1 CGHC010330532026 2026:CGHC:39636 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 6679 of 2026 Santosh Kumar Yadav S/o Late Manglu Ram Yadav Aged About 47 Years R/o Gewara Baasti Vishrampur, Post Office Kushmunda, District - Korba (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1 – State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department of Tribal Welfare Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, New Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Collector, Korba, District- Korba (C.G.) 3 - Assistant Commissioner, Tribal Welfare Department, District- Korba (C.G.) 4 - District Education Officer, Korba District- Korba (C.G.) 5 - Superintendent, Govt. Tribal Boys Hostel Korba, District- Korba (C.G.) ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Shashi Kumar Kushwaha, Advocate For State/Respondent : Mr. K.G. Yadav, Dy GA (Hon’ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru) Order on Board 10/09/2026 ASHUTOSH MISHRA Digitally signed by ASHUTOSH MISHRA Date: 2026.09.15 10:42:35 +0530 2 1. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, questioning the orders dated 14.02.2012, 15.03.2012 and 26.11.2024, whereby his claim for appointment on compassionate grounds has not been accepted, and has sought a direction to the respondents to consider and grant him appointment on compassionate basis. 2. The case of the petitioner, as projected in the writ petition, is that his father, namely, late Manglu Ram Yadav, was working as a Cook under the Superintendent, Government Tribal Boys Hostel, Korba and died while in service. According to the petitioner, his father died on 28.05.1997, whereas his mother died subsequently on 18.05.1998. It is pleaded that the petitioner was not granted appointment on compassionate grounds and that, subsequently, he made various representations and applications before the authorities seeking such appointment. His application for compassionate appointment was considered and was rejected by order dated 14.02.2012, followed by the order dated 15.03.2012. 3. The petitioner thereafter approached this Court by filing W.P.(S) No. 4956 of 2012, which came to be disposed of on 02.11.2012, granting liberty to the petitioner to make a representation before the competent authority. The petitioner thereafter continued to submit representations before the authorities. Again, the petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.(S) No. 4543 of 2014, which was disposed of on 21.01.2016, granting liberty to avail such remedy as may be available to him. Thereafter also, the petitioner continued to pursue his claim by 3 submitting representations before the authorities. The record placed before this Court further indicates that in the year 2018 the matter was again processed by the departmental authorities and the petitioner's case was forwarded for consideration for compassionate appointment. Ultimately, the claim of the petitioner came to be considered by the authorities and was again rejected by order dated 26.11.2024. The petitioner thereafter submitted a further notice/representation dated 11.04.2025 and has now approached this Court seeking consideration of his claim for compassionate appointment. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the authorities have failed to consider the petitioner's case in accordance with the applicable policy and have proceeded on an incorrect date of death of the petitioner's father. It is further submitted that the petitioner has been pursuing his claim before the authorities as well as before this Court from time to time and, therefore, the delay cannot be attributed to him. It is also submitted that the authorities themselves continued to process his case and, therefore, his claim ought to be considered on its merits. 5. Learned State counsel, on the other hand, opposes the petition and submits that the petitioner's claim for compassionate appointment is hopelessly stale. It is submitted that the petitioner's father died as far back as in the year 1997 and the petitioner admittedly did not seek compassionate appointment within a reasonable period. It is further submitted that the repeated representations and proceedings initiated subsequently cannot revive a cause of action which had already become stale. It is, therefore, submitted that no direction for compassionate 4 appointment can be issued after such an enormous lapse of time. 6. I have heard the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. 7. It appears from the material placed on record that the petitioner’s father died in 1997 and initially he approached the authorities after a considerable lapse of time in the year 2011 i.e. after lapse of about 14 years. The chronology placed by the petitioner himself shows that he had approached the authorities in connection with his claim for compassionate appointment only after several years from the date of death of his father. 8. The fundamental object of compassionate appointment is well settled. Such appointment is not a mode of regular recruitment nor is it a vested right which can be exercised at any point of time in future. The object is to provide immediate financial assistance to the family of a deceased employee so as to enable it to tide over the sudden crisis occasioned by the death of the breadwinner. 9. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana & Others, (1994) 4 SCC 138, the Supreme Court has categorically held that compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of a reasonable period and that the consideration for such employment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The Supreme Court has further explained that the object of compassionate employment is to enable the family to get over the financial crisis resulting from the death of the sole breadwinner and that such employment cannot be claimed or offered 5 after the crisis is over. 10. The same principle has subsequently been reiterated by the Supreme Court in several decisions. In State of J&K v. Sajad Ahmed Mir, (2006) 5 SCC 766, Local Administration Department v. M. Selvanayagam, (2011) 13 SCC 42, the Supreme Court has emphasised that the very basis of compassionate appointment is the immediacy of the need. Where the family has survived for a considerable period without such appointment, the very rationale for making an exception to the normal rule of recruitment disappears. 11. The facts of the present case have to be examined in the light of the aforesaid principle. The petitioner's father admittedly died in the year 1997. Thus, the foundational event giving rise to the claim for compassionate appointment occurred nearly three decades ago. Even according to the petitioner's own pleadings, his claim for compassionate appointment was not pursued within a reasonable period immediately following the death of his father. The petitioner approached the authorities for such appointment only after a substantial lapse of time i.e. in 2011 and the claim was considered and rejected as far back as in the year 2012. 12. What is significant is that the petitioner himself had knowledge of the rejection of his claim in the year 2012 and had thereafter approached this Court on more than one occasion. The writ petition filed in the year 2012 was disposed of on 02.11.2012, and another writ petition filed in the year 2014 was disposed of on 21.01.2016. Thus, the petitioner was fully 6 conscious of the nature of his claim and the stand of the authorities much before the filing of the present petition. 13. Merely because the petitioner continued to submit representations from time to time, the same would not have the effect of extending or reviving the cause of action which had already become stale. A representation cannot be utilised as a device to perpetually revive a cause of action which has otherwise become barred by delay and laches. The petitioner cannot, by repeatedly approaching the authorities, convert a stale claim for compassionate appointment into a continuing cause of action. 14. The subsequent consideration of the petitioner's representations by the authorities also does not alter the fundamental character of the claim. The order dated 26.11.2024, even if treated as a fresh order, cannot be examined in isolation from the original claim for compassionate appointment. The right claimed by the petitioner originates from the death of his father in the year 1997. The subsequent administrative correspondence and consideration were only in relation to that original claim and did not create a fresh substantive right in favour of the petitioner. 15. In fact, accepting the petitioner's contention at this stage would defeat the very purpose of compassionate appointment. The petitioner now seeks appointment nearly 27 years after the death of his father, and considerably more than a decade after his original claim was rejected in the year 2012. Such a direction would no longer serve the object of providing immediate succor to a family in financial distress. Rather, it 7 would amount to treating compassionate appointment as a source of employment available irrespective of the passage of time. 16. It is a trite law that compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and that an application made at a belated stage cannot be entertained, since with the lapse of time the very purpose of such appointment stands defeated. 17. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that there was some error regarding the date of death of the petitioner's father in the departmental record, such error would not cure the fundamental defect in the claim. The petitioner's own case is that the father died in 1997. Even reckoning the claim from that date, the petitioner has approached the authorities for compassionate appointment after an extraordinary and unexplained lapse of time. The issue of the applicable policy, therefore, cannot revive a claim which has otherwise lost its very foundation by efflux of time. 18. This Court, therefore, finds that the claim of the petitioner is hit by delay and laches. More importantly, by the passage of such a long period, the very object and purpose of compassionate appointment has disappeared. The family has necessarily survived for all these years without the compassionate appointment now sought. Granting a direction at this stage would be contrary to the settled principles governing compassionate appointment. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no ground warranting interference with the impugned orders in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8 19. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as well as on account of the claim having lost the very object and purpose of compassionate appointment by efflux of time. 20. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. SD/- SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) JUDGE ashu