24.08.2026 Sl. No. 3 Ct No. 446 SG WPA 17141 of 2026 With IA No. CAN 1 of 2026 Lab Chandra Dhar & Anr. Vs The State of West Bengal & Ors. Mr. Subir Banerjee, Mr. Shaunak Ghosh, Mr. Kamal Das, Md. Hosain, Ms. Shweta Singh, Ms. Smritikana Saha. …for the petitioners Mr. Kallol Guha Thakurata, Mr. S. Bhattacharjee. …for the State Mr. Diganta Das, Ms. Debopriya Saha. …for respondent nos. 4 & 5 1. Fundamentally, the present writ petition has been preferred praying for an order to set aside and/or cancel the proclamation of sale by public auction initiated by the Samata Cooperative Development Bank Limited (for short, ‘the Bank’) pursuant to a notice dated 20th July, 2026, fixing 24th August, 2026 as the date for effecting such proclamation of sale. 2. Succinctly stated, the facts leading to the presentation of the present writ petition are that the petitioner, being the proprietor of M/s. Joymaa Tara Enterprise, approached the Bank for obtaining a loan of Rs. 1.4 crore in August, 2019 by depositing two title deeds relating to the properties detailed in the loan sanction letter at pages 57, 58 and 59 of the writ petition. The loan was sanctioned in his favour by the respondent on 21st August, 2019, and a further loan of Rs. 2 9,36,559/- was also granted in his favour on 30th November, 2020. However, the petitioner failed to repay the said loan. Since the loan remained unpaid, the loan account slipped into a non-performing asset, whereupon the authority concerned invoked the power under Section 191K of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Rules, 2011 (for short, ‘the 2011 Rules’) and appointed a receiver. Subsequently, the Bank took possession of the mortgaged property by issuing a possession notice. Thereafter, the concerned Bank, by invoking its power under Sections 122/56 of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006 (for short, ‘the 2006 Act’), issued a notice for proclamation of sale by public auction of the property mortgaged by the petitioner for obtaining the aforesaid loan. 3. Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners, referring to Section 122 of the 2006 Act, argued that the provisions of Section 122 of the 2006 Act empower the Bank to sell the property which has been mortgaged to it. He submits that no mortgage has been created in respect of the property and no mortgage deed has ever been executed and/or registered. Therefore, the Bank is devoid of any power to initiate an auction process for sale of the property by treating the said property as a mortgaged property. He further argues that the dispute should have been treated as a dispute falling under Section 102 of the 2006 Act and, accordingly, the Bank should have referred the dispute to the Registrar for its effective adjudication. He further submits that the petitioners have also deposited certain fixed deposit certificates, which are still lying with the Bank, and that the Bank can easily liquidate those 3 certificates and adjust the amount and grant some time to the petitioners to repay the outstanding loan. 4. Mr. Das, learned Advocate appearing for the Bank, vehemently opposes the arguments made on behalf of the petitioners. He submits that the certificates have already been liquidated and the amount adjusted, and after such adjustment, the outstanding amount stands at Rs. 1,46,65,407.31/- as on 10th March, 2025. He submits that sufficient time was granted to the petitioners to repay the loan; however, the petitioners failed to do so. He submits that, in view thereof and in the facts and circumstances of the case, interference by this Court is not warranted. 5. Mr. Guha Thakurata, learned Advocate appearing for the State adopts the submission advanced on behalf of the Bank. 6. Heard the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties and perused the materials on record. The notice dated 20th July, 2026 indicates that the Sale Officer invoked the power conferred upon the Bank under Sections 120 and 56 of the 2006 Act. The power under Section 56 is invoked when a loan is taken by giving a Gehan declaration as provided under Section 55 of the 2006 Act. When a person, by giving such a declaration, creates a special charge over his immovable property, it is called a Gehan declaration, and thereafter, upon invocation of the power under Section 56 of the 2006 Act, sale can be conducted of the property in respect of which the Gehan declaration was given. Section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that where a person in any of the following towns, namely, the towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, and 4 in any other town which the State Government concerned may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, delivers to a creditor or his agent documents of title to immovable property, with intent to create a security thereon, the transaction is called a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Therefore, the concept of creation of a mortgage in respect of any property by depositing title deeds is not foreign to our country, and the property in question is situated in Kolkata. The main ingredients to ascertain whether a mortgage by deposit of title deeds has been created are threefold: (i) there must be a debt; (ii) there must be a deposit of title deeds; and (iii) there must be an intention that the deposit of the title deeds should constitute security for the debt. When a loanee deposits title deeds with a secured creditor, such as the Bank, it cannot be presumed that the title deeds were deposited merely for safe custody. In the present case, there was a debt, there was a deposit of the title deeds, and there was an intention that the title deeds should create security for the debt. Furthermore, as noted previously, since the Bank has invoked the power under Section 56 of the 2006 Act, it indicates that there was a Gehan declaration. 7. Taking note of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the provisions referred to in the foregoing paragraphs, as well as the notice for proclamation of sale by public auction and other notices, I do not find any justification to stall the auction process or to interfere in the exercise of judicial review, which is primarily limited and restricted to the decision-making process. 5 I do not find any infirmity or perversity in the decision-making process initiated by the concerned Bank. 8. In view thereof, writ petition and CAN 1 of 2026 are, thus, dismissed. 9. There is no order as to costs. 10. Since no affidavits have been called for from the respondents, the allegations made in the writ petition are deemed not to have been admitted by the respondents. 11. Let urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on usual undertaking. (Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.)