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2026 DAILYLAW 34730 (PNJ)

MS GOLDEN TERRY TOWEL PVT LTD v. THE PRESIDING OFFICER AND ANOTHER

CWP/21783/2026 · 2026-07-22

Kirti Singh

body2026

Judgment text

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CWP-21783-2026 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH (107) CWP-21783-2026 Date of Decision: 22.07.2026 M/s Golden Terry Towel Pvt. Ltd. ......Petitioner Versus The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court, Panipat and Another ......Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH Present: Mr. Diwan S. Adlakha, Advocate for the petitioner. **** KIRTI SINGH , J. (ORAL) (1) The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India challenging the impugned Award dated 29.01.2026 (Annexure P-5) passed by the learned Labour Court-respondent No.1, whereby the reference is decided in favour of the workman/respondent no.2. (2) It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent No. 2/workman, who was appointed as a Weaver with the petitioner company on 26.06.2006, voluntarily left the job on 16.07.2022 without any information to the management. At the time, no dues were kept pending by the petitioner. Yet, after the lapse of about three months, the workman issued a demand notice dated 07.10.2022, alleging illegal termination of his services. Thereafter, the matter was referred to the Learned Labour Court, Panipat, wherein the petitioner filed a written statement denying the allegations and specifically pleaded that the workman had abandoned the job on his own. Further, during the proceedings, the workman examined himself as WW-1 and admitted in his cross-examination that he had received salary for the days worked in July, 2022. The HR Executive of the RITIKA 2026.07.27 12:56 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP-21783-2026 -2- petitioner also deposed that the workman had left the job voluntarily and was not terminated. However, the Learned Labour Court wrongly held the termination to be illegal and granted reinstatement with 50% back wages vide Award dated 29.01.2026. Learned counsel contends that the respondent no.2- workman failed to prove any termination by the management, and the evidence on record clearly establishes voluntary abandonment of service. Therefore, the impugned Award is liable to be set aside. (3) I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and have gone through the record with his able assistance. (4) Before proceeding further, a gainful reference can be made to the proposition of law as discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.6511 of 2005 titled as Surendranagar District Panchayat Vs. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, relevant paras whereof reads thus:- “8. As per Section 25F, no workman who is in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer unless conditions laid therein are fulfilled. The retrenchment is defined in Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act). Under the definition termination of the service of a workman by the employer by any reason whatsoever, otherwise than, as a punishment, by way of disciplinary action, would constitute retrenchment except in cases accepted in the Section itself, they are :- i) a voluntary retirement of a workman; ii) retirement of a workman on reaching the age of superannuation; iii) termination of the service of a workman as a result of nonrenewal of the contract of employment; or iv) termination of the service on the ground of continued ill-health of the workman. Unless these reasons are existed and proved, termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason, would constitute retrenchment. Therefore, if the employer is to retrench the workmen employed in his industry who is in continuous service has to follow the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. To attract provisions of Section 25F, the workman claiming protection under it, has to prove that there exists relationship of employer and employee; that he is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act; the establishment in which he is employed is an industry within the meaning of the Act and he must have put in not less than one year of continuous service as defined by Section 25B under the employer. These conditions are cumulative. If any of these conditions are missing the provisions of Section 25F will not attract. To get relief from the court the workman has to establish that he has right to continue in service and that his service has been terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The Section postulates three conditions to be fulfilled by an employer for getting a valid retrenchment, namely :- i) One month's clear notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or that the workman has been paid wages for the period of RITIKA 2026.07.27 12:56 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP-21783-2026 -3- notice in lieu of such notice; ii) payment of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to 15 days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof, in excess of six months; iii) a notice to the appropriate Government in the prescribed manner. 9. To attract the provisions of Section 25F, one of the conditions required is that the workman is employed in any industry for a continuous period which would not be not less than one year. Section 25B of the Act defines continuous service for the purposes of Chapter V-A "Lay-off and Retrenchment". The purport of this Section is that if a workman has put in an uninterrupted service of the establishment, including the service which may be interrupted on account of sickness, authorised leave, an accident, a strike which is not illegal, a lock-out or cessation of work, that is not due to any fault on the part of the workman, shall be said to be a continuous service, for that period. Thus the workman shall be said to be in continuous service for one year i.e., 12 months irrespective of the number of days he has actually worked with interrupted service, permissible under Section 25B. However, the workmen must have been in service during the period, i.e., not only on the date when he actually worked but also on the days he could not work under the circumstances set out in sub-section (1). The workman must be in the employment of the employer concerned on the days he has actually worked but also on the days on which he has not worked. The import of sub-section (1) of Section 25B is that the workman should be in the employment of the employer for the continuous, uninterrupted period for one year except the period the absence is permissible as mentioned hereinabove. Subsection (2) of Section 25B introduces the fiction to the effect that even if the workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of Clause (i) of Section 25B for the period of one year or six months he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for that period under an employer if he has actually worked for the days specified in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2). By the legal fiction of sub-section 2(a) (i), the workman shall be deemed to be in continuous service for one year if he is employed underground in a mine for 190 days or 240 days in any other case. Provisions of the Section postulate that if the workman has put in at least 240 days with his employer, immediately prior to the date of retrenchment, he shall be deemed to have served with the employer for a period of one year to get the benefit of Section 25F. 16. In Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225, it is said by this Court that before a workman can claim retrenchment not being in consonance of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, he has to show that he has been in continuous service of not less than one year with the employer who had retrenched him from service. 17. In Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 SCC 25 - (At Page 26, Para 3), this Court held that "In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside." 19. In the light of the aforesaid, it was necessary for the workman to produce the relevant material to prove that he has actually worked with the employer for not less than 240 days during the period twelve calendar months preceding the date of termination. What we find is that apart from the oral evidence the workman RITIKA 2026.07.27 12:56 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP-21783-2026 -4- has not produced any evidence to prove the fact that he has worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that regard was produced; no coworker was examined; muster roll produced by the employer has not been contradicted. It is improbable that workman who claimed to have worked with the appellant for such a long period would not possess any documentary evidence to prove nature of his engagement and the period of work he had undertaken with his employer. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in employment for 240 days during the preceding 12 months of the date of termination of his service. The Courts below have wrongly drawn an adverse inference for non production of the record of the workman for ten years. The scope of enquiry before the Labour Court was confined to only 12 months preceding the date of termination to decide the question of continuation of service for the purpose of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman has never contended that he was regularly employed in the Panchayat for one year to claim the uninterrupted period of service as required under Section 25B(1) of the Act. In the fact and situation and in the light of the law on the subject, we find that the workman-respondent is not entitled for the protection or compliance of Section 25F of the Act before his service was terminated by the employer. As regards noncompliance of Sections 25G and 25H suffice is to say that witness Vinod Mishra examined by the appellant has stated that no seniority list was maintained by the department of daily wagers. In the absence of regular employment of the workman, the appellant was not expected to maintain seniority list of the employees engaged on daily wages and in the absence of any proof by the respondent regarding existence of the seniority list and his so called seniority no relief could be given to him for non-compliance of provisions of the Act. The Courts could have drawn adverse inference against the appellant only when seniority list was proved to be in existence and then not produced before the Court. In order to entitle the Court to draw inference unfavourable to the party, the Court must be satisfied that evidence is in existence and could have been proved. “ (5) The learned Tribunal, after appreciating the evidence, first satisfactorily recorded that respondent No. 2 had infact worked as a Weaver with the petitioner company and was covered under the definition of “Workman” under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was thereafter observed, based on the material on record, that the workman had completed more than 240 days of service in the preceding year, and that the petitioner failed to prove that the workman had abandoned the service voluntarily, by way of any evidence, including any notice, communication, settlement or otherwise. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the termination of services of respondent no.2 was in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and therefore rightly granted the relief of reinstatement with continuity of service along with 50% back wages. RITIKA 2026.07.27 12:56 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP-21783-2026 -5- (6) Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or error apparent on the face of the record in the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal. The findings of the learned Tribunal are based on proper appreciation of the evidence available on record. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, does not re-appreciate the evidence unless the findings are shown to be perverse or unsustainable in law, which is not the case herein. (7) In view of the above, I find no merit in the writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed. (8) Civil miscellaneous application(s) pending, if any, are also disposed of. (KIRTI SINGH) JUDGE July 22, 2026 Ritika Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No RITIKA 2026.07.27 12:56 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh