1 CGHC010166662024 2026:CGHC:38711-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 401 of 2024 1 - Ramlal S/o Late Golul Ram, Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Baradwar, District- Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) 2 - Ramkumar S/o Late Gokul Ram, Aged About 38 Years R/o Village Charpara, Deragarh, Tahsil Baradwar, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) 3 - Kanhaiya S/o Late Gokul Ram, Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Charpara, Dergarh, Tahsil Baradwar, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) 4 - Chhotelal S/o Late Gokul Ram, Aged About 22 Years R/o Village Charpara, Deragarh, Tahsil Baradwar, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) 5 - Purnima Kumari D/o Late Gokul Ram, Aged About 20 Years R/o Village Charpara, Deragarh, Tahsil Baradwar, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) 6 - Bundkunwar D/o Late Gokul Ram, Aged About 33 Years W/o Ganesh Ram R/o Village Kewali, Tahsil Kharsia, District Raigarh (C.G.) 7 - Usha D/o Late Gokul Ram, Aged About 30 Years W/o Goutam R/o Village Kewalli, Tahsil Kharsia, District Raigarh (C.G.) (All Are Legal Heirs Of Deceased Petitioner Gokul Ram And Substituted As Honble Court's Order Dated 13-06-2023) ... Appellants versus 1 - Janki Bai (Died) Through Lrs As Per Hon'ble Court Order Dated 25/03/2026 1.1 - (A) Lalit Sidar S/o Late Premsing Sidar Aged About 53 Years Resident Of Village Garhgorhi Post And P.S. Sakti Tehsil Sakti Dist- Sakti (C.G.) ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.09.03 10:27:09 +0530 2 1.2 - (B) Sushil Sidar S/o Late Premsing Sidar Aged About 51 Years Resident Of Village Garhgorhi Post And P.S. Sakti Tehsil Sakti Dist- Sakti (C.G.) 1.3 - (C) Lalita Bai D/o Late Presing Sidar Aged About 49 Years Resident Of Village- Kerribancha Tehsil Sakti Dist- Sakti C.G. 1.4 - (D) Satrupa Bai D/o Late Premsing Sidar Aged About 47 Years Resident Of Village Garhgorhi Post And P.S. Sakti Tehsil Sakti Dist- Sakti C.G. 1.5 - (E) Sukrita Bai D/o Late Prem Singh Sidar Aged About 44 Years Resident Of Village Talwa Tehsil Bhothia Dist- Sakti C.G. 2 - Lakhan Lal S/o Beniram, Aged About 49 Years Caste-Rathore, R/o Deragarh, Tahsil - Sakti, District Janjg-Champa, Now District Sakti, Chhattisgarh. 3 - State of Chhattisgarh, Through The Secretary, Department of Revenue D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Sub-Divisional Officer, Sakti, District- Janjgir-Champa, Now District Sakti, Chhattisgarh. 5 - Additional Collector, Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh, District Janjgir- Champa (C.G.) 6 - Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) 7 - Board of Revenue Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) (Respondent No. 8 In Writ Petition Namely Sukhwara Bai Died And Her Name Is Deleted As Per Honble Court Order Dated 13-06-2023 ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. B.P. Sharma and Mr. M.L. Sakat, Advocates For Respondents No.1.1 to 1.5 : Mr. Jai Prakash Shukla, Advocate For State/Respondents No.2 to 7 : Mr. Shashank Thakur, Additional Advocate General 3 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 01.09.2026 1 Heard Mr. B.P. Sharma and Mr. M.L. Sakat, learned counsel for the appellants as well as Mr. Jai Prakash Shukla, learned counsel for respondents No.1.1 to 1.5 and Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondents No.2 to 7. 2 By way of this writ appeal, appellants have prayed for following relief(s):- “It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order dated 20.3.20242 (Annexure A-1), allow the writ petition in toto and in effect dismiss the application filed by respondent concerned under Section 170B of the CG Land Revenue Code, 1959 in the interest of justice and/or pass such other orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3 The present intra-Court appeal has been filed against the order dated 20.03.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (C) No.2051/2019, whereby the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners/appellants has been dismissed. 4 4 The material facts, as projected before the learned Single Judge, may be noticed in brief. Survey No.665/1, admeasuring 0.29 acres, situated at Village Naya Baradwar, was originally recorded in the name of Latiram and, after his death, the said land came to be recorded in the name of his son, Dhaniram. Dhaniram thereafter transferred the subject land in favour of Firtu Ram, who was also a member of the Aboriginal Tribe, by way of a registered sale deed dated 23.05.1979 for a consideration of Rs.5,000/-. Subsequently, upon the death of Firtu Ram, the subject land was recorded in the name of Gokul Ram and, after his death, the same came to be recorded in the names of the present appellants, who claim their rights through late Gokul Ram. 5 It was further the case before the learned Single Judge that respondent No.1, namely, Janki Bai, initiated proceedings under Section 170-B of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for short, ‘the Code, 1959’) before the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), alleging that, notwithstanding the apparent title and revenue entries in favour of the tribal persons, the subject land was, in fact, in the possession and enjoyment of Lakhanlal Rathore, a person belonging to the non-tribal community. The Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), upon taking cognizance of the proceedings, called for a report from the concerned Patwari and issued notices to the persons concerned. The parties appeared before the authority and statements of the concerned persons and other witnesses were recorded. 5 6 Upon consideration of the report submitted by the Circle Patwari, the statements of the witnesses and other material available on record, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), vide order dated 30.03.1998, directed reversion of the subject land in favour of a member of the Aboriginal Tribe in exercise of powers under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. 7 Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, late Gokul Ram preferred an appeal before the Collector, who, while setting aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), remanded the matter for fresh consideration after affording due opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties. Upon remand, the matter was reconsidered by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), who, vide order dated 11.02.2003, once again directed reversion of the subject land in favour of a member of the Aboriginal Tribe. The said order was thereafter affirmed by the Collector, Bilaspur, vide order dated 03.03.2004 and by the Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, vide order dated 30.11.2009. The challenge carried before the Board of Revenue also did not yield any relief, the revision having been dismissed on the ground of maintainability. 8 Being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders passed by the revenue authorities, the present appellants, being the legal representatives of late Gokul Ram, approached the learned Single Judge by filing Writ Petition (C) No.2051/2019. The learned Single Judge, upon consideration of the rival submissions, the statutory provisions 6 and the material available on record, dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 20.03.2024. It is against the aforesaid order that the present intra-Court appeal has been preferred. 9 Mr. B.P. Sharma and Mr. M.L. Sakat, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, submit that the learned Single Judge as well as the authorities below have failed to appreciate the fundamental issue involved in the matter, namely, the effect of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, particularly Section 4 thereof, which, according to the appellants, has retrospective operation. It is submitted that the subject property was admittedly purchased in the name of the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, who belongs to the Scheduled Tribe community, by virtue of a registered sale deed, and therefore, the finding that the transaction was benami and that the property in fact belonged to Lakhanlal Rathore, a non-tribal, is contrary to the documentary evidence available on record and is perverse. 10 Learned counsel further submit that the revenue authorities have failed to accord due weight to the registered sale deed, which specifically records the predecessor of the appellants as the purchaser and holder of the property. According to learned counsel, the title and ownership flowing from a registered instrument could not have been displaced merely on the basis of oral statements or conjectures, particularly when there is no legally sustainable material establishing that the consideration for 7 the transaction was paid by Lakhanlal Rathore or that the predecessor of the appellants was merely a benamidar. It is, therefore, contended that the conclusion regarding the alleged benami nature of the transaction is based upon misappreciation of the evidence and erroneous application of law. 11 It is also submitted that the authorities below proceeded by addressing an incorrect and legally misconceived question as to whether the property was actually owned by Lakhanlal Rathore, instead of examining the matter in the light of the statutory protection and consequences flowing from Section 4 of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988. Learned counsel submit that the said aspect goes to the root of the matter and has escaped proper consideration. The appellants, who claim their title through a registered sale deed executed in favour of their predecessor, could not have been deprived of their property without a proper determination of the alleged benami transaction in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions. 12 Lastly, learned counsel submit that the impugned orders have the effect of depriving the appellants of their valuable property rights and are consequently liable to be interfered with by this Court. It is contended that such deprivation, without proper consideration of the registered title document and the statutory provisions relied upon by the appellants, is violative of the constitutional guarantees embodied under Articles 14, 19, 21 and 300-A of the 8 Constitution of India. On these grounds, learned counsel submit that the order passed by the learned Single Judge, as well as the orders of the revenue authorities impugned in the writ petition, deserve to be set aside and the writ appeal deserves to be allowed. 13 Reliance has been placed upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Khora (Dead) through Legal Heirs and others v. Mohar Sai and others, (2023) 14 SCC 767 as well as the judgment passed by this Court in Urmila Devi v. Vikas Kumar Agrawal and others (Writ Appeal No.590/2026 vide orde dated 15.07.2026) to buttress his submissions. 14 Mr. Jai Prakash Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the legal heirs of late Gokul Ram, namely, respondents No.1.1 to 1.5, opposes the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and submits that the orders passed by the revenue authorities, directing reversion of the subject land under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959, have been passed after due consideration of the material available on record and in accordance with the provisions of law. It is submitted that the competent authorities, upon conducting the requisite enquiry and considering the report of the concerned Patwari as well as the statements of the parties and other witnesses, have recorded a categorical finding that the subject land was, in substance, held and possessed by a non-tribal, namely, Lakhanlal Rathore. The 9 said finding has consistently been affirmed by the appellate revenue authorities and, therefore, does not warrant interference in the present intra-Court appeal. 15 Learned counsel further submits that the appellants cannot derive any benefit merely from the fact that the sale deed stands in the name of their predecessor, when the competent authority, on the basis of the evidence and surrounding circumstances, has found the transaction to be a benami transaction and the actual possession and interest in the land to be that of a non-tribal. It is contended that Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 is intended to protect tribal land from being transferred or held by non-tribals through colourable or benami arrangements, and the subsequent invocation of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 cannot be used to defeat the statutory protection available to members of the Scheduled Tribe community under the State land revenue law. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the learned Single Judge has rightly declined to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the revenue authorities and the writ appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 16 Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondents No.2 to 7, opposes the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and submits that the impugned orders passed by the revenue authorities are based upon a proper enquiry conducted in 10 accordance with Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. It is submitted that the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), after calling for the report from the concerned Patwari, issuing notice to the concerned parties and recording the statements of the parties and witnesses, had arrived at a finding that the subject land was in the possession and enjoyment of a non-tribal, namely, Lakhanlal Rathore. The said finding was thereafter examined and affirmed by the Collector as well as the Commissioner, Bilaspur Division. Learned counsel submits that the appellants have failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional error, perversity or violation of principles of natural justice warranting interference with the concurrent findings recorded by the competent revenue authorities. 17 Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the reliance placed by the appellants upon the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 is wholly misconceived and has no application so as to defeat the proceedings undertaken under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. It is contended that the proceedings under Section 170-B are intended to protect the land belonging to members of the Aboriginal Tribe from being held or enjoyed by non-tribals through benami or other colourable arrangements, and the mere existence of a registered sale deed in the name of the predecessor of the appellants cannot, by itself, conclude the issue of actual ownership and possession when the competent authority has recorded a finding to the contrary on the 11 basis of the material available on record. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the learned Single Judge has rightly refused to exercise writ jurisdiction and that the present writ appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 18 We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order as well as materials available on record as also the Writ Petition (C) No.2051/2019. 19 After appreciating the submissions of learned counsel for the parties as also the materials on record, the learned Single Judge while relying the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhaji v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla and others, (2003) 1 SCC 692 as also the provisions contained in Section 170-B of the Code, 1959, has passed the impugned order in following terms:- “9) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bhaiji vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla and Others reported in (2003) 1 SCC 692, in paragraph 8 held as under:- “8. It is well known that some of the aboriginal tribes are nomadic and some indulge into crimes traditionally and historically. The purpose of settling land with the tribals mostly which is done at very concessional rates and at times even without involving an obligation to pay the land revenue, is so done with a view to see that the aboriginals settle at one place 12 abandoning nomadism and picking up tilling the soil as their vocation by settling at one place and earning livelihood by labour and toil. It is also well known that creamy layers have developed and even as amongst socially unprivileged some have acquired affluence. An affluent shrewd tribal may indulge into exploiting his fellow beings. Possibility cannot be ruled out where a non- tribal may manage to have land transferred apparently but not in reality in the name of a tribal and taking advantage of his status, affluence or any other means, conferring him with capacity to exploit, may till the land to his own advantage depriving the aboriginal tribal from the benefits of the land settled by the State with him. All such cases are taken care of by Section 170-B. The purpose of enacting Section 170-B of the Code is very wide. The object sought to be achieved, as its drafting indicates, is to gather and make available all statistics with the State officials so as to find out how much land belonging to aboriginal tribals is in possession of anyone to whom it does not belong as on the cut off date. The information having been collected the enquiry under sub-Section (3) shall be directed towards finding out the nature of transaction resulting into transfer of land - whether such transaction of transfer has resulted in the aboriginal tribal having been defrauded of his legitimate right in the land. Sub- Sections (1), (2) and (3), as enacted in 13 1980, have to be read as part of one whole scheme. If the submission of Shri Gambhir is correct then the object of enquiry under sub- Section (3) would have been to find out if such transaction of transfer has resulted in an aboriginal tribal having been defrauded of his legitimate right by person not belonging to aboriginal tribe. But that is not so. Nowhere in the entire scheme of sub- Sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 170-B, as enacted in 1980, there is the least indication of confining the applicability of the provision to such transactions of transfer as were entered into by a member of aboriginal tribe in favour of a member not belonging to aboriginal tribe. No exception has been enacted by the Legislature so as to exclude from the purview of Section 170-B transactions of transfer between two persons both of whom are members of aboriginal tribes. Had it been so, the Legislature would have specifically said so. The language of the Section as drafted in 1980 is clear and unambiguous and does not admit of any doubt so far as this aspect is concerned.” In this judgment, it was observed that even though the transaction was between two Tribes, the provisions of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 would attract. 10) As far as the matter of Harjesh Rai (supra) is concerned, it is not the case with regard to houses situated in urban areas. The Aboriginal 14 Tribe had moved an application for reversion of agricultural land which was fraudulently transferred; therefore, the facts of the case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners are entirely different from the facts of the present case. 11) Taking into consideration the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the grounds raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners have no merit. 12) With regard to the conversion of Gram Panchayat to Nagar Panchayat, the sale deed was executed on 23.05.1979, at that time; Village Naya Baradwar was Gram Panchayat. Perhaps in the year 1990-91, it was upgraded as Nagar Panchayat; therefore Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 would apply in its full force. 13) Section 59 of the Code, 1959 says as under:- “59. Variation of land revenue according to purpose for which land is used.— (1)The assessment of land revenue on any land shall be made with reference to the use of land— (a)for the purpose of agriculture or such farm house, which is situated on holding of one acre or more; (b)as sites for dwelling houses; (c)for purposes other than those specified in item (a), (b), (d) or (e); 15 (d)for industrial or commercial purpose; (e)for the purpose of mining under a mining lease within the meaning of Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (No. 67 of 1959); Provided that the assessment of land revenue on any land situated in the areas which are constituted as reserved or protected forests under the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (16 of 1927), with reference to use of land for any of the purposes aforesaid shall not be proceeded with or any procedure relating to the assessment to be followed under the relevant provisions of the Code shall not be commenced except on a certificate permitting the use of land issued by an officer of the Forest Department duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf. (2)Where land assessed for use for any one purpose is diverted to any other purpose, the land revenue payable upon such land shall, notwithstanding that the term for which the assessment may have been fixed has not expired, be liable to be altered and assessed in accordance with the purpose to which it has been diverted. (2-a) The Alteration or Assessment Referred to in Sub-Section (2) Shall be Carried out by the [Collector] [Substituted 'Sub-Divisional Officer' 16 (3)Where the land held free from the payment of land revenue on condition of being used for any purpose is diverted to any other purpose it shall become liable to the payment of land revenue and assessed in accordance with the purpose to which is has been diverted. (4)The assessment made under sub- sections (2) and (3) shall be in accordance with the rules made by State Government in this behalf and such rules shall be in accordance with the principles contained in Chapter VII or VIII, as the case may be. (5)Where land for use for any one purpose is diverted to any other purpose, and land revenue is assessed thereon under the provisions of this section, the Sub-Divisional Officer' shall also have power to impose a premium on the diversion in accordance with rules made under this Code : Provided that no premium shall be imposed for the diversion of any land for charitable purposes. (6)Notwithstanding any usage or grant or anything contained in any law, the right of all persons holding land, which immediately before the coming into force of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1954 (II of 1955), was held in malik makbuza right, to exemption from payment of premium on diversion of such land is hereby abolished; 17 but every such person shall, on diversion of such land, be entitled in lieu of such right to a rebate equal to the land revenue for one year payable for such land from the amount of premium determined under sub-section (5).” Section 59 of the Code, 1959 does not touch upon the applicability of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959, therefore, the contention made by learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted. 14) Firtu Ram in his statement has stated that the house was constructed three years after the transaction. Undisputedly, the house was constructed but the member of non-tribe and other witnesses, namely, Prem Singh, Lakhan Lal and Bhulau Singh have specifically stated that the house was constructed in the year 1991-92 or 1997 and the papers of the property tax annexed by the petitioners in this petition would show that the electricity meter was installed in the year 1997 and the property tax was paid from 1997. The payment of property tax would not confer any right in favour of the petitioners; therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the grounds raised by the petitioners are of no help. 15) Taking into consideration the fact that there is a concurrent finding recorded by the Revenue Courts and undisputedly, the property belongs to the member of the Aboriginal Tribe, in the opinion of this Court, no case is made 18 out for interference. 16) In view of the above, this writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost(s).” 20 The principal question which arises for consideration in the present intra-Court appeal is whether the learned Single Judge was justified in declining to interfere with the concurrent orders passed by the revenue authorities under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959, directing reversion of the subject land in favour of a member of the Aboriginal Tribe. 21 The foundation of the challenge raised by the appellants is that the subject land was purchased in the name of Firtu Ram, a member of the Aboriginal Tribe, through a registered sale deed dated 23.05.1979 and that, therefore, the revenue authorities could not have gone behind the registered instrument and recorded a finding that the land was, in substance, being held and enjoyed by Lakhanlal Rathore, a non-tribal. It is further contended that such a determination amounts to adjudication of a disputed question concerning the real nature of the transaction and, therefore, falls beyond the scope of jurisdiction conferred upon the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. The appellants have also sought to derive support from the decision of this Court in Urmila Devi (supra). 22 Before dealing with the aforesaid submission, it is necessary to bear in mind the legislative object underlying Section 170-B of the 19 Code, 1959. The provision is a protective measure intended to safeguard the land of members of the Aboriginal Tribe from being lost or placed in the effective possession or enjoyment of persons who are not entitled to hold such land. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Bhaiji (supra), has explained the width and object of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 and has held that the enquiry contemplated by the provision is directed towards ascertaining the nature of the transaction and whether, as a result thereof, an Aboriginal Tribe has been deprived of his legitimate right in the land. The statutory protection, therefore, cannot be rendered ineffective merely because the transaction is clothed in the form of a registered instrument or because the revenue records contain an entry in the name of a tribal person. 23 In the present case, the proceedings under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 were not initiated or decided in a mechanical manner. The Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) called for the report of the concerned Patwari, issued notices to the persons concerned, afforded them an opportunity of appearing before the authority and recorded the statements of the parties as well as other witnesses. The matter was thereafter considered afresh upon remand by the Collector. 24 Thus, there was a full-fledged statutory enquiry into the circumstances surrounding the subject land, including the question of its actual possession and enjoyment. The conclusion 20 reached by the Sub-Divisional Officer was subsequently examined by the Collector and the Commissioner, and the findings were consistently maintained. 25 We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission that the revenue authorities proceeded merely on the basis of an oral allegation or that the registered sale deed was completely ignored. A registered document undoubtedly constitutes relevant evidence of the transaction recorded therein; however, in a proceeding under Section 170-B, the mere existence of such document cannot, by itself, foreclose an enquiry into the circumstances in which the land came to be possessed and enjoyed by a non-tribal. The statutory enquiry is concerned with the substance and consequence of the transaction and not merely with its outward form. 26 The material noticed by the learned Single Judge assumes significance in this regard. The learned Single Judge specifically adverted to the evidence relating to the construction raised over the subject property. Firtu Ram, in his statement, stated that the house had been constructed approximately three years after the transaction. However, the evidence of the non-tribal as well as other witnesses, namely, Prem Singh, Lakhan Lal and Bhulau Singh, was to the effect that the house had been constructed much later, around the years 1991-92 or 1997. This aspect finds further corroboration from the documents relied upon by the 21 appellants themselves, which indicate that the electricity connection was obtained only in the year 1997 and that property tax was being paid from the year 1997. Thus, the learned Single Judge did not proceed merely on the basis of the registered sale deed, but examined the surrounding circumstances and the material relating to actual possession and use of the property. The payment of property tax or existence of an electricity connection, by itself, may not confer title; however, such circumstances are certainly relevant while examining the factual question of possession and enjoyment of the property in the context of the statutory enquiry contemplated under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. 27 We may now deal with the reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellants upon the judgment of this Court in Urmila Devi (supra). Having carefully examined the said judgment, we are of the considered opinion that the same does not govern the controversy involved in the present appeal. In Urmila Devi (supra), the controversy arose in a materially different factual setting where the revenue authorities had proceeded to declare the registered sale transaction itself to be fraudulent and, on that basis, had sought to annul the subsequent registered transfer in favour of a non-tribal purchaser. The Division Bench, following the principle laid down in Khora (Dead) through Legal Representatives and others v. Mohar Sai and others, (2023) 14 SCC 767, held that determination of such disputed questions 22 concerning title, intention of the parties and the true nature of a registered transaction, for the purpose of declaring the transaction itself to be benami or fraudulent, falls within the domain of a competent civil court and cannot be undertaken by the revenue authorities in a summary proceeding under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. 28 The factual and legal position in the present case stands on a different footing. Here, the proceedings under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 concern the possession and enjoyment of the subject land and the statutory obligation to protect the land of an Aboriginal Tribe from being held by a non-tribal. The authorities have not merely purported to adjudicate a complicated suit for declaration of title between rival claimants; rather, after conducting the enquiry contemplated by Section 170-B of the Code, 1959, they have recorded findings on the basis of the revenue report, statements of witnesses and surrounding circumstances that the land was in the possession and enjoyment of a non-tribal and was consequently liable to be reverted. The said finding has thereafter been affirmed at successive stages. Thus, the ratio of Urmila Devi (supra) cannot be mechanically applied to the present case so as to render the statutory enquiry under Section 170-B wholly otiose. 29 It is also important to appreciate the distinction between an adjudication of title in the strict sense and an enquiry into the 23 factual circumstances relevant for exercising the statutory power under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. The appellants cannot contend that the Sub-Divisional Officer is completely precluded from examining the surrounding circumstances, actual possession or the effect of a transaction merely because a registered document exists. If such a construction were accepted, the protective purpose of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 could be defeated in every case by placing a registered document on record, irrespective of the actual manner in which the land came to be possessed or enjoyed. The provision must receive an interpretation which advances its object and prevents its circumvention through form rather than substance. 30 The reliance placed by the appellants upon Section 4 of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 also does not assist them in the facts of the present case. The present proceedings arise under the special statutory scheme contained in Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. The appellants cannot invoke the provisions of another enactment in such a manner as to completely nullify the statutory enquiry specifically contemplated under the Code. In any event, the existence of a registered sale deed in favour of a tribal person cannot, by itself, answer the question whether the land was subsequently placed in the effective possession or enjoyment of a non-tribal in circumstances attracting the protective provisions of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. 24 31 We are equally unable to accept the contention that the finding recorded by the revenue authorities is based merely on conjectures or surmises. The record, as noticed by the learned Single Judge, contains material relating to the construction over the property, the period of such construction, the electricity connection, payment of property tax and, more importantly, the statements of the persons examined during the statutory enquiry. These circumstances were considered cumulatively. It is not for this Court, in exercise of intra-Court appellate jurisdiction, to substitute its own appreciation of such evidence merely because another possible inference may be suggested by the appellants. 32 The fact that the subject land was originally transferred to Firtu Ram, who himself belonged to the Aboriginal Tribe, also does not conclude the matter. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhaiji (supra), Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 is not confined only to cases where the initial transfer is directly from a member of the Aboriginal Tribe to a non-tribal. The statutory enquiry is wider and is intended to ascertain whether the transaction has, in substance, resulted in the tribal being deprived of his legitimate right in the land. The learned Single Judge has, therefore, committed no error in applying the principle laid down in Bhaiji (supra) to the facts of the present case. 33 We are also mindful that the impugned orders have been passed after considerable lapse of time. However, mere passage of time 25 cannot, in the facts of the present case, by itself defeat the statutory protection available to members of the Aboriginal Tribe, particularly when the competent authority, after enquiry, has recorded a finding that the land has come to be held or enjoyed by a person not belonging to the protected class. The legislative purpose of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 would be substantially diluted if an arrangement found, upon statutory enquiry, to have resulted in deprivation of tribal land could be sustained merely on account of the passage of time. 34 So far as the scope of interference in the present intra-Court appeal is concerned, the appellants have failed to demonstrate that the learned Single Judge committed any jurisdictional error or adopted a view which is contrary to the statutory scheme. The learned Single Judge considered the relevant provisions, took note of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhaiji (supra), examined the circumstances relied upon by the parties and found that the concurrent findings recorded by the revenue authorities did not warrant interference. No perversity, patent illegality, violation of principles of natural justice or manifest error of law has been demonstrated before us. 35 We also find that the contention that the registered sale deed conclusively establishes the appellants' right in the subject land cannot be accepted in the context of the present proceedings. Registration of an instrument is undoubtedly a significant 26 circumstance, but it cannot be treated as an absolute bar against an enquiry which the statute itself requires the competent authority to undertake. What is material is whether, notwithstanding the apparent transaction, the land of an Aboriginal Tribe has, in reality, come to be held or enjoyed by a person who is not entitled thereto. That is precisely the aspect which has been examined by the revenue authorities in the present case. 36 The learned Single Judge has further noticed that the house existing over the subject land was not shown to have been constructed contemporaneously with the transaction relied upon by the appellants. On the contrary, the evidence regarding the subsequent construction, coupled with the electricity connection and property-tax records from the later period, was considered while examining the plea regarding possession and enjoyment. The learned Single Judge rightly observed that mere payment of property tax would not, in itself, confer title upon the appellants. The said documents, therefore, could not displace the findings recorded by the competent authorities on the basis of the evidence as a whole. 37 On a cumulative consideration of the entire material, we are satisfied that the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Collector and Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, do not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference. The proceedings were undertaken in accordance with the statutory 27 mechanism, the concerned parties were afforded opportunity of hearing, the relevant material was considered and the findings recorded by the authorities have remained consistent. The learned Single Judge, therefore, rightly declined to exercise the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court. 38 In view of the foregoing discussion, the reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellants upon Urmila Devi (supra) is misplaced and does not advance their case. The said decision cannot be read as laying down a proposition that, in every proceeding under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959, the competent revenue authority is prohibited from examining the actual possession, enjoyment and surrounding circumstances of the subject land merely because a registered sale deed exists in the name of a tribal person. The said judgment is confined to the factual and legal situation considered therein, namely, the assumption of jurisdiction by the revenue authorities to adjudicate and declare the registered transaction itself to be fraudulent/benami and to annul a subsequent transfer on that basis. The present case, on the other hand, concerns an enquiry into the circumstances relevant to the statutory protection under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959, followed by concurrent findings based upon the material available on record. 39 Consequently, we find no ground to interfere with the well- reasoned order passed by the learned Single Judge. The 28 appellants have failed to establish that the impugned order dated 20.03.2024 passed in Writ Petition (C) No.2051/2019 suffers from any error of law, jurisdictional infirmity, perversity or violation of the principles of natural justice. The findings recorded by the competent revenue authorities, having been considered and affirmed by the learned Single Judge, do not warrant interference in the present intra-Court appeal. 40 Accordingly, the present writ appeal is dismissed. The order dated 20.03.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (C) No.2051/2019, as well as the orders dated 11.02.2003, 03.03.2004 and 30.11.2009 passed by the Sub- Divisional Officer (Revenue), Collector and Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, respectively, are affirmed. 41 There shall be no order as to costs. 42 Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu