1 CGHC010311082026 2026:CGHC:39117 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Order Reserved on 18.08.2026 Order Delivered on 07.09.2026 WPC No. 4179 of 2026 Bhagwat Prasad Ratre S/o. Shri Sukhram Ratre Aged About 40 Years R/o. Village - Madhaibhatha, Post - Madhaibhatha, Tahsil - Bilaigarh, District - Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.), Presently Officiating Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Madhaibhatha ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department of Panchayat And Rural Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 2 - The Commissioner Bilaspur Division, Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur (C.G.). 3 - The Collector District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.). 4 - The Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) And Prescribed Authority Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.). 5 - The Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat, Bilaigarh, District - Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.). 6 - Dinanath Jatwar S/o Aghori Jatwar Aged About 34 Years Caste- Satnami, R/o. Village Madhaibhatha, Tahsil Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.). --- Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) YOGESH TIWARI Digitally signed by YOGESH TIWARI Date: 2026.09.08 17:26:05 +0530 2 For Petitioner : Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, Advocate For State : Mr. Anand Dadariya, Deputy Advocate General For Caveator : Mr. Vikram Pratap, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge CAV Order 1. Heard Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State as well as Mr. Vikram Pratap, learned counsel for the caveator. 2. The present writ petition has been filed calling in question the order dated 06.07.2026 passed by the learned Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, Bilaspur in Revision Case No.202607990500002/A-89, whereby the learned Commissioner, while entertaining the revision preferred by respondent No.6, has stayed the operation and implementation of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority-cum-Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.) removing respondent No.6 from the office of Sarpanch under Section 40(1) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and debarring him under Section 40(2) of the Act. The petitioner has prayed for following relief(s) :- “(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing the impugned interim order dated 06.07.2026 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Commissioner, Bilaspur 3 Division, Bilaspur in Revision Case No. 202607990500002/A-89, whereby the operation and implementation of the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) and Prescribed Authority has been stayed for a period of thirty days. (ii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction directing respondent Nos.1 to 4 to give full effect to the order passed by the Sub- Divisional Officer under Sections 40(1) and 40(2) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, removing respondent No.5 from the office of Sarpanch and debarring him for six years, during pendency of the revision proceedings. (iii) Pass such other order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. The case of the petitioner, in brief, is that the petitioner, along with other elected Panchs of Gram Panchayat Madhaibhatha, Janpad Panchayat Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.), submitted a complaint alleging illegal withdrawal and misappropriation of Panchayat funds by respondent No.6 by preparing and utilizing a false Panchayat resolution. Pursuant thereto, an enquiry was conducted by the enquiry committee constituted by the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Bilaigarh. The enquiry committee considered the Panchayat records, bank documents, statements of witnesses and other 4 relevant material and submitted its report, which culminated in the communication dated 06.11.2025 recommending initiation of proceedings under Section 40(1) of the Act against respondent No.6. 4. It is further the case of the petitioner that an independent enquiry was thereafter undertaken by the Collector, Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, on the complaint submitted by the petitioner and other Panchs. During the course of the said proceedings, statements of the concerned persons, including the then Secretary of the Gram Panchayat, were recorded. The Secretary stated that the bank proposal dated 05.06.2025 had been prepared by another person and that his signatures had been obtained under pressure. Upon consideration of the material available on record, the Collector, by noting dated 10.02.2026, found a prima facie case and referred the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), being the prescribed authority under the Act, for initiation of proceedings under Section 40 of the Act. 5. Thereafter, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), after initiating proceedings under Section 40 of the Act, afforded opportunity of hearing to respondent No.6 and considered the enquiry reports, documentary evidence as well as the defence taken by respondent No.6. Upon consideration of the material placed before him, the prescribed authority passed an order removing respondent No.6 from the office of Sarpanch under Section 40(1) 5 of the Act and further debarring him from contesting Panchayat elections for a period of six years under Section 40(2) of the Act. 6. It is not in dispute that consequent upon the order of removal, consequential proceedings were initiated by the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, under Section 38 of the Act for appointment of a temporary Sarpanch. Pursuant thereto, by order dated 22.06.2026, the petitioner was appointed as temporary Sarpanch and thereafter assumed charge of the office. It is also the case of the petitioner that consequentially the bank account of the Gram Panchayat came to be operated by the petitioner pursuant to the Panchayat resolution. 7. Aggrieved by the order of removal, respondent No.6 preferred an appeal before the Collector and also sought interim protection. The learned Collector, after considering the matter, did not grant interim relief and rejected the application for stay by order dated 25.06.2026. Thereafter, respondent No.6 approached the learned Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, by way of revision against the order refusing interim protection. The learned Commissioner, by the impugned order dated 06.07.2026, stayed the implementation of the order of removal for a period of thirty days. 8. Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the impugned interim order is wholly unsustainable inasmuch as the order of removal passed by the prescribed authority had already been acted upon before the 6 learned Commissioner proceeded to grant interim relief. It is submitted that pursuant to the removal of respondent No.6, the office of Sarpanch had fallen vacant, consequential proceedings under Section 38 of the Act had already been initiated and the petitioner had been appointed as temporary Sarpanch and had also assumed charge. Therefore, according to learned counsel, the interim order passed by the learned Commissioner does not merely preserve the existing position but has the effect of restoring respondent No.6 to an office from which he had already been removed. 9. Mr. Khetrapal further submits that the learned Commissioner has not recorded any prima facie finding regarding the illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the order passed by the prescribed authority. It is contended that the order of removal was passed after enquiry and after affording adequate opportunity of hearing to respondent No.6. Therefore, in the absence of any finding warranting interference with the order of removal, the learned Commissioner could not have granted an interim order which virtually nullifies the consequences of the final order passed by the prescribed authority. 10. It is submitted by Mr. Khetrapal that the material collected during the enquiry was not merely in the nature of an unverified allegation. The enquiry proceedings had disclosed, inter alia, that the proposal submitted before the State Bank of India for 7 withdrawal of an amount of Rs.2,97,000/- was different from the proposal allegedly passed in the Gram Panchayat meeting and that the then Secretary had stated that his signatures on the relevant proposal were obtained under pressure. It is also submitted that another amount of Rs.63,000/- was allegedly withdrawn without any valid Panchayat resolution. According to learned counsel, these circumstances were duly considered by the competent authorities before the order under Section 40 of the Act was passed. 11. Mr. Khetrapal next submits that the learned Commissioner has failed to consider the fact that the petitioner had already assumed charge as temporary Sarpanch and that the affairs of the Gram Panchayat were thereafter being conducted pursuant to the statutory orders. It is contended that granting interim protection to respondent No.6 at this stage would create serious administrative uncertainty and would result in conflicting claims with regard to the office of Sarpanch. It is also submitted that the impugned order has been passed without properly considering the principles governing grant of interim relief, namely, prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. 12. Mr. Khetrapal in support of his submissions, has placed reliance upon the orders passed by co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P. (C) No.3729 of 2023, decided on 22.08.2023; W.P.(C) No.1668 of 2018 and W.P.(C) No.1679 of 2018, decided on 21.06.2018, 8 as well as the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.78 of 2024, decided on 19.02.2024, and submits that the principles laid down therein lend support to the contention that an interim order ought not to be passed in a manner which has the effect of restoring a person to an office from which he has already been removed and thereby disturbing a position which has already stood altered and acted upon pursuant to the order of the competent authority. 13. On the other hand, Mr. Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State, opposes the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner and submits that the impugned order dated 06.07.2026 passed by the learned Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, Bilaspur, is purely interlocutory in nature and has been passed in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction conferred under the Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995. It is submitted that respondent No.6, being aggrieved by the order dated 03.06.2026 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) and Prescribed Authority under Section 40 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, removing him from the office of Sarpanch and debarring him from contesting Panchayat elections for a period of six years, had availed the statutory remedy of appeal before the Collector and, upon rejection of his prayer for interim protection, had approached the revisional authority. He would submit that the learned Commissioner, while considering the revision and the prayer for 9 interim protection, was competent to pass an appropriate interlocutory order so as to preserve the subject matter of the proceedings and ensure that the statutory remedy available to respondent No.6 does not become illusory or infructuous. The impugned order neither finally adjudicates the legality of the order dated 03.06.2026 nor records any conclusive finding in favour of respondent No.6 on the allegations which culminated in his removal. The substantive revisional proceedings are still pending consideration and the rights and contentions of the parties are yet to be finally adjudicated. It is, therefore, submitted that merely because the order of removal had, in the meantime, been acted upon and consequential administrative steps had been taken, the revisional authority could not be said to have become functus officio or denuded of its jurisdiction to consider and grant interim protection. If the mere implementation of an order were treated as an absolute bar against grant of interim relief, the statutory appellate and revisional remedies themselves would, in several cases, become ineffective merely on account of administrative action having been taken before the prayer for interim relief could be considered. 14. Mr. Dadariya submitted by learned State counsel that the subsequent appointment of the petitioner as temporary Sarpanch under Section 38 of the Act does not confer upon him any independent, vested or indefeasible right to continue in the office irrespective of the result of the statutory proceedings initiated by 10 respondent No.6. Section 38 itself contemplates a temporary arrangement in the event of a casual vacancy and the person so appointed merely officiates until the vacancy is duly filled in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The appointment of the petitioner, therefore, remains consequential upon the subsistence of the vacancy occasioned by the removal of respondent No.6 and cannot acquire a status higher than the statutory order from which such appointment flows. The fact that the petitioner has assumed charge or that the Panchayat bank account is being operated by him pursuant to such temporary arrangement cannot, by itself, create any substantive right in his favour or render the order of removal immune from appellate or revisional scrutiny. Learned State counsel would submit that the statutory scheme contained in Sections 38, 85 and 89 of the Act, read with the Chhattisgarh Panchayats (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995, particularly Rule 8 thereof, recognises the power of the competent authority to consider suspension or stay of the execution of an order during pendency of the statutory proceedings. Thus, the mere fact that consequential proceedings under Section 38 have been undertaken cannot operate as a legal impediment against the revisional authority exercising its jurisdiction to grant limited interim protection. On the contrary, such interim protection may become necessary to preserve the efficacy of the statutory remedy. If, during the pendency of the appeal or revision, the temporary arrangement is permitted to 11 culminate in a further electoral process and a fresh Sarpanch is elected, a situation may arise where, even if respondent No.6 ultimately succeeds in the statutory proceedings and the order of removal is set aside, restoration of the original position may become legally and practically complicated on account of the intervening electoral process. The consequence of permitting such irreversible developments during pendency of the statutory remedy may, therefore, be far more prejudicial to the party challenging the order of removal than the limited inconvenience which may be caused to the petitioner by continuation of the interim arrangement. 15. It is lastly submitted by Mr. Dadariya that the challenge to the impugned interim order is premature and does not disclose any exceptional circumstance warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. The learned Commissioner has merely granted interim protection for a limited period of thirty days and has not finally determined the revision or expressed any final opinion regarding the validity of the order passed by the prescribed authority. At the interlocutory stage, this Court ought not to undertake an adjudication of the merits of the allegations of financial irregularity, alleged illegal withdrawal of Panchayat funds, preparation or use of an allegedly false Panchayat resolution, or the evidentiary material considered by the prescribed authority, particularly when the statutory proceedings remain pending before the competent authority. The 12 petitioner, being merely a temporary Sarpanch appointed pursuant to Section 38, cannot claim that the temporary arrangement has crystallised into an indefeasible right so as to defeat the statutory remedy of respondent No.6. The interim order passed by the learned Commissioner, instead of causing any irreversible prejudice to the petitioner, merely seeks to preserve the position during the pendency of the statutory proceedings and prevents the creation of further complications which may arise from an intervening electoral or administrative process. It is thus submitted that the impugned order neither suffers from any patent jurisdictional error nor from perversity or manifest illegality warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate any legally enforceable right which stands adversely affected by the limited interim protection granted by the learned Commissioner. Accordingly, the writ petition, being devoid of merit and having been filed against a purely interlocutory order passed in pending statutory proceedings, deserves to be dismissed, leaving it open to the competent revisional authority to decide the pending proceedings on their own merits and in accordance with law. 16. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned State counsel and perused the pleadings, documents and material available on record. This Court has also carefully considered the nature and scope of the impugned order dated 06.07.2026, the circumstances in which the order of removal passed by the 13 prescribed authority came to be stayed, and the subsequent proceedings undertaken pursuant thereto. 17. The principal issue which arises for consideration is whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the learned Commissioner was justified in granting interim protection after the order of removal had already been acted upon and the petitioner had, pursuant to the consequential proceedings under Section 38 of the Act, been appointed as temporary Sarpanch and had assumed charge. At this stage, this Court is not called upon to examine the correctness of the allegations forming the basis of the proceedings under Section 40 of the Act or to adjudicate upon the ultimate merits of the pending revision. The consideration is confined to the legality and propriety of the impugned interim order and, in particular, whether such interim relief could have been granted when its practical consequence was to disturb the position already brought into existence pursuant to the order of the prescribed authority. 18. From the material placed on record, it is apparent that proceedings under Section 40 of the Act were initiated against respondent No.6 pursuant to complaints alleging irregular withdrawal and misappropriation of Panchayat funds. An enquiry was conducted by the competent authorities and the material collected during the enquiry was considered before proceedings under Section 40 were initiated. The prescribed authority thereafter considered the 14 material available on record and the defence of respondent No.6 and passed an order removing him from the office of Sarpanch and debarring him under Section 40(2) of the Act. The petition itself records that the proceedings before the prescribed authority were conducted after affording opportunity of hearing to respondent No.6. 19. The subsequent events are also of considerable significance. Pursuant to the order of removal, the Chief Executive Officer initiated consequential proceedings under Section 38 of the Act and, thereafter, the petitioner was appointed as temporary Sarpanch on 22.06.2026 and assumed charge of the office. Thus, by the time the learned Commissioner considered the prayer for interim relief, the order of removal had already been acted upon and its consequential statutory effects had already taken place. 20. In such circumstances, the learned Commissioner was required to consider the distinction between an interim order which merely protects the subject matter of the proceedings and an interim order which has the effect of undoing a completed action. Once respondent No.6 had been removed from the office pursuant to the order of the prescribed authority and the vacancy had thereafter been dealt with in accordance with the statutory mechanism, an order staying the implementation of the removal order could not be treated as a mere protective order. Its practical consequence would be to revive the position which had ceased to 15 exist. The impugned order dated 06.07.2026, though expressed in terms of staying the operation and implementation of the order of removal, therefore has a consequence much beyond preservation of the subject matter of the revision. In substance, it nullifies, for the period of the interim order, the consequences flowing from the order passed by the prescribed authority. The petitioner had already been appointed as temporary Sarpanch and had assumed charge. Therefore, the interim order has the effect of disturbing an arrangement which had already been brought into existence pursuant to the statutory process. 21. It is equally significant that the learned Commissioner, while granting interim protection, has not recorded any specific finding demonstrating that the order passed by the prescribed authority was prima facie without jurisdiction, perverse or in breach of the principles of natural justice. On the contrary, the material placed before this Court indicates that the order of removal was preceded by enquiry and consideration of the material available on record. The petitioner has specifically pleaded that respondent No.6 was afforded opportunity of hearing before the prescribed authority. 22. This Court is conscious of the fact that the revisional authority has jurisdiction to consider an application for interim relief during pendency of the revision. However, such discretion is required to be exercised judicially and in accordance with the settled parameters governing interim relief. The existence of revisional 16 jurisdiction by itself does not mean that an interim order can be passed in such a manner as to substantially grant the very consequence which would follow only upon success in the substantive proceedings. 23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Public Services Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P. and another, (2003) 4 SCC 104, has held in paras 36 and 38 as under :- “36. In Suman Dutta case this Court set aside the order passed by the High Court staying the order of termination as an interim measure in the pending proceeding. It was observed: (SCC p. 311, para 2) "[W]e are clearly of the opinion that the High Court erred in law in staying the order of termination as an interim measure in the pending writ petition. By such interim order if an employee is allowed to continue in service and then ultimately the writ petition is dismissed, then it would tantamount to usurpation of public office without any right to the same." *** 38. From the abovequoted decisions, it is evident that this Court has consistently been of the view that by way of an interim order the order of suspension, termination, dismissal and transfer etc. should not be stayed during the pendency of the proceedings in the court.” 17 24. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Prem Chopra, (2024) 12 SCC 426, has held in paras 18 and 19, as under :- “18. There is a difference between stay of operation of an order and quashing of an order which has been explained by this Court in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Lid. v. Church of South India Trust Assn., (1992) 3 SCC 1 as under: (SCC p. 9, para 10) "10. ……..While considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge, a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order. Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date of the passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of the passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence." 19. Following the said decision, this Court in Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. v. U.P. SEB, (1997) 5 SCC 772, has held that an order of stay which is granted during the pendency of a writ petition/suit or other proceeding comes to an end with the 18 dismissal of the substantive proceedings and it is the duty of the court in such cases to put the parties in the same position that they would have been in but for the interim order of the court. In that case, this Court rejected the contention that when the operation of the notification itself was stayed. no surcharge could be demanded upon the amount withheld. It was held thus: (SCC pp. 779-80, para 11) "11.... Holding otherwise would mean that even though the Electricity Board, who was the respondent in the writ petitions succeeded therein, yet deprived of the late payment surcharge which was due to it under the tariff rules/regulations. It would be a case where the Board suffers prejudice on account of the orders of the court and for no fault of its. It succeeds in the writ petition and yet loses. The consumer files the writ petition, obtains stay of operation of the notification revising the rates and fails in his attack upon the validity of the notification and yet he is relieved of the obligation to pay the late payment surcharge for the period of stay. which he is liable to pay according to the statutory terms and conditions which terms and conditions indeed form part of the contract of supply of supply entered into by him with the Board. We do not think that any such unfair and inequitable proposition can be sustained in law. 19 equally well settled that an order of stay granted pending disposal of a writ petition/suit or other proceeding, comes to an end with the dismissal of the substantive proceeding and that it is the duty of the court in such a case to put the parties in the same position they would have been but for the interim orders of the court. Any other view would result in the act or order of the court prejudicing a party (Board in this case) for no fault of its and would also mean rewarding a writ petitioner in spite of his failure. We do not think that any such unjust consequence can be countenanced by the courts. As a matter of fact, the contention of the consumers herein, extended logically should mean that even the enhanced rates are also not payable for the period covered by the order of stay because the operation of the very notification revising/enhancing the tariff rates was stayed. Mercifully, no such argument was urged by the appellants. It is ununderstandable how the enhanced rates can be said to be payable but not the late payment surcharge thereon, when both the enhancement and the late payment surcharge are provided by the same notification operation of which was stayed." (emphasis in original)” 20 25. Reverting to the facts of the case in the light of above judicial precedents, it is quite vivid that in the present case, the order of removal had already been implemented. The petitioner had been appointed as temporary Sarpanch and had assumed charge. The learned Collector had also declined to grant interim protection. In these circumstances, the learned Commissioner was required to consider whether there existed any exceptional circumstance warranting interference with the existing position at the interim stage. The impugned order, however, does not disclose adequate consideration of these material circumstances. 26. Another relevant consideration is the balance of convenience. The petitioner has already assumed charge pursuant to the consequential proceedings initiated after removal of respondent No.6. If the impugned interim order is permitted to operate, it would result in uncertainty as to the person entitled to discharge the functions of Sarpanch and would disturb the functioning of the Gram Panchayat. The public administration of the Panchayat cannot be permitted to remain subject to conflicting claims created by an interim order which effectively reverses an action already completed. 27. The material placed on record further indicates that the allegations against respondent No.6 relate to alleged withdrawal and utilization of Panchayat funds without following the prescribed procedure. The enquiry material was considered by the competent 21 authorities before proceedings under Section 40 were initiated. This Court, at the present stage, is not required to adjudicate upon the correctness of those allegations or record any final opinion on the merits of the removal proceedings. However, the existence of such material is certainly a relevant consideration while examining whether the learned Commissioner was justified in granting interim protection having the effect of restoring the removed office-holder. It is also required to be kept in mind that the present proceedings arise out of an interim order passed in a pending statutory proceeding. The Court is not examining, in the present writ petition, the ultimate correctness of the order of removal passed under Section 40 of the Act. The only question is whether the interim protection granted by the learned Commissioner, in the facts existing on the date of the impugned order, was legally sustainable. 28. In the considered opinion of this Court, once the order of removal had already been implemented and the petitioner had already been appointed as temporary Sarpanch and assumed charge, the learned Commissioner ought not to have passed an interim order which, in its practical operation, had the effect of restoring respondent No.6 to the office from which he had already been removed. Such an order does not merely preserve the subject matter of the proceedings; rather, it substantially alters the position which had come into existence pursuant to the order of the prescribed authority. 22 29. The fact that the revision preferred by respondent No.6 remains pending does not, by itself, justify restoration of the removed Sarpanch by way of interim relief. The revisional proceedings are required to be adjudicated on their own merits. If respondent No.6 ultimately succeeds in the substantive proceedings, the appropriate consequences may follow in accordance with law. However, at the interlocutory stage, the revisional authority was required to exercise greater caution before disturbing a position which had already been acted upon. 30. This Court, therefore, finds that the learned Commissioner has failed to properly consider the effect of the prior implementation of the order of removal, the appointment and assumption of charge by the petitioner as temporary Sarpanch, and the fact that the application for interim protection had already been considered by the learned Collector. The impugned order, consequently, cannot be sustained. 31. At the same time, it is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the ultimate merits of the proceedings initiated against respondent No.6 under Section 40 of the Act. The observations made herein are confined only to the legality of the impugned interim order dated 06.07.2026 and shall not prejudice the rights and contentions of respondent No.6 in the pending statutory proceedings. 32. Accordingly, having considered the matter in its entirety, this Court 23 is of the considered view that the impugned interim order dated 06.07.2026 passed by the learned Commissioner, Bilaspur Division in Revision Case No.202607990500002/A-89, cannot be sustained in law, particularly when the order of removal passed by the prescribed authority had already been acted upon and the petitioner had, pursuant to the consequential proceedings under Section 38 of the Act, been appointed as temporary Sarpanch and had assumed charge. The impugned order, in its practical effect, amounts to restoration of respondent No.6 to the office from which he had already been removed. Consequently, the impugned interim order dated 06.07.2026 passed by the learned Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, Bilaspur is hereby quashed and set aside, and the order passed by the learned Collector declining interim relief is upheld. The learned Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, is directed to forthwith transmit the entire records of the proceedings, including the records received from the learned Collector and the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), if the same are presently in his custody, to the concerned Collector. Thereafter, the learned Collector, Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, shall proceed to adjudicate the substantive proceedings on their own merits, in accordance with law, after affording due opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties. Having regard to the fact that the dispute relates to the right to hold an elected statutory office and consequential civil rights of the parties, the learned Collector shall make all endeavour to decide the matter expeditiously, preferably 24 within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the records. 33. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the substantive proceedings or on the correctness of the findings recorded by the prescribed authority, and the learned Collector shall decide the matter independently, uninfluenced by any observation made in the present order. 34. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition stands allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Yogesh The date when the judgment is reserved The date when the judgment is pronounced The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website Operative Full 18.08.2026 07.09.2026 ------ 08.09.2026 25 Head-Note An interim order staying termination amounts to quashing the termination order or obliterate it from existence. Ordinarily, Courts should not permit an employee to continue in public office merely on the strength of an interim order, as continuation may amount to usurpation of a public office if the writ petition ultimately fails.