- 1 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA WRIT PETITION NO.17039 OF 2023 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: T. RAGHAVENDRA GOWDA AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS, S/O M. THIMMEGOWDA, RESIDING AT NO.65, VANIWILAS ROAD, BASAVANAGUDI, BANGALORE - 560 004. INCORRECTLY MENTIONED IN THE FIR AS RAGHAVENDRA, S/O THIMMEGOWDA, ALFANARI WINE STORE FACTORY OWNER MADAVADI VILLAGE, TALAKADU HOBLI, T. NARSIPURA TALUK, MYSURU DISTRICT, KARNATAKA. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. MANU P. KULKARNI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY SHO, TALAKADU PS, NANAJANGUDU SUB DIVISION, MYSORE DISTRICT - 57122. Digitally signed by PADMAVATHI B K Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 2. SIDDAMMA AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS, W/O LATE MANCHAIAH, R/O PARINAMIPURA VILLAGE, TALAKADU HOBLI, T. NARSIPURA TALUK, MYSORE DISTRICT - 571 122. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. K. NAGESHWARAPPA, HCGP FOR R1; R2 IS SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED) THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA R/W SEC.482 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CRIME NO.33/2023, DTD 15.06.2023, REGISTERED BY TALAKADU POLICE STATION / R1 FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE U/S 504, 323, 354, 506 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860, AND SECTION 3(1)(r) 3(1)(s) AND 3(2)(va) OF THE SCHEDULED CASTE AND SCHEDULED TRIBE (PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES) ACT, 1989 AT ANNEXURE-A AND ETC. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: - 3 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioner is before this Court, seeking the following prayer: "a. Quash the FIR in Crime No.33/2023, dated 15.06.2023, registered by Talakadu Police Station/Respondent No.1 for the offences punishable under Sections 504, 323, 354, 506 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 3(1)(r) 3(1)(s) & 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (at Annexure - A); b. Quash the Complaint allegedly lodged by the Respondent No.2 on 15.06.2023 (at Annexure - B); C. Pass any such other orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case to meet the ends of justice." 2. Heard Sri. Manu P. Kulkarni, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri. K. Nageshwarappa, learned HCGP appearing for respondent No.1 and have perused the material on record. 3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: The petitioner is the accused and the 2nd respondent is the complainant. The 2nd respondent institutes a suit seeking - 4 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 injunction in O.S.No.215/2015 in respect of Survey No.93/1. The said suit comes to be dismissed. The petitioner's employee registered a complaint against one Sri. Mahadeva, an acquaintance of respondent No.2, who was trying to encroach upon the land belonging to the petitioner in Survey No.93/1 and assaulting the petitioner's employee. This becomes a crime in FIR in Crime No.28/2023. The second crime that is sought to be registered, results in an NCR. On the complainant coming to know of the crime so registered on the disturbance caused by the acquaintance of the complainant, the complainant comes near the said property where the petitioner and his employees were carrying out cleaning activities and an altercation occurs between the two parties. This altercation leads to filing of a complaint by the 2nd respondent against the petitioner. On the said complaint, an FIR comes to be registered in Crime No.33/2023 for the offences punishable under Sections 504, 323, 354 and 506 of the IPC and Sections 3(1)(r) & (s) and 3(2)(va) of the Schedule Case & Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 ("Atrocities Act" for short). - 5 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 It is the registration of this crime, is what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner taking this Court through the documents appended to the petition would seek to demonstrate that the pendency of a civil suit between the parties and its dismissal leads to a squabble between the two. The petitioner's employee had registered the crime in Crime No.28/2023 and as a counterblast to the dismissal of the civil suit and the crime so registered by the petitioner's employee in Crime No.28/2023, the subject crime comes to be registered. He would seek quashment of the same on the score that the petitioner has neither hurled abuse in a place which is in public view nor a public place, as the case would be. 5. Learned HCGP would however refute the submission in contending that investigation in the least is a must. He would seek dismissal of the petition. - 6 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 6. The complainant though served 3 years ago remains unrepresented even today. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 8. The afore-narrated facts are a matter of record. They would not require any iteration. Since the entire issue has sprung from the complaint, the complaint is required to be noticed. 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The complaint nowhere indicates that the alleged abuses were hurled in a public place or a place of public view or even with an intention to cause insult to the complainant's caste or the complainant belonging to the said caste. In the absence of these basic materials, the crime itself could not have been registered, as it is now by too well settled a principle of law that unless the abuses are in a public place or a place of - 8 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 public view, the offences under Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 ('the Atrocities Act' for short) cannot be attracted. Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Atrocities Act, read as follows: "3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.-(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,— ……… ……… ……… (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;” (Emphasis supplied) Sections 3(1)(r) & (s) of the Atrocities Act, punishes the intentional insult or abuse of a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. 10. The interpretation of 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. - 9 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 10.1. Court in the case of HITESH VERMA v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND1, held as follows: “10. The Act was enacted to improve the social economic conditions of the vulnerable sections of the society as they have been subjected to various offences such as indignities, humiliations and harassment. They have been deprived of life and property as well. The object of the Act is thus to punish the violators who inflict indignities, humiliations and harassment and commit the offence as defined under Section 3 of the Act. The Act is thus intended to punish the acts of the upper caste against the vulnerable section of the society for the reason that they belong to a particular community. 11. It may be stated that the charge-sheet filed is for an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The said section stands substituted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26-1-2016. The substituted corresponding provision is Section 3(1)(r) which reads as under: “3. (1)(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;” 12. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act can be classified as “(1) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and (2) in any place within public view”. 13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to 1 (2020) 10 SCC 710 - 10 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that Respondent 2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that Respondent 2 is a member of Scheduled Caste. 14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:“Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would - 11 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 be an offence since it is in the public view.”] . The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28) “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” (emphasis in original) 15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of - 12 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 this Court in Swaran Singh [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] , it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet. 16. There is a dispute about the possession of the land which is the subject-matter of civil dispute between the parties as per Respondent 2 herself. Due to dispute, the appellant and others were not permitting Respondent 2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since the matter is regarding possession of property pending before the civil court, any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimidated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.” The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment holds that pending civil litigation between the parties being the foundation for registration of the crime for offences punishable under the Atrocities Act cannot be ruled out in the event of subsistence. In the case at hand also, the earlier suit that was registered against the petitioner has been dismissed and the petitioner has registered a crime against the complainant's acquaintance. With all these factors put together, the complaint is a product of wrecking vengeance against the petitioner by including the offences under the Atrocities Act. - 13 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 10.2. Later, the Apex Court in the case of GUNJAN ALIAS GIRIJA KUMARI AND OTHERS v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) AND ANOTHER2, has held as follows: “5.1 Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act read as under, “3. Punishments for offences atrocities.— 3(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,— (a) to (q) ……….. (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;” 5.1.1 The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act can be said to have been committed when a person not belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe intentionally insults or intimidates with an intent to humiliate a person belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. Offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is made out when any member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is abused by caste name in any place within public view. 5.2 The ingredients of the offences are that there has to be an intentional insult or intimidation which has to be with an intent to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or that such member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is abused by caste name by a person who does not 2 2026 SCC OnLine SC 834 - 14 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The common essential for constituting the offence under both the Sections is that the insult or intimidation under sub-clause (r) or hurling of abuses under sub- clause (s) have taken place “in any place within public view”. 5.3 All the appellants are framed for the offence under Section 506 read with Section 34, IPC. Section 506, IPC is about punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation whereas the offence of criminal intimidation is defined in Section 503, IPC. It says that whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, and when the same is done with an intent to cause alarm to that person, commits criminal intimidation. Section 34, IPC speaks about the acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. 5.4 Before examining the sustainability of the charge framed and the charge-sheet for its details and contents in respect of the aforesaid offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, it would be useful to survey few decisions of this Court which have explained the scope and purport of the phrase “in any place within public view” pinpointing that the said requirement is indispensable to be fulfilled in order that the offence under the SC/ST Act is constituted. 5.5 In Swaran Singh v. State through Standing Counsel7, the place where the informant was insulted by the appellant by calling him ‘chamar’ was one where he had been standing near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises of his employer. This Court held that such place was “a place within public view”. The argument that the alleged act was not committed in a public place and hence did not come within the purview of the offence under the SC/ST Act was negatived by explaining a fine distinction between the expression ‘in any place within public view’ as used in the provision and the expression ‘public place’. - 15 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 5.5.1 It was stated that the expression ‘a place within public view’ could not be confused with the expression ‘public place’. It was highlighted that a place can be a private place yet can be within public view, “….It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view….” (Para 28) 5.6 Swaran Singh (supra) came to be relied on by this Court in Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand8 in respect of the concept of ‘place within public view’ as an ingredient of the offence. The very observations in Swaran Singh (supra) were reiterated in paragraph 14 in Hitesh Verma (supra) when the Court noticed the allegations in the FIR about abusing the informant. It was stated in the FIR that the incident of abuse happened within the four walls of the building of the informant, and it was not the case of the informant that any member of the public was present at the time of the incident in the house. The Court, therefore, ruled that the basic requirement that the abusive words were uttered in ‘a place within public view’ was not made out. It was further noticed that witnesses whose names were appended to the chargesheet were not the persons present within the four walls of the building. 5.7 In a more recent decision in Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy9, this Court considered its own decisions in Swaran Singh (supra) as well as Hitesh - 16 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 Verma (supra), and elucidated an ironed-out proposition of law as under, “It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public view’, the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view.” (Para 11) 5.7.1 The Court observed that even by taking the allegations in the FIR at their face value, what was alleged was that when the complainant was in the office, the accused came there, made inquiries from the complainant and upon not being satisfied, started abusing the complainant in the name of his caste and insulted him. Thereafter, three colleagues of the complainant came later to pacify the accused and took him away. The Court thus noticed that the incident had taken place within the four corners of the chambers of the complainant, which was not “a place within public view”. 5.8 A decision of the Karnataka High Court in Sri Rithesh Pais v. State of Karnataka, by Puttur Town P.S.10 may also be noticed to be relevant, in which the offence was held to be not made out as the chargesheet material showed that the hurling of the abuses had happened in the basement and within the walls of the basement, holding that the basement of the building was not “a place within public view”. 5.9 A conclusive statement of law that emanates from the ratio of the decisions of this Court discussed above is that in order to make out the offence under Section 3(1)(r) and/or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, the occurrence of the incident and the act and conduct of hurling of caste-based abuses must take place at “a place within public view”. It must be a place within the public gaze. Even happens - 17 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 to be a private place, then in such eventuality a public-eye must have an access to be able to notice what happens there or what is taking place that will only make the “place within public view”. 6. Having appreciated the aspect that the requirement that the occurrence of the incident of insult or abuse, towards the member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe has to be in “a place within public view”, making the same a necessary condition for constituting the offence under the SC/ST Act, the facts in the present case may be attentively noticed. 6.1 In the FIR, while referring to the incident of abuse, on 28.01.2021, the statements were made by respondent No. 2-complainant that the appellants were in the habit of harassing and hurling caste- based slurs at him for over a year and that they used to do it when some other persons or friends come to meet him, by using the abusive words from their balcony or at the ground floor of the house. 6.2 These allegations about the alleged continuous conduct did not speak of any specific instance or happening on a particular day and they are too irrelevant to contribute to make out an offence under Section 3(1)(r) or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. It was next stated that because of such behaviour of the appellants, respondent No. 1- complainant had to send his son in a separate house. Such general accusations lead nowhere when it comes to allegation about the commission of offence. 6.3 As per the averments in the FIR, on the relevant date that is on 28.01.2021, the altercation occurred at the time when the appellants were trying to break open the house of respondent No. 2- complainant. According to respondent No. 2- complainant, appellant No. 1 hurled casteist slur in an abusive way to insult him and his wife. All the appellants-accused, it was further alleged, intimidated respondent No. 2-complainant and also threatened to implicate him in molestation charge. - 18 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 6.4 It was noticeable that in the complaint/FIR, nowhere it was stated that the said incident wherein appellant No. 1 and other appellants are stated to have abused and threatened respondent No. 1- complainant, took place where there was a public gaze. The necessary ingredient of occurrence of the incident “in a place within public view” was conspicuously absent. 6.5 Not only that it was not stated that it was “a place within public view” or that the outsiders or the members of the family were present at the time, the details mentioned in the FIR clearly indicated that the place of occurrence of the incident was inside the residential house. Referring to the facts stated and the contents of FIR in this regard, firstly the FIR is silent about the place of occurrence of the alleged incident. Secondly, point No. 5(b) in the FIR mentioned the place of occurrence at the address stated as “7/38, Ramesh Nagar, New Delhi”, which was admittedly a residential home. Similarly was recorded the address of respondent No. 2- complainant in point No. 6(e) in the FIR to reinforce that it was the place of residential house where the occurrence took place. Thirdly, in the charge-sheet filed before the court, the very residential address “7/38, Ramesh Nagar, Kirti Nagar, Delhi” was mentioned to suggest the place of occurrence. 6.6 Respondent No. 2-complainant named two witnesses, one Love Manchanda and another named Chandra Prakash. Not only that both were the friends of respondent No. 2-complainant, from their statements, nothing could be elicited to show that they witnessed the incident. Love Manchanda stated that “on 28.12.2020, Bhim Sain (complainant) asked me to accompany him to his house where he wanted to take a picture of the locked lock of his house”. In his statement, Chandra Prakash stated that “he went to the house at Ramesh Nagar with the complainant Bhim Sain and when he wanted to open the lock of his house, the accused interjected”. 6.7 All material facts go to suggest that the alleged incident took place in a private place and - 19 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 within four walls of the house of respondent No. 2- complainant and the appellants, who all are family members. While the allegation in the FIR was, as stated, that respondent No. 2-complainant had been suffering similar kind of incidents since long and for last one year, it was not stated anything specific in respect of those earlier incidents with regard to the incident for which the complaint was filed, it was not indicated that any independent member of public was present to witness the occurrence. Once that is so, to suggest that the house place was not exposed to public eye or public gaze, a residential house in no way becomes “a place within public view”. 7. For any criminal proceedings to initiate, the starting point is filing of a complaint and registration of FIR. The complaint/FIR provides the first account of the happening of events and incidents alleged as commission of offence. A reaction and revelation at the first blush is always natural and therefore becomes creditworthy. The contents of the complaint giving the initial and primary description could be treated as more reliable, for, at the subsequent stage, there would be a scope and room for improvisation. 8. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal11, this Court laid down the acid test that if the contents of the FIR, taken at their face value, do not make out any case against the accused, such an FIR registered with ulterior motive deserves to be quashed. In Hitesh Verma (supra), in addition to the ingredient of “a place within public view”, the details in the FIR or the charge-sheet failed to disclose the precise contents of abusive language employed by the applicant to attract the offence under the SC/ST Act. In other words, when the essentials to constitute the offence did not come - 20 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 out from and were not satisfied in the contents of the FIR, the offence was held to have not been made out, rendering the FIR liable to be quashed. 8.1 In Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh12, this Court noted that the defect in the FIR was in the nature of non-mentioning of the name of material witness PW-1 which was treated as a basic defect in the hypothesis portrayed by the prosecution. The Court, in that context, observed, “although we accept that the FIR need not be an encyclopaedia of the crime, but absence of certain essential facts which are conspicuously missing in the present FIR, point towards suspicion that the crime itself may have been staged”. 8.2 Also in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v. State of Uttar Pradesh13, this Court found absence of requisite ingredients of the offence under the SC/ST Act holding that the offence was not committed at “a place within public view”. It was observed that even though the appellant in that case might have abused the complainant, but such abuse by itself and without anything more does not warrant subjecting the appellant to face a trial, particularly in view of the clear absence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. 9. Thus, it is trite principle that the FIR becomes liable in law to be quashed when it, in its bare reading, does not disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence alleged therein. The basic constituents of the offence alleged in the FIR must stem and stand disclosed from the contents of the FIR. In order that the FIR alleging any action is sustainable in law to be a good and acceptable document to proceed criminally against any accused named therein or any person to be made accused on its basis, it - 21 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 must manifest and reveal basic ingredient of the offence(s) alleged therein. For an offence to be made out under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, as is the question in the instant case, the requirement that the occurrence has to be “in a place within public view” is not satisfied, is missing and absent. 9.1 It could be said that the occurrence of the incident to become an offence under the SC/ST Act must have happened “in a place within public view”, is in a way, a principal requirement amongst the other ingredients. The other aspects namely “intentional insult or intimidation” and “an intent to humiliate”, gathers a kind of intensity when the insult, intimidation, humiliation or abusive utterances, as the case may be, takes place in “a place within public view”, in the presence of members of the public. The requirement that the place must be one “within public view” can be said to be substantiating the other elements of the offence under the SC/ST Act. It is therefore a sine qua non for making out the offence under the SC/ST Act. 10. This leaves the Court to the charge framed under Section 506 read with Section 34, IPC against all the appellants. As noted hereinabove, the offence of criminal intimidation as defined under Section 503, IPC and made punishable under Section 506, IPC requires that whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property and when such threat is with the intent to cause alarm to that person, commits criminal intimidation. The “intent to cause alarm” is an pivotal aspect and consideration to judge whether the offence of criminal intimidation is made out or not. - 22 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 10.1 In the present case, even after closely reading the averments in the complaint, it is difficult to come to the conclusion that the appellants-accused exerted threat with an intent to cause “alarm” to respondent No. 2-complainant. The submission could be countenanced that the element of “alarm” to the complainant was “absent”. Even otherwise, the offence under Section 506, IPC was alleged against the appellants to conjunct the same with the offence alleged under the SC/ST Act which are not made out. 10.2 As far as the charge under Section 34, IPC is concerned, nothing is suggested either from the facts or attendant circumstances that the appellants-accused had any common intention to do a criminal act and that they acted in furtherance of such common intention. In that view, it would be an abuse of the process of law and would amount to harassment to the appellants to subject them to the criminal proceedings in relation to Section 506 read with Section 34, IPC.” (Emphasis supplied at each instance) The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment holds that, for offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Atrocities Act to be attracted, the caste-based insult or abuse must have occurred at a place within public view. A private place would fall within the ambit of “public view” only where the occurrence was visible to, or capable of being witnessed by, members of the public. - 23 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010400382023 NC: 2026:KHC:41744 WP No. 17039 of 2023 11. In the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of HITESH VERMA and GUNJAN supra and the attending facts that are narrated hereinabove, permitting further investigation in the case at hand would become an abuse of the process of the law and result in miscarriage of justice. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) The petition is allowed. (ii) The complaint dated 15-06-2023 and the FIR in Crime No.33/2023 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 504, 323, 354 and 506 of the IPC and Sections 3(1)(r) & (s) and 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act, qua the petitioner, stand quashed. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE SJK/List No.: 2 Sl No.: 57