Page No.# 1/22 GAHC010179442024 2026:GAU-AS:2575 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : I.A.(Civil)/3079/2024 AKLIM UDDIN LASKAR @ AKLIM HUSSAIN LASKAR AND 12 ORS. S/O LATE TAJ UDDIN LASKAR RESIDENT OF VILLAGE DAKHIN MOHANPUR PART VII, MOUZA BONRAJ, PS SONAI, PS SONAI, DIST CACHAR, ASSAM 788119 2: MD. ABDUL MATIN LASKAR S/O LATE TAJ UDDIN LASKAR RESIDENT OF VILLAGE DAKHIN MOHANPUR PART VII MOUZA BONRAJ PS SONAI PS SONAI DIST CACHAR ASSAM 788119 3: MD. ALTAF HUSSAIN LASKAR S/O LATE TAJ UDDIN LASKAR RESIDENT OF VILLAGE DAKHIN MOHANPUR PART VII MOUZA BONRAJ PS SONAI PS SONAI DIST CACHAR ASSAM 788119 4: MUSST. CHAMPARUN NESSA LASKAR W/O MD. KARIM UDDIN LASKAR D/O LATE TAJ UDDIN LASKAR RESIDENT OF VILLAGE ISARPAR PH. AND MOUZA KAPTANPUR PART 17 PO AMJURGHAT PS SONAI DIST CACHAR ASSAM 788119 Page No.# 2/22 5: MUSST. RINKU BEGUM LASKAR W/O MD. RINKU MIA LASKAR D/O LATE TAJ UDDIN LASKAR RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NAGDIRGRAM PO HATIRKHAL BAZAR PS SONAI DIST CACHAR ASSAM 788121 6: MUSST. JAYRUN NESSA LASKAR W/O LATE TAJ UDDIN LASKAR RESIDENT OF VILLAGE DAKHIN MOHANPUR PART VII MOUZA BONRAJ PS SONAI PS SONAI DIST CACHAR ASSAM 788119 7: MD. ZABRUL ISLAM LASKAR S/O LATE TAJ UDDIN LASKAR RESIDENT OF VILLAGE DAKHIN MOHANPUR PART VII MOUZA BONRAJ PS SONAI PS SONAI DIST CACHAR ASSAM 788119 8: KAIMUL ISLAM LASKAR S/O LATE TAJ UDDIN LASKAR RESIDENT OF VILLAGE DAKHIN MOHANPUR PART VII MOUZA BONRAJ PS SONAI PS SONAI DIST CACHAR ASSAM 788119 9: MUSST. KEWARUN NESSA LASKAR S/O LATE TAJ UDDIN LASKAR RESIDENT OF VILLAGE DAKHIN MOHANPUR PART VII MOUZA BONRAJ PS SONAI PS SONAI DIST CACHAR ASSAM 788119 10: MD. KAMRUL ISLAM LASKAR Page No.# 3/22 RESIDENT OF VILLAGE DAKHIN MOHANPUR PART VII MOUZA BONRAJ PS SONAI PS SONAI DIST CACHAR ASSAM 788119 11: MUSST. JAYRUN NESSA LASKAR W/O LATE TAJ UDDIN LASKAR RESIDENT OF VILLAGE DAKHIN MOHANPUR PART VII MOUZA BONRAJ PS SONAI PS SONAI DIST CACHAR ASSAM 788119 12: MD. SAFIQUE UDDIN LASKAR S/O RAHMAT ALI LASKAR @ ROMAN ALI RESIDENT OF VILLAGE DAKHIN MOHANPUR PART VII MOUZA BONRAJ PS SONAI PS SONAI DIST CACHAR ASSAM 788119 13: MD. ALTAF HUSSAIN LASKAR RESIDENT OF VILLAGE DAKHIN MOHANPUR PART VII MOUZA BONRAJ PS SONAI PS SONAI DIST CACHAR ASSAM 78811 VERSUS AJMAN ALI @ AJMAN ALI LASKAR S/O LATE REAJ ALI LASKAR, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE NUTAN RAMNAGAR PART IV, PO DAKHIN MOHANPUR, PH. BONRAJ, PS SONAI, DIST CACHAR, ASSAM 788119 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. I ALAM, MR. T SK,MR. B J GHOSH Advocate for the Respondent : MR N N UPADHYAYA, MR. B B KAKATI Page No.# 4/22 BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN ORDER 20.02.2026 Heard Mr. I. Alam, learned counsel for the applicants and Mr. N.N. Upadhyaya, learned counsel for the opposite party. 2. This interlocutory application, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is preferred by the applicants for condoning the delay of 709 days in preferring the connected regular second appeal, against the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2019, passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 2, Cachar at Silchar (first appellate court hereinafter), in Title Appeal No. 12/2014, whereby the learned first appellate court had varied the judgment and order dated 31.03.2014, passed by the learned Munsiff No. 1, Cachar at Silchar (trial court hereinafter), in Title Suit No. 39/2011. 3. Mr. Alam, learned counsel for the applicants submits that the applicants herein are the defendants in the Title Suit No. 39/2011, which was instituted by the opposite party herein, for specific performance of the contract, dated 28.02.2008, in respect of the suit land and for recovery of khas possession along with other reliefs. The applicants herein, as defendants, contested the suit by filing written statement. Thereafter, the learned trial court, after hearing both the parties, held that plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for specific performance of the contract, but, decreed the suit by directing the defendant No.1 to refund the advance consideration amount of Rs. 10,000/-, with interest @ 6% per annum, w.e.f. 13.04.2011, till realization. 3.1. Mr. Alam also submits that thereafter, against the said judgment and decree, the applicants/defendants had preferred an appeal, being Title Appeal Page No.# 5/22 No. 12/2014, before the learned first appellate court. Then, after hearing both the parties, the learned first appellate court, vide impugned judgment and decree, dated 17.08.2019, had allowed the appeal by holding that the plaintiff is entitled to have the sale deed executed with respect to the suit land and get the same registered after payment of the balance consideration amount of Rs. 25,000/- within one month of the preparation of the decree, along with an interest @ 6% per annum on the aforesaid amount. The learned first appellate court had further held that on receipt of the same, within one month, the defendant No. 1 will executed the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and if the defendant No. 1 fails to execute the sale deed, then the plaintiff may have the sale deed executed through the court in his favour. It is also held that the plaintiff is also entitled to be handed over the khas possession of the suit property, after execution of the sale deed, by evicting the defendants and their men and agents or anyone claiming under them, if any. 3.2. Mr. Alam further submits that though the judgment and decree was passed on 17.08.2019, the regular second appeal could not be preferred in time and the same has duly been explained in paragraph No. 8 of the application. 3.3. Taking this Court through the para No.8 of the application, Mr. Alam also submits that after the death of defendant No. 1, namely, Taj uddin Laskar, on 21.01.2016, the applicant No. 1, who is serving under the Indian Army, had contacted with the counsel engaged by his father Tajuddin Laskar, about the pending appeal, while he was on leave. But, subsequently, he joined his duties in the year 2017. Thereafter, due to his service conditions, he could not contact the counsel and that the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2019, was passed without the knowledge of the applicants, since the applicant No. 1 is eldest son of Late Tajuddin Laskar and after death of Tajuddin Laskar he has been looking Page No.# 6/22 after the pending appeal. Then, in the mean time, the COVID 19 Pandemic have broke out with effect from January, 2020 in all over the country and the same was continued till 2022 and during this period, the applicants herein could not follow the status of their pending appeal. 3.4. It is the further submission of Mr. Alam that thereafter, the applicants had received summons of Title Execution Case No. 29/2021, in the month of December, 2021 and then, contacted with another counsel at Silchar, who advised them to collect the certified copy of the Title Appeal No. 12/2014 and accordingly, they had applied for certified copy of the judgment on 14.12.2021, and received the same only in the last part of February, 2022. Thereafter, the applicants had contacted with their advocate in the month of March, 2022 and he advised them to file an appeal before this Court and he also told them that he will arrange everything for filing of an appeal. Thereafter, the applicants, on good faith, had handed over the brief to him in the month of April, 2022 and they had regularly contacted him and he assured them that the appeal will be filed on time. But, they did not receive any orders from this Court and in the meantime, execution proceeding had been started and order of the same had been furnished to them and therefore, the applicant No. 1 physically came to Guwahati, on 10.09.2023, to enquire about the pending appeal before this Court and on 11.09.2023, he contacted with the present counsel and found that no appeal has been preferred before this Court against the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2019. Thereafter, the applicant No. 1 again came to Guwahati on 30.09.2023, with complete brief and handed over the same to his engaged counsel and his engaged counsel took some time to prepare the appeal and filed the same, before this Court, on 11.10.2023. 3.5. Mr. Alam further submits that due to the facts and circumstances Page No.# 7/22 mentioned above, the delay of 709 days occurred in filing the regular second appeal, which is beyond the control of the applicants and that the delay is not intentional, rather it is circumstantial and there is no willful or deliberate laches on the part of the applicants and therefore, it is contended to condone the delay. 3.6. It is also submitted by Mr. Alam that there is no delay as per Section 14 of the Limitation Act in filing the regular second appeal, which has been caused due to the reasons beyond the control of the applicants as stated hereinabove. 3.7. In support of his submission, Mr. Alam has referred following case laws:- (i) Shakuntala Devi Jain vs. Kuntal Kumari and others, reported in AIR 1969 SC 575; (ii) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another vs. vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107; and (iii) Inder Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2025 0 Supreme (SC) 519. 4. Per-contra, Mr. Upadhyaya, learned counsel for the opposite party, has vehemently opposed the application. He submits that the applicants have failed to put forward any plausible explanation for the delay of 709 days in preferring the connected regular second appeal. He has also pointed out that though the applicants have blamed the earlier engaged counsel, yet no complaint has been lodged against him and as such, the explanation that the earlier counsel has not taken any step for filing the appeal remained unexplained and the same cannot be accepted and other explanations are also not at all acceptable. Under such circumstances, Mr. Upadhyay has contended to dismiss this application. Page No.# 8/22 5. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the application as well as the documents placed on record. 6. It appears that the impugned judgment and decree has been passed on 17.08.2019, and the appeal was preferred on 26.09.2024, and there is delay of 709 days in preferring the connected regular second appeal, as per calculation made by the registry of this Court, even after exclusion of the period of COVID 19 Pandemic, in view of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020 (IN RE: COGNIZANCE FOR EXTENSION OF LIMITATION). 7. Before directing a discussion into the issue, it would be in the interest of justice to go through the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in respect of condonation of delay, presently holding the field, so to deal with the issue with greater precision. 7.1. It is to be noted here that Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Katiji (supra), has observed as under:- “The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian LimitationAct of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on "merits". The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice - that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been Page No.# 9/22 making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy, and such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to Page No.# 10/22 benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the "State" which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even- handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the "State" is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be Page No.# 11/22 evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even- handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits.” 7.2. Again, in the case of N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123, Hon’ble Supreme Court went a step further and made the following observations:- “It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter; acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be un-condonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the Page No.# 12/22 rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finislitium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. Page No.# 13/22 While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 7.3. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon’ble Supreme Court, referring to its earlier authorities, broadly culled out the principles of condonation of delay as under:- “(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (iv) No presumption can be attached to Page No.# 14/22 deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in Page No.# 15/22 the name of liberal approach. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” 7.4. To the aforesaid principles, Hon’ble Supreme Court also added some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario, in the said case. They are:- “(a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner Page No.# 16/22 on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 7.5. Again in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (Dead) by Lrs. vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and Another, reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448, while dealing with the issue of condonation of delay, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount Page No.# 17/22 consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner sub- serves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the land losers facilitating their rehabilitation/ resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the land losers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the land losers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest. 31. It is true that when the State and its instrumentalities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay they may be entitled to Page No.# 18/22 certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. The Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the Government in filing appeals or applications as such. It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In a given case if any such facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and those factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the present case, no such facts are pleaded and proved though a feeble attempt by the learned counsel for the respondent was made to suggest collusion and fraud but without any basis. We cannot entertain the submission made across the Bar without there being any proper foundation in the pleadings.” 7.6. It is to be noted here that in the case of Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, reported in AIR 1962 SC 361, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “In construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this legal right which has accured to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The Page No.# 19/22 other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause of excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone the delay and admit the appeal. It is further necessary to emphasize that event if the sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage the diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration.” 7.7. The legal proposition, which can be crystallized from the aforesaid decisions and discussion, is that courts are not supposed to legalize injustice, but are obliged to remove injustice. Therefore, liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non- pedantic approach has to be adopted while dealing with an application for condonation of delay if ‘sufficient cause’ is being shown. The terms ‘sufficient cause’ should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose and regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. The paramount and pivotal consideration is substantial justice; the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. In respect of deliberate causation of delay the presumption is not available but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of, besides lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay, which is a significant and relevant fact. The courts should not adhere to strict proof, but required to be vigilant so that there is no real failure of justice. The Page No.# 20/22 approach of the court must be liberal but at the same time it must be reasonable also. In case of inordinate delay, strict approach is required to be taken while in case of delay of short duration, a liberal delineation is required. The fundamental principle, being weighing the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. While condoning delay the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. In the case of the explanation, being offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such litigation. The entire gamut of facts is to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. The State or a public body or an entity, representing a collective cause, should be given some acceptable latitude. But, the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. 8. Now, adverting to the facts herein this case this Court finds that the explanations are put forwarded by the applicants, in paragraph Nos. 7, 8 & 9 of the application. From a careful consideration of the same would, firstly, reveals that the applicant No. 1 is serving under the Indian Army and when he was on leave, he contacted with the lawyer engaged by his late father, about the status of pending appeal. But, subsequently he joined his duties in the year 2017 and thereafter, due to his service conditions, he could not contact with the counsel. Secondly, it reveals that only after receipt of summons of Title Execution Case No. 29/2021, he contacted with an advocate at Silchar District Bar Association, Silchar, who advised him to collect the certified copy of the Title Page No.# 21/22 Appeal No. 12/2014 and accordingly, he had applied for certified copy of the judgment and only on 14.12.2021, he received the same, from the Advocate Clerk, in the last part of February, 2022. Thirdly, the Advocate of the applicant advised him to file an appeal before this Court and the said Advocate also assured the applicant No. 1 that he will arrange everything for filing of an appeal and he is not required to come to Guwahati and then, the applicant No. 1 had handed over the brief to the said Advocate in the month of April, 2022 for filing of an appeal before this Court and then, the counsel assured him that the appeal will be filed on time. Fourthly, as the applicant No.1 did not receive any orders from this Court he physically came to Guwahati on 10.09.2023, to enquire about the pending appeal before this Court and contacted with the present counsel and then, he came to know that no appeal has been preferred before this Court. Fifthly, he handed over the complete documents to his newly engaged counsel who has, ultimately, filed the appeal on 26.09.2024. 8.1. The explanation, so forthcoming from the applicants’ side, when considered in the light of the proposition of law, as laid down in respect of condonation of delay and as discussed in the foregoing para, especially in paragraph No. 7.7., this Court is of the view that the explanation is not at all acceptable. Mr. Upadhyaya, learned counsel for the opposite party, has rightly pointed this out. Though the applicant No. 1 was pre-occupied with his profession, yet there are several other applicants to follow up the status of appeal and being unaware of the status of appeal, when the notice of execution case was received cannot be a ground, let alone a ‘sufficient ground’, for failing to follow up the status of the appeal. Thereafter, pendency of the matter with the engaged counsel for long time and the allegation of laches on his part, without a complaint being filed against him also cannot be a just ground. Page No.# 22/22 Further, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lala Mata Din vs. A. Narayanan, Civil Appeal Nos. 2410 and 2411 of 1966, mistake of counsel may in certain circumstances be taken into account in condoning delay although there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always a sufficient ground. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose such as laches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way and that being so, the blame made upon the counsel by the applicants, cannot be accepted. 8.2. Thus, having examined the explanation, so forthcoming for the delay of 709 days in preferring the connected regular second appeal, in the light of the proposition of law laid down in the aforementioned cases, this Court is of the view that the explanation cannot be accepted as ‘sufficient ground’, even after taking a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach. There is gross negligence on the part of the counsel and also of the applicants and also there appears to be lack of bona fides. If such a ground is accepted in the name of liberal approach, it would amount to allowing the other side to expose unnecessarily to face such litigation. 9. Thus, having scrutinized the entire gamut of facts carefully, this Court finds no merit in this application and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. JUDGE Comparing Assistant