GURJIVAN SINGH v. PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, AND OTHERS
CWP/24558/2026 · 2026-08-07
Kirti Singh
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 35303 (PNJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 35303 (PNJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
CWP No. 24558 of 2026 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
(107)
CWP No. 24558 of 2026 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 07.08.2026
Gurjivan Singh
.....Petitioner
Versus
Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal,
Patiala and others
.....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH
Present: Mr. Ravi Gakhar, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Ms. Aakanksha Gupta, AAG, Punjab.
**** KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL)
1) The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing of the order dated 10.12.2025 (Annexure P-1) passed by respondent No.1, whereby Claim Application No.123/2020 filed by the petitioner under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has been dismissed. 2)
Learned counsel for the petitioner, while narrating the pleaded
facts, submits that the petitioner was engaged by respondent No.2 as a carpenter and he executed the assigned work along with his co-workers during the period from 01.02.2015 to 02.05.2015. It is submitted that the labour charges totalled to Rs.1,47,400/-, out of which only Rs.70,000/- was paid, leaving a balance of Rs.77,400/- payable by the respondents, while was not released despite repeated requests and demands. A claim petition was thus filed by the petitioner, which though was subsequently withdrawn on SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.08.14 16:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
CWP No. 24558 of 2026 (O&M) -2-
13.12.2019 on account of a technical defect, with liberty to institute a fresh claim. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner instituted Claim Application No.123/2020 under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") before the learned Industrial Tribunal. However, the same was wrongly dismissed by holding that the petitioner was not a workman, that the respondents did not constitute an industry, which learned counsel submits, could not have been done under the limited scope of Section 33-(C)(2). 3) Notice of motion to the official respondent at this stage only. 4) At the asking of the Court, Ms. Aakanksha Gupta, AAG, Punjab accepts notice on behalf of respondent No. 1. She submits that the impugned
order was rightly passed after due appreciation of the facts and the material on record. 5)
Heard learned counsel on either side and perused the judicial record with their able assistance. 6)
At this juncture, a gainful reference can be made to Section 33(C) (2) of the 1947 Act, bare language of which reads thus:-
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government] [Substituted by Act 36 of 1964, Section 19, for Section 33-C (w.e.f. 19.12.1964). ][within a period not exceeding three months:] [ Inserted by Act 46 of 1982, Section 19 (w.e.f. 21.8.1984).][Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit."
7)
With regard to the scope of Section 33-(C)(2), reliance can also be placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.08.14 16:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
CWP No. 24558 of 2026 (O&M) -3-
in Civil Appeal No.813 of 2022 titled as M/s Bombay Chemical Industries v. Deputy Labour Commissioner and another, wherein it was observed that:-
"6. At the outset it is required to be noted that respondent No.2 herein filed an application before the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, demanding difference of wages from 01.04.2006 to
31.03.2012. It was thus the case on behalf of respondent No.2 that he was working with the appellant as a salesman. However, the appellant had taken a categorical stand that respondent No.2 was never engaged by the appellant. It was specifically the case on behalf of the appellant that respondent No.2 had never worked in the establishment in the post of salesman.
Therefore, once there was a serious dispute that respondent No.2 had worked as an employee of the appellant and there was a very serious dispute raised by the appellant that respondent No.2 was not in employment as a salesman as claimed by respondent No.2, thereafter, it was not open for the Labour Court to entertain disputed questions and adjudicate upon the employer-employee relationship between the appellant and respondent No.2. As per the settled proposition of law, in an application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate dispute of entitlement or the basis of the claim of workmen. It can only interpret the award or settlement on which the claim is based. As held by this Court in the case of Ganesh Razak and Anr. (supra), the labour court's jurisdiction under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is like that of an executing court. As per the settled preposition of law without prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed claim of the workmen, proceedings for computation of the arrears of wages and/or difference of wages claimed by the workmen shall not be maintainable under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. (See Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak and Anr. (1995) 1 SCC 235). In the case of Kankuben (supra), it is observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital.
The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act while the latter does not. 7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the fact of the case on hand, when there was no prior adjudication on the issue whether respondent No.2 herein was in employment as a salesman as claimed by respondent No.2 herein and there was a serious dispute raised that respondent No.2 was never in employment as a salesman and the documents relied upon by respondent No.2 were seriously disputed by the appellant and it was the case on behalf of the SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.08.14 16:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
CWP No. 24558 of 2026 (O&M) -4-
appellant that those documents are forged and/or false, thereafter the Labour Court ought not to have proceeded further with the application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court ought to have relegated respondent No.2 to initiate appropriate proceedings by way of reference and get his right crystalized and/or adjudicate upon. Therefore, the order passed by the Labour Court was beyond the jurisdiction conferred under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The High Court has not appreciated the aforesaid facts and has confirmed the same without adverting to the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act."
8)
Reverting to the case in hand, a perusal of the impugned award reveals that the Labour Court, upon a proper appreciation of the pleadings made and evidence on record, returned the finding that the existence of an employer-employee relationship, and the inclusion of the petitioner within the definition of "workman" were disputed questions of fact, which the petitioner had failed to establish.
Reiterating the scope of the jurisdiction of the provision invoked by the petitioner, the learned Tribunal held that since no pre-existing or adjudicated right in favour of the petitioner for claiming the amount in question existed, therefore, the claim of the petitioner was not maintainable, since proceedings under Section 33-C(2) are confined only to computation of an existing or admitted entitlement, and could be invoked for adjudication of disputed rights. 9)
It is well settled that this Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India over awards of Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals, does not sit in appeal over findings of fact, nor does it re-appreciate the evidence to test whether a different view was possible; interference is warranted only where a finding is shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Learned counsel for the petitioner, despite his able assistance, has been unable to point to any such infirmity in the impugned SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.08.14 16:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
CWP No. 24558 of 2026 (O&M) -5-
Award. The findings recorded by the learned Tribunal are based on a fair appreciation of the evidence on record and call for no interference. 10)
Consequently, finding no merit in the present writ petition, the same is dismissed. 11)
Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stands
disposed of.
(KIRTI SINGH)
JUDGE August 07, 2026
SwarnjitS
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable
: Yes/No SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.08.14 16:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document