Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA 167
1.
ISHWAR ISHWAR ISHWAR ISHWAR
Vs Vs Vs Vs BARU AND OTHERS BARU AND OTHERS BARU AND OTHERS BARU AND OTHERS
2.
ISHWAR ISHWAR ISHWAR ISHWAR
Vs Vs Vs Vs DAYANAND DAYANAND DAYANAND DAYANAND AND OTHERS AND OTHERS AND OTHERS AND OTHERS
3.
ISHWAR ISHWAR ISHWAR ISHWAR
Vs Vs Vs Vs ANGURI AND ORS.
ANGURI AND ORS.
ANGURI AND ORS.
ANGURI AND ORS.
4.
ISHWAR ISHWAR ISHWAR ISHWAR
Vs Vs Vs Vs DAYANAND DAYANAND DAYANAND DAYANAND AND ORS.
AND ORS.
AND ORS.
AND ORS.
5.
ISHWAR ISHWAR ISHWAR ISHWAR
Vs Vs Vs Vs BARU BARU BARU BARU AND ORS.
AND ORS.
AND ORS.
AND ORS.
6.
ISHWAR ISHWAR ISHWAR ISHWAR
Vs Vs Vs Vs ANGURI ANGURI ANGURI ANGURI AND ORS.
AND ORS.
AND ORS.
AND ORS.
CORAM:
CORAM:
CORAM:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH
Present: Mr. A.K. Kansal, Advocate
Mr. Shadab Ahmed, Advocate
Ms. Garima Kansal, Advocate
for the appellant(s). Mr. Aman Pal, Senior Advocate with
Ms. Neha Rani, Advocate
Ms. Mansi, Advocate
Mr. for the respondent(s). SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026 (O&M) IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH AT CHANDIGARH AT CHANDIGARH AT CHANDIGARH
SAO No.27 SAO No.27 SAO No.27 SAO No.27
Date of Decision
BARU AND OTHERS BARU AND OTHERS BARU AND OTHERS BARU AND OTHERS
SAO No.2 SAO No.2 SAO No.2 SAO No.2
AND OTHERS AND OTHERS AND OTHERS AND OTHERS
SAO No.29 of 2026 SAO No.29 of 2026 SAO No.29 of 2026 SAO No.29 of 2026
ANGURI AND ORS. ANGURI AND ORS. ANGURI AND ORS. ANGURI AND ORS. SAO No.30 of 2026 SAO No.30 of 2026 SAO No.30 of 2026 SAO No.30 of 2026
AND ORS. AND ORS. AND ORS. AND ORS. SAO No.31 of 2026 SAO No.31 of 2026 SAO No.31 of 2026 SAO No.31 of 2026
AND ORS. AND ORS. AND ORS. AND ORS. SAO No.32 of 2026 SAO No.32 of 2026 SAO No.32 of 2026 SAO No.32 of 2026
AND ORS. AND ORS. AND ORS. AND ORS. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH Mr. A.K. Kansal, Advocate Mr. Shadab Ahmed, Advocate and Ms. Garima Kansal, Advocate for the appellant(s). Mr. Aman Pal, Senior Advocate with Ms. Neha Rani, Advocate Ms. Mansi, Advocate Mr. Balraj, Advocate
for the respondent(s).
****
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH AT CHANDIGARH AT CHANDIGARH AT CHANDIGARH SAO No.27 SAO No.27 SAO No.27 SAO No.27 of of of of 2026 2026 2026 2026 (O&M) (O&M) (O&M) (O&M) Date of Decision: 20.07.2026
......Appellant …..Respondent …..Respondent …..Respondent …..Respondentssss SAO No.2 SAO No.2 SAO No.2 SAO No.28888 of 2026 of 2026 of 2026 of 2026 (O&M) (O&M) (O&M) (O&M) ......Appellant …..Respondents …..Respondents …..Respondents …..Respondents SAO No.29 of 2026 SAO No.29 of 2026 SAO No.29 of 2026 SAO No.29 of 2026 (O&M) (O&M) (O&M) (O&M) ......Appellant …..Respondents …..Respondents …..Respondents …..Respondents SAO No.30 of 2026 SAO No.30 of 2026 SAO No.30 of 2026 SAO No.30 of 2026 (O&M) (O&M) (O&M) (O&M) ......Appellant …..Respondents …..Respondents …..Respondents …..Respondents SAO No.31 of 2026 SAO No.31 of 2026 SAO No.31 of 2026 SAO No.31 of 2026 (O&M) (O&M) (O&M) (O&M) ......Appellant …..Respondents …..Respondents …..Respondents …..Respondents SAO No.32 of 2026 SAO No.32 of 2026 SAO No.32 of 2026 SAO No.32 of 2026 (O&M) (O&M) (O&M) (O&M) ......Appellant …..Respondents …..Respondents …..Respondents …..Respondents HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH MANUJ MANUJ MANUJ MANUJAAAA
Mr. Aman Pal, Senior Advocate with 1 MOHMED ATIK 2026.07.31 12:08 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this
order/judgment
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026
HARKESH MANUJA, J. (Oral) HARKESH MANUJA, J. (Oral) HARKESH MANUJA, J. (Oral) HARKESH MANUJA, J. (Oral)
Vide this common order, SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 of 2026 are being decided, as the appeal involve common/identical question of law. For the sake of brevity, facts are being noticed from being referred to as per their status in the [2]. By way of present appeal, challenge has been laid to the order dated 16.01.2026 passed by the learned District Judge, Jind (hereinafter referred to ‘‘‘‘First Appellate Court’ First Appellate Court’ First Appellate Court’ First Appellate Court’ Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs assailing the order dated 07.03.2022 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jind (hereinafter referred to as the allowed, thereby setting aside matter to the learned Trial Court for fresh adjudication. [3]. Briefly stating, respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs filed of damages against appellant/defend was pleaded that FIR No.363 dated 11.12.2006, filed under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B IPC, was registered at P.S. Sadar Jind against respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs at the instance of appellant/defenda & 2/plaintiffs having faced trial were acquitted vide decision dated 09.01.2014 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jind. Aggrieved thereof, the State of Haryana as well the appellant/defendant No.3 being comp Appeal Nos. 94 of 2014 and 1 of 2014 respectively, which were dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court vide judgment dated 21.01.2017. A criminal revision petition against the said decision dated 21.01.2017 preferred at the ins appellant/defendant No.3 came to be filed by respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs before the learned Trial Court SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026 (O&M) HARKESH MANUJA, J. (Oral) HARKESH MANUJA, J. (Oral) HARKESH MANUJA, J. (Oral) HARKESH MANUJA, J. (Oral) Vide this common order, SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 of 2026 are being decided, as the appeal involve common/identical question of law.
For the sake of brevity, facts are being noticed from SAO Nos.31 of 2026 SAO Nos.31 of 2026 SAO Nos.31 of 2026 SAO Nos.31 of 2026 being referred to as per their status in the original By way of present appeal, challenge has been laid to the order dated 16.01.2026 passed by the learned District Judge, Jind (hereinafter referred to First Appellate Court’ First Appellate Court’ First Appellate Court’ First Appellate Court’) vide which the appeal filed at the instance of respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs assailing the order dated 07.03.2022 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jind (hereinafter referred to as the allowed, thereby setting aside the aforementioned order matter to the learned Trial Court for fresh adjudication. Briefly stating, respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs filed of damages against appellant/defendant No.3 and respondent No.4. In the plaint, it was pleaded that FIR No.363 dated 11.12.2006, filed under Sections 420, 467, 468, B IPC, was registered at P.S. Sadar Jind against respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs at the instance of appellant/defenda & 2/plaintiffs having faced trial were acquitted vide decision dated 09.01.2014 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jind. Aggrieved thereof, the State of Haryana as well the appellant/defendant No.3 being comp Appeal Nos. 94 of 2014 and 1 of 2014 respectively, which were dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court vide judgment dated 21.01.2017. A criminal revision petition against the said decision dated 21.01.2017 preferred at the ins appellant/defendant No.3 was pending consideration; came to be filed by respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs before the learned Trial Court
Vide this common order, SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 of 2026 are being decided, as the appeal involve common/identical question of law. For the SAO Nos.31 of 2026 SAO Nos.31 of 2026 SAO Nos.31 of 2026 SAO Nos.31 of 2026. The parties are original Civil Suit. By way of present appeal, challenge has been laid to the order dated 16.01.2026 passed by the learned District Judge, Jind (hereinafter referred to as the ) vide which the appeal filed at the instance of respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs assailing the order dated 07.03.2022 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jind (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’ ‘Trial Court’ ‘Trial Court’ ‘Trial Court’) was the aforementioned order while remanding the matter to the learned Trial Court for fresh adjudication.
Briefly stating, respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs filed suit for recovery ant No.3 and respondent No.4. In the plaint, it was pleaded that FIR No.363 dated 11.12.2006, filed under Sections 420, 467, 468, B IPC, was registered at P.S. Sadar Jind against respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs at the instance of appellant/defendant no.3, wherein respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs having faced trial were acquitted vide decision dated 09.01.2014 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jind. Aggrieved thereof, the State of Haryana as well the appellant/defendant No.3 being complainant filed Criminal Appeal Nos. 94 of 2014 and 1 of 2014 respectively, which were dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court vide judgment dated 21.01.2017. A criminal revision petition against the said decision dated 21.01.2017 preferred at the instance of the
consideration; suit for recovery of damages came to be filed by respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs before the learned Trial Court 2 Vide this common order, SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 of 2026 are being decided, as the appeal involve common/identical question of law. For the he parties are By way of present appeal, challenge has been laid to the order dated as the ) vide which the appeal filed at the instance of respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs assailing the order dated 07.03.2022 passed by the learned ) was while remanding the for recovery ant No.3 and respondent No.4. In the plaint, it was pleaded that FIR No.363 dated 11.12.2006, filed under Sections 420, 467, 468, B IPC, was registered at P.S. Sadar Jind against respondent Nos.1 & nt no.3, wherein respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs having faced trial were acquitted vide decision dated 09.01.2014 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jind. Aggrieved thereof, the State lainant filed Criminal Appeal Nos. 94 of 2014 and 1 of 2014 respectively, which were dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court vide judgment dated 21.01.2017. A criminal revision tance of the suit for recovery of damages came to be filed by respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs before the learned Trial Court MOHMED ATIK 2026.07.31 12:08 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this
order/judgment
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026
on 17.08.2017. Relevant paragraph nos.2 to 5 of the plaint are reproduced hereunder:-
2. IPC, P.S. Sadar Jind was registered on the complaint of Ishwar Singh son of Rup Chand r/o Vill. Shahpur accused No.3 and that case FIR was transferred in economic cell, S.P. off over to Ram Niwas ASI who was posted as I.O. in Economic Cell. S.P. office, Jind. Ram Niwas ASI in connivance, collusion and in conspiracy with Ishwar Singh Complainant now defendant No.3 to hara plaintiffs, arrested plaintiffs on 17.3.2008 in the above referred case FIR and they were sent to judicial custody and were released on 09.07.2008. After filing of challan, trial was conducted by Ld. CJM. Jind registering the afore in criminal case No. 332 acquitted plaintiffs vide judgment dated 9.1.2014. The State of Haryana as well as Ishwar Singh complainant now defendant No.3 filed criminal appeal No. 94 of 2014 a Anil Kumar, Addl. Sessions Judge, Jind and both the aforesaid appeal were dismissed vide judgment dated 21.1.2017. 3. defendant No.3 only to grab the land of plaintiffs and to harass and defame them and to cause loss to them. The complaint was totally based on concocted facts and there was no truth in that complaint. Ram Niwas, ASI in connivance with Ishwar Singh complainan remained in judicial custody up to 09.07.2008 and they suffered financially, mentally and physically and they had to spent lacs of Rupees in getting bail, in the shape of their counsels fee and High Court and during the period they remained in judicial custody and they faced trial for a period of about six years continuously attending courts regularly and facing trouble and expenses and lost thei work suffered substantially and they had to spent substantial amount in thousands to face trial and to attend court and pay counsel's fee and other expenses. There was none to look after their houses and children and their they were defamed in the village amongst the inhabitance, friends and relatives and suffered financially, mentally, physically which cannot be compensated in terms of money, however, it may be estimated at Rs. 10.00 lacs each. 4. investigation conducted by Ram Niwas ASI was abuse of proses, low and it was SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026 (O&M) on 17.08.2017.
Relevant paragraph nos.2 to 5 of the plaint are reproduced
That a case FIR No. 363 dated 11.12.2006 U/s. 420,467,468,471, 120 IPC, P.S. Sadar Jind was registered on the complaint of Ishwar Singh son of Rup Chand r/o Vill. Shahpur accused No.3 and that case FIR was transferred in economic cell, S.P. office. Jind lor investigation and its investigation was handed over to Ram Niwas ASI who was posted as I.O. in Economic Cell. S.P. office, Jind. Ram Niwas ASI in connivance, collusion and in conspiracy with Ishwar Singh Complainant now defendant No.3 to hara plaintiffs, arrested plaintiffs on 17.3.2008 in the above referred case FIR and they were sent to judicial custody and were released on 09.07.2008. After filing of challan, trial was conducted by Ld. CJM. Jind registering the afore in criminal case No. 332-1 of 3.5.2008/8.9.2012 and after recording evidence acquitted plaintiffs vide judgment dated 9.1.2014. The State of Haryana as well as Ishwar Singh complainant now defendant No.3 filed criminal appeal No. 94 of 2014 and 1 of 2014 respectively which were decided jointly by the Court of Sh. Anil Kumar, Addl. Sessions Judge, Jind and both the aforesaid appeal were dismissed vide judgment dated 21.1.2017. That false complaint was filed by Ishwar Singh complainant now fendant No.3 only to grab the land of plaintiffs and to harass and defame them and to cause loss to them. The complaint was totally based on concocted facts and there was no truth in that complaint.
Ram Niwas, ASI in connivance with Ishwar Singh complainant now defendant No.3 arrested plaintiffs on 17.3.2008 and they remained in judicial custody up to 09.07.2008 and they suffered financially, mentally and physically and they had to spent lacs of Rupees in getting bail, in the shape of their counsels fee and other expenses as the bail was granted by Hon'ble High Court and during the period they remained in judicial custody and they faced trial for a period of about six years continuously attending courts regularly and facing trouble and expenses and lost thei work suffered substantially and they had to spent substantial amount in thousands to face trial and to attend court and pay counsel's fee and other expenses. There was none to look after their houses and children and their they were defamed in the village amongst the inhabitance, friends and relatives and suffered financially, mentally, physically which cannot be compensated in terms of money, however, it may be estimated at Rs. 10.00 lacs each. That the complaint filed by Ishwar Singh defendant No. 3 and investigation conducted by Ram Niwas ASI was abuse of proses, low and it was
on 17.08.2017. Relevant paragraph nos.2 to 5 of the plaint are reproduced That a case FIR No. 363 dated 11.12.2006 U/s. 420,467,468,471, 120 IPC, P.S. Sadar Jind was registered on the complaint of Ishwar Singh son of Rup Chand r/o Vill. Shahpur accused No.3 and that case FIR was transferred in ice. Jind lor investigation and its investigation was handed over to Ram Niwas ASI who was posted as I.O. in Economic Cell. S.P. office, Jind. Ram Niwas ASI in connivance, collusion and in conspiracy with Ishwar Singh Complainant now defendant No.3 to harass, disrepute and damage plaintiffs, arrested plaintiffs on 17.3.2008 in the above referred case FIR and they were sent to judicial custody and were released on 09.07.2008. After filing of challan, trial was conducted by Ld. CJM.
Jind registering the aforesaid case FIR 1 of 3.5.2008/8.9.2012 and after recording evidence acquitted plaintiffs vide judgment dated 9.1.2014. The State of Haryana as well as Ishwar Singh complainant now defendant No.3 filed criminal appeal No. 94 of nd 1 of 2014 respectively which were decided jointly by the Court of Sh. Anil Kumar, Addl. Sessions Judge, Jind and both the aforesaid appeal were dismissed vide judgment dated 21.1.2017. That false complaint was filed by Ishwar Singh complainant now fendant No.3 only to grab the land of plaintiffs and to harass and defame them and to cause loss to them. The complaint was totally based on concocted facts and there was no truth in that complaint. Ram Niwas, ASI in connivance with Ishwar t now defendant No.3 arrested plaintiffs on 17.3.2008 and they remained in judicial custody up to 09.07.2008 and they suffered financially, mentally and physically and they had to spent lacs of Rupees in getting bail, in the other expenses as the bail was granted by Hon'ble High Court and during the period they remained in judicial custody and they faced trial for a period of about six years continuously attending courts regularly and facing trouble and expenses and lost their mental peace and their domestic work suffered substantially and they had to spent substantial amount in thousands to face trial and to attend court and pay counsel's fee and other expenses. There was none to look after their houses and children and their agricultural land and they were defamed in the village amongst the inhabitance, friends and relatives and suffered financially, mentally, physically which cannot be compensated in terms of money, however, it may be estimated at Rs. 10.00 lacs each. t the complaint filed by Ishwar Singh defendant No. 3 and investigation conducted by Ram Niwas ASI was abuse of proses, low and it was 3 on 17.08.2017.
Relevant paragraph nos.2 to 5 of the plaint are reproduced That a case FIR No. 363 dated 11.12.2006 U/s. 420,467,468,471, 120-B IPC, P.S. Sadar Jind was registered on the complaint of Ishwar Singh son of Rup Chand r/o Vill. Shahpur accused No.3 and that case FIR was transferred in ice. Jind lor investigation and its investigation was handed over to Ram Niwas ASI who was posted as I.O. in Economic Cell. S.P. office, Jind. Ram Niwas ASI in connivance, collusion and in conspiracy with Ishwar ss, disrepute and damage plaintiffs, arrested plaintiffs on 17.3.2008 in the above referred case FIR and they were sent to judicial custody and were released on 09.07.2008. After filing of said case FIR 1 of 3.5.2008/8.9.2012 and after recording evidence acquitted plaintiffs vide judgment dated 9.1.2014. The State of Haryana as well as Ishwar Singh complainant now defendant No.3 filed criminal appeal No. 94 of nd 1 of 2014 respectively which were decided jointly by the Court of Sh. Anil Kumar, Addl. Sessions Judge, Jind and both the aforesaid appeal were That false complaint was filed by Ishwar Singh complainant now fendant No.3 only to grab the land of plaintiffs and to harass and defame them and to cause loss to them. The complaint was totally based on concocted facts and there was no truth in that complaint.
Ram Niwas, ASI in connivance with Ishwar t now defendant No.3 arrested plaintiffs on 17.3.2008 and they remained in judicial custody up to 09.07.2008 and they suffered financially, mentally and physically and they had to spent lacs of Rupees in getting bail, in the other expenses as the bail was granted by Hon'ble High Court and during the period they remained in judicial custody and they faced trial for a period of about six years continuously attending courts regularly r mental peace and their domestic work suffered substantially and they had to spent substantial amount in thousands to face trial and to attend court and pay counsel's fee and other expenses. There agricultural land and they were defamed in the village amongst the inhabitance, friends and relatives and suffered financially, mentally, physically which cannot be compensated in t the complaint filed by Ishwar Singh defendant No. 3 and investigation conducted by Ram Niwas ASI was abuse of proses, low and it was MOHMED ATIK 2026.07.31 12:08 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this
order/judgment
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026
tainted and plaintiffs were maliciously prosecuted without any evidence and base and they were prosecuted without any rea was no evidence to hold them guilty and on the basis of the evidence collected by Ram Niwas. ASI no case was made out for arrest plaintiffs and Ram Niwas. ASI in connivance with Ishwar Singh complainant now defendant No maliciously and ultimately, the criminal case initiated against plaintiffs remained un-successful and it was terminated in favour of plaintiffs. There was no facts and circumstances existing giving rise to a belief to hold plaintiffs as guilty and plaintiffs during their judicial custody remained in association with hardened criminals and their mental peace was disturbed and they suffered mental pain and agony and physical trouble which cannot be compensated even in terms of money and they were defa hating them and even their relatives and friends started boycotting them socially and neither they used to visit their houses nor invited them to their houses even on social marriage and religi
5. financially and socially and their social reputation and credibility were, damaged and their reputation was lowered in the society and amongst thei relatives and they suffered damages of more than Rs. 10.00 lakh each due to their malicious proceedings in the above referred criminal case and they had to face trial for about 6/7 years and sword remained hanging on their neck and they had to engage counsel paying huge amount of fee and had to attend the courts continuously for about ten years and during that period they could do no work and had suffered damages of more than Rs. 10.00 lakh each and they are entitled to recover the same from a plaintiffs and thus the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the damages suffered by them from defendants as they suffered such damages due to the act and conduct and dishonest intention and motive o
[4].
Upon appearance, the appellant/defendant No.3 filed written statement as well as application for rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the ground that the suit preferred at the instance of respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs was barred by limitation as they were acquitted by the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jind on 09.01.2014, whereas the suit for recovery of damages was filed by them on 17.08.2017, though the limitation for the purpose of SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026 (O&M) tainted and plaintiffs were maliciously prosecuted without any evidence and base and they were prosecuted without any rea was no evidence to hold them guilty and on the basis of the evidence collected by Ram Niwas. ASI no case was made out for arrest plaintiffs and Ram Niwas. ASI in connivance with Ishwar Singh complainant now defendant No maliciously and ultimately, the criminal case initiated against plaintiffs remained successful and it was terminated in favour of plaintiffs. There was no facts and circumstances existing giving rise to a belief to hold plaintiffs as guilty and plaintiffs during their judicial custody remained in association with hardened criminals and their mental peace was disturbed and they suffered mental pain and agony and physical trouble which cannot be compensated even in terms of money and they were defamed in their respective villages and all the villagers started hating them and even their relatives and friends started boycotting them socially and neither they used to visit their houses nor invited them to their houses even on social marriage and religious functions in their houses. That in the above circumstances, plaintiffs suffered mentally, physically, financially and socially and their social reputation and credibility were, damaged and their reputation was lowered in the society and amongst thei relatives and they suffered damages of more than Rs.
10.00 lakh each due to their malicious proceedings in the above referred criminal case and they had to face trial for about 6/7 years and sword remained hanging on their neck and they had o engage counsel paying huge amount of fee and had to attend the courts continuously for about ten years and during that period they could do no work and had suffered damages of more than Rs. 10.00 lakh each and they are entitled to recover the same from all the defendants payable by them jointly and severally to plaintiffs and thus the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the damages suffered by them from defendants as they suffered such damages due to the act and conduct and dishonest intention and motive of defendants.” Upon appearance, the appellant/defendant No.3 filed written statement as well as application for rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the ground that the suit preferred at the instance of respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs was barred by limitation as they were acquitted by the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jind on 09.01.2014, whereas the suit for recovery of damages was filed by them on 17.08.2017, though the limitation for the purpose of
tainted and plaintiffs were maliciously prosecuted without any evidence and base and they were prosecuted without any reasonable and probable cause and there was no evidence to hold them guilty and on the basis of the evidence collected by Ram Niwas. ASI no case was made out for arrest plaintiffs and Ram Niwas. ASI in connivance with Ishwar Singh complainant now defendant No.3 acts maliciously and ultimately, the criminal case initiated against plaintiffs remained successful and it was terminated in favour of plaintiffs.
There was no facts and circumstances existing giving rise to a belief to hold plaintiffs as guilty and plaintiffs during their judicial custody remained in association with hardened criminals and their mental peace was disturbed and they suffered mental pain and agony and physical trouble which cannot be compensated even in terms of money med in their respective villages and all the villagers started hating them and even their relatives and friends started boycotting them socially and neither they used to visit their houses nor invited them to their houses even on ous functions in their houses. That in the above circumstances, plaintiffs suffered mentally, physically, financially and socially and their social reputation and credibility were, damaged and their reputation was lowered in the society and amongst their friends and relatives and they suffered damages of more than Rs. 10.00 lakh each due to their malicious proceedings in the above referred criminal case and they had to face trial for about 6/7 years and sword remained hanging on their neck and they had o engage counsel paying huge amount of fee and had to attend the courts continuously for about ten years and during that period they could do no work and had suffered damages of more than Rs.
10.00 lakh each and they are entitled to ll the defendants payable by them jointly and severally to plaintiffs and thus the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the damages suffered by them from defendants as they suffered such damages due to the act and conduct f defendants.” Upon appearance, the appellant/defendant No.3 filed written statement as well as application for rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the ground that the suit preferred at the instance of respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs was barred by limitation as they were acquitted by the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jind on 09.01.2014, whereas the suit for recovery of damages was filed by them on 17.08.2017, though the limitation for the purpose of 4 tainted and plaintiffs were maliciously prosecuted without any evidence and base sonable and probable cause and there was no evidence to hold them guilty and on the basis of the evidence collected by Ram Niwas. ASI no case was made out for arrest plaintiffs and Ram Niwas. ASI .3 acts maliciously and ultimately, the criminal case initiated against plaintiffs remained successful and it was terminated in favour of plaintiffs. There was no facts and circumstances existing giving rise to a belief to hold plaintiffs as guilty and plaintiffs during their judicial custody remained in association with hardened criminals and their mental peace was disturbed and they suffered mental pain and agony and physical trouble which cannot be compensated even in terms of money med in their respective villages and all the villagers started hating them and even their relatives and friends started boycotting them socially and neither they used to visit their houses nor invited them to their houses even on That in the above circumstances, plaintiffs suffered mentally, physically, financially and socially and their social reputation and credibility were, damaged r friends and relatives and they suffered damages of more than Rs.
10.00 lakh each due to their malicious proceedings in the above referred criminal case and they had to face trial for about 6/7 years and sword remained hanging on their neck and they had o engage counsel paying huge amount of fee and had to attend the courts continuously for about ten years and during that period they could do no work and had suffered damages of more than Rs. 10.00 lakh each and they are entitled to ll the defendants payable by them jointly and severally to plaintiffs and thus the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the damages suffered by them from defendants as they suffered such damages due to the act and conduct Upon appearance, the appellant/defendant No.3 filed written statement as well as application for rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the ground that the suit preferred at the instance of respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs was barred by limitation as they were acquitted by the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jind on 09.01.2014, whereas the suit for recovery of damages was filed by them on 17.08.2017, though the limitation for the purpose of MOHMED ATIK 2026.07.31 12:08 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this
order/judgment
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026
filing the same was of one year as preferred under Article 74 of Schedule 1 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. The other point raised by the appellant/defendant No.3 in the application was with respect to non on the damages of Rs.1 application was opposed at the instance of respondent No.1/plaintiff. [5].
The learned Trial Court vide order dated 07.03.2022 rejected the plaint while recording that since the revision petit 21.01.2017 passed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jind was pending consideration before this Court, respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs were having no cause of action to file the suit. The operative paragraph n dated 07.03.2022 passed by the learned Trial Court is reproduced hereunder:
5. latest Limitation Act of 1963, that limitation for a suit for damages for malicious prosecution arises from the date of the trial Court, even if the acquittal has been appealed against. On the other hand, a decision by a single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in decided on 13.09 limitation period. Otherwise also, imagine a situation that after the present suit is
decreed, the acquittal, which would have formed the sole basis of such decretal, is reversed in appeal by the very basis of the probable decree and also resulting in a Civil Court's decision on the Civil Side being contrary to that of the High Court/Supreme Court on the criminal side, which is legally just not pala situation would arise if the probable decree in this suit was to be upheld till the Apex Court of India, thereby resulting in diametrically opposite decisions of the Apex Court, in its Civil and Criminal appellate jurisdiction pendency of appeal(now fixed for 16.3.22 before the High Court, as per online status on official website of the High Court) against the relevant acquittal, there is no cause for action to file the present suit. Hence, the same is rejected
Order VII rule 11(a) of the C.P.C. File be consigned to records, after due compliance.”
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026 (O&M) he same was of one year as preferred under Article 74 of Schedule 1 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. The other point raised by the appellant/defendant No.3 in the application was with respect to non on the damages of Rs.10 lakhs as quantified in the plaint. The prayer made in the application was opposed at the instance of respondent No.1/plaintiff. The learned Trial Court vide order dated 07.03.2022 rejected the plaint while recording that since the revision petit 21.01.2017 passed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jind was pending consideration before this Court, respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs were having no cause of action to file the suit. The operative paragraph n dated 07.03.2022 passed by the learned Trial Court is reproduced hereunder:
None of the case-laws relied upon by the defendant no. 3 holds under the latest Limitation Act of 1963, that limitation for a suit for damages for malicious osecution arises from the date of the trial Court, even if the acquittal has been appealed against. On the other hand, a decision by a single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Ajit Singh Vs The Punjab State RSA No. 711 of 1994 decided on 13.09.1994. holds that appeal period is relevant for determining limitation period. Otherwise also, imagine a situation that after the present suit is
decreed, the acquittal, which would have formed the sole basis of such decretal, is reversed in appeal by the High Court/Supreme Court, thereby demolishing the very basis of the probable decree and also resulting in a Civil Court's decision on the Civil Side being contrary to that of the High Court/Supreme Court on the criminal side, which is legally just not pala situation would arise if the probable decree in this suit was to be upheld till the Apex Court of India, thereby resulting in diametrically opposite decisions of the Apex Court, in its Civil and Criminal appellate jurisdiction pendency of appeal(now fixed for 16.3.22 before the High Court, as per online status on official website of the High Court) against the relevant acquittal, there is no cause for action to file the present suit. Hence, the same is rejected
Order VII rule 11(a) of the C.P.C. File be consigned to records, after due compliance.”
he same was of one year as preferred under Article 74 of Schedule 1 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. The other point raised by the appellant/defendant No.3 in the application was with respect to non-payment of ad valorem Court fee 0 lakhs as quantified in the plaint. The prayer made in the application was opposed at the instance of respondent No.1/plaintiff. The learned Trial Court vide order dated 07.03.2022 rejected the plaint while recording that since the revision petition against the decision dated 21.01.2017 passed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jind was pending consideration before this Court, respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs were having no cause of action to file the suit. The operative paragraph no.5 of the order dated 07.03.2022 passed by the learned Trial Court is reproduced hereunder:- laws relied upon by the defendant no. 3 holds under the latest Limitation Act of 1963, that limitation for a suit for damages for malicious osecution arises from the date of the trial Court, even if the acquittal has been appealed against. On the other hand, a decision by a single Judge of the Punjab Ajit Singh Vs The Punjab State RSA No. 711 of 1994 . holds that appeal period is relevant for determining limitation period. Otherwise also, imagine a situation that after the present suit is
decreed, the acquittal, which would have formed the sole basis of such decretal, is High Court/Supreme Court, thereby demolishing the very basis of the probable decree and also resulting in a Civil Court's decision on the Civil Side being contrary to that of the High Court/Supreme Court on the criminal side, which is legally just not palatable. A more legally awkward situation would arise if the probable decree in this suit was to be upheld till the Apex Court of India, thereby resulting in diametrically opposite decisions of the Apex Court, in its Civil and Criminal appellate jurisdictions. Thus, till the pendency of appeal(now fixed for 16.3.22 before the High Court, as per online status on official website of the High Court) against the relevant acquittal, there is no cause for action to file the present suit. Hence, the same is rejected under
Order VII rule 11(a) of the C.P.C. File be consigned to records, after due 5 he same was of one year as preferred under Article 74 of Schedule 1 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. The other point raised by the appellant/defendant Court fee 0 lakhs as quantified in the plaint. The prayer made in the The learned Trial Court vide order dated 07.03.2022 rejected the ion against the decision dated 21.01.2017 passed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jind was pending consideration before this Court, respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs were o.5 of the order laws relied upon by the defendant no. 3 holds under the latest Limitation Act of 1963, that limitation for a suit for damages for malicious osecution arises from the date of the trial Court, even if the acquittal has been appealed against. On the other hand, a decision by a single Judge of the Punjab Ajit Singh Vs The Punjab State RSA No. 711 of 1994 . holds that appeal period is relevant for determining limitation period. Otherwise also, imagine a situation that after the present suit is
decreed, the acquittal, which would have formed the sole basis of such decretal, is High Court/Supreme Court, thereby demolishing the very basis of the probable decree and also resulting in a Civil Court's decision on the Civil Side being contrary to that of the High Court/Supreme Court on the table. A more legally awkward situation would arise if the probable decree in this suit was to be upheld till the Apex Court of India, thereby resulting in diametrically opposite decisions of the s. Thus, till the pendency of appeal(now fixed for 16.3.22 before the High Court, as per online status on official website of the High Court) against the relevant acquittal, there is under
Order VII rule 11(a) of the C.P.C. File be consigned to records, after due MOHMED ATIK 2026.07.31 12:08 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this
order/judgment
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026
[6].
Aggrieved thereof, respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs filed Civil Appeal No.29 of 2022, wherein cross appellant/defendant No.3. The learned First Appellate Court vide order dated 16.01.2026 allowed the appeal preferred at the instance of respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs. The impugned order dated 07.03.2022 passed by the learned Trial Court was set aside resulting in the following observations:
“13. the impugned order and shall:
[7].
Impugning the aforementioned order dated 16.01.20 learned First Appellate Court, the present appeal(s) have been preferred.
CONTENTIONS
CONTENTIONS
CONTENTIONS
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT [8].
Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant No.3 has made two
contentions. Firstly, it has been submitt quantified in the plaint by respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs @ Rs.10 lakhs each, the Court fee was required to be at least contention learned counsel relies upon decision p SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026 (O&M) Aggrieved thereof, respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs filed Civil Appeal No.29 of 2022, wherein cross-objections were preferred at the instance of /defendant No.3. The learned First Appellate Court vide order dated 16.01.2026 allowed the appeal preferred at the instance of respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs. The impugned order dated 07.03.2022 passed by the learned Trial Court was set aside resulting into restoration of the suit to its original number with the following observations:-
“13.
The learned trial court shall proceed from the stage prior to passing the impugned order and shall: frame necessary issues, including on limitation, court fee/valuati and prematurity, if pressed;
decide objections regarding court fee/valuation in accordance with law and if deficiency is found, afford opportunity to make good the same;
if found appropriate, defer or stay adjudication of the claim for damages till final termination of criminal proceedings, rather than dismissing the suit;
thereafter, decide the suit on merits in accordance with law, uninfluenced by observations contained in the impugned order.” Impugning the aforementioned order dated 16.01.20 learned First Appellate Court, the present appeal(s) have been preferred.
CONTENTIONS
CONTENTIONS
CONTENTIONS
CONTENTIONS: : : : ---- ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT////DEFENDANT NO.3 DEFENDANT NO.3 DEFENDANT NO.3 DEFENDANT NO.3
Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant No.3 has made two
contentions. Firstly, it has been submitted that once the amount of damages were quantified in the plaint by respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs @ Rs.10 lakhs each, the Court fee was required to be at least affixed on the said claim. In support of his contention learned counsel relies upon decision p
Aggrieved thereof, respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs filed Civil Appeal objections were preferred at the instance of /defendant No.3. The learned First Appellate Court vide order dated 16.01.2026 allowed the appeal preferred at the instance of respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs. The impugned order dated 07.03.2022 passed by the learned Trial to restoration of the suit to its original number with The learned trial court shall proceed from the stage prior to passing frame necessary issues, including on limitation, court fee/valuati and prematurity, if pressed; decide objections regarding court fee/valuation in accordance with law and if deficiency is found, afford opportunity to make good the if found appropriate, defer or stay adjudication of the claim for nal termination of criminal proceedings, rather than thereafter, decide the suit on merits in accordance with law, uninfluenced by observations contained in the impugned order.” Impugning the aforementioned order dated 16.01.2026 passed by the learned First Appellate Court, the present appeal(s) have been preferred.
DEFENDANT NO.3 DEFENDANT NO.3 DEFENDANT NO.3 DEFENDANT NO.3 ::::----
Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant No.3 has made two ed that once the amount of damages were quantified in the plaint by respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs @ Rs.10 lakhs each, the on the said claim. In support of his contention learned counsel relies upon decision passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court 6 Aggrieved thereof, respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs filed Civil Appeal objections were preferred at the instance of /defendant No.3. The learned First Appellate Court vide order dated 16.01.2026 allowed the appeal preferred at the instance of respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs. The impugned order dated 07.03.2022 passed by the learned Trial to restoration of the suit to its original number with The learned trial court shall proceed from the stage prior to passing frame necessary issues, including on limitation, court fee/valuation decide objections regarding court fee/valuation in accordance with law and if deficiency is found, afford opportunity to make good the if found appropriate, defer or stay adjudication of the claim for nal termination of criminal proceedings, rather than thereafter, decide the suit on merits in accordance with law, uninfluenced by observations contained in the impugned order.” 26 passed by the
Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant No.3 has made two ed that once the amount of damages were quantified in the plaint by respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs @ Rs.10 lakhs each, the on the said claim. In support of his assed by the Hon’ble Apex Court MOHMED ATIK 2026.07.31 12:08 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this
order/judgment
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026
in the case of ‘State of Punjab and others Vs. Dev Brat Sharma State of Punjab and others Vs. Dev Brat Sharma State of Punjab and others Vs. Dev Brat Sharma State of Punjab and others Vs. Dev Brat Sharma INSC 316 INSC 316 INSC 316 INSC 316”. [8.1]. Further, it has been contended that once respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs stood acquitted by the Court of learned Chief Jud
judgment dated 09.01.2014, the suit was to be filed within one year of their acquittal as the same otherwise resulted in termination of prosecution and thus, it is submitted that the suit filed by respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs on 17 clearly barred by limitation having been filed beyond one year of the judgment of acquittal passed on 09.01.2014. In support, learned counsel relies upon ‘ Devi and others Vs. Manohar Lal Lagah Devi and others Vs. Manohar Lal Lagah Devi and others Vs. Manohar Lal Lagah Devi and others Vs. Manohar Lal Lagah and Ni Ni Ni Nilkanth Baliram Sawarkar Vs. Vidyanand Balkrishna Ogale lkanth Baliram Sawarkar Vs. Vidyanand Balkrishna Ogale lkanth Baliram Sawarkar Vs. Vidyanand Balkrishna Ogale lkanth Baliram Sawarkar Vs. Vidyanand Balkrishna Ogale
“2018 LawSuit(Bom) 780 2018 LawSuit(Bom) 780 2018 LawSuit(Bom) 780 2018 LawSuit(Bom) 780
Sheela Devi Sheela Devi Sheela Devi Sheela Devi
“[8]. accrual of complaint without summoning the respondent explanation has come forth in not filing the suit within the period of 3 years, i.e..
15.10.2012. Filing of the revision enlarge the period of limitation. In case such proposition is accepted, then there would not be any end to the litigation. A person can always come out with the plea of accrual of cause of action after the factors, in my view, have not been taken into consideration by the Court below, resulting into fallacious and perverse findings.”
Nilkanth Baliram Sawarkar Nilkanth Baliram Sawarkar Nilkanth Baliram Sawarkar Nilkanth Baliram Sawarkar
“18. respondent in the case of Bhaskar (supra), Vasantrao (supra) and Malabai (supra), it has been held that once an order of acquittal or discharge is passed by the Court, it amounts to termi Section 74 of the Act of 1963 is triggered from the date of such an order. Once the SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026 (O&M) State of Punjab and others Vs. Dev Brat Sharma State of Punjab and others Vs. Dev Brat Sharma State of Punjab and others Vs. Dev Brat Sharma State of Punjab and others Vs. Dev Brat Sharma Further, it has been contended that once respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs stood acquitted by the Court of learned Chief Jud
judgment dated 09.01.2014, the suit was to be filed within one year of their acquittal as the same otherwise resulted in termination of prosecution and thus, it is submitted that the suit filed by respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs on 17 clearly barred by limitation having been filed beyond one year of the judgment of acquittal passed on 09.01.2014. In support, learned counsel relies upon ‘ Devi and others Vs. Manohar Lal Lagah Devi and others Vs. Manohar Lal Lagah Devi and others Vs. Manohar Lal Lagah Devi and others Vs. Manohar Lal Lagah, reported as “ lkanth Baliram Sawarkar Vs. Vidyanand Balkrishna Ogale lkanth Baliram Sawarkar Vs. Vidyanand Balkrishna Ogale lkanth Baliram Sawarkar Vs. Vidyanand Balkrishna Ogale lkanth Baliram Sawarkar Vs. Vidyanand Balkrishna Ogale 2018 LawSuit(Bom) 780 2018 LawSuit(Bom) 780 2018 LawSuit(Bom) 780 2018 LawSuit(Bom) 780. Relevant paragraphs thereof are extracted hereunder: Sheela Devi Sheela Devi Sheela Devi Sheela Devi’s case ’s case ’s case ’s case
“[8]. The question which is posed is as to which would be the actual date for accrual of the cause of action. In my view, it would be 15.10.2012 when the complaint without summoning the respondent explanation has come forth in not filing the suit within the period of 3 years, i.e.. 15.10.2012. Filing of the revision petition and its dismissal on 3.2.2014 would not enlarge the period of limitation. In case such proposition is accepted, then there would not be any end to the litigation. A person can always come out with the plea of accrual of cause of action after the factors, in my view, have not been taken into consideration by the Court below, resulting into fallacious and perverse findings.” Nilkanth Baliram Sawarkar Nilkanth Baliram Sawarkar Nilkanth Baliram Sawarkar Nilkanth Baliram Sawarkar’s case ’s case ’s case ’s case
“18. On the other hand, in the judgments of this Court relied upon by the respondent in the case of Bhaskar (supra), Vasantrao (supra) and Malabai (supra), it has been held that once an order of acquittal or discharge is passed by the Court, it amounts to termination of the prosecution as the period of limitation under Section 74 of the Act of 1963 is triggered from the date of such an order. Once the
State of Punjab and others Vs. Dev Brat Sharma State of Punjab and others Vs. Dev Brat Sharma State of Punjab and others Vs.
Dev Brat Sharma State of Punjab and others Vs. Dev Brat Sharma, reported as “2022 2022 2022 2022 Further, it has been contended that once respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs stood acquitted by the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate vide
judgment dated 09.01.2014, the suit was to be filed within one year of their acquittal as the same otherwise resulted in termination of prosecution and thus, it is submitted that the suit filed by respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs on 17.08.2017 was clearly barred by limitation having been filed beyond one year of the judgment of acquittal passed on 09.01.2014. In support, learned counsel relies upon ‘Sheela Sheela Sheela Sheela , reported as “2018 LawSuit(P&H) 2373 2018 LawSuit(P&H) 2373 2018 LawSuit(P&H) 2373 2018 LawSuit(P&H) 2373 lkanth Baliram Sawarkar Vs. Vidyanand Balkrishna Ogale lkanth Baliram Sawarkar Vs. Vidyanand Balkrishna Ogale lkanth Baliram Sawarkar Vs. Vidyanand Balkrishna Ogale lkanth Baliram Sawarkar Vs. Vidyanand Balkrishna Ogale, reported as . Relevant paragraphs thereof are extracted hereunder: The question which is posed is as to which would be the actual date for the cause of action. In my view, it would be 15.10.2012 when the complaint without summoning the respondent-plaintiff was dismissed. No explanation has come forth in not filing the suit within the period of 3 years, i.e.. petition and its dismissal on 3.2.2014 would not enlarge the period of limitation. In case such proposition is accepted, then there would not be any end to the litigation. A person can always come out with the plea of accrual of cause of action after the decision by the Apex Court. All these factors, in my view, have not been taken into consideration by the Court below, resulting into fallacious and perverse findings.”
On the other hand, in the judgments of this Court relied upon by the respondent in the case of Bhaskar (supra), Vasantrao (supra) and Malabai (supra), it has been held that once an order of acquittal or discharge is passed by the Court, nation of the prosecution as the period of limitation under Section 74 of the Act of 1963 is triggered from the date of such an order. Once the 7 2022 2022 2022 2022 Further, it has been contended that once respondent Nos.1 & icial Magistrate vide
judgment dated 09.01.2014, the suit was to be filed within one year of their acquittal as the same otherwise resulted in termination of prosecution and thus, it is .08.2017 was clearly barred by limitation having been filed beyond one year of the judgment of Sheela Sheela Sheela Sheela 2018 LawSuit(P&H) 2373 2018 LawSuit(P&H) 2373 2018 LawSuit(P&H) 2373 2018 LawSuit(P&H) 2373 , reported as . Relevant paragraphs thereof are extracted hereunder:- The question which is posed is as to which would be the actual date for the cause of action. In my view, it would be 15.10.2012 when the plaintiff was dismissed. No explanation has come forth in not filing the suit within the period of 3 years, i.e.. petition and its dismissal on 3.2.2014 would not enlarge the period of limitation. In case such proposition is accepted, then there would not be any end to the litigation. A person can always come out with the decision by the Apex Court. All these factors, in my view, have not been taken into consideration by the Court below, On the other hand, in the judgments of this Court relied upon by the respondent in the case of Bhaskar (supra), Vasantrao (supra) and Malabai (supra), it has been held that once an order of acquittal or discharge is passed by the Court, nation of the prosecution as the period of limitation under Section 74 of the Act of 1963 is triggered from the date of such an order. Once the MOHMED ATIK 2026.07.31 12:08 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this
order/judgment
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026
period of limitation 14 030518 sa 464.16.judg odt starts to run from the date of such order, it cannot be suspen made subject matter of challenge before a higher Court by the aggrieved party. The relevant portion of the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhaskar (supra) reads as follows :
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026 (O&M) period of limitation 14 030518 sa 464.16.judg odt starts to run from the date of such order, it cannot be suspended or halted only because such an order has been made subject matter of challenge before a higher Court by the aggrieved party. The relevant portion of the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhaskar (supra) reads as follows :-
"3. Article 23 of the Limitation Act, Schedule I, prescribes one year's period of limitation for compensation for a malicious prosecution and the time begins to run "when the plaintiff is acquitted, or the prosecution is otherwise terminated". Apart from authori provision would seem to be plain. In the case of an acquittal, it provides a terminal point from which the time begins to run, the terminal point being the acquittal. Now, an acquittal is an acquittal, whether or not the complainant files a revision application against the order of acquittal or an appeal or the State files an appeal. The position is not altered by the addition of Section 417(3) in the Code of Criminal Procedure which permits the complainant, in the case of a private appeal to the High Court against an order of acquittal with its permission or leave. The original acquittal is still operative, and on the language of the provision, it is the date of acquittal from which time begins to run. The other alternative is that "the prosecution is otherwise, terminated." Now, whenever a prosecution is started, it may not necessarily end in an acquittal. A prosecution may end either in acquittal or conviction. If it is the first, then it is governed by the fi the second, there can be no case for a suit. It may also result in an order of discharge or in a dismissal of the complaint if the complainant is absent on the date fixed for the hearing of the complaint.
The later provision "the prosecution is otherwise terminated" is intended to meet such cases, and here again, it is the end of that proceeding which is operative for all intents and purposes and governs the point of time when the period begins to run. 4. In our view the first part of this provision is indicative of the meaning to be attached to the latter part, and it could only mean the first terminal point when the prosecution ends in the first Court, for the reason that the effect of such an ending is This is the view expressed in ILB 47 Bom 28 : (AIR 1922 Bom 209). In this case, the plaintiff was discharged on November 28, 1918. The defendant made an application in revision against the order of discharge but the application was rejected in March, 1919. The plaintiff raised the
period of limitation 14 030518 sa 464.16.judg odt starts to run from the date of ded or halted only because such an order has been made subject matter of challenge before a higher Court by the aggrieved party. The relevant portion of the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case ticle 23 of the Limitation Act, Schedule I, prescribes one year's period of limitation for compensation for a malicious prosecution and the time begins to run "when the plaintiff is acquitted, or the prosecution is otherwise terminated". Apart from authority, the language of this provision would seem to be plain. In the case of an acquittal, it provides a terminal point from which the time begins to run, the terminal point being the acquittal. Now, an acquittal is an acquittal, whether or not the t files a revision application against the order of acquittal or an appeal or the State files an appeal.
The position is not altered by the addition of Section 417(3) in the Code of Criminal Procedure which permits the complainant, in the case of a private complaint, to file an appeal to the High Court against an order of acquittal with its permission or leave. The original acquittal is still operative, and on the language of the provision, it is the date of acquittal from which time begins to run. The r alternative is that "the prosecution is otherwise, terminated." Now, whenever a prosecution is started, it may not necessarily end in an acquittal. A prosecution may end either in acquittal or conviction. If it is the first, then it is governed by the first part of this provision, and if it is the second, there can be no case for a suit. It may also result in an order of discharge or in a dismissal of the complaint if the complainant is absent on the date fixed for the hearing of the complaint. The later part of the provision "the prosecution is otherwise terminated" is intended to meet such cases, and here again, it is the end of that proceeding which is operative for all intents and purposes and governs the point of time when In our view the first part of this provision is indicative of the meaning to be attached to the latter part, and it could only mean the first terminal point when the prosecution ends in the first Court, for the reason that the effect of such an ending is the same as in the case of an acquittal. This is the view expressed in ILB 47 Bom 28 : (AIR 1922 Bom 209). In this case, the plaintiff was discharged on November 28, 1918. The defendant made an application in revision against the order of discharge e application was rejected in March, 1919.
The plaintiff raised the 8 period of limitation 14 030518 sa 464.16.judg odt starts to run from the date of ded or halted only because such an order has been made subject matter of challenge before a higher Court by the aggrieved party. The relevant portion of the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case ticle 23 of the Limitation Act, Schedule I, prescribes one year's period of limitation for compensation for a malicious prosecution and the time begins to run "when the plaintiff is acquitted, or the prosecution is ty, the language of this provision would seem to be plain. In the case of an acquittal, it provides a terminal point from which the time begins to run, the terminal point being the acquittal. Now, an acquittal is an acquittal, whether or not the t files a revision application against the order of acquittal or an appeal or the State files an appeal. The position is not altered by the addition of Section 417(3) in the Code of Criminal Procedure which complaint, to file an appeal to the High Court against an order of acquittal with its permission or leave. The original acquittal is still operative, and on the language of the provision, it is the date of acquittal from which time begins to run. The r alternative is that "the prosecution is otherwise, terminated." Now, whenever a prosecution is started, it may not necessarily end in an acquittal. A prosecution may end either in acquittal or conviction. If it is rst part of this provision, and if it is the second, there can be no case for a suit.
It may also result in an order of discharge or in a dismissal of the complaint if the complainant is absent on part of the provision "the prosecution is otherwise terminated" is intended to meet such cases, and here again, it is the end of that proceeding which is operative for all intents and purposes and governs the point of time when In our view the first part of this provision is indicative of the meaning to be attached to the latter part, and it could only mean the first terminal point when the prosecution ends in the first Court, for the reason the same as in the case of an acquittal. This is the view expressed in ILB 47 Bom 28 : (AIR 1922 Bom 209). In this case, the plaintiff was discharged on November 28, 1918. The defendant made an application in revision against the order of discharge e application was rejected in March, 1919. The plaintiff raised the MOHMED ATIK 2026.07.31 12:08 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this
order/judgment
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026
19. distinguished the judgments of the Allahabad High Court, Madras High Court and Nagpur High Court relied upon in the present case 16 030518 sa 464.16.judg odt on behalf of the appellant. It has been further Court in the aforesaid case as follows :
20. in the case of Vasantrao (supra) by this Court, wherein it has been held as follows:
21. the case of Malabai (supra), wherein it has been held as follows:
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026 (O&M) suit on March 10, 1920 to recover damages from the defendant for malicious prosecution. The Court held that the cause of action arose on the
order of discharge being passed in plaintiff's began to run, it would not be suspended because further proceeding might be taken either by Government or by the complainant in order to get the
order of discharge set aside. The Court followed the decision in Venu v. Coorya Narayan, (1881) ILR 6 Bom 376, where similarlty the Court held that the prosecution terminated on the order of discharge being made in favour of an accused person. Similar view was taken in Narayya v Seshayya (1900) ILR 23 Mad 24."
Thereafter, the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid judgment has distinguished the judgments of the Allahabad High Court, Madras High Court and Nagpur High Court relied upon in the present case 16 030518 sa 464.16.judg odt on behalf of the appellant. It has been further Court in the aforesaid case as follows :-
"10. No doubt, it is true that the words in the first part "when the plaintiffs acquitted" cannot be divorced from the words "or the prosecution is otherwise terminated". If the added to these words, then it must be apparent that the word "acquitted must give colour to the words "otherwise terminated and if time begins to run from the date of acquittal, by the trial Court, then equally where the prosecution ends otherwise, time must begin to run. This has been held by the decision in ILR 47 Bom 28 : (AIR 1922 Bom 209) which followed an earlier decision of this Court in (1881) ILR 6 Bom 376."
The said judgment of the Division Bench of this Court has bee in the case of Vasantrao (supra) by this Court, wherein it has been held as follows:
"10. As discussed, "on acquittal" as contemplated under Article 74 means the only acquittal at the first instance and that would be the staring point for limitation. In AIR 1922 Bombay 209 ( Purushottam Vishaldas Bhat vs Rooji Hari Athavle ) and 1967 Mah .L.J. 1971 (Bhaskar Narhar Deshmukh vs Kisanlal Sadasukhdas and another), this Court has held that appeal or revision is of no consequence to suspend the period limitation. The time once began to run cannot be deferred or kept in abeyance."
The said judgment of Vasantrao (supra) has been followed by this Court in the case of Malabai (supra), wherein it has been held as follows:
suit on March 10, 1920 to recover damages from the defendant for malicious prosecution. The Court held that the cause of action arose on the
order of discharge being passed in plaintiff's favour and once the period began to run, it would not be suspended because further proceeding might be taken either by Government or by the complainant in order to get the
order of discharge set aside. The Court followed the decision in Venu v. yan, (1881) ILR 6 Bom 376, where similarlty the Court held that the prosecution terminated on the order of discharge being made in favour of an accused person. Similar view was taken in Narayya v Seshayya (1900) ILR 23 Mad 24." Bench of this Court in the aforesaid judgment has distinguished the judgments of the Allahabad High Court, Madras High Court and Nagpur High Court relied upon in the present case 16 030518 sa 464.16.judg odt on behalf of the appellant. It has been further held by the Division Bench of this No doubt, it is true that the words in the first part "when the plaintiffs acquitted" cannot be divorced from the words "or the prosecution is otherwise terminated". If the word "finally" cannot be added to these words, then it must be apparent that the word "acquitted must give colour to the words "otherwise terminated and if time begins to run from the date of acquittal, by the trial Court, then equally where the on ends otherwise, time must begin to run. This has been held by the decision in ILR 47 Bom 28 : (AIR 1922 Bom 209) which followed an earlier decision of this Court in (1881) ILR 6 Bom 376." The said judgment of the Division Bench of this Court has been followed in the case of Vasantrao (supra) by this Court, wherein it has been held as follows: As discussed, "on acquittal" as contemplated under Article 74 means the only acquittal at the first instance and that would be the staring ation. In AIR 1922 Bombay 209 ( Purushottam Vishaldas Bhat vs Rooji Hari Athavle ) and 1967 Mah .L.J. 1971 (Bhaskar Narhar Deshmukh vs Kisanlal Sadasukhdas and another), this Court has held that appeal or revision is of no consequence to suspend the period limitation. The time once began to run cannot be deferred or kept in The said judgment of Vasantrao (supra) has been followed by this Court in the case of Malabai (supra), wherein it has been held as follows:- 9 suit on March 10, 1920 to recover damages from the defendant for malicious prosecution.
The Court held that the cause of action arose on the favour and once the period began to run, it would not be suspended because further proceeding might be taken either by Government or by the complainant in order to get the
order of discharge set aside. The Court followed the decision in Venu v. yan, (1881) ILR 6 Bom 376, where similarlty the Court held that the prosecution terminated on the order of discharge being made in favour of an accused person. Similar view was taken in Narayya v Bench of this Court in the aforesaid judgment has distinguished the judgments of the Allahabad High Court, Madras High Court and Nagpur High Court relied upon in the present case 16 030518 sa 464.16.judg odt held by the Division Bench of this No doubt, it is true that the words in the first part "when the plaintiffs acquitted" cannot be divorced from the words "or the word "finally" cannot be added to these words, then it must be apparent that the word "acquitted must give colour to the words "otherwise terminated and if time begins to run from the date of acquittal, by the trial Court, then equally where the on ends otherwise, time must begin to run. This has been held by the decision in ILR 47 Bom 28 : (AIR 1922 Bom 209) which followed an n followed in the case of Vasantrao (supra) by this Court, wherein it has been held as follows: As discussed, "on acquittal" as contemplated under Article 74 means the only acquittal at the first instance and that would be the staring ation. In AIR 1922 Bombay 209 ( Purushottam Vishaldas Bhat vs Rooji Hari Athavle ) and 1967 Mah .L.J. 1971 (Bhaskar Narhar Deshmukh vs Kisanlal Sadasukhdas and another), this Court has held that appeal or revision is of no consequence to suspend the period of limitation. The time once began to run cannot be deferred or kept in The said judgment of Vasantrao (supra) has been followed by this Court in MOHMED ATIK 2026.07.31 12:08 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this
order/judgment
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026
22. once the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated, the period of limitation is triggered and that when time begins to run, it cannot be held in abeyance or suspended, only because an order of acquittal or terminating the prosecution has been made subject matter of challenge before the Higher Court. It is clear from the said position of law that if the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant in the present case are accepted, it would amount reading something more in Article 74 of the Act of 1963, than what is plainly stated therein, which is not acceptable. If the contentions are accepted, it would amount to reading the words "finally terminated" or "finally acquitted" in the said provisio
[8.2]. No other arguments have been addressed by learned counsel for the appellant. ON BEHALF OF ON BEHALF OF ON BEHALF OF ON BEHALF OF [9]. On the other hand, learned Senior counsel for respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs while referring to the prayer clause made in the plaint submits that the claim set up by respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs is merely tentative subject to determination of damages by the learned Trial Court and no specific amount of damage was ever 2/plaintiffs were not required to pay SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026 (O&M)
"11. This Court, therefore considers it appropriate to respectfully agree with the view taken by this Court in aforesaid case of Vasantrao Chiddarwar as incorporated in Para 10, to the effect that once the starting point of limitation for the accused for a civil action to claim comp for malicious prosecution begins, it does not thereafter stop. The appeal or Revision does not operate in stopping the clock of limitation or suspending the process of running of limitation. Time once begin to run, save and except provided for by deferred, or kept in abeyance.
This Court is, therefore, unable to agree with the submissions that there is a contradictory view of different Benches of this Court."
Thus, the aforesaid judgments of this Court h once the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated, the period of limitation is triggered and that when time begins to run, it cannot be held in abeyance or suspended, only because an order of acquittal or terminating the prosecution has been made subject matter of challenge before the Higher Court. It is clear from the said position of law that if the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant in the present case are accepted, it would amount reading something more in Article 74 of the Act of 1963, than what is plainly stated therein, which is not acceptable. If the contentions are accepted, it would amount to reading the words "finally terminated" or "finally acquitted" in the said provision, which is wholly impermissible. No other arguments have been addressed by learned counsel for the ON BEHALF OF ON BEHALF OF ON BEHALF OF ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NOs. 1 & 2/PLAINTIFFS:
RESPONDENT NOs. 1 & 2/PLAINTIFFS:
RESPONDENT NOs. 1 & 2/PLAINTIFFS:
RESPONDENT NOs. 1 & 2/PLAINTIFFS: On the other hand, learned Senior counsel for respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs while referring to the prayer clause made in the plaint submits that the claim set up by respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs is merely tentative subject to determination of damages by the learned Trial Court and no specific amount of was ever claimed in the prayer clause, thus respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs were not required to pay ad valorem
considers it appropriate to respectfully agree with the view taken by this Court in aforesaid case of Vasantrao Chiddarwar as incorporated in Para 10, to the effect that once the starting point of limitation for the accused for a civil action to claim compensation for malicious prosecution begins, it does not thereafter stop. The appeal or Revision does not operate in stopping the clock of limitation or suspending the process of running of limitation.
Time once begin to run, save and except provided for by law, the running of limitation cannot be deferred, or kept in abeyance. This Court is, therefore, unable to agree with the submissions that there is a contradictory view of different Thus, the aforesaid judgments of this Court have consistently held that once the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated, the period of limitation is triggered and that when time begins to run, it cannot be held in abeyance or suspended, only because an order of acquittal or otherwise terminating the prosecution has been made subject matter of challenge before the Higher Court. It is clear from the said position of law that if the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant in the present case are accepted, it would amount reading something more in Article 74 of the Act of 1963, than what is plainly stated therein, which is not acceptable. If the contentions are accepted, it would amount to reading the words "finally terminated" or "finally acquitted" in the said n, which is wholly impermissible.” No other arguments have been addressed by learned counsel for the RESPONDENT NOs. 1 & 2/PLAINTIFFS:
RESPONDENT NOs. 1 & 2/PLAINTIFFS:
RESPONDENT NOs. 1 & 2/PLAINTIFFS:
RESPONDENT NOs. 1 & 2/PLAINTIFFS:---- On the other hand, learned Senior counsel for respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs while referring to the prayer clause made in the plaint submits that the claim set up by respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs is merely tentative subject to final determination of damages by the learned Trial Court and no specific amount of in the prayer clause, thus respondent Nos.1 & ad valorem Court fee on the tentative amount 10 considers it appropriate to respectfully agree with the view taken by this Court in aforesaid case of Vasantrao Chiddarwar as incorporated in Para 10, to the effect that once the starting ensation for malicious prosecution begins, it does not thereafter stop. The appeal or Revision does not operate in stopping the clock of limitation or suspending the process of running of limitation. Time once begin to run, law, the running of limitation cannot be deferred, or kept in abeyance.
This Court is, therefore, unable to agree with the submissions that there is a contradictory view of different ave consistently held that once the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated, the period of limitation is triggered and that when time begins to run, it cannot be otherwise terminating the prosecution has been made subject matter of challenge before the Higher Court. It is clear from the said position of law that if the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant in the present case are accepted, it would amount to reading something more in Article 74 of the Act of 1963, than what is plainly stated therein, which is not acceptable. If the contentions are accepted, it would amount to reading the words "finally terminated" or "finally acquitted" in the said No other arguments have been addressed by learned counsel for the On the other hand, learned Senior counsel for respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs while referring to the prayer clause made in the plaint submits that the final determination of damages by the learned Trial Court and no specific amount of in the prayer clause, thus respondent Nos.1 & amount MOHMED ATIK 2026.07.31 12:08 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this
order/judgment
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026
of Rs.10 lakhs each claimed as damages in the body of plaint. Para No.12, prayer clause as relied by learned
“12. be ascertained which are to be ascertained by the court after Adducing evidence by the parties and so that tentative value for the purpose o court fee is fixed at Rs.10,000/ The plaintiffs will cover the deficiency of the court fee later on after ascertaining the actual damage by the court. The valuation of suit for jurisdiction is fixed at Rs PPPPRAYER CLAUSE RAYER CLAUSE RAYER CLAUSE RAYER CLAUSE
ascertained and calculated by the Hon’ble Court and found entitled by the plaintiffs be granted in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants with costs amount of damages at the rate of 12% p.a. may also be granted w.e.f. filing of the suit till recovery.”
[9.1]. Learned Senior counsel further submits that the issue of limitation in the case in hand, is a mixed question of law and fact and the learned First Appellate Court, which framed a specific issue thereupon followed by grant of oppor counsel thus, submits that the impugned order passed by the learned First Appellate Court calls for no interference and prayed for dismissal of the present appeal(s) preferred at the instance of appel [10]. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the paper book. [11]. A perusal of the records sho 2/plaintiffs were under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120 SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026 (O&M) of Rs.10 lakhs each claimed as damages in the body of plaint. Para No.12, prayer clause as relied by learned Senior counsel are extracted hereunder:
“12. That at this stage the actual damage suffered by the plaintiff cannot be ascertained which are to be ascertained by the court after Adducing evidence by the parties and so that tentative value for the purpose o court fee is fixed at Rs.10,000/- on which the court fee of Rs.250/ The plaintiffs will cover the deficiency of the court fee later on after ascertaining the actual damage by the court. The valuation of suit for jurisdiction is fixed at Rs.10.00 lacs.
RAYER CLAUSE RAYER CLAUSE RAYER CLAUSE RAYER CLAUSE It is therefore prayed that a decree for recovery of damages to be ascertained and calculated by the Hon’ble Court and found entitled by the plaintiffs be granted in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants with costs payable by the defendants jointly and severally. Interest on the amount of damages at the rate of 12% p.a. may also be granted w.e.f. filing of the suit till recovery.”
Learned Senior counsel further submits that the issue of limitation in the case in hand, is a mixed question of law and fact and the learned First Appellate Court, which framed a specific issue thereupon followed by grant of opportunity to the parties to prove the same. Learned Senior counsel thus, submits that the impugned order passed by the learned First Appellate Court calls for no interference and prayed for dismissal of the present appeal(s) preferred at the instance of appellant/defendant No.3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the A perusal of the records shows that admittedly, Respondent N were sought to be prosecuted in terms of under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B IPC registered at P.S. Sadar Jind
of Rs.10 lakhs each claimed as damages in the body of plaint. Para No.12, prayer Senior counsel are extracted hereunder:- That at this stage the actual damage suffered by the plaintiff cannot be ascertained which are to be ascertained by the court after Adducing evidence by the parties and so that tentative value for the purpose of the on which the court fee of Rs.250/- is fixed. The plaintiffs will cover the deficiency of the court fee later on after ascertaining the actual damage by the court. The valuation of suit for It is therefore prayed that a decree for recovery of damages to be ascertained and calculated by the Hon’ble Court and found entitled by the plaintiffs be granted in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants payable by the defendants jointly and severally.
Interest on the amount of damages at the rate of 12% p.a. may also be granted w.e.f. filing Learned Senior counsel further submits that the issue of limitation in the case in hand, is a mixed question of law and fact and was rightly identified by the learned First Appellate Court, which framed a specific issue thereupon tunity to the parties to prove the same. Learned Senior counsel thus, submits that the impugned order passed by the learned First Appellate Court calls for no interference and prayed for dismissal of the present lant/defendant No.3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the ws that admittedly, Respondent Nos.1 and sought to be prosecuted in terms of FIR No.363 dated 11.12.2006, B IPC registered at P.S. Sadar Jind 11 of Rs.10 lakhs each claimed as damages in the body of plaint. Para No.12, prayer That at this stage the actual damage suffered by the plaintiff cannot be ascertained which are to be ascertained by the court after Adducing f the is fixed. The plaintiffs will cover the deficiency of the court fee later on after ascertaining the actual damage by the court. The valuation of suit for It is therefore prayed that a decree for recovery of damages to be ascertained and calculated by the Hon’ble Court and found entitled by the plaintiffs be granted in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants payable by the defendants jointly and severally. Interest on the amount of damages at the rate of 12% p.a. may also be granted w.e.f. filing Learned Senior counsel further submits that the issue of limitation in was rightly identified by the learned First Appellate Court, which framed a specific issue thereupon tunity to the parties to prove the same.
Learned Senior counsel thus, submits that the impugned order passed by the learned First Appellate Court calls for no interference and prayed for dismissal of the present I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the and 11.12.2006, B IPC registered at P.S. Sadar Jind, MOHMED ATIK 2026.07.31 12:08 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this
order/judgment
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026
registered at the instance of upon trial, the respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs were learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jind vide judgment dated 09.01.2014. The appeal preferred at the instance of State of Haryana as well as appellant/ No.3, was dismissed on 2 of 2017 titled ‘Ishwar Vs before this Court, wherein notice has been issued. RRRREEEE:::: PPPPAYMENT OF AYMENT OF AYMENT OF AYMENT OF [12]. In the suit for damages, the fixation of Court fee is governed by Section 7(i) of the Court Fees Act. Sections 7 & hereunder:- SSSSECTION ECTION ECTION ECTION 7777(i) OF THE OF THE OF THE OF THE
“7. Computation of fees payable in certain suits. under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows : for money. or arrears of maintenance, of annuities, or of other sums payable periodically) according to the amount claimed; SSSSECTION ECTION ECTION ECTION 9999 OF THE OF THE OF THE OF THE CCCC
“9. Power to ascertain net profits or marke think that the annual net profits or the market garden as is mentioned in section 7, paragraphs (v) and (vi), have or has been wrongly estimated, the Court may, for the purpose of comput in any suit therein mentioned, issue a commission to any proper person directing him to make such local or other investigation as may be necessary, and to report thereon to the Court.” [13]. A suit for damages falls squarely within cl for "money," and not within clause (iv), which alone permits a plaintiff to state a SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026 (O&M) registered at the instance of appellant/defendant No.3 being complainant, wherein the respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs were Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jind vide judgment dated 09.01.2014. The appeal preferred at the instance of State of Haryana as well as appellant/ was dismissed on 21.01.2017 and a criminal revision bearing CRR No.1568 Ishwar Vs. Bhanu’ arising out of the same is pending consideration before this Court, wherein notice has been issued. AYMENT OF AYMENT OF AYMENT OF AYMENT OF CCCCOURT OURT OURT OURT FFFFEES EES EES EES In the suit for damages, the fixation of Court fee is governed by Section 7(i) of the Court Fees Act.
Sections 7 & OF THE OF THE OF THE OF THE CCCCOURT OURT OURT OURT FFFFEES EES EES EES AAAACT CT CT CT
7. Computation of fees payable in certain suits. under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows :- for money.-(i) In suits for money (including suits for damages or compensation, or arrears of maintenance, of annuities, or of other sums payable periodically) according to the amount claimed;” CCCCOURT OURT OURT OURT FFFFEES EES EES EES AAAACT CT CT CT
“9. Power to ascertain net profits or marke think that the annual net profits or the market garden as is mentioned in section 7, paragraphs (v) and (vi), have or has been wrongly estimated, the Court may, for the purpose of comput in any suit therein mentioned, issue a commission to any proper person directing him to make such local or other investigation as may be necessary, and to report thereon to the Court.” A suit for damages falls squarely within cl and not within clause (iv), which alone permits a plaintiff to state a
defendant No.3 being complainant, wherein the respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs were acquitted by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jind vide judgment dated 09.01.2014. The appeal preferred at the instance of State of Haryana as well as appellant/defendant .01.2017 and a criminal revision bearing CRR No.1568 arising out of the same is pending consideration before this Court, wherein notice has been issued. In the suit for damages, the fixation of Court fee is governed by Section 7(i) of the Court Fees Act. Sections 7 & 9 of the Act are reproduced
7.
Computation of fees payable in certain suits.- The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as In suits for money (including suits for damages or compensation, or arrears of maintenance, of annuities, or of other sums payable periodically)
“9. Power to ascertain net profits or market-value.-If the Court sees reason to think that the annual net profits or the market-value of any such land, house or garden as is mentioned in section 7, paragraphs (v) and (vi), have or has been wrongly estimated, the Court may, for the purpose of computing the fee payable in any suit therein mentioned, issue a commission to any proper person directing him to make such local or other investigation as may be necessary, and to report A suit for damages falls squarely within clause (i) of Section 7, a suit and not within clause (iv), which alone permits a plaintiff to state a 12 defendant No.3 being complainant, wherein acquitted by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jind vide judgment dated 09.01.2014.
The defendant .01.2017 and a criminal revision bearing CRR No.1568 arising out of the same is pending consideration In the suit for damages, the fixation of Court fee is governed by 9 of the Act are reproduced The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as In suits for money (including suits for damages or compensation, or arrears of maintenance, of annuities, or of other sums payable periodically)- If the Court sees reason to value of any such land, house or garden as is mentioned in section 7, paragraphs (v) and (vi), have or has been ing the fee payable in any suit therein mentioned, issue a commission to any proper person directing him to make such local or other investigation as may be necessary, and to report ause (i) of Section 7, a suit and not within clause (iv), which alone permits a plaintiff to state a MOHMED ATIK 2026.07.31 12:08 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this
order/judgment
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026
tentative valuation in the body of the plaint pending final assessment by the Court. Such liberty is available only in the six categories of s and a suit for damages is not one of Sharma (supra) Sharma (supra) Sharma (supra) Sharma (supra) sought to defer quantification of is one for compensation or damages falling under clause (i) of Section 7, valorem Court fee is payable on the amount actually claimed. The liberty to plead a tentative valuation is confined to clause (iv) suits and cannot be of this kind by analogy. [14]. Applying this principle, plaint does not itself quantify the damages claimed. It seeks instead a decree recovery of damages to be ascertained and calculated However, paragraph nos.3 and 5 of the plaint specifically plead and quantify the damages suffered at Rs.10 lakhs open while specifying the claim in the body of the plaint does not exe plaintiffs from Accordingly, the impugned order dated 16.01.2026 passed by the learned First Appellate Court is ordered to be modified. The respondent Nos.1 & 2 / plaintiffs are hereby directed to make valuation of the plaint for the purposes of assessment of Court fee as against the claim of damages to the tune of Rs.10 lakhs said Court fee is to be affixed by the month from the date fixe RE RE RE RE:::: QUESTION OF LIMITATI QUESTION OF LIMITATI QUESTION OF LIMITATI QUESTION OF LIMITATI [15]. Further, with respect as to whether the suit for damages filed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026 (O&M) tentative valuation in the body of the plaint pending final assessment by the Court. Such liberty is available only in the six categories of s and a suit for damages is not one of those. The Hon’ble Apex Court i dealt with a suit for compensation where the plaintiff had similarly sought to defer quantification of Court fee pending trial. It is one for compensation or damages falling under clause (i) of Section 7, ourt fee is payable on the amount actually claimed. The liberty to plead a tentative valuation is confined to clause (iv) suits and cannot be of this kind by analogy. Applying this principle, admittedly, plaint does not itself quantify the damages claimed.
It seeks instead a decree recovery of damages to be ascertained and calculated However, paragraph nos.3 and 5 of the plaint specifically plead and quantify the damages suffered at Rs.10 lakhs by each of plaintiffs open while specifying the claim in the body of the plaint does not exe plaintiffs from affixing ad valorem Court fee on the amount so specified. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 16.01.2026 passed by the learned First Appellate Court is ordered to be modified. The respondent Nos.1 & 2 / plaintiffs cted to make valuation of the plaint for the purposes of assessment of Court fee as against the claim of damages to the tune of Rs.10 lakhs said Court fee is to be affixed by the respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs within one month from the date fixed before the learned Trial Court. QUESTION OF LIMITATI QUESTION OF LIMITATI QUESTION OF LIMITATI QUESTION OF LIMITATION ON ON ON Further, with respect as to whether the suit for damages filed by respondent Nos.1 and 2-plaintiffs was within limitation, the same has not been
tentative valuation in the body of the plaint pending final assessment by the Court. Such liberty is available only in the six categories of suits listed under clause (iv), The Hon’ble Apex Court in Dev Brat Dev Brat Dev Brat Dev Brat dealt with a suit for compensation where the plaintiff had similarly ourt fee pending trial. It was held that once a suit is one for compensation or damages falling under clause (i) of Section 7, ourt fee is payable on the amount actually claimed. The liberty to plead a tentative valuation is confined to clause (iv) suits and cannot be extended to suits admittedly, the prayer clause in the present plaint does not itself quantify the damages claimed. It seeks instead a decree "for recovery of damages to be ascertained and calculated by the Hon'ble Court." However, paragraph nos.3 and 5 of the plaint specifically plead and quantify the of plaintiffs.
Leaving the prayer clause open while specifying the claim in the body of the plaint does not exempt the ourt fee on the amount so specified. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 16.01.2026 passed by the learned First Appellate Court is ordered to be modified. The respondent Nos.1 & 2 / plaintiffs cted to make valuation of the plaint for the purposes of assessment of Court fee as against the claim of damages to the tune of Rs.10 lakhs each. The respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs within one d before the learned Trial Court. Further, with respect as to whether the suit for damages filed by plaintiffs was within limitation, the same has not been 13 tentative valuation in the body of the plaint pending final assessment by the Court. uits listed under clause (iv), Dev Brat Dev Brat Dev Brat Dev Brat dealt with a suit for compensation where the plaintiff had similarly held that once a suit is one for compensation or damages falling under clause (i) of Section 7, ad ourt fee is payable on the amount actually claimed. The liberty to plead a extended to suits the prayer clause in the present
"for by the Hon'ble Court." However, paragraph nos.3 and 5 of the plaint specifically plead and quantify the . Leaving the prayer clause mpt the ourt fee on the amount so specified. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 16.01.2026 passed by the learned First Appellate Court is ordered to be modified. The respondent Nos.1 & 2 / plaintiffs cted to make valuation of the plaint for the purposes of assessment . The respondent Nos.1 & 2/plaintiffs within one Further, with respect as to whether the suit for damages filed by plaintiffs was within limitation, the same has not been MOHMED ATIK 2026.07.31 12:08 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this
order/judgment
SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026
dealt with in detail by the learned First A depends on a mixed question of fact and law and requires detailed consideration, after the parties have been given adequate opportunity to establish their respective stands. For this reason, this Court does not find First Appellate Court's direction to frame a specific issue as to whether the suit was filed within limitation, and the learned Trial Court shall proceed accordingly. [16]. In view of aforesaid discussion, all the appeals stand disposed of. [17]. Nothing contained in this order shall be construed as an expression of final opinion on the merits of the plea of limitation and the same shall not prejudice the rights and content parties shall be at liberty to raise all pleas available to them in law and to lead such evidence as may be necessary, and the learned Trial Court shall decide the issue of limitation on its own mer [18]. In view of aforesaid discussion, all the appeals stand disposed of. Pending application(s), if any shall also stand disposed of. July July July July 20 20 20 20, 202 , 202 , 202 , 2026666 Atik Whether speaking/reasoned Whether reportable SAO Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 of 2026 (O&M) dealt with in detail by the learned First Appellate Court. depends on a mixed question of fact and law and requires detailed consideration, after the parties have been given adequate opportunity to establish their respective For this reason, this Court does not find First Appellate Court's direction to frame a specific issue as to whether the suit was filed within limitation, and the learned Trial Court shall proceed accordingly. In view of aforesaid discussion, all the appeals stand disposed of. Nothing contained in this order shall be construed as an expression of final opinion on the merits of the plea of limitation and the same shall not prejudice the rights and contentions of either party before the learned Trial Court. Both parties shall be at liberty to raise all pleas available to them in law and to lead such evidence as may be necessary, and the learned Trial Court shall decide the issue of limitation on its own merits, uninfluenced by any observations made in this order. In view of aforesaid discussion, all the appeals stand disposed of.
Pending application(s), if any shall also stand disposed of. Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No Whether reportable
Yes/No
ppellate Court. The issue of limitation depends on a mixed question of fact and law and requires detailed consideration, after the parties have been given adequate opportunity to establish their respective For this reason, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the First Appellate Court's direction to frame a specific issue as to whether the suit was filed within limitation, and the learned Trial Court shall proceed accordingly. In view of aforesaid discussion, all the appeals stand disposed of. Nothing contained in this order shall be construed as an expression of final opinion on the merits of the plea of limitation and the same shall not prejudice ions of either party before the learned Trial Court. Both parties shall be at liberty to raise all pleas available to them in law and to lead such evidence as may be necessary, and the learned Trial Court shall decide the issue of its, uninfluenced by any observations made in this order. In view of aforesaid discussion, all the appeals stand disposed of. Pending application(s), if any shall also stand disposed of. (HARKESH MANUJA) (HARKESH MANUJA) (HARKESH MANUJA) (HARKESH MANUJA)
JUDGE JUDGE JUDGE JUDGE Yes/No Yes/No 14 The issue of limitation depends on a mixed question of fact and law and requires detailed consideration, after the parties have been given adequate opportunity to establish their respective any reason to interfere with the First Appellate Court's direction to frame a specific issue as to whether the suit was Nothing contained in this order shall be construed as an expression of final opinion on the merits of the plea of limitation and the same shall not prejudice ions of either party before the learned Trial Court. Both parties shall be at liberty to raise all pleas available to them in law and to lead such evidence as may be necessary, and the learned Trial Court shall decide the issue of its, uninfluenced by any observations made in this order.
In view of aforesaid discussion, all the appeals stand disposed of. MOHMED ATIK 2026.07.31 12:08 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this
order/judgment