1 CGHC010215672026 2026:CGHC:39878 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1663 of 2026 Suryajeet Patel S/o Omnarayan Patel Aged About 25 Years R/o Village Pahiya, P/s Chandaora, District Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. --- Petitioner versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, District Balrampur- Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent (Cause title is taken from CIS system) For Applicant : Mr. Rahul Mishra, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Pranjal Shukla, P.L. Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu Order On Board 11/09/2026 1. Petitioner has filed this petition questioning the legality and sustainability of the impugned order dated 23.05.2026, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Balrampur, Ramanujganj in Criminal Revision No.30 of 2026, whereby revision filed challenging the order of rejection of application for supurdnama of CRETA car bearing No.C.G.04-LD-3949 was rejected. BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN Digitally signed by BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN 2 2. Learned counsel for petitioner would submit that one sold vehicle without number was intercepted and police officers found that 7 agricultural cattle are being transported and accordingly crime as registered, however, CRETA car bearing No. C.G.04-LD-3949 was also intercepted far from place of interception of alleged sold vehicle transporting cattles and driver of the CRETA car is also made accused and the said car is also seized. Applicant has filed an application for supurdnama of CRETA car, however, learned trial Court has rejected the same applying the provisions of Section 6 of the Chhattisgarh Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 2004 (In short ‘the Act of 2004’) erroneously. He contended that as the CRETA is not being used for transporting the agricultural cattle, therefore, the provision under Section 6 of the Act, 2004 would not apply to the facts of the case. 3. Learned State counsel opposes the submission of learned counsel for petitioner and would submit that learned Court below has taken into consideration the fact that CRETA car was being used for escorting the vehicle in which the agricultural cattle is being transported, therefore, application was rightly rejected. 4. I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the documents placed on record. 5. To appreciate the submission of learned State counsel supporting the order, relying upon the provision under Section 6 of the Act, 2004, I find it appropriate to extract the relevant provision of Section 6 of the Act, 2004, which is as under :- “6. Prohibition on transport of Agricultural cattle for slaughter. - 3 (1) No person shall sell, or transport or offer to transport or cause to be transported any Agricultural cattle from any place within the state to any place within the State or outside the State, for the purpose of its slaughter in contravention of the provisions of this Act or with the knowledge that it will be or is likely to be, so slaughtered. [(2) Whenever any person transports or causes to be transported in contravention of provisions of sub-section (1) any agricultural cattle as specified in the Schedule, such vehicle or any conveyance used in transporting such animal alongwith such agricultural cattle shall be liable to be seized by such authority or officer as the State Government may appoint in this behalf. (3) The vehicle or conveyance so seized under sub- section (2) shall not be released by the order of the court on bond or surety before the expiry of six months from the date of such seizure or till the final judgment of the court, whichever is earlier and such vehicle shall also be liable for confiscation at the end of the trial.]” 6. A focused perusal of provision under Section 6 of the Act, 2004 would show that it restricts transport or offer to transport or cause to be transported any agricultural cattle from any place within the state to any place within the State or outside the State, for the purpose of its slaughter in contravention of the provisions of this Act, 2004 and sub- section (2) of Section 6 of the Act, 2004 provides for seizure of vehicle on which the agricultural cattle specified in schedule, is found to be transported. 7. From the facts as appearing from the impugned order, it is clearly appearing that agricultural cattle is being transported in another sold 4 vehicle and not in the vehicle, which is sought to be in supurdnama (custody) by applicant, which is CRETA car. 8. It is well settled law that penal statutes are to be strictly construed. When a specific word has been inserted by the legislature, the provision cannot be given a different meaning. In the matter of W. H. King v. Republic of India and another, reported in AIR 1952 SC 156, their Lordships of the Supreme Court pertinently observed as under:- “13. As the statute creates an offence and imposes a penalty of fine and imprisonment, the words of the section must be strictly construed in favour of the subject. We are not concerned so much with what might possibly have been intended as with what has been actually said in and by the language employed.” 9. Similarly, in the matter of State of West Bengal and others v. Swapan Kumar Guha and others, reported in (1982) 1 SCC 561, the Supreme Court held as under: - “15. ………….when it is said that penal statutes must be construed” strictly, what is meant is that the court must see that the thing charged is an offence within the plain meaning of the words used and it must not strain the words: “To put it in other words, the rule of strict construction requires that the language of a statute should be so construed that no case shall be held to fall within it which does not come within the reasonable interpretation of the statute”, and that in case of doubt, the construction favourable to the subject should be preferred. But I do not think that this rule of strict interpretation of penal statutes in any way affects the fundamental principle of interpretation, that the primary test which can safely be applied is the language used in the Act and, therefore, when the words are clear and 5 plain, the court must accept the expressed intention of the legislature…….” 10. The pari materia provision contained in clause (4) of Section 6(A) of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954 came up for consideration before the Gujarat High Court in Ravidasbhai Segjibhai Vasava v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine Guj 14545 in which the Gujarat High Court considering the issue identical as involved in the present case held that clause (4) of Section 6(A) would apply only in a case where the animals are being transported for the purpose of slaughter. It has been observed in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the report as under: “10. The plain reading of section 6(A) clause (1) would indicate that the same is applicable in a case where it is found that the animals were being transported from any place within the State to any other place within the State for the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the provisions of the Act or with the knowledge that they were likely to be slaughtered. There is a proviso to section 6(A) clause (1) which provides that a person shall be deemed to be transporting such animal for the purpose of slaughter unless contrary is proved thereto to the satisfaction of the concerned authority or officer by such person or he has obtained a permission under sub- section (2) for transporting the animal for bona fide agricultural or animal husbandry purpose. 11. Clause (4) to section 6(A) puts a restriction so far as the release of the vehicle is concerned for a period of six months. 12. It is, therefore, manifest that section 6(A) clause (4) would apply only in a case where the animals are being transported for the purpose of slaughter. 6 13. It is not in dispute so far as the present case is concerned that no permit was obtained by the petitioner herein as the registered owner of the vehicle for the purpose of transport. However, at the same time, the prosecution has to, prima facie, show something that the transport of the cattle was for the purpose of slaughter. For such purpose, I inquired with Mr. Dabhi, the learned APP, regarding the materials collected by the police in the course of investigation. Mr. Dabhi has fairly submitted that there is nothing to show that the cattle were being transported for the purpose of slaughter. It appears that there is no investigation in that direction. If it is the case of the prosecution that the cattle were being transported for the purpose of slaughter, then at least, it is expected from the investigating officer to investigate at which place they were being taken and were to be handed over to whom for the purpose of slaughter. There is nothing in that regard. In the absence of such material, in my view, the prosecution cannot straight way take recourse to the deeming fiction as provided under section 6(A)(1). In such circumstances, I am of the view that there should not be any legal impediment in releasing the vehicle before the expiry of the statutory time period i.e six months.” 11. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai Vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (2002) 10 SCC 283, in para 7 and 17 has laid down guiding principles for releasing the vehicle seized by police. For ready reference, the relevant portion is reproduced below:- “7. In our view, the powers under Section 451 CrPC should be exercised expeditiously and judiciously. It would serve various purposes, namely: 7 1. owner of the article would not suffer because of its remaining unused or by its misappropriation; 2. court or the police would not be required to keep the article in safe custody; 3. if the proper panchnama before handing over possession of the article is prepared, that can be used in evidence instead of its production before the court during the trial. If necessary, evidence could also be recorded describing the nature of the property in detail; and 4. this jurisdiction of the court to record evidence should be exercised promptly so that there may not be further chance of tampering with the articles. x x x x x x 17. In our view, whatever be the situation, it is of no use to keep such seized vehicles at the police stations for a long period. It is for the Magistrate to pass appropriate orders immediately by taking appropriate bond and guarantee as well as security for return of the said vehicles, if required at any point of time. This can be done pending hearing of applications for return of such vehicles.” 12. Similar view has also been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Multani Hanifbhai Kalubhai Vs. State of Gujarat & Another reported in 2013 (3) SCC 240, wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court has expressed that it is not advisable to keep the seized vehicle in the Police Station in open condition which is prone to natural decay on account of weather conditions for a long period. 13. In the aforementioned facts of the case and the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court I am of the considered view that learned Court below 8 erred in dismissing the application taking note of the provision under Section 6 of the Act, 2004, which is not sustainable. 14. From perusal of the impugned order, offence is registered on 24.02.2026 and as of now also, six months have elapsed. Considering the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283, learned trial Court is directed to provide interim custody of the vehicle CRETA car bearing No. C.G.04-LD-3949 to petitioner by imposing reasonable conditions. The vehicle shall be released within 10 days from the date of receipts of this order and complying with the conditions imposed by the trial Court. 15. Accordingly, this petition is allowed to the extent indicated here-in- above. Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge Balram