12.08.2026. Item No. 39. Court No. 13 ap M.A.T. 1541 of 2017 With I.A. No. CAN 1 of 2017 (Old CAN 9578 of 2017) And I.A. No. CAN 2 of 2017 (Old CAN 9579 of 2017) The State of West Bengal & Ors. Versus Abdus Samad & Ors. Mr. Debopriya Gupta, Ld. A.G.P. Mr. Barun Ghosh, Mr. Biswanath Banerjee. …For the appellants. Mr. Gulam Mustafa, Mr. Tarasankar Samanta. …For the respondents. Re: CAN 1 of 2017 (Condonation) 1. There is a delay of 755 days in preferring the instant appeal. 2. In the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 from paragraphs 4 to 13 first indicate that the server copy of the impugned order dated 15th July, 2015 passed by the learned Single Bench was sent to the Legal Remembrancer and the process of obtaining certified copy started on 11th January, 2016 i.e. nearly five months after the impugned order was passed. Certified copy was prepared by the Registry on 31st March, 2016 and made ready for delivery on 11th April, 2016. 3. The decision to prefer an appeal was taken by the District Inspector of Schools (SE), Murshidabad on 10th May, 2016, nearly nine months after the 2 impugned order was passed. Intra departmental communication ensued all the way after the Principal Secretary, School Education Department from May, 2016. The decision to prefer the appeal was approved on 19th May, 2016 by the Commissioner of School Education. It further transpires that a further communication dated 21st June, 2016 was addressed by District Inspector of Schools (SE), Murshidabad to the Commissioner of School Education for taking immediate steps to prefer the appeal against the impugned judgment dated 15th July, 2015. 4. The Office of the Legal Remembrancer took the decision to prefer the appeal on 2nd August, 2016 and entrusted the papers to its earlier Advocate. 5. The said Advocate was handed over papers on 5th August, 2016. By a communication dated 17th November, 2016, the District Inspector of Schools (SE), Murshidabad requested the erstwhile Advocate to take steps to prefer the appeal. A further reminder is also sent to the said erstwhile Advocate on 6th January, 2017 to prefer the appeal on urgent basis. 6. By a communication dated 16th March, 2017, the District Inspector of Schools (SE), Murshidabad requested the Legal Remembrancer to regularize the appointment of the erstwhile Advocates to appear in a contempt application being CPAN 976 of 2016 filed by the respondent/writ petitioner before the Single Bench. Thereafter on 10.08.2017 the erstwhile 3 Advocate appeared on behalf of the alleged contemnors in the said contempt application and undertook to comply with the order of the Single Bench. At such time, the concerned District Inspector of Schools (SE), Murshidabad was also personally present in Court. 7. The learned erstwhile Advocate is stated to have returned the brief on 31st August, 2017 that he cannot act in the matter any further due to his personal difficulties. 8. The State thereafter engaged a new Advocate to prepare the Memorandum of Appeal on 1st September, 2017. The said new Advocate-on-record is stated to have prepared the Memorandum of Appeal and the application for stay and the same was settled and the appeal was filed on 6th September, 2017. 9. This Court is inclined to extract paragraphs 213, 214, 215, 261 and 262of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs. – Vs. – Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969: “213. From a combined reading of Bal Kishan Mathur (supra) and Sheo Raj Singh (supra) it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would not only compromise the sanctity of limitation. The earlier view, insofar as it favoured a liberal approach towards the State or any of its instrumentality is no more the correct position of law. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural 4 bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a “sufficient cause” for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. 214. What has been conveyed in so many words, by the decision of Postmaster General (supra) is that while excuses premised solely on bureaucratic lethargy cannot, by themselves, constitute sufficient cause, there may nonetheless be circumstances where the explanation offered, though involving bureaucratic procedures, reflects a genuine and bona fide cause for the delay. In such instances, the true test is whether the explanation demonstrates that the State acted with reasonable diligence and whether the delay occurred despite efforts to act within time. Where such bona fides are established, the Court retains the discretion to condone the delay. 215. In other words, Postmaster General (supra) does not shut the door on condonation of delay by the State in all cases involving bureaucratic processes. The real distinction lies between a case where delay is the result of gross negligence, inaction, or casual indifference on the part of the State, and a case where delay has occurred despite sincere efforts, owing to the inherent complexities of governmental decision-making. While the former category must necessarily be rejected to uphold the discipline of limitation, the latter can still attract judicial indulgence where public interest is at stake and the cause is shown to be reasonable. 261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. 5 262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.” 10. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Shivamma (supra), this Court notices negligence, inordinate and unexplained delay and a casual indifference on the part of the appellants. 11. One cannot ignore the fact that the erstwhile Advocate of the appellants has undertaken before the learned Single Bench in the contempt proceedings to comply with the order in presence of the District Inspector of Schools (SE), Murshidabad before the learned Single Bench. 12. Although pleadings in the application for condonation of delay, indicates that the erstwhile Advocate after lapse of two years has returned the brief, such Advocate has not been made a party respondent to the instant proceedings nor is there any mention of submission in contempt proceedings before 6 the Single Bench that the appellants will comply with the impugned order. 13. This Court is, therefore, of the view that the State in this matter has been rather guilty of suppression of material facts. 14. The explanation offered for the delay is neither bona fide nor acceptable to this Court. 15. The decision in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee – vs. – Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors. reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 cited by Counsel for the appellants has duly been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the aforesaid Shivamma decision (supra). 16. The decision in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, undoubtedly remains an important exposition of the principles governing the exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It advocates a liberal, pragmatic and justice-oriented approach, while simultaneously cautioning that such liberality cannot be extended to cases marked by gross negligence, deliberate inaction, lack of bona fides or a fanciful explanation. The subsequent decision in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs. v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 INSC 1104 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, does not depart from Esha Bhattacharjee; on the contrary, in paragraph 121 it expressly reiterates and reproduces the principles formulated therein. The two 7 decisions must, therefore, be read as forming part of a continuing and evolving line of authority rather than as expressing competing approaches. 17. What Shivamma does is to sharpen the discipline underlying the liberal approach recognised in Esha Bhattacharjee. It clarifies that “sufficient cause” must furnish a bona fide and satisfactory explanation covering the entire continuum from the commencement of limitation until the actual filing of the proceeding; that the apparent strength of the case on merits cannot substitute for an acceptable explanation for the delay; and that the State or a public body is not entitled to preferential indulgence merely on account of bureaucratic procedure or institutional inertia. Thus, while the justice-oriented approach in Esha Bhattacharjee continues to hold the field, Shivamma underscores that such an approach is not a charter for condoning negligence or reviving stale proceedings. The discretion under Section 5 must remain informed by substantial justice, but it must equally preserve the certainty, finality and discipline which constitute the very foundation of the law of limitation. 18. In the light of the above discussions, the application made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay cannot be treated as an application for exclusion of 755 days in preferring the instant appeal. The delay in filing the appeal is 8 inordinate, unexplained and the explanation offered does not indicate that the delay was bona fide. Hence, CAN 1 of 2017 (old CAN 9578 of 2017) is rejected. Re: M.A.T. 1541 of 2017 19. Consequently M.A.T. 1541 of 2017 is dismissed for being filed beyond limitation. 20. In view of dismissal of the appeal itself, the connected application being CAN 2 of 2017 is also dismissed. 21. There will be no order as to costs. 22. All parties are directed to act on a server copy of this order duly downloaded from the official website of this Court. (Rajasekhar Mantha, J.) (Anuj Singh, J.)