CWP-17271-2026 (O&M) -1- 124 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP-17271-2026 (O&M) Date of decision: 23.07.2026 M/S GAURI SHANKAR EDUCATIONAL TRUST (REGD.) ...Petitioner(s) VERSUS M/S RELIGARE FINVEST LTD. AND OTHERS ...Respondent(s) CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASGURPREET SINGH PURI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV BERRY Present:- Mr. Aman Pal, Senior Advocate with Mr. Jatinder Pal Singh, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Nitin Thatai, Advocate and Ms. Monika Thatai, Advocate for respondents No.1 and 2. **** JASGURPREET SINGH PURI, J. 1. The present Civil Writ Petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned order dated 29.11.2018 (Annexure P-10) passed by respondent No.4, along with the entire proceedings initiated under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the SARFAESI Act’), pursuant to the notice dated 22.11.2018 (Annexure P-8) and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, with a further prayer to direct the respondents to restore the possession of the secured assets of the petitioner, CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 11:29 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-17271-2026 (O&M) -2- and/or in the alternative directing the respondents to reconsider the restructuring proposal of the petitioner in accordance with the applicable RBI guidelines and also restraining the respondents from alienating, auctioning, transferring, encumbering or creating any third party rights in respect of the secured assets forming the subject matter of the present writ petition. 2. Mr. Aman Pal, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, while giving the facts of the case, submitted that the petitioner herein is a registered Educational Trust established in the year 2006, which had availed financial assistance from Punjab National Bank. Thereafter, due to financial constraints as well as internal disputes amongst the Trustees, the petitioner approached the respondent-Company, who sanctioned the credit facility in the year 2016. He submitted that the grievance of the petitioner pertains to the action of the respondent-Company in invoking the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002. In the year 2018, the loan account of the petitioner was classified as Non-Performing Asset (NPA), which was arbitrary and illegal and thereafter, a notice was issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act by the respondent- Company vide Annexure P-6 on 23.07.2018. In response to the aforesaid notice, the petitioner filed statutory objections under Section 13(3A) of the SARFAESI Act by raising various objections, including the objection that separate loan accounts had been illegally clubbed in a single demand notice. The respondent- Company withdrew the aforesaid notice and thereafter, issued a fresh demand notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act on 22.11.2018 vide Annexure P-8 by raising a demand of Rs.4,47,94,553.51/-. A separate notice was also issued to the petitioner under the Negotiable Instruments Act by the respondent- CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 11:29 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-17271-2026 (O&M) -3- Company. On 20.01.2019, the petitioner again filed objections to the aforesaid notice issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act. However, on 03.05.2019 vide Annexure P-13, the respondent-Company issued a composite possession notice for taking possession of the properties. The request made by the petitioner for restructuring of the loan account was declined by the respondents. 3. Thereafter, on 15.06.2019, the petitioner along with respondent No.5 filed a Securitisation Application (SA) No.147 of 2019 before the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Chandigarh, challenging the aforesaid demand notice as well as the possession notice. Thereafter, on 31.08.2022, the District Magistrate passed an order under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act and on 23.09.2022, the learned DRT dismissed the application of the petitioner seeking amendment of the Securitisation Application to challenge the subsequent orders and communications issued during the pendency of the proceedings before the learned DRT. 4. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a writ petition bearing No.CWP-25938-2022 before this Court, wherein the dispossession of the petitioner was stayed vide Annexure P-17 dated 15.11.2022. The aforesaid writ petition was ultimately disposed of by a Coordinate Bench of this Court on 05.01.2024 vide Annexure P-18 granting liberty to the petitioner to avail statutory remedy available to it in accordance with law. Thereafter, during the pendency of the Securitisation Application before the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal, the respondent-Company took physical possession of the secured property. CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 11:29 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-17271-2026 (O&M) -4- 5. Vide order dated 29.11.2025 (Annexure P-19), the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal-II Chandigarh ultimately dismissed the aforesaid Securitisation Application No.147 of 2019. This said order passed by the learned DRT is also under challenge in the present writ petition. No appeal against the aforesaid order has been preferred by the petitioner before the learned Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT). 6. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the grievance of the petitioner is with regard to the dismissal of the Securitisation Application (SA) by the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) without adjudicating the fundamental core issues involved pertaining to clubbing of two loan accounts and various other issues. He further submitted that thereafter on 08.05.2026, the respondents issued a 15 days' sale notice proposing to conduct an e-auction of the secured properties on 28.05.2026 and in this way, the present writ petition has also been filed by the petitioner because of the issuance of the aforesaid sale notice. 7. Mr. Pal submitted that even though the petitioner has not filed any appeal before learned DRAT against the order passed by the learned DRT, this Court would still have jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition since the issues involved in the present case were pertaining to the action being taken by the respondent-Company in an unlawful manner and therefore, the proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act were not in accordance with law. 8. At this stage, Mr. Nitin Thatai, Advocate has appeared on behalf of respondents No.1 and 2 and submitted that the petitioner did not prefer statutory appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act against the order passed by the CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 11:29 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-17271-2026 (O&M) -5- learned Debts Recovery Tribunal dated 29.11.2025 (Annexure P-19) and therefore, the present writ petition is not entertainable. He further submitted that even otherwise also, after the learned DRT had dismissed the SA, sale notice was issued to the petitioner, pursuant to which the property has already been auctioned. 9. Learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2 submitted that after filing of the present writ petition, the petitioner has filed a fresh Securitisation Application (SA) before the learned DRT on 06.06.2026 challenging the sale notice, the e-auction conducted on 28.05.2026 and all the consequential proceedings and the said SA is still pending before the learned DRT. 10. Mr. Thatai has supplied a photocopy of the proceedings of the learned DRT to this Court pertaining to the orders passed by learned DRT dated 06.06.2026, 12.06.2026 and 08.07.2026. He has prayed that photocopy of the same may be taken on record as the petitioner cannot maintain the present writ petition because now a fresh SA has been filed before the learned DRT challenging the sale notice, e-auction conducted and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom. 11. The photocopies of the aforesaid orders passed by the learned DRT, as supplied by the learned counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2, are hereby taken on record as Mark- ‘X’. Registry is directed to tag the same at an appropriate place in the paper-book. 12. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 13. Admittedly, the petitioner had filed a Securitisation Application (SA) before the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) by taking up the pleas CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 11:29 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-17271-2026 (O&M) -6- available to it and the said application was dismissed by the learned DRT vide order dated 29.11.2025 (Annexure P-19). A perusal of the aforesaid order would show that the learned DRT has considered the issues raised by the petitioner pertaining to the action of the respondents in combining two separate loan accounts along with other issues raised by the petitioner, which are now sought to be agitated before this Court. The petitioner did not choose to file a statutory appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act before the learned Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) and instead, now after a period of about six months, the present writ petition has been filed. After filing of the present writ petition, the petitioner again filed a fresh Securitisation Application (SA) before the learned DRT challenging the said sale notice, e-auction and all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom. The property has already been auctioned on 28.05.2026. A perusal of the aforesaid orders supplied by the learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2 would show that even the Auction Purchaser has also appeared before the learned DRT in the proceedings filed by the petitioner, which are still pending. 14. The law with regard to the maintainability and entertainability of a writ petition in the presence of an alternative remedy under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act is no longer res integra. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Varimadugu Obi Reddy versus B. Sreenivasulu and others, (2023) 2 SCC 168 held that in the ordinary course of business where the order of the Tribunal is an appealable order, the borrower/person aggrieved is supposed to avail the statutory remedy of appeal which the law provides under Section 18 of the CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 11:29 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-17271-2026 (O&M) -7- SARFAESI Act. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:- “34. The order of the Tribunal dated 1st August, 2019 was an appealable order under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and in the ordinary course of business, the borrowers/person aggrieved was supposed to avail the statutory remedy of appeal which the law provides under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 in the absence of efficacious alternative remedy being availed, there was no reasonable justification tendered by the respondent borrowers in approaching the High Court and filing writ application assailing order of the Tribunal dated 1st August, 2019 under its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution without exhausting the statutory right of appeal available at its command. 35. This Court in the judgment in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon & Others, (2010) 8 SCC 110 was concerned with the argument of alternative remedy provided under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and dealing with the argument of alternative remedy, this Court had observed that where an effective remedy is available to an aggrieved person, the High Court ordinarily must insist that before availing the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, the alternative remedy available under the relevant statute must be exhausted. Paras 43, 44 and 45 of the said judgment are relevant for the purpose and are extracted below: "43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 11:29 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-17271-2026 (O&M) -8- greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislation's enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self- imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 11:29 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-17271-2026 (O&M) -9- compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance." 36. In the instant case, although the respondent borrowers initially approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal by filing an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, but the order of the Tribunal indeed was appealable under Section 18 of the Act subject to the compliance of condition of pre-deposit and without exhausting the statutory remedy of appeal, the respondent borrowers approached the High Court by filing the writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution. We deprecate such practice of entertaining the writ application by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution without exhausting the alternative statutory remedy available under the law. This circuitous route appears to have been adopted to avoid the condition of pre-deposit contemplated under 2nd proviso to Section 18 of the Act 2002.” 15. Basic principle for exercising the power under Article 226 was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Babubhai Muljibhai Patel versus Nandlal Khodidas Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706, wherein it was held that the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:- "10. Exercise of the jurisdiction is no doubt discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 11:29 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-17271-2026 (O&M) -10- judicial principles. When the petition raises complex questions of fact, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute should not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition (see Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality (1969) 3 SCC 769)." 16. In Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev versus State of Maharashtra, (2011) 2 SCC 782, while considering the question of maintainability of the writ petition, when alternate remedy is available, Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- "23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well settled that ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. (See Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and SBI v. Allied Chemical Laboratories.) 24. In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala this Court had observed that: "30. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to consider whether: (a) adjudication of the writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved; (b) the petition reveals all material facts; CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 11:29 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-17271-2026 (O&M) -11- (c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute; (d) the person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches; (e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation; (f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors." 17. In Nivedita Sharma versus Cellular Operators Assn. of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained, ignoring the statutory dispensation. 18. In Southern Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa Ltd. versus Sri Seetaram Rice Mill, (2012) 2 SCC 108, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it should only be for the specialised tribunal or the appellate authority to examine the merits of assessment or even the factual matrix of the case. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:- "80. It is a settled canon of law that the High Court would not normally interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India where statutory alternative remedy is available. It is equally settled that this canon of law is not free of exceptions. The courts, including this Court, have taken the view that the statutory remedy, if provided under a specific law, would impliedly oust the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain writ or appropriate proceedings despite availability of an alternative remedy. This jurisdiction, the High Court would exercise with some circumspection in exceptional cases, particularly, CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 11:29 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-17271-2026 (O&M) -12- where the cases involve a pure question of law or vires of an Act are challenged. This class of cases we are mentioning by way of illustration and should not be understood to be an exhaustive exposition of law which, in our opinion, is neither practical nor possible to state with precision. The availability of alternative statutory or other remedy by itself may not operate as an absolute bar for exercise of jurisdiction by the courts. It will normally depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. The further question that would inevitably come up for consideration before the Court even in such cases would be as to what extent the jurisdiction has to be exercised. 81. Should the courts determine on merits of the case or should they preferably answer the preliminary issue or jurisdictional issue arising in the facts of the case and remit the matter for consideration on merits by the competent authority? Again, it is somewhat difficult to state with absolute clarity any principle governing such exercise of jurisdiction. It always will depend upon the facts of a given case. We are of the considered view that interest of administration of justice shall be better sub-served if the cases of the present kind are heard by the courts only where they involve primary questions of jurisdiction or the matters which go to the very root of jurisdiction and where the authorities have acted beyond the provisions of the Act. However, it should only be for the specialised tribunal or the appellate authorities to examine the merits of assessment or even the factual matrix of the case." 19. In Cicily Kallarackal versus Vehicle Factory, (2012) 8 SCC 524, Hon’ble Supreme Court issued a direction of caution that it will not be a proper CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 11:29 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-17271-2026 (O&M) -13- exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court to entertain a writ petition against such orders against which statutory appeal lies. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:- "4. Despite this, we cannot help but state in absolute terms that it is not appropriate for the High Courts to entertain writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the orders passed by the Commission, as a statutory appeal is provided and lies to this Court under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Once the legislature has provided for a statutory appeal to a higher court, it cannot be proper exercise of jurisdiction to permit the parties to bypass the statutory appeal to such higher court and entertain petitions in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even in the present case, the High Court has not exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law. The case is one of improper exercise of jurisdiction. It is no expected of us to deal with this issue at any greater length as we are dismissing this petition on other grounds." 20. In CIT versus Chhabil Dass Agrawal, (2014) 1 SCC 603, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. 21. The facts and circumstances of the present case clearly suggest that the petitioner instead of filing an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act has after about six months chosen to file the present writ petition, which therefore cannot be entertained in view of the aforesaid law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court. CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 11:29 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-17271-2026 (O&M) -14- 22. In light of the above discussion and the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, it is now well settled that the practice of entertaining writ petitions by the High Courts in exercise of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, without exhausting the alternative remedy available under the law has been strongly deprecated by Hon’ble Supreme Court. 23. Not only this, during the pendency of the present writ petition, the petitioner has filed a fresh Securitisation Application (SA) challenging the sale notice, e-auction and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom as the property has already been sold and the Auction Purchaser has also appeared before the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal in the said Securitisation Application filed by the petitioner, which is still pending and therefore, we are of the view that the present writ petition is not entertainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on this ground as well. 24. 24. The exceptions to the general law that first alternate remedy should be exhausted which have been carved out in the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation versus Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, 1998 (8) SCC 1, are as follows: (a) the writ petition has been filed for enforcement of a Fundamental Right protected by Part III of the Constitution of India, (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice, (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction and (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged. However, in the present case, the case of the petitioner does not fall in any of the exceptions because there is neither any allegation of violation of the Fundamental Rights of the petitioner nor any violation of the CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 11:29 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. CWP-17271-2026 (O&M) -15- principles of natural justice nor it is alleged that the order passed by the learned DRT is without jurisdiction. Rather, it was not the case of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the learned DRT lacked jurisdiction to pass the order dated 29.11.2025 (Annexure P-19). 25. We are therefore of the view that considering the aforesaid totality of facts and circumstances of the present case, the present petition is liable to be dismissed as being not entertainable. The petitioner may invoke or pursue alternate remedies available to it in accordance with law. 26. Consequently, the present Civil Writ Petition is hereby dismissed with costs of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand). The petitioner is directed to deposit the aforesaid costs with the High Court Legal Services Committee, within a period of three months from today. (JASGURPREET SINGH PURI) JUDGE (SANJIV BERRY) 23.07.2026 JUDGE Chetan Thakur Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No CHETAN THAKUR 2026.07.31 11:29 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment.