1 CGHC010178732022 2026:CGHC:39114 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 2476 of 2022 Order Reserved on 10. 8 .2026 Order Delivered on 07.09.2026 1 - Neeraj Jain S/o Shri Kantilal Jain Aged About 43 Years R/o Ward No. 1, Shankar Nagar, Mahasamund, Tehsil and P.S. Mahasamund, District- Mahasamund (C.G.) 2 - Vikas Chopra S/o Late Shri Prakashchand Chopra, Aged About 41 Years R/o Station Road, Mahasamund, Tehsil & P.S. Mahasamund, District- Mahasamund (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Mahasamund, Revenue and Civil District- Mahasamund (C.G.) 2 - Sub-Divisional Magistrate and Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) Mahasamund, Revenue and Civil District- Mahasamund (C.G.) SHYNA AJAY Digitally signed by SHYNA AJAY Date: 2026.09.07 18:36:14 +0530 2 3 - Tehsildar Mahasamund, Revenue and Civil District- Mahasamund (C.G.) 4 - Jagdish Prasad Agrawal S/o Late Shri Sukhdev Prasad Agrawal Aged About 75 Years R/o Ward No. 30, Main Road, Near Sitli, Mahasamund, Tehsil and P.S. Mahasamund, District- Mahasamund (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) (Cause Title downloaded from CIS Periphery) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Surfuraj Khan, Advocate For Respondent /State For Respondent No.4 : : Dr. Arham Siddique, Panel Lawyer Mr. Prakash Tiwari, Advocate SB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad C A V Order 1. The present petition has been filed challenging the proceedings and the order dated 25.4.2022, passed by the Tehsildar, Mahasamund in Revenue Case No.202112120600051/B- 121/2021-22, whereby an application filed by respondent No.4 seeking an injunction against construction over the suit land belonging to the petitioners was allowed. According to the petitioners, such relief of injunction can only be granted by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction under Section 34 & 37 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 read with Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC. The revenue authorities do not possess the statutory power 3 or jurisdiction to grant an injunction. Matter involving disputes of title and claims of injunction fall exclusively within the domain of the Civil Court and cannot be adjudicated by the Revenue Courts. 2. By way of this petition, the petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs : 10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a Suitable Writ (s), Order (s), Direction (S), by quashing the entire proceeding (Annexure P/1 & P/2) and also the order dated 25/04/2022 (Annexure P-1) passed in Revenue Case No. 202112120600051/B- 121/2021-22, (Jagdish Prasad Agrawal V/s. Neeraj Jain & Another), by the respondent no. 3 and to issue a suitable writ in the nature of prohibition for preventing an order or decision being made which if made would be subject to certiorari. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call the entire records from the court below for its kind perusal. 10.3 Any other relief, which may be suitable in the facts and circumstances of the case, may also be granted. 3. The facts of the case, as pleaded by the petitioners, are that they are the owner and possession holder of land bearing Khasra No.2052/1, admeasuring area 0.131 hectare and Khasra No.2052/2, admeasuring area 0.198 hectare situated at Village Mahasamund, Tehsil and District Mahasamund. The petitioners derived ownership and title to the subject land by virtue of a registered sale-deed dated 27.8.2021, on the basis of which Bhumiswami rights accrued in their favour over the said land. Thereafter, respondent No.4 filed an application dated 9.12.2021 4 before respondent No.3 (Tehsildar), seeking an injunction to restrain the petitioners from raising further construction and to stop the ongoing construction over the subject land. The concerned Tehsildar entertained the application in separate proceedings and issued notice to the petitioners. Upon appearance, the petitioners filed preliminary objections challenging the maintainability of the application, stating that the Revenue Courts lacks jurisdiction to grant an injunction or restrain construction. It was specifically contended that disputes involving title and injunctive relief fall within the domain of the Civil Courts. Such statutory powers are exclusively vested in the Civil Court under Sections 34 and 37 of the Specific Relief Act read with Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts to grant injunctions. It was further contended that respondent No.4 had already instituted Civil Suit No.27-A/2009, before the Second Civil Judge Class-I, Mahasamund, however, the said suit was dismissed. In the said preliminary objection, the petitioners pleaded that the subject land is non-agricultural in nature and contains a residential house. Hence, the Revenue Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the application and further, any dispute pertaining thereto can exclusively be adjudicated by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. It was further contended that respondent No.4 has no interest in the suit property, as he owns no land or structure adjacent to the land in dispute. However, when the preliminary objection was not decided by the concerned Tehsildar, the 5 petitioner/s approached this Court by filing WPC No.649/2022, wherein vide order dated 4.2.2022, ithe concerned Tehsildar was directed to consider and decide the said objection in accordance with law. However, as the preliminary objection was still not decided by the Tehsildar despite the directions of this Court, the petitioners were compelled to file Contempt Case No.400/2022, wherein notices were issued to the concerned Tehsildar. Prompted by the issuance of the contempt notice, the Tehsildar hurriedly passed the impugned order dated 25.4.2022 against the petitioners, granting an injunction and restraining construction over the suit land. Hence, this Petition. 4. Mr. Surfuraj Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the power to grant temporary/permanent injunction is governed by Section 37/39 of the Specific Relief Act read with Order 39 Rule 1& 2 of the CPC, which is exclusively vested in a competent Civil Court. A Revenue Court possesses no jurisdiction to entertain an application seeking temporary injunction. He submits that respondent No.4, being fully aware of the legal position, had previously instituted a civil suit for permanent injunction in respect of the subject matter, which came to be dismissed. Hence, the present application filed before the Tehsildar is an attempt to somehow restrain the petitioners from raising construction and is non-maintainable on its face. He also submits that since the subject property is non-agricultural residential land upon which the petitioners were raising construction, the Revenue Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application. Therefore, the entire 6 proceedings including the impugned order granting stay on construction, are liable to be quashed. He further submits that considering the aforesaid aspects of the matter, this Court vide order dated 14.6.2022, stayed the further proceedings before the Tehsildar in the subject Revenue Case. In support of these contentions, learned counsel places reliance upon the orders passed by the Coordinate Benches of this Court in the matters of Ram Niwas Sahu Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others (WP227 No.800 of 2015 {decided on 19.7.2018}) and Bisahu Ram (Died) Through LRs. Smt. Ganga Devi and others Vs. Khelavan Singh and others (WP227 No.771/2013 {decided on 24.7.2017}), wherein it has been categorically held that the Revenue Courts lack statutory authority and jurisdiction to grant orders of injunction, such power being exclusively vested in the competent Civil Court. In view of the above, the present petition deserves to be allowed and the entire proceedings as well as the impugned order passed by the Tehsildar, are liable to be quashed. 5. Per contra, Mr. Prakash Tiwari, learned counsel for respondent No.4 submits that initiation of the proceeding is well within the jurisdiction of the concerned Revenue Courts. He further submits that respondent No.4 is the owner and possession holder of the land bearing Khasra No.2052/3, admeasuring 0.0680 hectare, situated in Tehsil and District of Mahasamund, having purchased the property vide the sale dated 22.10.1988 from one Chhedi Lal Nishad. After the death of Chhedi Lal Nishad, the adjacent land bearing Khasra No.2052/1 admeasuring 0.131 hectare and 7 Khasra No.2052/2 admeasuring 0.198 hectare was sold by legal heirs of the deceased to the petitioners. However, the petitioners could not trace their own land and is now, illegally claiming rights in respect of Khasra No.2052/3 as their individual property. The land bearing Khasra No.2052/3 was neither purchased by the petitioners from Chhedi Lal Nishad or any other person. When the petitioners arbitrarily began felling trees on the said land through muscle power, an application was filed by respondent No.4 seeking appropriate action to restrain the petitioners from doing so and to prevent them from erecting any construction thereon. Accordingly, the Tehsildar initiated the revenue proceedings and rightly passed the impugned order, which cannot be said to be contrary to law. He further submits that since there exists a dispute in respect of the position of the land, the subject case was registered upon the objection filed by the petitioners and has not yet been finally decided. The initiation of the impugned proceedings and the impugned order passed by the concerned Tehsildar are well within the four corners of the law and cannot be termed as being without jurisdiction. The concerned Tehsildar has complied the order passed by this Court and there is no ambiguity in it. 6. Dr. Arham Siddique, learned counsel for the State/respondents 1 to 3 submits that the order was passed within the jurisdiction of the concerned Tehsildar. There is no illegality either in the initiation of the proceedings or in the impugned order. Hence, the petition is bereft of merit and is liable to be dismissed. 8 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the documents annexed with the petition with utmost circumspection. 8. The primary questions that arise for determination of this Court are as follows : (i) Whether the Tehsildar can entertain an application seeking an injunction, as provided under Section 37 and Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act?; (ii) Whether an order under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC can be passed by a revenue authority in the garb of a stay order? 9. This Court would now answer the aforesaid points/questions in detail. 10. Evidently, respondent No.4 had earlier filed a suit for permanent injunction against Chhedi Lal Nishad, Santosh Kumar and Toshan Lal arising out of the same land dispute and allegations. Chhedi Lal Nishad is the father, whereas Santosh Kumar and Toshan Lal are his sons. According to the petitioners, they purchased the subject property i.e. land bearing Khasra No.2052/1 (area 0.131 hectare) and Khasra No.2052/2 (area 0.198 hectare), situated at Village Mahasamund from the legal heirs of late Chhedi Lal. A perusal of the application filed by respondent No.4 shows that the present petitioners are allegedly attempting to illegally take possession of land bearing Khasra No.2052/3 belonging to respondent No.4. It is further alleged that the petitioners have illegally commenced felling standing trees and are attempting to 9 dispossess respondent No.4, in respect of which complaints were also lodged with the police. By way of the said application, respondent No.4 prayed for an order restraining the petitioners from interfering with or taking possession of the subject land. Meanwhile, in the parallel civil suit, the competent Civil Court has framed issues, observing that the land bearing Khasra No.2052/3 is not open land. The plaintiff i.e. respondent No.4 is in possession of the said land. Further, in a separate issue, the trial Court held that the defendants therein i.e. the sellers who sold the land to the petitioners were not interfering with the possession of respondent No.4. The trial Court categorically held vide issue No.6 that respondent No.4/plaintiff constructed a boundary wall and a pucca residential house wherein he currently resides covering an area excess of the land purchased by him. This finding under issue No.6 has remained unchallenged and has attained finality. Hence, the suit land is no longer agricultural land or open vacant land over which revenue authorities possess jurisdiction, but is rather a residential property constructed thereon. 11. It is trite law that Revenue Courts lack jurisdiction to entertain any application or to initiate proceedings or to grant interim injunctions with respect to a house constructed over a residential land. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again held that the jurisdiction of Revenue Courts is confined to agricultural or revenue assessed land and does not extend to residential land over which constructions have been erected. Once the property 10 in dispute includes a permanent structure or built up area, the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court is ousted. The Civil Court alone possesses exclusive jurisdiction to determine title under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act as well as to grant temporary and permanent injunctions under Sections 37 and 39 of the said Act read with Order 39 Rule 1& 2 of the CPC. A Coordinate Bench of this Court has affirmed this view in WP227 No.800/2015 {decided on 19.07.2018}, relying upon the principle laid down in Maya Lalchandani (Mrs) and others Vs. Board of Revenue and others reported in (2009) 3 MPLJ 660. In light of this settled legal position, the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners that the Tahsildar has acted in excess of jurisdiction are well founded and the contention raised by respondent No.4 is not in accordance with law. 12. This Court in Seraj Ahmad Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & others 2017 (4) C.G.L.J. 559 has held that the order to grant injunction is surely vested in the jurisdictional Civil Court and the Revenue Courts cannot grant the order of injunction and it was held that the revenue order granting temporary injunction restraining the transfer would be without jurisdiction and without authority of law. The said judgment was based on Maya Lalchandani (supra). Relevant part of the decision is reproduced herein below: “2 Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) has passed order on 10.03.2016 granting temporary injunction for which he has no jurisdiction, therefore, the order passed by the Sub- Divisional Officer (Revenue) is without 11 jurisdiction and without authority of law. He relies upon a decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Maya Lalchandani (Mrs.) and others Vs. Board of Revenue and others in which the M.P. High Court has held as under: 4. After going through the order passed by the learned President, Board of Revenue and taking into consideration the legal provisions, we are of the opinion that the directions sisued in paragraph 7 of the order passed by the Board of Revenue cannot be allowed to stand. Section 32 of the Land Revenue Code talks of the inherent powers of the Revenue Authorities while Section 43 talks of applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is to be seen from Section 32 that nothing in the Land Revenue Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Revenue Court to make such orders as may be necessary to meet the ends of justice or as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of Court. Section 43 simply provides that unless otherwise expressly provided in the Code, the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure shall, so far as may be, followed in all proceedings under the Code. Section 43 in no case would authorise a Revenue Authority to grant an injunction. Section 43 simply provides that the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure so far as may be followed in all proceedings under the Code. It is also to be seen from the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure that an injunction can be granted only by civil Court and by none else. Section 32 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code only talks of the inherent powers of the Revenue Courts where they are required to make such order as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. The powers under Section 32 can be exercised within the Code itself and not beyond the Code. If the Revenue Authority does not have the power to grant injunction then the Board of Revenue also could not grant injunction. 3. The order to grant injunction is surely vested in the jurisdictional civil court, revenue courts cannot grant order of injunction. Therefore, the order passed by the revenue authority granting temporary injunction restraining transfer following the principle of law laid down in Maya Lalchandani (Supra) is without jurisdiction and 12 without authority of law. It is accordingly set aside. However, the Sub-Divisional officer (Revenue) is directed to take decision on merits after hearing the parties in accordance with law, expeditiously, within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 13. The aforementioned decision was referred with approval in the case of Vandana Gupta & Ors. Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. in WPC No. 235/2020 and has observed thus:- “9. Considering the nature of stay order, certainly it would show that the Tahsildar has exceeded its jurisdiction which is vested under the Land Revenue Code and therefore, the order of the nature would be without jurisdiction and without authority of law. Since the order is without jurisdiction, as such, the petitioner even if has not availed the remedy of appeal, this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can look into such issue when jurisdictional issue is involved in view of the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1 wherein, it has been held as under: 14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo quarranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for "any other purpose”. 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition.But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a 13 violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field. 16. Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board Kairana AIR 1950 SC 163 laid down that existence of an adequate legal remedy was a factor to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs. This was followed by another Rashid case, namely, K.S. Rashid & Son V. Income Tax Investigation Commission AIR 1954 SC 207 which reiterated the above proposition and held that where alternative remedy existed, it would be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse or to interfere in a petition under Article 226. This proposition was, however qualified by the significant words, “unless there are good grounds therefor”, which indicated that alternative remedy would not operate as an absolute bar and that writ petition under Article 226 could still be entertained in exceptional cases. 14. Coming to the facts of the present case, in light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments and further in light of the findings recorded by the competent Civil Court in Civil Suit No.27- A/2009 {judgment dated 26.4.2016 passed by the Second Civil Judge Class-I, Mahasamund (CG)} filed by respondent No.4 (plaintiff therein), wherein the prayer for permanent injunction was refused and the finding under issue No.6 establishing the existence of a permanent structure on the suit land attained finality, this Court is of the firm view that the Tehsildar possessed no power or jurisdiction to entertain an application for injunction in any manner whatsoever. Such disputes fall exclusively within the domain of the Civil Court and are non-amenable to the jurisdiction 14 of the Revenue Courts. 15. As a result, the Petition is Allowed. The entire subject proceedings pending before the concerned Tehsildar together with the impugned interim order dated 25.4.2022, are hereby quashed. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Shyna Ajay