1 CGHC010332192023 2026:CGHC:39115 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 4355 of 2023 Order Reserved on 22.07.2026 Order Passed on 07.09. 2026 1 - Tula Ram S/o Nathuram Aged About 52 Years R/o Village Kothari, Tehsil, Barpali District Korba Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Revenue Department, Mantralaya Naya Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Sub -Divisional Office (Revenue) And Land Acquisition Officer Korba, District Korba Chhattisgarh. 3 - Sub Divisional Officer, (B/r), Public Works Department Korba Sub - Division Korba Chhattisgarh. 4 - National Highways Authority Of India Through Project Director Project Implementation Unit Tifra Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause title is downloaded from CIS Periphery.) For Petitioner : Ms. Anju Ahuja, Advocate. For State : Mr. Shobhit Mishra, Dy. G.A. For Respondent No. 4 : Mr. Gary Mukhopadhyay, Advocate. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad C.A.V. Order RAVVA UTTEJ KUMAR RAJU Digitally signed by RAVVA UTTEJ KUMAR RAJU Date: 2026.09.07 17:56:12 +0530 2 1. The petitioner has filed this petition questioning the illegal and arbitrary acts of the respondent authorities by which they have reviewed their earlier award passed on 05.08.2022 by allowing Rs. 76,97,676/- for acquisition of land of the petitioner and thereafter vide subsequent letter/award dated 18.08.2023 the earlier award was reviewed and modified by reducing the amount of compensation to the tune of Rs. 65,11,748/- which is not in accordance with law as such, the petitioner has preferred this petition seeking following reliefs:- “10.1 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pressed to call for the records. 10.2 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents to pay compensation to the petitioner to the tune of 7697676 along with 24% interest and cost. 10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash letter dated 18/08/2023 (annexure P6) in the interest of Justice. 10.4 That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct enquiry on the subject issue and wrong doers may kindly be punished. 10.5 That the Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents to pay compensation as per the 3 present market price, since it was not paid within time and the interest of the petitioner be safe guarded. 10.6 That the Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents not to take any coercive step to disposes the petitioner, from the house unless the entire compensation amount is paid along with interest and cost. 10.7 Any other relief which this Hon'ble court deems fit and proper may be granted in fever of petitioner along with cost.” 2. Briefly stated facts of the case is that the petitioner is title and possession holder of land bearing Khasra No. 537/4, situated at village Kothari, Tahsil Barpali, Korba (C.G.) in the said land, a house was also constructed in which the family members were residing. The concerned State Government has issued gazette notification dated 15.03.2018 and 19.09.2018 by which they have notified that the land of the petitioner is required for widening of road of Champa, Korba Chhuri, Katghora National Highway as such, the aforesaid land is required to be acquired. The concerned land acquisition authority after completing necessary formalities has passed an order dated 11.01.2019 and 19.02.2021, however it was found that since in the aforesaid award, the compensation in respect of house was not calculated and, therefore, while adding compensation for house calculation sheet was prepared for aforesaid reasons and after calculating 4 entire aspect the total compensation to the tune of Rs. 76,97,676/- was calculated. Accordingly, the concerned National Highways Authority of India (N.H.A.I.) has deposited the amount of compensation for disbursement of the same to the petitioner. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Officer cum Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Korba, (C.G.) has again calculated the compensation on 18.08.2023 while reducing the compensation to the tune of Rs. 65,11,748/- and has issued a letter to the petitioner on 29.12.2023 while directing him to remove the possession from his land as the amount has already been deposited in the State Bank of India, Barpali Branch in the Account No. 1150253335. It was also stated in the said notice that if the petitioner will not remove his possession, appropriate action will be taken against him,this gave cause of action to the petitioner for filing this petition. Since, the same S.D.O. (Revenue)/Land Acquisition Officer under the National Highways Act, 1956 has suo moto reviewed the award and an amended award was passed on 18.08.2023, the petitioner is challenging the same in the aforesaid writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Land Acquisition Officer has no power or authority to review his own order by subsequently reducing the amount of compensation after a lapse of more than one year. It is contended that there is no provision under the National Highways Act, 1956 conferring upon the concerned authority the power to review the compensation already determined and awarded. The final award under Section 5 3G of the National Highways Act, 1956 had already been passed on 05.08.2022. Therefore, the subsequent order whereby the earlier award was reviewed and the amount of compensation was reduced is wholly without jurisdiction and contrary to law. 4. Ex adverso, learned counsel appearing for the State/respondent Nos. 1 to 3 submits that the present petition is not maintainable. It is contended that the petitioner’s house was very old and that its valuation had not been properly assessed at the relevant time. Accordingly, the Land Acquisition Officer, Korba (C.G.), directed the Sub-Divisional Officer, PWD, Korba (C.G.), to conduct an enquiry and verify the actual condition and value of the petitioner’s house. Upon such enquiry, the value of the house was assessed at Rs. 32,55,878/-, and consequently, vide memo dated 08.08.2023, the petitioner was informed that he was entitled to compensation of Rs. 65,11,748/- only. It is further submitted that, owing to the incorrect valuation initially made, compensation amounting to Rs. 76,97,676/- had been calculated. However, upon revaluation, the said assessment was found to be erroneous and not in accordance with law. He also submits that the subsequent valuation was undertaken in the presence of the petitioner after due notice was given to him; however, the petitioner declined to sign the valuation proceedings. 5. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 4/N.H.A.I. submits that the Land Acquisition Officer reviewed the earlier award pursuant to certain complaints received by the authorities, wherein 6 it was specifically alleged that the petitioner’s house was an old structure and that the compensation earlier assessed was not in accordance with law. Accordingly, after issuing due notice to the petitioner, an enquiry was conducted in his presence. A Panchnama was also prepared during the course of the enquiry, wherein it was found that the petitioner’s house was an old structure and, consequently, the compensation payable in respect thereof required reassessment and reduction. It is, therefore, contended that the Land Acquisition Officer, after undertaking the aforesaid enquiry and upon finding that the earlier assessment was erroneous, rightly reduced the amount of compensation by reviewing the earlier award, and such action is in accordance with law. He next submits that, in any event, if the petitioner is aggrieved by the revised determination of compensation, he has an efficacious statutory remedy by filing an application under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956. 6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and upon perusal of the documents annexed to the present petition, the question of law arising for consideration in the instant case is reproduced herein under, as formulated by this Court in its order dated 14.09.2020 passed in W.P.(C) No. 665 of 2019 and other connected matters, particularly in paragraphs 4, 5 and 11 to 21 thereof: 7 “4. The question of law involved in the present cases or the point of issue to be considered in these writ petitions is that; “Whether the prescribed authority i.e. the Land Acquisition Officer, the concerned Sub-Divisional Officer has a power to review, amend or modify a final award passed under Section 3(G) of the National Highways Act, 1956. 5. It was the stand and contention of the petitioners all along, that once when the prescribed authority has passed a final award and the same has been published, the prescribed authority thereafter becomes functus officio.It was further contended that once when an award has been passed, the statute does not provide for any of the aggrieved persons to prefer a review, nor does the statute confer any suo-moto powers upon the prescribed authority permitting suo- moto review of the final award. In view of this, the counsel for the petitioners stressed that the impugned amended award dated 05.10.2018 to be per-se illegal and contrary to law. Another ground raised by the petitioners while challenging the amended award was that while registering a review the authority concerned did not issue any sort of notice to the petitioners nor was a fair and reasonable opportunity of hearing provided and thus the impugned order was also violative of the principles of natural justice. The further contention of the petitioner was that the plain reading and the proceedings would clearly reflect that the entire acquisition proceedings have been conducted 8 strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act and as such there is no procedural, technical and legal shortcoming or lacuna in the process of passing of the final award under Section 3(G) of the National Highways Act, 1956 on 01.06.2018. 11. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to Section 3G of the National Highways Act, 1956 and which for ready reference is being reproduced herein under: “3G. Determination of amount payable as compensation.— (1) Where any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount which shall be determined by an order of the competent authority. (2) Where the right of user or any right in the nature of an easement on, any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount to the owner and any other person whose right of enjoyment in that land has been affected in any manner whatsoever by reason of such acquisition an amount calculated at ten per cent. of the amount determined under sub-section (1), for that land. (3) Before proceeding to determine the amount under sub- section (1) or sub-section (2), the competent authority shall give a public notice published in two local newspapers, one of which will be in a vernacular language inviting claims from all persons interested in the land to be acquired. (4) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land and shall require all persons interested in such land to appear in person or by an agent or by a legal practitioner referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3C, before the competent authority, at a time and place and 9 to state the nature of their respective interest in such land. (5) If the amount determined by the competent authority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on an application by either of the parties, be determined by the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government. (6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to every arbitration under this Act. (7) The competent authority or the arbitrator while determining the amount under sub- section (1) or sub-section (5), as the case may be, shall take into consideration— (a) the market value of the land on the date of publication of the notification under section 3A; (b) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of the severing of such land from other land; (c) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other immovable property in any manner, or his earnings; (d) if, in consequences of the acquisition of the land, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses, if any, incidental to such change.”” 12. And for the competent authority in the course of conducting the proceedings under the National Highways Act, 1956 they have been given certain powers which the 10 Civil Court exercises while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 13. The limited provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which can be exercised by the competent authority under the NH Act is spelt out in 3(I) of the Act of 1956, which again for ready reference is reproduced herein under: “3-I. Competent authority to have certain powers of civil court.—The competent authority shall have, for the purposes of this Act, all the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely:— (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document; (c) reception of evidence on affidavits;- (d) requisitioning any public record from any court or office; (e) issuing commission for examination of witnesses.” 14. In exercise of power conferred under Section 9 of the National Highways Act, 1956, the Central Government had also framed certain Rules known as “The National Highways Rules, 1957”. The entire provision of the Rules of 1957 does not provide for a power of review to the competent authority, so far as the award under the National Highways Act, 1956 is concerned. 11 15. Recently, the Bombay High Court had the occasion of dealing with a similar issue and in the said judgment of “Bhupendrasingh v. Competent Authority” 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 6092, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in paragraphs No. 25, 27 & 47 has held as under: “25. It would thus be apparent that the power of review, being a creature of a statute, has to be conferred upon the authority by the provisions of the statute. It cannot be said that the Parliament while enacting the Amending Act No. 16 of 1997, amending the provisions of the NH Act 1956, was oblivious of the nature of rights and powers being conferred upon the Competent Authority for the purposes of acquisition of land for the National Highways. Thus, had it been the intention of the Parliament to confer a power of review upon the ‘Competent Authority’, as constituted u/s. 3(a) of the NH Act, 1956, it would have so done by insertion of a proper provision in that regard in the statute. The absence of such a provision, therefore, indicates the intention of the law makers, not to confer such a power upon the Competent Authority, in absence of which, such a power cannot be said to be available to the Competent Authority. 27. Thus, under the scheme of acquisition under the NH Act, 1956, under Section 3-A, the Central Government, for the purposes as stated therein, has the power to, by publication of notification in the Official Gazette, declare its intention to acquire such land. Under Sec. 3-B, any person authorised in this behalf, has the lawful authority to inspect, survey, measure, value, enquire, take levels, etc.. Section 3-C then authorises the Competent Authority to hear objections, as may be filed by any person interested in land and after hearing him or his counsel and after making such further enquiry, if any, as thought necessary, decide the objections, and such decisions/order has been made final. Section 3-D relates to submitting the report as to acquisition of land to the Central Government and on receipt of such report, the 12 Central Government shall declare, by notification in the Official Gazette, that the land should be acquired for the purpose mentioned in sub-section (1) or Section 3-A. Section 3-E prescribes for taking possession of the land acquired. Section 3-F is with regard to the right to enter into the land where land has vested in the Central Government and Section 3-G is relating to determination of compensation amount by the Competent Authority for the land acquired. This would demonstrate no power of review or for that matter a power to make any correction in the award passed, for whatsoever reason, has been conferred upon the Competent Authority. The status of the Competent Authority and the nature of the power exercised by it, are material in considering whether it would have an inherent power of review/correction as is being contended by the learned A.S.G. Shri Sanjeev Deshpande. 47. The net result of the discussion, as made above, is that the provisions of section 33 of the Act of 2013, are not available to the Competent Authority constituted u/s. 3(a) of the NH Act, 1956, in the process of acquisition of land under the NH Act, 1956 and thus, it is impermissible for the Competent Authority to make any correction or for that matter to pass any order in the nature of correction of an award or for that matter an amended award. Once the award has been passed by the Competent Authority, the Competent Authority loses any authority to tinker with it in any manner whatsoever.” 16. A similar dispute also came up before the Allahabad High Court in the case “Ravindra Kumar Singh v. Union of India”, 2019 SCC OnLine All 3589. The Division Bench of Allahabad also in paragraphs No. 30 to 34 held as under: “30. We find unbroken line of authority to the effect that power of review is not an inherent power. It needs to be conferred by the statute 13 by express or specific provision. In absence of any such power the order simply becomes without jurisdiction. 31. The legal position in this regard is much too well settled to require any reiteration. We may in this regard gainfully refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar. 32. The Act does not empower the Collector to review an order passed by him under Section 76-A. In the absence of any power of review, the Collector could not subsequently reconsider his previous decisions and hold that there were grounds for annulling or reversing the Mahalkari's order. The subsequent order dated February 17, 1959 reopening the matter was illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction. The High Court ought to have quashed the order of the Collector dated February 17, 1959 on this ground. 33. The said judgement has been consistently followed by the Supreme Court, in Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania4 the Supreme Court has made the following observation: “Review in absence of statutory provisions 12. It is settled legal proposition that unless the statute/rules so permit, the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi- judicial orders. In the absence of any provision in the Act granting an express power of review, it is manifest that a review could not be made and the order in review, if passed, is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. (Vide Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh.) 13. In Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji, Major Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan4, Kuntesh Gupta (Dr.) v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records and Settlement6 and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain this Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either expressly/specifically or by necessary 14 implication and in the absence of any provision in the Act/Rules, review of an earlier order is impermissible as review is a creation of statute. Jurisdiction of review can be derived only from the statute and thus, any order of review in the absence of any statutory provision for the same is a nullity, being without jurisdiction.” 34. Applying the said principle, we find that the competent authority has traveled beyond its jurisdiction to review its own order. He has ventured to sit over the order by his predecessor in reopening the Award. Hence, in the absence of any power of review, impugned order passed by the competent authority in the present case is without jurisdiction.” 17.The High Court of Karnataka also had an occasion of dealing with a similar situation in the case of “National Highway Authority of India v. Assistant Commissioner and Competent Authority, Kolar and Another" 2011 SCC Online KAR 115, wherein in paragraph No.13 the Division Bench has held as under: “13. The question is whether respondent No. 1 has any such power under the provisions of the Act to pass such a second award. The answer has to be an emphatic no. There is no provision in the Act clothing respondent No. 1 to pass a second award. Once an award is passed determining the compensation by the competent authority, then as per the provisions contained under sub-Section (5) of Section 3G of the Act, the aggrieved party who does not accept the amount has to make an application to the Arbitrator appointed by the Central Government who will determine the correct amount payable. As per sub-Section (6) of Section 3G of the Act, the provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, are made applicable to every Arbitration that takes place under the National Highways Act, 1956. As per sub-Section (7) of Section 3G of the Act, certain factors are enumerated which are required to be taken into consideration while determining the amount of compensation by the competent authority and also 15 by the arbitrator. It is thus clear that if it is the case of the claimants-land owners that proper market value to the acquired lands payable as on the date of preliminary Notification published under Section 3A of the Act was not determined and awarded by the competent authority, the only course open for them is to move the arbitrator whereupon the arbitrator is enjoined with a duty to determine the same by following the provisions contained under sub-Section (7) of Section 3G of the Act The aggrieved party will be further entitled to avail the provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.” 18. Recently the Hon'ble Supreme Court also in the case of “Naresh Kumar & Others v. Government (NCT of Delhi)” 2019 (9) SCC 416 considering the issue whether a review of an award passed under the Acquisition Act was permissible or not, in paragraphs No.13 & 14 held as under: “13. It is settled law that the power of Review can be exercised only when the statute provides for the same. In the absence of any such provision in the concerned statute, such power of Review cannot be exercised by the authority concerned. This Court in the case of Kalabharati Advertising vs. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania (2010) 9 SCC 437, has held as under: “… 12. It is settled legal proposition that unless the statute/rules so permit, the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. In the absence of any provision in the Act granting an express power of review, it is manifest that a review could not be made and the order in review, if passed, is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. (Vide Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar [AIR 1965 SC 1457] and Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh [AIR 1966 SC 641] . 13. In Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji [(1971) 3 SCC 844] , Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan [(1979) 1 SCC 321] , Kuntesh Gupta (Dr.) v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya [(1987) 4 SCC 525] , State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land 16 Records and Settlement [(1998) 7 SCC 162] and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain [(2008) 2 SCC 705] this Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either expressly/specifically or by necessary implication and in the absence of any provision in the Act/Rules, review of an earlier order is impermissible as review is a creation of statute. Jurisdiction of review can be derived only from the statute and thus, any order of review in the absence of any statutory provision for the same is a nullity, being without jurisdiction. 14. Therefore, in view of the above, the law on the point can be summarised to the effect that in the absence of any statutory provision providing for review, entertaining an application for review or under the garb of clarification /modification/ correction is not permissible.” 14. In view of the aforesaid, we hold that the Award dated 01.10.2003 could not have been reviewed by the Collector, and thus we allow these appeals and quash the order dated 04.07.2004 passed by the Collector in Review Award No.16/03- 04 as well as the order dated 04.03.2010 passed by the Delhi High Court in Naresh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi). The appellants shall thus be entitled to the compensation as awarded in terms of the Award of the Land Acquisition Collector dated 01.10.2003, and the Supplementary Award dated 27.10.2004. No orders as to costs.” 19. From the reading of the aforesaid judicial pronouncements of the various High Courts as also of the Hon'ble Supreme Court a fact which stands established is that unless the provision of law i.e. the statute provides for the power of review, an award once passed in itself becomes final. The position of Law also gets well settled on the basis of the aforesaid judicial pronouncements that the power of review is not an inherent power, it must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. A review is 17 always considered to be a creature of statute and the power of review cannot be entertained in the absence of a provision thereof. 20. What is also required to be considered at this juncture is, can the amended award passed by the authorities be brought within the ambit of Section 33 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 which empowers the Collector to carry out correction in so far as any clerical or arithmetic mistake and which can be done either on his own motion or on the application from an interested party. In the factual matrix of the case by way of the amended award, the prescribed authority has modified the order to the extent of changing the methodology of calculation thereby has reduced the compensation substantially from what was quantified in the original award. Thus, it is evidently clear that it was not a clerical or an arithmetic error, which the authority has carried out, rather it is a case where the prescribed authority has reviewed his own award and has modified the award detrimental to the interest of the petitioners. What has also to be seen at this juncture is that the original award was passed on 01.06.2018, however the amended award has been passed on 05.10.2018 i.e. after a period of more than 4 months. 21. As regards the objection of the respondents, so far as the right of the petitioners to challenge the award by way of an arbitration invoking Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 is concerned, this Court is of the opinion that, once when the 18 challenge is made to the amended award primarily on the ground of, lack of jurisdiction and competence on the part of the prescribed authority, in reviewing his award and the ground being that of the authorities being denuded of their power of review this Court is of the opinion that under such circumstances, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India exercising the power of judicial review can entertain a writ petition in this regard, even in the case, if there is a provision of appeal provided under the statute. It is by now a well settled proposition of law that when a challenge to an order is primarily on the ground of jurisdiction and competence of the authority Writ Court can entertain a writ petition. Thus, the objection so far as the petitioners having an alliterative remedy stands rejected. 7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court In the matter of Naresh Kumar and Others v. Government (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2019) 9 SCC 416 held in paras 12 & 13 which reads as under:- “12. It is settled law that the power of Review can be exercised only when the statute provides for the same. In the absence of any such provision in the concerned statute, such power of Review cannot be exercised by the authority concerned. This Court in the case of Kalabharati Advertising vs. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania (2010) 9 SCC 437, has held as under: “…………….. 12. It is settled legal proposition that unless the statute/rules so permit, the review. application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi Judicial orders. In the absence of any provision in the Act granting an express power of review, 19 it is manifest that a review could not be made and the order in review, if passed, is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. (Vide Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar [AIR 1965 SC 1457] and Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh [AIR 1966 SC 641].) 13. In Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji ((1971) 3 SCC 844 13. AIR 1970 SC 1273], Major Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan [(1979) 1 SCC 321], Kuntesh Gupta (Dr.) v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya [(1987) 4 SCC 525: 1987 SCC (L&S) 491: AIR 1987 SC 2186], State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records and Settlement [(1998) 7 SCC 162] and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain [(2008) 2 SCC 705: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 537] this Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either expressly/specifically or by necessary implication and in the absence of any provision in the Act/Rules, review of an earlier order is impermissible as review is a creation of statute. Jurisdiction of review can be derived only from the statute and thus, any order of review in the absence of any statutory provision for the same is a nullity, being without jurisdiction. 13. In view of the aforesaid, we hold that the Award dated 01.10.2003 could not have been reviewed by the Collector, and thus we allow these appeals and quash the order dated 04.07.2004 passed by the Collector in Review Award No. 16/03 04 as well as the order dated 04.03.2010 passed by the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition (C ) No. 2185 of 2008 and Writ Petition (C ) No. 381 of 2009. The appellants shall thus be entitled to the compensation as awarded in terms of the Award of the Land Acquisition Collector dated 01.10.2003, and the Supplementary Award dated 27.10.2004.” 20 8. As a sequel, this writ petition stands allowed. It is held that the petitioner is entitled to the benefits flowing from the original award dated 05.08.2022, and shall be granted all consequential benefits in terms thereof. (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge U.K. Raju The date when the judgment is reserved The date when the judgment is pronounced The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website Operative Full 22.07.2026 07.09.2026. -- 07.09.2026