1 CGHC010002132014 2026:CGHC:39569 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 237 of 2014 • Shatruhan Lal, S/o Dilharan Yadav, aged about 30 Years, R/o Khaira, P.S. Seepat, Distt. Bilaspur C.G. ...Appellant versus • State of Chhattisgarh, Through SHO, P.S. Seepat, Distt. Bilaspur C.G. ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Krishna Kumar Khatri, Advocate. For Respondent : Ms. Vartika Shrivastava, Panel Lawyer. (Hon’ble Shri Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judgment on Board 09.09.2026 1. This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “Cr.P.C.”) has been preferred by the appellant against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25.02.2014 passed by the learned Special Judge under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) in Special Sessions Case No.97/13, whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offences punishable under Section 456 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “the IPC”) and Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, “the POCSO Act”). Though the appellant was also convicted under Section 354(d) of IPC, but AKHILESH BEOHAR Digitally signed by AKHILESH BEOHAR Date: 2026.09.11 17:39:33 +0530 2 separate sentence for the said offence was not imposed in view of the graver offence under Section 8 of the POCSO Act. Appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 456 of IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional imprisonment for six months Under Section 8 of the POCSO Act Rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and fine of Rs.3,000/-, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional imprisonment for six months Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 17.11.2013, at about 10:00- 10:30 PM, prosecutrix, aged about 13 years, was sleeping in her house situated at village Khaira and her parents had gone to attend a Kirtan programme in the village. It is alleged that the appellant entered the house with an intention to outrage the modesty of the prosecutrix and caught hold of her hand. On hearing her shout, appellant ran away from the house. On the next morning, matter was reported to the police and FIR (Ex.P-1) was registered against the appellant on 18.11.2013 at about 10:10 AM at Police Station Sipat. During investigation, spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-2 and the document relating to the age of the prosecutrix was seized vide Ex.P-4C. Appellant was arrested vide Ex.P-5 and statements of the witnesses were recorded. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the competent Court. 3. Learned trial Court framed charges against the appellant under Sections 456 and 354(d) of IPC and Section 8 of POCSO Act. 3 Appellant abjured the guilt and pleaded false implication. 4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined 8 witnesses and exhibited 5 documents. In his defence, the appellant examined one witness, namely, DW-1 Chaitram, but did not exhibit any document. 5. The learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned hereinabove. Hence, this appeal. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the appellant has been convicted solely on the basis of the deposition of the minor prosecutrix. It is argued that the minor prosecutrix herself admitted in cross-examination that there was darkness at the place of occurrence at the relevant time and that when the person allegedly caught hold of her hand, she woke up and asked him as to who he was and why he had come there. This, according to learned counsel, clearly indicates that the prosecutrix was unable to identify or recognize the person who allegedly committed the offence. It is further submitted that the minor prosecutrix did not disclose the name of the alleged assailant even to her cousin sister, PW-2- Ku. Manjita, who was admittedly present at the spot at the relevant time. It is contended that the other prosecution witnesses are relatives of the prosecutrix, to whom the alleged incident was disclosed subsequently, and their evidence does not provide any independent corroboration to the prosecution case. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that there is no cogent and conclusive evidence on record connecting the appellant with the alleged offences and that the learned Special Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant merely on the basis of conjectures and surmises. Hence, it is prayed 4 that the appeal be allowed, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence be set aside and the appellant be acquitted of the charges levelled against him. 7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the minor victim herself stated that the person who caught hold of her hand was the appellant and in cross-examination, she denied that she had not identified the appellant. It is further submitted that the appellant was also named in the FIR (Ex.P-1). Therefore, the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be dismissed. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9. The first question which arises for consideration is whether the prosecutrix was a minor on the date of the alleged incident. 10. In order to ascertain the age of the prosecutrix, prosecution has relied upon the copy of Dakhil Kharij Register (Ex.P-4C) of Government Middle School, Khaira, Lagara, wherein the date of birth of the prosecutrix was recorded as 15.02.2000. PW-5 Jamuna Prasad Patanwar, Headmaster of the said school, has also proved the aforesaid document. Thus, from the evidence available on record, this Court finds that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age on the date of incident. The learned trial Court has, therefore, rightly held that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of the incident, and the said finding is hereby affirmed. 11. Now, the next question is whether the appellant is the author of the crime in question. 5 12. In the present case, prosecution case is that, on the date of incident, appellant entered the house of the prosecutrix and caught hold of her hand with an intention to outrage her modesty. Prosecutrix (PW-1), in her deposition, stated that while she was sleeping, appellant came there and caught hold of her hand, whereupon she woke up and the appellant fled from the spot. However, in her cross-examination, prosecutrix admitted that there was darkness at the spot at the time of the incident. She also admitted that when the person caught hold of her hand, she asked him, “Who are you and why have you come here?”. This part of her statement creates a doubt as to whether she had actually identified the person at the time of occurrence. This apart, there is also a material discrepancy regarding the place where the prosecutrix was sleeping. In cross-examination, at paragraph 3, prosecutrix admitted that at the time of incident, she was sleeping in the parchhi (verandah), but on the other hand, the prosecution case shows that at the time of incident, prosecutrix was sleeping inside the house along with her cousin sister- Asha. The prosecution has also not examined Asha, who was stated to be present at the relevant time, for the reasons best known to it. 13. More importantly, the evidence of PW-2 Manjita, who was present with the prosecutrix at the time of incident, also does not support the prosecution case on the question of identity of appellant. PW-2 Manjita has stated that after hearing the shout of prosecutrix, she came there and saw a person running away from the back door. However, she clearly stated that she could not see that person and that the prosecutrix had not told her his name. Her statement is material because she was the person who was present immediately after the occurrence. PW-2 Manjita also denied the suggestion that immediately after reaching the 6 prosecutrix, she had told her that the person who had committed the incident was Appellant- Shatruhan. Thus, the evidence does not establish that the prosecutrix had immediately disclosed the name of the appellant to PW-2- Manjita. If the prosecutrix had clearly recognized the person at that time, it would have been natural for her to disclose his name to PW-2 Manjita, who was present with her immediately after the incident. 14. Moreover, the evidence of PW-3 mother of the prosecutrix, and PW-4 aunt of the prosecutrix, also does not support the prosecution case. On the date of incident, both these witnesses had gone to attend Kirtan Progamme in the village and returned home after some time. PW-3 mother of the prosecutrix has stated that when she returned home at night, prosecutrix had not told her that appellant was the person who had entered the house and caught hold of her hand. Likewise, PW-4 aunt of the prosecutrix has also stated that the prosecutrix had not told the name of the person who had caught hold of her hand. Thus, there is no clear and consistent evidence that immediately after the incident, the prosecutrix had identified the appellant and disclosed his name to the persons who were present with her. 15. It is true that the conviction can be based upon the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if her evidence is found to be wholly reliable and inspires confidence. However, in the present case, the identification of the appellant by the prosecutrix is doubtful. Her admission regarding darkness at the place of the incident; her statement that she first asked the person who he was and why he had come; the discrepancy regarding the place where she was sleeping and the evidence of PW-2 7 Manjita, PW-3 mother of the prosecutrix and PW-4 aunt of the prosecutrix, regarding non-disclosure of the appellant’s name immediately after the incident by the prosecutrix, create a reasonable doubt regarding the identity of the person who had entered the house on the date of the incident. 16. The learned Trial Court has not properly considered these material contradictions and omissions in the evidence. The conviction has mainly been recorded by relying upon the statement of the prosecutrix, without properly examining whether her identification of the appellant is corroborated by the surrounding circumstances. On an overall consideration of the evidence, it would not be safe to hold beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant who, on the date of the incident, entered the house and caught hold of the hand of the prosecutrix with an intention to outrage her modesty. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt. 17. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25.02.2014 passed by the learned Special Judge under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Bilaspur, C.G. in Special Sessions Case No.97/13, convicting and sentencing the appellant under Section 456 of the IPC and Section 8 of the POCSO Act, is hereby set aside. 8 18. Appellant- Shatruhan Lal is acquitted of the charges under Sections 456 and 354(d) of IPC and Section 8 of the Act, 2012 by extending him the benefit of doubt. 19. Appellant is reported to be on bail. His bail bonds are not discharged at this stage and the same shall remain operative for a further period of six months from today in terms of Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. 20. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the concerned Trial Court for information and necessary compliance. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge Akhilesh