arguments were advanced with regard to the ratio laid down in Umadevi (supra), His Lordship was of the view that the subsequent decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court had clarified the ratio of Umadevi (supra). According to His Lordship, the fact that the termination order had been set aside by the writ court and the municipality had granted them permanent appointment, went a long way to demonstrate that the writ petitioners could not be treated as employees of the municipality who had been illegally appointed against unsanctioned posts. His 21 Lordship also held that the approval of the Director of Local Bodies was not required as the appointment was made in 1995. 18. Under such circumstances, His Lordship set aside the order dated February 2, 2015 passed by the Director of Local Bodies and directed the Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal to take a decision himself or by an officer not below the rank of Principal Secretary specially appointed by him for this purpose, so that the order of His Lordship could be implemented and requisite approvals and financial concurrences from the appropriate department, could also be granted. 19. On the merits as well, we have underlined the peculiar facts of the case and we are not inclined to condone the delay on the ground that the appellants have a good chance of success in the appeal. We are not persuaded by the submissions of the learned Government Pleader that, the order impugned does not have any legs to stand on. 20. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed. 21. In view of dismissal of the application for condonation of delay, the appeal and the connected application also stand dismissed. 22. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 22 23. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on usual undertaking. (Shampa Sarkar, J.) (Arjun Ray Mukherjee, J.)