1 CGHC010309332021 2026:CGHC:39192 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 4796 of 2021 1 - Dayaram Yadav S/o Late Phoolchand Yadav Aged About 59 Years R/o M/s. Dayaram And Sons, Anand Cinema Building, Maudahapara, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Housing And Environment Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Capital Complex, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Deputy Secretary Town And Country Planning, Regional Office, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Joint Director Town And Country Planning, Regional Office, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Shri Aditya Dhar Diwan appears on behalf of Shri Anurag Singh, Advocates. For State/ Respondent(s) : Shri Anmol Sharma, PL. (Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Order on Board 07/09/2026 1. This Writ Petition has been filed for the following reliefs:- AVINASH SHARMA Digitally signed by AVINASH SHARMA Date: 2026.09.16 14:15:00 +0530 2 1] That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions quashing the impugned order dated 13.09.2021 (Annex. P/1) issued by the Revisional Authority and the Joint Director may kindly be directed to consider the case of the petitioner for grant of permission for development under Section 29 afresh and passed an order within a stipulated period. 2] That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief(s), which is deemed fit and proper in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner is the owner of the land bearing Khasra No. 415/36 area 610 Sqmtr./6532 Sqft., Situated at village Rawabhanta, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.). He is challenging the order passed by the Secretary of Housing and Environment Department, Chhattisgarh, whereby the revision preferred by the petitioner under Section 32 of Chhattisgarh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam 1973, has been dismissed and order of appellate authority dated 09.11.2020 and order of rejection passed under Section 30 of the Act of 1973 have been upheld. He submits that son of the petitioner namely Kailash Yadav has applied for allotment of the retail outlet of BPCL for site Ravabhata, District Raipur, Municipal Corporation Birgaon. The petitioner’s son has offered land bearing Khasra No. 415/36 area 6532 Sqft. The petitioner has issued the NOC/consent for the said land. The Oil company has carried out the investigation and has found the land of the petitioner suitable for opening of the retail outlet (MS/HSD) and LOI has been issued on 07.03.2019. Petitioner 3 being an owner of the land made an application under Section 29 of Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam 1973 for grant of permission to carry out the development along with all the requisite documents, including the demarcation report. The application of the petitioner was rejected by the Joint Director 28.11.2019 holding that, since the proposed site is situated at confluence of Two roads i.e. Bilaspur-Raipur Road NH-30 and MR-38 proposed Road and therefore the permission cannot be granted. The said order was challenged in appeal under Section 31 but the appeal was dismissed on 09.11.2020 and thereafter on 13.09.2021 the revision under Section 32 has been rejected. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that impugned order of the Joint Director dated 13.09.2021 itself shows that the land of the petitioner is not situated at the junction of two major roads i.e. NH-30 and proposed MR-38, but it is situated at the junction of 30 feet approach road of NH-30 and proposed MR-38 which is not the prohibition under Rule 53(iv) of the Bhumi Vikas Niyam 1984. He also submits that the Joint Director has failed to appreciate that as per Rule 53 (iv) of Bhumi Vikas Niyam 1984 the petrol pump should have been at the distance of 80-100meters from the junction, but the land of the petitioner is not situated at confluence of two roads i.e. NH-30 and proposed MR-38. In fact, as per the demarcation report filed along with Annexure P/4 as well as the map which is attached the with demarcation report, itself shows that the land of the petitioner is not adjacent with National Highway-30 and it is not situated at confluence of two roads i.e. NH-30 and proposed MR-38. MR-38 has not been notified by the state or central government and it is only proposed as major road and the land of the 4 petitioner is adjacent with major road and approach road of NH-30 and it is ½ kilometer away from the ring road. The LOl (Letter of Intent) issued in favour of the petitioner by the BPCL, dated 07.03.2019 Annexure P/3 is still in force. It has neither been lapsed or nor has been issued to someone else. Even for the sake of arguments, if it accepted that the land of the Petitioner is situated at the junction of two roads, grant of permission for development ought not to have been rejected by the Joint Director, because Rule 53 of Chhattisgarh Bhumi Vikas Rules, 1984 provides in Note 2 as under:- “2. Clause of distance from road junction shall not be applicable on the roads having width of 18 metres and above including service roads. However, the Petrol Pump/ Kisan Seva Kendra owner shall have to construct service road and footpath of 250-250 metres on either sides of the Petrol Pump/Kisan Seva Kendra at his own cost." 4. Counsel for the petitioner submits that from bare perusal of the norms for petrol feeling stations and Kisan Seva Kendra on roads other than NH as quoted above, it is evident that clause of distance from road junction shall not be applicable on the roads having width of 18 meters and above including service roads. However the petrol pump/Seva Kendra owner shall have to construct service road on either side of the petrol pump. The case of the petitioner does not fall under any of prohibited category. Moreover, the authorities have failed to appreciate the factual position on spot, even the revisional authority while passing the impugned order dated 13.09.2021 has categorically held that the approach road of 30 feet connects National Highway 30 with proposed MR-38. If the same will be taken into consideration the findings of the joint director that it is situated at confluence of two roads is logically incorrect. Lastly, he prays that impugned order dated 5 13.09.2021 (Annexure P/1) issued by the Revisional Authority and the Joint Director may kindly be quashed and the authorities may kindly be directed to consider the case of the petitioner for grant of permission for development under Section 29 afresh and passed an order within a stipulated period. 5. Learned counsel for the State submits that vide Annexure P/1 i.e. the order dated 13.09.2021 wherein, the Revisional Authority has categorically observed the fact that, the Appellate Authority has denied permission on the grounds that, the land junction is within 100 meters of the 30 feet road junction connecting MR-38 to NH Bilaspur-Raipur of the Raipur Development Plan Review, 2021 i.e., adjacent to a junction of land routes, which is not permissible under the Rule 53 (3) (iii) of the Land Development Rules, 1984. It has been further observed that, under the aforesaid rules, it is also mentioned that, if 250 meters service road is constructed on both sides, then the conditions of road junction are not applicable. The Joint Director, Town and Country Planning, Regional Office, Raipur, or the Appellate Authority could have approved the permission on this condition to which, the monitor also agrees and the Rule 95 of the Land Development Rules, 1984 deals with relaxation under which, the exemption from the rule can be allowed provided the exemption sought violates the health, safety and fire safety of the residents and the building and surrounding areas. The rule 92 also requires approval of the Petrol Filling Center in consultation with the Additional Director, Town and Country Planning. The Revisional Authority has further observed the fact that, as per the report received from the concerned Joint Director, vide memo dated 14.07.2020, the appellant had submitted an application for commercial (Petrol Pump) purposes for land 6 bearing Khasra No. 415/36, admeasuring 0.061 Hectare, situated at Village Rawanbhatha through Inward No. 9498 dated 23.09.219 to this office and as per Rule 53 (3) of the Chhattisgarh Land Development Rules, 1984, as per the norms for Petrol Pump Filling Center and Kisan Seva Kiendra, on the minimum width of the road on the front side of the plot being 18 meters, the minimum distance from the road junction is permissible to be 80 meters and on the road width of 24 meters, the minimum distance from the road junction is permissible to be 100 meters. The site in question was located at the junction of roads connecting MR-38 (Bilaspur Raipur) to NH-30 and hence, the provisions of Rule 53 (3) of the Chhattisgarh Land Development Rules, 1984 were not followed, hence, the said application of the applicant organization was rejected under the provisions of Section 30 (1) (g) of Chhattisgarh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 and the Rule 27 of the Chhattisgarh Land Development Rules, 1984 vide letter dated 28.11.2019. The order dated 13.09.2021 wherein, the Revisional Authority has further observed the fact that, the Revisioner and the respondents were given opportunities to be heard in the case and the documents and the facts presented were examined and perused and the documents and facts presented by them, clearly state that, the site in question falls under MR-38 of the Raipur Development Plan (Revised) 2021 and it is located on a 30 feet road connection NH Bilaspur-Raipur. According to Rule 53 (3) (iii) of the Chhattisgarh Land Development Rules, 1984, the land plot must be at least 100 meters away from a road junction for the purpose of establishing a petrol pump. According to the appellant's layout and site inspection report, the site in question is adjacent to a road junction. The 30 feet road has been 7 constructed concrete by the local body, resulting in a road junction at the site in question. The order dated 19.11.2020, passed by the Appellate authority is in accordance with the law and no interference in the said order is required, therefore, the application submitted by the Revisioner under Section 32 of the Act, 1973 has been appropriately rejected. Learned Appellate and Revisional Authorities have categorically passed the order impugned after due consideration of all the aspects of the matter and the materials available on record, therefore, the impugned order has been passed by the learned quasi Judicial Authorities in quasi judicial capacity and the same is well reasoned order based on the findings and reasonings mentioned therein. 6. Having heard counsel for the parties and having perused the record, it appears that the petitioner preferred an application under Section 30 (1) (g) of the Chhattisgarh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam. 1973 read with Rule 27 of the Chhattisgarh Land Development Rules, 1984 for issuance of NOC in his favour so as to open retail outlet of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, which has been rejected by Joint Director, Town and Country Planning vide communication dated 28.11.2019 holding that the proposed site is situated at junction/confluence of two roads (MR 38 and NH- 30{ Raipur- Bilaspur}). The said order was challenged in an appeal which was also dismissed vide order dated 19.11.2020 and when the same was challenged by the petitioner in a revision, the same was also dismissed vide order dated 13.09.2021 by Additional Chief Secretary, Housing and Environment Department holding that according to Rule 53 (3) (iii) of the Land Development Rules, 1984, the proposed site should be 100 meters away from the junction and since, upon spot inspection, it was found that the 8 proposed site of petitioner is situated within 100 meters from the junction of roads connecting MR-38 to NH- 30 (Raipur-Bilaspur) and as such, the revisional authority held that the said site would not be proper for establishing a petrol pump, which in the opinion of this Court is not required to be interfered with as the aforesaid finding is based upon the site inspection and the material available on record. The petitioner has not been able to demonstrate that the authorities have acted without jurisdiction, ignored any mandatory statutory provision, or recorded a finding which is perverse or unsupported by evidence. Merely because the petitioner seeks to interpret the site position differently, or because another view may possibly be taken on the factual aspect, would not furnish a ground for exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ajay Singh v. Khacheru and Others { (2025) 3 SCC 266 } held in paragraph 17 to 21, as under:- “17. It is a well-established principle that the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot reappreciate the evidence and arrive at a finding of facts unless the authorities below had either exceeded its jurisdiction or acted perversely. 18. On the said settled proposition of law, we must make reference to the judgment of this Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram [Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447] . The relevant portion thereof reads as under : (SCC p. 458, para 16) “16. … It is well settled that the High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of fact of an appropriate court if there was no evidence to justify such a conclusion and if no reasonable 9 person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the courts below have come or in other words a finding which was perverse in law. This principle is well settled. In D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee [D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee, (1952) 2 SCC 619] it was laid down by this Court that unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention it was not for the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere. If there is evidence on record on which a finding can be arrived at and if the court has not misdirected itself either on law or on fact, then in exercise of the power under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court should refrain from interfering with such findings made by the appropriate authorities.” 19. The abovesaid proposition of law was reiterated in Shamshad Ahmad v. Tilak Raj Bajaj [Shamshad Ahmad v. Tilak Raj Bajaj, (2008) 9 SCC 1] , wherein it was observed that : (SCC pp. 10-11, para 38) “38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior 10 tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law. 20. Observations similar in nature were made in Krishnanand v. State of U.P. [Krishnanand v. State of U.P., (2015) 1 SCC 553 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 584] , wherein it was held that : (SCC p. 557, para 12) “12. The High Court has committed an error in reversing the findings of fact arrived at by the authorities below in coming to the conclusion that there was a partition. No doubt, the High Court did so in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is a settled law that such a jurisdiction cannot be exercised for reappreciating the evidence and arrival of findings of facts unless the authority which passed the impugned order does not have jurisdiction to render the finding or has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or the finding is patently perverse.” 21. In our considered view, the High Court has committed an error of law and facts in setting aside the concurrent findings in both the impugned judgment and order [Khacheru v. State of U.P., 2013 SCC OnLine All 16168] , [Khacheru v. State of U.P., 2013 SCC OnLine All 16169] . There was no basis for the High Court to ignore the findings of the authorities and come to its own conclusion by appreciating the evidence on 11 record. The same was outside the purview of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the absence of any perversity or illegality afflicting the findings of the authorities.” 8. The law regarding the limited scope of judicial review over concurrent findings of fact recorded by statutory and quasi-judicial authorities is well settled. In Ajay Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court ordinarily cannot reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding for that of the competent authorities unless the findings are perverse, unsupported by evidence, or the authorities have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. 9. In the present case, the Joint Director, the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority have all considered the matter and have arrived at concurrent conclusions against the petitioner. The orders do not disclose any jurisdictional error, perversity or violation of the governing statutory provisions warranting interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 10. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the writ petition. The same is, therefore, dismissed. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) JUDGE Avinash