IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH **** 123+227 CR-4179-2026 (O&M) Date of decision: 07.08.2026 M/s Landmark Apartments . . . . Petitioner Vs. L.K. Vashisht and another . . . . Respondents **** CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA **** Present: - Mr. Karanvir Hooda , Advocate, for the petitioner. Mr. Manoj Swarup, Sr. Advocate, with Mr. Nitin Jain, and Mr. Khushan Dutta, Advocates, for the respondents. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. The petitioner has invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assailing the order dated 20.01.2026 (Annexure P-14) passed by the learned State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Haryana, Panchkula (hereinafter referred to as ‘the State Commission’) in EA-9-2025 arising out of CC-226-2015, whereby the objections filed by the petitioner/judgment-debtor have been dismissed. 2. The dispute, in the present petition, is confined to the interpretation of the order dated 19.03.2024 (Annexure P-9 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos.5655-5656 of 2020. The petitioner contends that the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed reimbursement of 2.2 times the entire principal amount and did not separately award interest at the rate of 18% per annum. It is, accordingly, submitted that the State Commission, while executing the said order, could not direct payment of interest at the contractual rate of 18% per annum. 3. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents/decree- holders, on the other hand, submits that the petitioner is seeking to read only a VIVEK PAHWA 2026.08.11 14:44 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR-4179-2026 2026:PHHC:109334 PAGE N: 2 OF TOTAL 8 PAGES part of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The direction was specifically to reimburse 2.2 times the entire principal amount “in terms of Clause 11 of the agreement concerned”. Clause 11 expressly provides not only for reimbursement of 2.2 times the entire principal amount but also for bank interest at the rate of 18% per annum. It is thus contended that the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has to be understood in the context of the complete Clause 11 and not by isolating one part thereof. 4. Learned senior counsel has further submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had itself considered the complete Clause 11, found the demand of the buyers for enforcement thereof to be reasonable and specifically rejected the builder's attempt to avoid the consequences of the said clause. The State Commission has, therefore, correctly dismissed the objections raised by the petitioner. 5. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the order dated 19.03.2024 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the agreement (Annexure P-1) between the parties and the impugned order passed by the State Commission. 6. The controversy requires examination in the backdrop of the precise contractual stipulation and the manner in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with it. 7. The respondents had entered into Builder-Buyer Agreements/ Memoranda of Understanding dated 10.08.2008 with the petitioner in respect of commercial units in the project situated at Sector 67, Gurugram. Clause 4 of the agreement provided for assured return of ₹55,000/- per month, payable quarterly, till possession or for a period of three years. Clause 11 provided as under: “That the First Party will reimburse 2.2 times of the entire principal amount in case of non-completion of project along with bank interest of 18% annually.” 8. The dispute ultimately travelled to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. While considering the appeals preferred by the buyers, the Hon’ble Supreme VIVEK PAHWA 2026.08.11 14:44 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR-4179-2026 2026:PHHC:109334 PAGE N: 3 OF TOTAL 8 PAGES Court specifically reproduced Clause 11 and considered the contention of the builder that the said clause was in the nature of a stipulation for liquidated damages and was liable to be examined under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected the said contention. It recorded a categorical finding that there was nothing unreasonable in the buyers' demand for compliance with Clause 11. It further held that the buyers were entitled to invoke Clause 11 as the units purchased by them had not become ready for occupation and enjoyment. The Court consequently found the demand of the buyers for enforcement of Clause 11 to be reasonable. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, thereafter, took note of the assured return already received by the buyers for five years and held that, under Clause 4, their entitlement to assured return was only for three years. It consequently directed that the assured return received for the period beyond three years be adjusted against the amount payable. 11. The operative portion of the order dated 19.03.2024 reads as under: “We, accordingly, set aside the impugned orders and allow the appeals arising from SLP(C) Nos. 5655-5656/2020 directing, the builder to reimburse 2.2 times the entire principal amount in terms of the clause 11 of the agreement concerned, deducting therefrom the sum remitted by it under the head 'assured return' for period beyond three years. We are apprised by learned counsel/senior counsel appearing for the parties that the said sum has already been received by the buyers. The adjusted amount shall be remitted to the buyers within a period of six months from today.” 12. The emphasis in the aforesaid direction, in the considered opinion of this Court, is not merely upon the expression “2.2 times the entire principal amount”, but upon the complete expression “2.2 times the entire principal amount in terms of Clause 11 of the agreement concerned.” 13. The petitioner seeks to read the operative direction as though the Hon’ble Supreme Court had directed payment of 2.2 times the principal VIVEK PAHWA 2026.08.11 14:44 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR-4179-2026 2026:PHHC:109334 PAGE N: 4 OF TOTAL 8 PAGES amount simpliciter. Such an interpretation would, however, require the words “in terms of Clause 11” to be ignored or rendered substantially meaningless. 14. This Court cannot adopt such an interpretation. Clause 11 is a composite contractual stipulation. It provides for reimbursement of 2.2 times the entire principal amount along with bank interest at 18% per annum. The two components constitute the contractual consequence of non-completion of the project. When the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed reimbursement of 2.2 times the entire principal amount in terms of Clause 11, it necessarily incorporated the contractual provision which it had itself reproduced and considered in the judgment. 15. Had the Hon’ble Supreme Court intended to sever the interest component from Clause 11 and award only 2.2 times the principal amount, there was no necessity to qualify the direction by the words “in terms of Clause 11 of the agreement concerned.” The expression used by the Hon’ble Supreme Court must be given meaning and effect. 16. The interpretation suggested by the petitioner would lead to an anomalous result. On the one hand, the petitioner seeks to rely upon the operative portion of the order to contend that only 2.2 times the principal amount is payable; on the other hand, it seeks to disregard the very contractual clause in terms whereof the said amount was directed to be reimbursed. Such selective reading of the operative direction cannot be accepted. 17. There is yet another significant aspect of the matter. The Hon’ble Supreme Court did not mechanically refer to Clause 11. Prior to issuing the operative direction, it considered the validity and reasonableness of the clause. The Court specifically observed that it did not find anything unreasonable in the buyers' demand for compliance with Clause 11 and held that the demand was reasonable. 18. Thus, the reference to Clause 11 in the operative portion of the judgment has to be understood in the light of the preceding reasoning. The Court had consciously upheld the buyers' entitlement to invoke Clause 11. It thereafter directed the builder to reimburse 2.2 times the entire principal VIVEK PAHWA 2026.08.11 14:44 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR-4179-2026 2026:PHHC:109334 PAGE N: 5 OF TOTAL 8 PAGES amount in terms of that clause, subject only to the adjustment of assured return received beyond three years. 19. The petitioner’s interpretation would, in effect, amount to severing the very clause which the Hon’ble Supreme Court had found enforceable. Such an interpretation cannot be accepted. 20. The fact that the Consumer Protection Act is a beneficial legislation also assumes importance while appreciating the rival constructions. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that consumer protection legislation is beneficial in nature and is required to receive a liberal and purposive interpretation so as to advance the object of protecting consumers. 21. The principle is not that the Court can rewrite a judicial order in favour of a consumer. Rather, where the language of an order admits of two possible constructions, the construction which advances the object of the consumer legislation and gives meaningful effect to the contractual and adjudicated rights of the consumer deserves preference over a construction which would substantially curtail the relief already upheld and granted. 22. The present case is, therefore, not one where the State Commission has created a new liability in favour of the respondents. The liability flows from Clause 11 itself, the enforceability of which stood affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The State Commission has merely given effect to the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court by reading its direction in conjunction with the clause to which the direction expressly refers. 23. The submission that the executing forum cannot go beyond the decree is acceptable as a proposition of law. But the State Commission, in the present case, has not gone beyond the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Rather, it has given effect to the order according to its plain language. The words “in terms of Clause 11” necessarily require reference to and implementation of Clause 11 as a whole. 24. The petitioner cannot be permitted to take advantage of a selective reading of the operative portion while ignoring the express reference VIVEK PAHWA 2026.08.11 14:44 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR-4179-2026 2026:PHHC:109334 PAGE N: 6 OF TOTAL 8 PAGES therein to Clause 11. The direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cannot be read in a manner which renders a material part thereof redundant. 25. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not separately mention “18% interest” in the operative paragraph, therefore, does not advance the case of the petitioner. An express repetition of every component of the contractual clause was unnecessary once the Court directed reimbursement in terms of that very clause, after having reproduced and considered it in detail. 26. It is also material that the adjustment directed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was specifically confined to the assured return received for the period beyond three years. The Court did not direct deletion or exclusion of any component of Clause 11. On the contrary, the adjustment was specifically identified, while the remainder of the contractual consequence under Clause 11 was left intact. 27. The State Commission has, therefore, correctly observed that accepting the petitioner's interpretation would result in an incomplete implementation of Clause 11 and would permit the judgment-debtor to avoid a part of the liability which stood incorporated in the Supreme Court's direction. 28. The subsequent conduct of the petitioner also cannot be lost sight of. Despite the Hon’ble Supreme Court having finally settled the entitlement of the respondents vide order dated 19.03.2024 and granted six months for compliance, the petitioner has, instead of honouring the said order, sought to resist its execution by placing a restricted interpretation upon the operative direction. The litigation, which has already travelled from the consumer forum to the National Commission and ultimately to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has thus been further prolonged, compelling the respondents to litigate afresh for enjoying the fruits of an adjudication, which has attained finality. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 cannot be permitted to become another avenue for delaying execution of a binding order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. VIVEK PAHWA 2026.08.11 14:44 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR-4179-2026 2026:PHHC:109334 PAGE N: 7 OF TOTAL 8 PAGES 29. The present petition, therefore, is not merely an unsuccessful challenge to an order of the State Commission; it forms part of a continued attempt to restrict the benefit already granted to the respondents by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The objection is founded upon a selective reading of the operative portion of the order dated 19.03.2024, while ignoring the express words “in terms of Clause 11 of the agreement concerned”. While a litigant is entitled to avail remedies available in law, such right cannot be permitted to degenerate into a device for delaying compliance with a final adjudication. 30. In the circumstances, the conduct of the petitioner has not only caused avoidable prejudice to the respondents but has also unnecessarily burdened the judicial process. The present petition is, therefore, found to be devoid of merit and has contributed to further delay in satisfaction of the respondents' legitimate entitlement. Such conduct warrants dismissal of the petition with exemplary costs, so as to discourage abuse of the process of law. 31. In view of the aforesaid conduct of the petitioner, the petition deserves to be dismissed with exemplary costs of ₹1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only). The said amount shall be paid by the petitioner to the respondents within a period of four weeks from today, failing which it shall be recoverable in execution proceedings in accordance with law. 32. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court finds no illegality, perversity or jurisdictional infirmity in the impugned order dated 20.01.2026 passed by the learned State Commission. 33. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed with costs of ₹1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only). The learned State Commission shall proceed with the execution expeditiously and in accordance with its order dated 20.01.2026 (Annexure P-14) and the directions contained in the order dated 19.03.2024 (Annexure P9) passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, including the liability flowing from Clause 11 of the agreement, after giving due adjustment to the assured return received for the period beyond three years, as specifically directed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. VIVEK PAHWA 2026.08.11 14:44 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR-4179-2026 2026:PHHC:109334 PAGE N: 8 OF TOTAL 8 PAGES 34. It is made clear that the pendency or disposal of the present petition shall not be construed as permitting any further delay in execution of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The State Commission shall endeavour to bring the execution proceedings to their logical conclusion expeditiously, in accordance with law. 35. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. 07.08.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Vivek Pahwa JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes Whether reportable:- No VIVEK PAHWA 2026.08.11 14:44 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document