1 CGHC010435262025 2026:CGHC:39116 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 5343 of 2025 Order Reserved on 05/08/2026 Order Pronounced on 07/09/ 2026 Jasila Thithiyo W/o Ranjeet Das Aged About 23 Years R/o Ward No. 10, Village- Krishnanagar, Post- Bardar, Police Station And Tehsil- Balrampur, District- Balrampur-Ramanujganj, C.G. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Panchayat And Rural Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur C.G. 2 - Collector District Balrampur-Ramanujganj C.G. 3 - Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue)/Election Tribunal Balrampur, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj C.G. 4 - Returning Officer Panchayat Nirvachan, Gram Panchayat Krishnanagar Janpad Panchayat, Balrampur, District Balrampur- Ramanujganj C.G. 5 - Tahsildar Balrampur, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj C.G. SHYNA AJAY Digitally signed by SHYNA AJAY Date: 2026.09.07 17:58:07 +0530 2 6 - Surajpati Ram W/o Ramdas Ram, Aged 46 Years R/o Village- Krishnanagar, Post- Bardar, Police Station and Tehsil- Balrampur, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj C.G. 7 - Nirmala Devi W/o Shailendra Ram R/o Village- Krishananagar, Post- Bardar, Police Station and Tehsil- Balrampur, District Balrampur- Ramanujganj C.G. ... Respondent(s) (Cause Title downloaded from CIS Periphery) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ishan Verma, Advocate and Mr. Aditya Kumar Mishra, Advocate For Respondent No.6 For Respondent /State : Mr Ashok Kumar Shukla, Mr. Ravi Singh and Mr. Shivam Mishra, Advocates Mr. Anand Dadariya, Dy. AG SB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad CAV Order 1. The petitioner herein assails the legality and propriety of the impugned order dated 25.9.2025 passed by the Election Tribunal (Sub-Divisional Officer), Balrampur, District Balrampur- Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh in an Election Petition RCN No.202503272200017/A-89/2024-25), instituted under Section 122 of the CG Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as “the Adhiniyam”) by respondent No.6. By the said order, the Election Tribunal declared the election of the petitioner to the post of Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat, Krishna Nagar, under the concerned Janpad Panchayat, as null and void, holding that the petitioner had not attained 21 years of age on the date of 3 submission of her nomination papers and consequently, her election to the said office was void ab initio. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the impugned order, has preferred the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, contending that the Election Petition was adjudicated in manifest non- compliance with the mandatory procedural requirements enshrined in Rule 11 & 12 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Election Petitions, Corrupt Practices and Disqualification for Membership) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “the Election Petition Rules, 1995”). The petitioner contends that the Election Tribunal committed a grave procedural illegality by omitting to frame issues necessary for adjudication of the dispute and by proceeding to pass the impugned order without recording the evidence of the witnesses. Thus, in absence of framed issues and a proper record of witnesses’ testimony, the impugned order stands vitiated in the eyes of law and is, therefore, liable to be quashed at the very threshold. 2. By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following reliefs in this petition : 10.1. Quash and set aside the order dated 25.09.2025, passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Balrampur, District Balrampur- Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh, in R.C.N. No. 202503272200017/A- 89/2024- 25, whereby the learned authority allowed the election petition filed under Section 122 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (ANNEXURE P-1) 4 10.2. Declare the petitioner as the duly elected Sarpanch of Village Panchayat Krishnanagar, District Balrampur, Chhattisgarh; 10.3. Pass any other order(s) or direction(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. 3. The succinct facts of the case, as averred by the petitioner, are that pursuant to the election notification issued by the State Government through the competent authority, the petitioner tendered her nomination papers for the post of Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat, Krishna Nagar, under the concerned Janpad Panchayat. Upon scrutiny by the Returning Officer, the nomination of the petitioner was found to be in order and was duly accepted, without any objection being raised from any quarter at the relevant time. Ultimately, a total of three candidates, including the petitioner, contested the election for the said office. All contesting candidates duly submitted the requisite Form 4-B in accordance with the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Nirvachan Niyam, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “the Nirvachan Niyam, 1995”). Further, the petitioner submitted Form 4-B-1 as mandated under Rule 31-A of the said Niyam. At the ensuing election conducted on 22.2.2025, the petitioner secured the highest number of valid votes and was, accordingly, duly declared the returned candidate. Accordingly, a Certificate of Election in Form-25 was issued in her favour under Rule 81 of the Nirvachan Niyam, 1995. 5 Subsequently, the election of the petitioner was notified in Form 26-A pursuant to Rule 90 of the said Niyam, whereupon the petitioner was formally recognized as the duly elected Sarpanch, Krishna Nagar, with effect from 27.2.2021. After the official notification of the election result, respondent No.6 filed an Election Petition under Section 122 of the Adhiniyam before the Specified Officer/Election Tribunal (SDO, Revenue), Balrampur on 11.3.2025, assailing the election of the petitioner to the office of Sarpanch. The primary ground of challenge was that the petitioner stood statutorily disqualified on account of being underage, having not attained the mandatory age of 21 years on the date of submission of her nomination papers. It was alleged that her true date of birth is ‘12.4.2004’, according to which she was only 19 years of age at the material time. Respondent No.6 further alleged that the petitioner fraudulently secured the recording of her date of birth as ‘12.4.2002’ on the strength of forged and fabricated documents, including her Voter ID and Aadhar Card, to project that she had attained the statutory age of 21 years. In consequence whereof, respondent No.6 contended that the petitioner’s election is void ab initio and claimed that having secured the second highest number of valid votes, respondent No.6 be declared the duly elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Krishna Nagar. The concerned Election Tribunal issued notice to the petitioner and other non-applicants. In response thereto, the petitioner entered an appearance before the Tribunal and filed her reply, controverting and denying the allegations raised in the 6 Election Petition regarding her age. The petitioner categorically pleaded that she fulfilled all eligibility criteria to contest the election for the post of Sarpanch and contended that her nomination paper had been duly accepted upon scrutiny without any objection being raised by any party at the time of filing nomination papers. Hence, the Election Petition preferred by respondent No.6 is unsustainable and liable to be dismissed. Though statements/affidavits under Order 18 Rule 4 of the CPC were submitted before the Election Tribunal and the petitioner raised a preliminary objection asserting her eligibility and that she had attained 21 years of age on the date of filing her nomination papers, but the Tribunal did not frame any issues on the disputed questions of fact regarding her age. Significantly, without recording evidence of the parties or formulating issues , the Tribunal passed the impugned order declaring the election of the petitioner as null and void on the premise that she had not attained 21 years of age at the material time and was thus ineligible to contest the election for the concerned Gram Panchayat. In doing so, the Tribunal erroneously relied solely on the High School Marksheet issued by the Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary Education (reflecting the date of birth as 12.4.2004), while discarding the Aadhar Card and Electoral Roll (reflecting the date of birth as 12.4.2002) without a full-fledged trial. On the basis of this unproven finding, the petitioner was declared disqualified and removed from the office of Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Krishna Nagar, under Section 122(3) of the Adhiniyam. 7 4. Mr. Ishan Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the findings recorded by the Election Tribunal are illegal, arbitrary and vitiated. The Tribunal committed a grave procedural illegality by failing to act in accordance with Rule 11 and 12 of the Election Petition Rules, 1995 along with the governing provisions of Section 122 of the Adhiniyam. Under this statutory scheme, the Tribunal was under a legal obligation to frame specific issues on the disputed questions of fact and record the evidence of the parties before arriving at any conclusion regarding the allegations made in the election petition or declaring the petitioner ineligible to contest the election. He further submits arriving at a finding of disqualification against the petitioner without framing issues or recording evidence renders the order unsustainable in the eyes of the law. He further submits that the Election Petition suffered from a fatal defect of non-joinder of parties, amounting to a direct violation of Rule 4 of the Election Petition Rules, 1995. Since the election petitioner did not implead all the contesting candidates as respondents, the Election Petition ought to have been dismissed at the threshold under Rule 8 of the Election Petition Rules, 1995, which mandates summary rejection for non-compliance with Rule 4. .He also submits that under Rule 16 of the Election Petition Rules, 1995, the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972 are strictly applicable to an enquiry into an election petition. However, in absence of oral and documentary evidence being recorded in accordance with law, the findings arrived at in the impugned order is per se illegal, unsustainable 8 and liable to be quashed/set-aside. He further submits that the Tribunal further committed a material irregularity by failing to appreciate the stark discrepancies in the documentary evidence placed on record. While the petitioner’s Voter ID reflects a downloaded date of 30.01.2025, the document tendered by the election petitioner bears a downloaded date of 5.3.2025. He submits that in absence of proper proof or cross-examination, the Tribunal erred in placing reliance upon an unproven and disputed document. He submits that though the Voter ID purports to emanate from a competent authority of the Election Commission of India, but no official witness was summoned or examined to authenticate the record. In the absence of primary evidence or proper verification, declaring the date of birth of the petitioner as ‘12.4.2004’ only on the basis of a Voter ID is impermissible. He further submits that the present petitioner, in her written statement before the Tribunal, specifically denied the adverse factual assertions made in the Election Petition and pleaded that her date of birth had been wrongly stated. The petitioner produced reliable documents, including Aadhar Card and Voter ID card, both showing her date of birth as ‘12.4.2002’. However, the Election Tribunal ignored this documentary evidence. Learned counsel further submits that though guidelines issued by the Election Tribunal require a candidate to state their true date of birth, even where an incorrect entry appears in supporting documents and to possess valid documents to address potential objections, Form 4-B of the Nirvachan Niyam, 1995, contains no statutory 9 requirement to annex supporting documents to the declaration form. He submits that in a consistent line of precedents, this Court as well as the Supreme Court have categorically held that the framing of specific issues on disputed questions of fact is mandatory legal requirement in an Election Petition. He submits that Rule 11 of the Election Petition Rules, 1995 clearly prescribe the framing of issues and recording of evidence. Any deviation from this prescribed procedure is impermissible in the eyes of law. Thus, the manner in which the present election petition has been decided is unsustainable and not in accordance with law. In support of these contentions, learned counsel relies upon the judgments rendered in the matters of Babloo Pasi Vs. State of Jharkhand and others reported in (2008) 13 SCC 133 and Umesh Kumar Kanwar Vs. Suman Singh Wakre reported in 2015 SCC OnLine Chh 1311. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Ashok Kumar Shukla, Mr Ravi Singh and Mr. Shivam Mishra, learned counsel for respondent No.6, submit that the Election Tribunal has rightly passed the impugned order declaring the election of the petitioner as Sarpanch of Krishna Nagar as null and void. They submit that the petitioner had not completed 21 years of age at the time of filing her nomination paper, thereby violated Article 243F(1)(a) of the Constitution of India read with the relevant provisions of the Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, wherein attaining of 21 years of age is a condition precedent for contesting any Panchayat election. They also submit that the recorded date of birth of the petitioner is 12.4.2004 10 and as such, she had attained only 19 years on the date of filing her nomination paper for contesting the election for the post of Sarpanch. They further submit that against the order passed by the Election Tribunal/the SDO, Balrampur, there is an efficacious alternative remedy available before the concerned Collector under the relevant provisions of the Adhiniyam. Hence, the petitioner having directly filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without exhausting the statutory remedy, the writ petition itself is not maintainable. They submit that the petitioner’s contention regarding non-framing of issues and non- recording of evidence by the Tribunal is devoid of merit. They submit that where the dispute pertains to the petitioner’s date of birth and age, facts peculiarly within her personal knowledge, there was no requirement to frame issues. Furthermore, a perusal of the order sheets as well as the impugned order clearly shows that the petitioner was afforded ample opportunities to adduce evidence. However, as reflected in the record, the petitioner failed to lead to any evidence whatsoever to rebut the documentary proof establishing her date of birth as 12.4.2004. They submit that having failed to adduce evidence before the Election Tribunal, the petitioner cannot now turn around and allege violation of the principles of natural justice or a denial of an opportunity of hearing. In a full fledged inquiry into the election petition, the petitioner was afforded due opportunity at every stage of the proceedings, however, in absence of any evidence in rebuttal, she chose not to lead evidence to controvert the case against her. 11 This is not a case where the petitioner was denied an opportunity to adduce evidence, but rather one where, despite being granted ample opportunities, she failed to do so. They also submit that the petitioner relies upon the date of birth recorded in her Aadhar Card and Voter ID Card, both of which reflect her date of birth as ‘12.04.2002’. However, her actual date of birth, as proved by her Class X marksheet issued by the Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary Education, is ’12.4.2004’, which constitutes primary documentary evidence overriding secondary identity cards. They further submit that for determining the authenticity of a date of birth, primary reliance must be placed on the Birth Certificate, Class X Certificate or Class XII Certificate. In the present matter, the Class X Marksheet/Certificate of the Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary Education was produced, according to which, the date of birth of the petitioner was found to be 12.4.2004. They submit that it is a well-settled statutory requirement that a candidate must have attained the age of 21 years to contest an election. This condition is a statutory imperative and no candidate can plead ignorance of the law. The relevant provisions of the Adhiniyam and the rules framed thereunder prescribe this minimum age qualification as a condition precedent. Furthermore, Article 243-F(1)(a) of the Constitution of India mandates 21 years as the minimum age to contest a Panchayat election. With respect to the leading of evidence, learned counsel for the election petitioner/respondent No.6 submits that the petitioner has been afforded due opportunities by the Election Tribunal to lead 12 evidence, however, she declined to adduce any evidence, which is evident from the order sheet filed along with the present petition. They further submit that there is a categorical finding by the Election Tribunal in the order sheet to the effect that the petitioner was afforded due opportunities to cross-examine witnesses and adduce evidence. Although a perusal of the order sheet dated 8.9.2025 shows that the petitioner was denied the opportunity to lead evidence on that specific date, the record demonstrates that she had been granted such opportunities on numerous prior occasions. Thus, the grounds raised by the petitioner are not available to her. It was argued that where the matters in dispute are well known to the parties, the framing of issues is not mandatory in every case, as the parties proceed to trial fully aware of their respective rival contentions. Learned counsel submit that the documentary evidence produced by the election petitioner/respondent No.6 was never rebutted by the present petitioner. In such an eventuality, the failure to frame issues would not be fatal and it is not open to a party to contend that the entire proceeding is vitiated on this ground alone. The Class X Certificate issued by the Chhaitisgarh Board of Secondary Education in respect of the petitioner constitutes valid and conclusive proof of her date of birth establishing her age, which remains undisputed. Consequently, the Election Tribunal was fully justified in holding that on the date of filing of nomination papers, the petitioner had not attained 21 years of age. Notwithstanding the absence of dispute on this point, the Tribunal 13 acted well within its jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue in the election petition and rightly declared the election of the petitioner to be null and void. They submit that the Election Tribunal rightly held that since the petitioner contested the election without having attained 21 years of age, she could not be permitted to hold office and was accordingly directed to be removed under Section 122(3) of the Adhiniyam, which is in accordance with law. Additionally, it was argued that in the absence of any interim stay granted by this Court, the concerned authorities initiated fresh election proceedings for the post of Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat, Krishna Nagar. Pursuant to the notification dated 8.5.2026 issued by the State Election Commission, a fresh election was conducted wherein respondent No.6 contested, was declared elected and subsequently received the Certificate of Election on 4.6.2026. In view of these supervening events, the present petition has been rendered infructuous and is liable to be dismissed. In support of the above contentions, learned counsel relied upon the judgments rendered in the matters of Authrorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another Vs. Mathew K.C. reported in (2018) 3 SCC 85, Kalyan Singh Chouhan Vs. C.P. Joshi reported in (2011) 11 SCC 786, Meghwal Samaj Shiksha Samiti Vs. Lakh Singh and others reported in (2011) 11 SCC 800, Sushil Kumar Vs. Rakesh Kumar reported in 2003 AIR SCW 6005, and Santosh Kumar Nishad Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others reported in 2016 AIR Chhattisgarh 164 {Division Bench of this Court}) 14 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed with the petition as well as the preliminary objection raised regarding maintainability. 7. At the outset, the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of this writ petition deserves to be addressed. 8. According to learned counsel for respondent No.6, the petitioner ought to have exhausted the alternative statutory remedy of filing an appeal before the concerned Collector against the impugned order passed by the Election Tribunal. However, in my considered view, the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable in light of the law laid down by this Court in the matter of Cheti Bai Yadav Vs. Smt. Bhupeshwari Sahu, reported in 2016 SCC OnLine Chh 921, wherein, it was held that the procedure for presentation and trial of election petition has been prescribed under the Election Petition Rules, 1995. Rule 25 of the Rules, 1995 attaches finality to the order passed by the Specified Officer. It uses the term decision of the Specified Officer. Rule 23 deals with the decision which may be taken by the Specified Officer while trying the election petition and thus includes any final order passed in the election petition. Thus, the law prescribes and attaches finality to the order passed in the election petition. Therefore, remedy of preferring an appeal or revision under Section 91 read with Appeal and Revision Rules is not available to aggrieved party. Para 2 of the aforesaid order reads as under : 15 2. The remedy of filing election petition is provided under Section 122 of the Adhiniyam providing that an election petition can be preferred within a period of 30 days from the date when the election in question was notified and that such petition shall be enquired into or disposed of according to such procedures as may be prescribed. The procedure for presentation and trial of election petition has been prescribed under the Rules known as the Chhattisgarh Panchayats (Election Petitions, Corrupt Practices and Disqualification for Membership) Rules, 1995 (for short ‘the Rules, 1995’). Rule 25 of the Rules, 1995 attaches finality to the order passed by the Specified Officer. It uses the term decision of the Specified Officer. Rule 23 deals with the decision which may be taken by the Specified Officer while trying the election petition and thus includes any final order passed in the election petition. Thus, the law prescribes and attaches finality to the order passed in the election petition. Therefore, remedy of preferring an appeal or revision under Section 91 read with Appeal and Revision Rules is not available to aggrieved party. The only remedy available to such party is to prefer a petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 9. Rule 25 of the Election Petition Rules, 1995 speaks about the "25. Finality of decision.— The decision of the specified officer shall be final 10. Considering Rule 25 of the Election Petition Rules, 1995 as well as law laid down by this Court in Cheti Bai Yadav (supra), this Court has no hesitation in holding that against the final order passed by the Election Tribunal, a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable, as it is the only remedy available to an aggrieved party. 11. So far as the second point regarding the framing of issues is concerned, the same has been raised by the petitioner relying on 16 various judgments rendered by this Court. 12. Order 14 Rule 1 of the CPC deals with the framing of issues, the provisions of which are made applicable to election petitions by virtue of Rule 11 of the Election Petition Rules, 1995. Although Election Tribunals are required under Order 14 Rule 2 of the CPC to frame issues to clearly define the dispute and guide the adducing of evidence, the non-framing of issues is not fatal where the parties are fully aware of the real points in dispute and have proceeded to trial with knowledge of each others’ case. 13. A Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Santosh Kumar Nishad (supra), considered this aspect in a similar matter where the Election Tribunal had decided an election petition without framing issues. Relying upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Arikala Narasa Reddy Vs. Venkata Ram Reddy Reddygari and another reported in (2014) 5 SCC 312, the Division Bench held in paragraphs 13 to 15 as under : 13. In (2011) 11 SCC 786 : (AIR 2011 SC 1127) paras 21 & 23) (Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. C.P. Joshi), the main dispute was whether one lady had cast her vote twice under two different names and whether the tendered votes cast in the election must be counted and whether six votes polled against the tendered votes must be rejected. In that case also the margin of victory was only one vote. A prayer was made to summon certain documents with regard to the tendered votes. This prayer was rejected on the ground that these facts were not opleaded and no issue had been framed in respect of those tendered votes. An appeal was filed before the Apex Court wherein the elected candidate urged that the election petition has to be adjudicated strictly adhering to the statutory provisions and the Court cannot 17 permit a party to lead evidence unless an issue has been framed on the controversy and an issue cannot be framed unless there are actual pleadings in respect thereof. We are not concerned with the second part because there is no allegation in the present case that the pleadings are lacking material particulars. The only allegation is that no issue was framed. With regard to non-framing of issues, the Apex Court in the said judgment held as follows:— “25. The object of framing issues is to ascertain/shorten the area of dispute and pinpoint the points required to be determined by the Court. The issues are framed so that no party at the trial is taken by surprise. It is the issues fixed and not the pleadings that guide he parties in the matter of adducing evidence, xxxxxxxxx 27. There may be an exceptional case wherein the parties proceed to trial fully knowing the rival case and lead all the evidence not only in support of their contentions but in refutation thereof by the other side. In such an eventuality, absence of an issue would not be fatal and it would not be permissible for a party to submit that there has been a mistrial and the proceedings stood vitiated.” 14. This view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in (2014) 5 SCC 312 : (AIR 2014 SC 1290, para 10) (Arikala Narasa Reddy v. Venkata Ram Reddy Reddygari) as follows: “16. There may be an exceptional case where the parties proceed to trial fully knowing the rival case and lead all the evidence not only in support of their contentions but in refutation of the case set up by the other side. Only in such circumstances, absence of an issue may not be fatal and a party may not be permitted to submit that there has been a mistrial and the proceedings stood vitiated.” 15. What we have to decide is whether the present case falls within the exception carved out by the Apex Court. As pointed out before, the dispute in the election petition was very short. Detailed allegation had been made challenging the correctness of the counting of the votes and specific allegations were made with regard to alleged wrong counting of votes of particular booths. These allegations were specific and were denied by the elected candidate. On these specific pleadings, evidence was led by the Election Petitioner and the Election Petitioner and his witnesses were 18 cross-examined on these aspects of the matter by the elected candidate and thereafter the elected candidate also led evidence and he examined himself and other witnesses with regard to these very allegations and counter-allegations. Therefore, this clearly shows that the elected candidate was clearly aware of what was the dispute between the parties. In this case there was only one dispute and that was whether the votes have been properly counted or not and even with regard to that there was specific allegation and it was not a general plea of recounting. Since evidence has been led by both the parties on these specific pleadings knowing fully well what was the case set up by the election petitioner and what was the defence of the elected candidate. Therefore, it cannot be said that the non-framing of issue(s) has caused prejudice to the elected candidate. As such, in the facts of this case we hold that the non-framing of issue (s) is not fatal the decision of the case and therefore we find no merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed. 14. When the facts of the case at hand are examined in light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as the Division Bench of this Court, it is evident that the sole point in controversy pertains as to whether the petitioner had attained 21 years of age, a question of which both parties were cognizant throughout the proceedings. 15. The petitioner was well aware of the fact that the central point in dispute pertained to her date of birth, which according to her is 12.4.2002, whereas according to respondent No.6, based on reliable documentary evidence, it is 12.4.2004. Applying the settled principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court, it cannot be said that the parties were unaware of the actual issue in dispute that fell for adjudication before the Tribunal. As such, in my view, non-framing of a specific issue regarding the date of birth of the petitioner was not fatal. 19 The petitioner is the person whose date of birth is in question and respondent No.6 had already adduced cogent documentary evidence in support of her contention. Consequently, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, framing of a specific issue was not necessary in the present matter and its non-framing is not fatal to the proceedings. 16. Now, coming to the third point for determination, which pertains to the alleged denial of an opportunity to lead evidence, the petitioner challenges the legality and propriety of the impugned order on the ground that she was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to adduce evidence. Conversely, respondent No.6 (election petitioner before the Tribunal) submits that adequate opportunities were indeed granted to the petitioner, however, she declined to lead evidence regarding her date of birth, which constitutes the pivotal point in controversy. 17. This Court has carefully examined the records and order sheets of the Election Tribunal placed on record. A perusal of the order sheet shows that the election petition was filed on 11.3.2025, whereupon notices were issued on the very same day. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned on various dates for one reason or the other. On 16.7.2025, the petitioner (who was the respondent before the Election Tribunal) entered appearance and sought time to file her written statement. The matter was subsequently listed for evidence on 23.7.2025, 30.7.2025, 6.8.2025, 14.8.2025 and 21.8.2025. On each of these scheduled dates, the petitioner sought time to file objections or to cross-examine the election 20 petitioner. On 28.8.2025, when time was sought yet again, a final opportunity was granted to the petitioner. However, on 8.9.2025, the petitioner declined to cross-examine the election petitioner or adduce any rebuttal evidence, after which the matter was fixed for final orders. Thereafter, the case was listed on 11.9.2025, 18.9.2025 and 25.9.2025, and ultimately, upon the petitioner’s repeated failure to lead evidence, the final order dated 28.9.2025 was passed. Consequently, the ground raised by the petitioner that she was denied an opportunity to lead evidence is belied by the record and is factually incorrect. Adequate opportunities were afforded to the petitioner, which she failed to avail herself of, leading to passing of the impugned order. 18. Now, adverting to the next point for determination regarding which documents must be taken into consideration to ascertain a persons’ date of birth when the same is in dispute, the Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 7 SCC 263, extensively examined this aspect. The Supreme Court held in order to determine the correct date of birth of an individual, the relevant documents to be examined are : the matriculation or equivalent certificate issued by the concerned Board, the date of birth recorded in the school admission register and the birth certificate issued by a Corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. These documents are considered the primary documentary evidence for determining a person’s date of birth. 19. A valid proof of date of birth can be established through official documents issued by Government authorities, educational 21 institutions attended by the person or a declaration by a competent Court of law. The primary and most widely accepted document for determining a person’s age is a Birth Certificate issued by a competent Municipal Corporation, local Municipality or similar statutory authorities. The second most reliable form of proof is Class X passing Certificate or XII passing Certificate or School Leaving Certificate bearing the recorded date of birth. While supporting documents such as PAN card, Driving License or official Government service records may serve as secondary evidence, they are not generally considered primary proof for establishing a person’s date of birth. 20. Time and again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in the absence of a Birth Certificate issued by competent authorities, the Class X or XII Certificate issued by a recognized Examination Board serves as a primary document for determining a person’s date of birth in official records. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has clarified that an Aadhar Card is not conclusive proof of date of birth. A person’s date of birth can only be definitively established on the basis of a Birth Certificate issued by the competent authorities, an Educational Board Certificate bearing the date of birth, or a decree passed by a civil court of competent jurisdiction rather than through an Aadhar Card or Voter ID Card. 21. In Ram Kripal alias Chirkut v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Others, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 13286 of 1981 (decided on 25.11.2011) , All. HC, the Allahabad High Court ruled that the informal nature of the date of birth recorded in the 22 voter list and voter ID card render it unreliable for determining the actual date of birth. The relevant excerpt is reproduced hereinbelow: “22. The evidence being insignificant would not shift the burden on shoulders of the petitioners. There appears to be no reason as to why Smt. Gulabi did not examine any of her relatives in support of her case. The evidentiary value of voter list of the year 1966 and 1973 is also of inconsequential nature. The voter-list is prepared on the statement and particulars furnished by such person. It is in the nature of self serving evidence. It is not safe to place much reliance upon it, in such matters. However, our legal system has always emphasis on value, weight and quality rather than quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witness. Nothing has come on record to connect Smt. Gulabi with the said birth entry. 23. Therefore, on facts at hand, in the absence of evidence to show on what material the entry in the Voters List in the name of the accused was made, a mere production of a copy of the Voters List, though a public document, in terms of Section 35, was not sufficient to prove the age of the accused.” 22. Furthermore, the issue is no longer res integra in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Saroj & Ors. Vs. Iffco-Tokio General Insurance Co. & Ors. reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3038 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court categorically held as under: “9.6 We find that the Unique Identification Authority of India, by way of its Circular No.08 of 2023, has 23 stated, in reference to an Office Memorandum issued by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology dated 20th December 2018, that an Aadhar Card, while can be used to establish identity, it is not per se proof of date of birth. This office memorandum dated 20th December, 2018 was taken note of by a learned Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in State of Maharashtra v. Unique Identification Authority of India And Ors in its order dated 28th July, 2023….” 23. In the matter of P. Yuvaprakash Vs, State, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 846, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as follows: “13. It is evident from conjoint reading of the above provisions that wherever the dispute with respect to the age of a person arises in the context of her or him being a victim under the POCSO Act, the courts have to take recourse to the steps indicated in Section 94 of the JJ Act. The three documents in order of which the Juvenile Justice Act requires consideration is that the concerned court has to determine the age by considering the following documents: “(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board”.’ (Emphasis supplied) 24 24. In Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp SCC 604, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that an entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded. 25. In Jabar Singh v. Dinesh, (2010) 3 SCC 757, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that any documents which are not maintained in discharge of official duty, such documents cannot be relevant under Section 35 of the Evidence Act for the purpose of determination of age of the person. 26. In many cases, Hon'ble Supreme Court has relied upon matriculation or equivalent certificates, including the school- leaving certificates as valid proof in determining the age of an accused person. (Refer to Parag Bhati v. State of U.P., (2016) 12 SCC 744, Nawaz v. State of U.P., (2011) 13 SCC 751 and Raju v. State of Haryana, (2010) 3 SCC 235). 27. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the petitioner possesses a Birth Certificate (Annexure P/8) wherein her recorded date of birth is 12.04.2002. Under Article 243 F(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, attaining the age of 21 years is a mandatory pre-condition and an essential qualification for contesting a Panchayat election. A candidate who intends to contest the election for the post of Sarpanch is required to strictly satisfy the age criteria during the scrutiny of nomination papers. 25 The petitioner herein cannot be granted relief or deemed eligible solely on the basis of the Aadhar Card and Voter ID Card where date of birth is recorded as ‘12.04.2002’, as these secondary identity documents cannot override or supersede the Birth Certificate. The Birth Certificate constitutes the primary statutory proof of date of birth and brushing it aside during the scrutiny of documents is contrary to established legal principles. However, in the present matter, the Birth Certificate cannot be relied upon as it was updated and issued on 5.7.2025 and the said document was obtained after institution of the Election Petition. Further, the said Birth Certificate was neither relied upon by the petitioner nor was any evidence adduced to substantiate the entries contained therein. On the contrary, in all educational documents from Class-I up to Matriculation, the date of birth of the petitioner is mentioned as 12.4.2004, which appears to be authentic. 28. As held in the matter of Ram Kripal alias Chirkut (supra), the date of birth mentioned in Voter ID and Aadhar are not reliable evidence for the purpose of ascertaining date of birth. The view is reasonable and as such, the date of birth mentioned in Voter ID and Aadar cannot be taken under consideration. 29. The petitioner submitted her Aadhar Card and Voter ID Card, wherein her date of birth is recorded as 12.4.2002, to contest the election for the post of Sarpanch. Under the relevant provisions of the Panchayati Raj Adhiniyam, where an election petition is filed against a returned candidate on the ground of underage disqualification pursuant to Article 243F of the Constitution of 26 India, an unqualified person cannot be permitted to occupy or hold office to the detriment of a qualified candidate. Hence, any person, who has not completed 21 years of age, at the time of filing nomination paper, is ineligible to contest the election for the post of Sarpanch. 30. Under Article 243F of the Constitution of India, inserted via the Constitution, (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992, the text reads as follows : 243F. Disqualifications for membership.— (1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of a Panchayat— (a) if he is so disqualified by or under any law for the time being in force for the purposes of elections to the Legislature of the State concerned: Provided that no person shall be disqualified on the ground that he is less than twenty-five years of age, if he has attained the age of twenty-one years; (b) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by the Legislature of the State. (2) If any question arises as to whether a member of a Panchayat has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (1), the question shall be referred for the decision of such authority and in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide.” 31. Though the Birth Certificate of the petitioner records her date of birth as 12.4.2002 but, as discussed above, the same cannot be relied upon as it was updated and issued on 5.7.2025 i.e. after filing of the Election Petition. All School Records from Class I to Class XII state the date of birth of the petitioner as 12.4.2004. The 27 Matriculation Certificate issued by the Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary Education in the month of March 2021 also records the same date of birth i.e. 12.4.2004. Since the entry with regard to date of birth in the Birth Certificate was updated and subsequently issued on 5.7.2025 i.e. after filing of the Election Petition and the petitioner has failed to adduce any evidence to substantiate that her actual date of birth is 12.4.2002, the Matriculation Certificate issued by the Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary Education remains the reliable and admissible document for determining her date of birth (12.4.2004) under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. This position is further supported by the petitioner’s earlier educational certificates, which consistently record the same date of birth. Had the petitioner adduced any credible evidence to establish the authenticity of the date of birth recorded in the updated Birth Certificate, the situation would have been different. 32. This Court cannot ignore the Class X Marksheet issued by the Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary Education in the year 2021, wherein the date of birth of the petitioner has been mentioned as 12.4.2004. It is also important to note that the petitioner, at the time of filing her nomination papers, did not submit the Birth Certificate to substantiate her claim that her date of birth is 12.4.2002. It also raises serious doubt before this Court that if the petitioner was already in possession of the Birth Certificate, she ought to have filed the same along with her nomination papers. However, for reasons best known to her, it was not filed at the relevant time. Instead, the Birth Certificate was subsequently 28 updated and issued on 5.7.2025 i.e. about three months before passing of the impunged order dated 25.9.2025 by the SDO (R ), Balrampur. 33. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the date of birth recorded in the updated Birth Certificate cannot be relied upon. Consequently, the date of birth recorded in Class X Marksheet issued by the Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary Education, wherein her date of birth is mentioned as ‘12.4.2004’ is held to be the correct date of birth of the petitioner. 34. Under the governing statutory provisions, a person is disqualified from being chosen as a member of a Panchayat if he/she has not attained the minimum age of 21 years. Since the petitioner had not attained the age of 21 years at the relevant time, her election stands legally invalid. 35. Consequently, this Court finds no merit in this petition and confirms the impugned order passed by the Election Tribunal, whereby the Election Petition was allowed. 36. Further, it has been stated at the Bar that a Notification for fresh election has subsequently been issued. 37. Resultantly, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Shyna Ajay