CWP-22096-2026 -1- 132 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP-22096-2026 Date of decision: 22.07.2026 ISHPAL SINGH AND OTHERS ...Petitioner(s) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ...Respondent(s) CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASGURPREET SINGH PURI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV BERRY Present:- Mr. Bhushan Bhatia, Advocate for the petitioners. Mr. Arihant Goyal, Senior Panel Counsel for respondent No.1-Union of India. Ms. Puja Chopra, Senior Advocate with Ms. Palak Sharma, Advocate and Ms. Arshdeep Kaur, Advocate for respondent No.2. **** JASGURPREET SINGH PURI, J. (Oral) 1. The present Civil Writ Petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking the following prayers:- (i) Issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing and setting aside the order dated 16.05.2026 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Yamuna Nagar at Jagadhri in Summ/3716/2026 under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the SARFAESI Act’). CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 09:38 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-22096-2026 -2- (ii) Issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing and setting aside the physical possession taken on 19.06.2026 (Annexure P-3) pursuant to the void CJM order and the possession notice dated 03.06.2026 (Annexure P-4). (iii) Issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for setting aside and quashing the E-Auction Sale Notice dated 24.06.2026 (Annexure P-5). (iv) Issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing and setting aside the order dated 19.06.2026 (Annexure P-3) passed by DRT-II, Chandigarh, dismissing the Securitisation Application (SA) as barred by limitation. (v) Issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing respondent No.2 to forthwith restore the physical possession of the secured asset to the petitioners, with a further prayer to declare the entire SARFAESI enforcement proceedings, including notice under Section 13(2) dated 16.12.2025 (Annexure P-6), the symbolic possession of 17.03.2026 (Annexure P-7), CJM order dated 16.05.2026 (Annexure P-1), physical possession of 19.06.2026 (Annexure P-3) and E-Auction Sale Notice dated 24.06.2026 (Annexure P-5), as illegal, without jurisdiction and void ab initio. 2. Mr. Bhushan Bhatia, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that in the present case, respondent No.2-Company, which is a Financial Institution under the SARFAESI Act, has proceeded against the petitioners CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 09:38 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-22096-2026 -3- under the provisions of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act and thereafter, even the possession of the secured asset has also been taken by respondent No.2- Company. He further submitted that a Securitisation Application (SA) was filed before the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Chandigarh, which has been dismissed on 19.06.2026 vide Annexure P-3, although on the ground of limitation. He further submitted that one of the issues involved in the present case is that respondent No.2, being a private company, could not have proceeded against the petitioners as the amount involved was less than Rs.20 lakhs and therefore, the proceedings conducted by respondent No.2-Company and the aforesaid order passed by the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal are liable to be set aside. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that although the aforesaid plea with regard to the competence of respondent No.2 to have proceeded against the petitioners under the SARFAESI Act was not taken in the main Securitisation Application filed by the petitioners and therefore, there was no adjudication on the aforesaid issue but the petitioners have filed a review application before the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal, which is pending for 28.07.2026, wherein the aforesaid issue regarding the competence of respondent No.2-Company has been raised. He also submitted that since the dues were less than Rs.20 lakhs, this Court may entertain the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. On the other hand, Ms. Puja Chopra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2-Company submitted that the present petition is neither maintainable nor entertainable. In this regard, she submitted CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 09:38 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-22096-2026 -4- that a fresh plea has been taken by the petitioners in the present petition by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, despite the fact that the aforesaid plea regarding dues being less than Rs.20 lakhs was not even taken before the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal at the time of filing of the Securitisation Application and therefore, no such adjudication could have been undertaken by the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal. She further submitted that even otherwise also, the aforesaid plea which the petitioners are now seeking to raise before this Court has already been taken in the review application filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, which is still pending and on this ground as well, the present writ petition is not maintainable. 5. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that even otherwise also, the dues were not less than Rs.20 lakhs but were in fact more than Rs.20 lakhs, which is clear from the notices issued to the petitioners starting from the notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act and therefore, such a plea is otherwise also not maintainable on merits. 6. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 7. The petitioners are seeking to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, despite the existence of an alternative remedy available to them under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, in accordance with law. The basic argument which was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners was with regard to the competence of respondent No.2-Company to have even initiated the SARFAESI proceedings since, according to him, the dues were less than Rs.20 lakhs. CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 09:38 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-22096-2026 -5- However, on the other hand, it was the case of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2-Company that the dues were more than Rs.20 lakhs, which is evident from the notice issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act. 8. We are of the considered view that this Court would not go into the aforesaid issue as to whether the dues were less than Rs.20 lakhs or more than Rs.20 lakhs and we do not wish to make any observation on the same as the same being disputed question of fact. However, this Court would look into the objections raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 with regard to the maintainability and entertainability of the present petition. 9. Admittedly, in the Securitisation Application (SA) which was filed by the petitioners, no such plea was taken by them and the said Securitisation Application stands dismissed, although on the ground of limitation. This issue pertaining to amount being less than Rs.20 lakhs, which the learned counsel for the petitioners is pressing before this Court today has been raised in the review application before the learned DRT, which is still pending. 10. The law with regard to the maintainability and entertainability of a writ petition in the presence of an alternative remedy under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act is no longer res integra. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Varimadugu Obi Reddy versus B. Sreenivasulu and others, (2023) 2 SCC 168 held that in the ordinary course of business where the order of the Tribunal is an appealable order, the borrowers/person aggrieved is supposed to avail the statutory remedy of appeal which the law provides under Section 18 of the CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 09:38 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-22096-2026 -6- SARFAESI Act. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:- “34. The order of the Tribunal dated 1st August, 2019 was an appealable order under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and in the ordinary course of business, the borrowers/person aggrieved was supposed to avail the statutory remedy of appeal which the law provides under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 in the absence of efficacious alternative remedy being availed, there was no reasonable justification tendered by the respondent borrowers in approaching the High Court and filing writ application assailing order of the Tribunal dated 1st August, 2019 under its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution without exhausting the statutory right of appeal available at its command. 35. This Court in the judgment in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon & Others, (2010) 8 SCC 110 was concerned with the argument of alternative remedy provided under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and dealing with the argument of alternative remedy, this Court had observed that where an effective remedy is available to an aggrieved person, the High Court ordinarily must insist that before availing the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, the alternative remedy available under the relevant statute must be exhausted. Paras 43, 44 and 45 of the said judgment are relevant for the purpose and are extracted below: "43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 09:38 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-22096-2026 -7- greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislation's enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self- imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 09:38 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-22096-2026 -8- compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance." 36. In the instant case, although the respondent borrowers initially approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal by filing an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, but the order of the Tribunal indeed was appealable under Section 18 of the Act subject to the compliance of condition of pre-deposit and without exhausting the statutory remedy of appeal, the respondent borrowers approached the High Court by filing the writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution. We deprecate such practice of entertaining the writ application by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution without exhausting the alternative statutory remedy available under the law. This circuitous route appears to have been adopted to avoid the condition of pre-deposit contemplated under 2nd proviso to Section 18 of the Act 2002.” 11. Basic principle for exercising the power under Article 226 was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Babubhai Muljibhai Patel versus Nandlal Khodidas Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706, wherein it was held that the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:- "10. Exercise of the jurisdiction is no doubt discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 09:38 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-22096-2026 -9- judicial principles. When the petition raises complex questions of fact, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute should not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition (see Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality (1969) 3 SCC 769)." 12. In Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev versus State of Maharashtra, (2011) 2 SCC 782, while considering the question of maintainability of the writ petition, when alternate remedy is available, Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- "23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well settled that ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. (See Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and SBI v. Allied Chemical Laboratories.) 24. In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala this Court had observed that: "30. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to consider whether: (a) adjudication of the writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved; (b) the petition reveals all material facts; CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 09:38 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-22096-2026 -10- (c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute; (d) the person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches; (e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation; (f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors." 13. In Nivedita Sharma versus Cellular Operators Assn. of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained, ignoring the statutory dispensation. 14. In Southern Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa Ltd. versus Sri Seetaram Rice Mill, (2012) 2 SCC 108, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it should only be for the specialised tribunal or the appellate authority to examine the merits of assessment or even the factual matrix of the case. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:- "80. It is a settled canon of law that the High Court would not normally interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India where statutory alternative remedy is available. It is equally settled that this canon of law is not free of exceptions. The courts, including this Court, have taken the view that the statutory remedy, if provided under a specific law, would impliedly oust the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain writ or appropriate proceedings despite availability of an alternative remedy. This jurisdiction, the High Court would exercise with some circumspection in exceptional cases, particularly, CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 09:38 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-22096-2026 -11- where the cases involve a pure question of law or vires of an Act are challenged. This class of cases we are mentioning by way of illustration and should not be understood to be an exhaustive exposition of law which, in our opinion, is neither practical nor possible to state with precision. The availability of alternative statutory or other remedy by itself may not operate as an absolute bar for exercise of jurisdiction by the courts. It will normally depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. The further question that would inevitably come up for consideration before the Court even in such cases would be as to what extent the jurisdiction has to be exercised. 81. Should the courts determine on merits of the case or should they preferably answer the preliminary issue or jurisdictional issue arising in the facts of the case and remit the matter for consideration on merits by the competent authority? Again, it is somewhat difficult to state with absolute clarity any principle governing such exercise of jurisdiction. It always will depend upon the facts of a given case. We are of the considered view that interest of administration of justice shall be better sub-served if the cases of the present kind are heard by the courts only where they involve primary questions of jurisdiction or the matters which go to the very root of jurisdiction and where the authorities have acted beyond the provisions of the Act. However, it should only be for the specialised tribunal or the appellate authorities to examine the merits of assessment or even the factual matrix of the case." 15. In Cicily Kallarackal versus Vehicle Factory, (2012) 8 SCC 524, Hon’ble Supreme Court issued a direction of caution that it will not be a proper exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court to entertain a writ petition against CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 09:38 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-22096-2026 -12- such orders against which statutory appeal lies. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:- "4. Despite this, we cannot help but state in absolute terms that it is not appropriate for the High Courts to entertain writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the orders passed by the Commission, as a statutory appeal is provided and lies to this Court under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Once the legislature has provided for a statutory appeal to a higher court, it cannot be proper exercise of jurisdiction to permit the parties to bypass the statutory appeal to such higher court and entertain petitions in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even in the present case, the High Court has not exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law. The case is one of improper exercise of jurisdiction. It is no expected of us to deal with this issue at any greater length as we are dismissing this petition on other grounds." 16. In CIT versus Chhabil Dass Agrawal, (2014) 1 SCC 603, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. 17. A perusal of the aforesaid judgments would show that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has rather deprecated the practice of the High Courts entertaining petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, despite the availability of a remedy under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. Considering the aforesaid law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court and the facts and circumstances of the present case that SA filed by the petitioners was dismissed CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 09:38 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-22096-2026 -13- and review is pending, therefore without observing anything on the merits of the plea raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners pertaining to as to whether the due amount was less than Rs.20 lakhs or more than Rs.20 lakhs being a disputed question of fact, we are not inclined to entertain the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 18. Consequently, the present Civil Writ Petition is dismissed. (JASGURPREET SINGH PURI) JUDGE (SANJIV BERRY) 22.07.2026 JUDGE Chetan Thakur Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 09:38 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment.