1 Reserved on : 09.04.2026 Pronounced on : 29.07.2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 29TH DAY OF JULY, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION No.2623 OF 2026 BETWEEN: MR.SHIVA SWAMY T.M., S/O T.M.MUNICHOODAIAH AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS RESIDING AT NO.74, 3RD MAIN, MPM LAYOUT MALLATHAHALLI, BENGALURU SOUTH BENGALURU – 560 056. (DETAILS OF PETITIONER AS PER AADHAR CARD) ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MAHESH S., ADVOCATE) AND: MR.MOHAN KUMAR A., S/O LATE ASHWATHAIAH AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS RESIDING AT NO.265, 2ND BLOCK, 6TH MAIN, R.T. NAGAR, BENGALURU – 560 032. ... RESPONDENT (BY SRI DHYAN CHINNAPPA, SR.ADVOCATE A/W SRI AKSHAY R.HUDDAR, ADVOCATE) Digitally signed by PADMAVATHI B K Location: High Court of Karnataka 2 THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER HEREIN IN C.C.NO.14809/2024 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE LEARNED VIII ADDL. CJM AT BENGALURU FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 193, 200, 211, 499, 500 OF IPC. THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 09.04.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:- CAV ORDER The petitioner/accused is before the Court calling in question proceedings in C.C.No.14809 of 2024 registered for offences punishable under Sections 193, 200, 211, 499 and 500 of the IPC arising out of C.C.No.14809 of 2024. 2. Heard Sri Mahesh. S, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri Dhyan Chinnappa, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent. CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA 3 3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: - 3.1. The petitioner is the Executive Editor of Kannada news channel BTV. The complainant is said to be a well-known public figure across Karnataka. On 10-02-2021, BTV channel runs a programme wherein several statements and allegations are made against the respondent/complainant regarding his involvement in the affairs of the Bangalore Development Authority (‘BDA’). It is alleged that he is the master-mind in several illegal activities in the BDA not restricting to allotment of sites. On 23-02-2021, the complainant causes a legal notice to the Directors and Anchors of BTV channel. Immediately thereafter, a complaint comes to be registered against the Directors and Anchors of BTV channel in P.C.R. No.18421 of 2021 for offences punishable under Sections 499 and 500 of the IPC – for defamation. The concerned Court takes cognizance of the offence and registers C.C.No.30428 of 2021. Summons were issued. The allegation is that when the respondent/complainant along with the Police Officer had attempted to serve the summons, the complainant had threatened the employees of the petitioner at the work place while verbally abusing 4 them. The petitioner, therefore, registers a complaint before the Commissioner of Police on 11-11-2021 for offences punishable under Sections 354, 427, 120B, 504 and 506 of the IPC including the offences under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 3.2. On 19-11-2021, the Assistant Commissioner of Police ('ACP') of Cubbon Park Police Station was directed to conduct an inquiry and report on the allegations. The report is that the complaint and the contents were false. It is then the respondent causes a legal notice for making false allegations against him while registering the complaint before the Commissioner of Police. The petitioner replies to the said notice. The complainant now registers a private complaint in P.C.R.No.5245 of 2022 for offences punishable under Sections 193, 200, 211, 499 and 500 of the IPC. Cognizance is taken by the concerned Court for the said offences and C.C.No.14809 of 2024 is registered. It is this that drives the present petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. 5 4. The learned counsel Sri Mahesh S, appearing for the petitioner would contend that offences punishable under Sections 193, 200 and 211 of the IPC can be invoked only when there is false evidence in a judicial proceeding. In the case at hand, the learned counsel submits, there is no judicial proceeding where false evidence is said to have been given. The complaint was given by the petitioner. It is closed without registration of FIR. Therefore, neither the complaint nor the report of the ACP was a public document. It was an internal document. The respondent obtains it under the Right To Information Act, 2005. It was not available to public in general. Since the complaint was not made public and not even presented before any Court of law, it would not amount to publication or circulation as necessary under Section 499 of the IPC. He would submit that there is no foundation for the offences alleged since the report of the ACP does not state that the complaint of the petitioner is false. It only affirms that incident has occurred but the allegations are exaggerated. Serving of summons by the respondent/complainant on 11-11-2021 was illegal even as per the report of ACP. Therefore, the fact that the complainant had entered the premises and caused commotion in the BTV is not altogether 6 denied. He would seek to place reliance upon several judgments of the Apex Court and that of this Court, all of which would bear consideration qua their relevance in the course of the order. 5. Contrariwise, the learned senior counsel Sri Dhyan Chinnappa appearing for the respondent/complainant would submit that Explanation-2 to Section 193 of the IPC would include an investigation. Therefore, proceedings before a Court is not a necessary ingredient for the offence under Section 193 of the IPC. If the offence is committed inside the Court, then the bar against taking cognizance under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. would be applicable. Since the offence is not committed inside the Court or in relation to any proceeding of the Court, the offences under Sections 193, 200 and 211 of the IPC are made out and the procedure under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C. is not required to be followed. If one files a complaint in the Court and makes a statement before the Court, the Court would be required to institute proceedings as per Section 195 read with 340 of the Cr.P.C. However, if a false statement is made outside the Court, the other offences that are alleged would straight away become applicable. It was a false 7 allegation made. Therefore, the petitioner must face proceedings. He would seek dismissal of the petition. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. On the aforesaid submissions, the following issues would arise for consideration: (i) Whether the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C. would be applicable to the case at hand? (ii) Whether the ingredients of offences under Sections 193, 200 and 211 of the IPC are made out in the case at hand? (iii) Whether the proceedings contained ingredients of offence of defamation? Issue No.1: Whether the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C. would be applicable in the case at hand? 8 7. To consider this issue, it becomes apposite to notice Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., which reads as follows: “195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence.—(1) No Court shall take cognizance— (a)(i) of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or (ii) of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate; (b)(i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or (ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii), except on the complaint in writing of that Court or by such officer of the Court as that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. 9 (2) Where a complaint has been made by a public servant under clause (a) of sub-section (1) any authority to which he is administratively subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and send a copy of such order to the Court; and upon its receipt by the Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint: Provided that no such withdrawal shall be ordered if the trial in the Court of first instance has been concluded. (3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term “Court” means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (4) For the purposes of clause (b) of sub-section (1), a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the principal Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within whose local jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate: Provided that— (a) where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate; (b) where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed.” Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C. deals with the taking of cognizance for certain offences i.e., the ones punishable under Sections 193 to 196, 199, 200, 205 to 211 and 228 of the IPC, when the offence is committed in any Court or in relation to 10 proceedings in any Court. The petitioner files a complaint before the Police, which comes to be closed after conducting an enquiry, prior to the registration of an FIR. The impugned proceedings in C.C.No.14809 of 2024 spring on the score that the petitioner has registered a false complaint against the respondent - complainant. Whether the offences under Section 193, 200 and 211 of the IPC, as alleged in the case at hand, are committed in any Court or in relation to proceedings in any Court and therefore, whether the proceedings in C.C.No.14809 of 2024 are barred by Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C. is necessary to be noticed. 8. The interpretation of what would become an offence committed in any Court or in relation to a proceeding in any Court as obtaining under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C. is elucidated by the Apex Court in the case of BHIMA RAZU PRASAD v. STATE1, wherein while considering the entire spectrum of the law on the issue, it is held as follows: “…. …. …. 12. Aforementioned observations of this Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai [Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of 1(2021) 19 SCC 25 11 Gujarat, (1971) 2 SCC 376 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 548] , as cited in Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] , make the import and purpose of Section 195(1)(b)CrPC clear. The provision is intended to bar the right to initiate prosecution only where the offence committed has a reasonably close nexus with the court proceedings, such that the Court can independently determine the need for an inquiry into the offence with reference to its own records. Therefore, the offence must be such that directly impacts administration of justice by the Court. This would certainly be the case if the document was in the custody of the Court at the time of commission of offence. However, the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) cannot be read as operating even in cases where the offence against administration of justice was committed in respect of a document (1) outside of the Court, (2) by a person who was not yet party to the Court proceedings, and, (3) at a time long before the production of the document before the Court. The same would not have a “reasonably close nexus” with the court proceedings. 13. Though these observations in Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] were made in the context of Section 195(1)(b)(ii), we find that they have useful application in interpreting Section 195(1)(b)(i) as well. The prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(b)(i) should not be extended to provide protection to a person who has been accused of tendering false evidence during the investigative stage prior to becoming a party to the court proceedings and producing such evidence before the Court. 14. The view taken in Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] was subsequently affirmed by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] . In that case, it was alleged that the appellants had created a fictitious 12 will to divest the respondents out of their share in the disputed property. Since the respondents' application under Section 340CrPC was not disposed of, they filed a criminal complaint for prosecuting the appellants under Sections 192 and 193, as well as Sections 463 and 471IPC. The Metropolitan Magistrate in that case held that both Sections 195(1)(b)(i) and (ii)CrPC operated as a bar against taking cognizance of these offences. The Sessions Judge and the High Court, relying on Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] , held that the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) would not apply where forgery of a document was committed before producing the said document in court. However, it was noticed that Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] appeared to conflict with an earlier three-Judge Bench decision in Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh [Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh, (1996) 3 SCC 533 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 521] . Surjit Singh [Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh, (1996) 3 SCC 533 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 521] had held that the bar against taking cognizance under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) would apply even if the offences stipulated therein were committed prior to production of the document before the Court, if such document was subsequently produced before the Court. 15. The Constitution Bench clarified the position of law as follows : (Iqbal Singh Marwah case [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] , SCC pp. 380-82, 384 & 390, paras 10-12, 14, 18, 20 & 33) “10. … This being the scheme of two provisions or clauses of Section 195 viz. that the offence should be such which has direct bearing or affects the functioning or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant or has a direct correlation with the proceedings in a court of justice, the expression ‘when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court’ occurring in clause (b)(ii) should normally mean commission of such an offence after the document has actually been produced or given in evidence in the court. The situation or contingency where an offence as enumerated in this clause has already been committed earlier and later on the document is produced or is given in evidence in court, does 13 not appear to be in tune with clauses (a)(i) and (b)(i) and consequently with the scheme of Section 195CrPC. This indicates that clause (b)(ii) contemplates a situation where the offences enumerated therein are committed with respect to a document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a proceeding in any court. 11. … The fact that the procedure for filing a complaint by court has been provided in Chapter XXVI dealing with offences affecting administration of justice, is a clear pointer to the legislative intent that the offence committed should be of such type which directly affects the administration of justice viz. which is committed after the document is produced or given in evidence in court. Any offence committed with respect to a document at a time prior to its production or giving in evidence in court cannot, strictly speaking, be said to be an offence affecting the administration of justice. 12. It will be useful to refer to some earlier decisions touching the controversy in dispute which were rendered on Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (for short “the old Code”). … *** 14. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Kushal Pal Singh [Emperor v. Kushal Pal Singh, 1931 SCC OnLine All 45 : AIR 1931 All 443] considered the scope of the aforesaid provision and held, that clause (c) of Section 195(1) applies only to cases where an offence is committed by a party, as such, to a proceeding to any court in respect of a document which has been produced or given in evidence in such proceeding. It was held that an offence which has already been committed by a person who does not become a party till, say, 30 years after the commission of the offence, cannot be said to have been committed by a party within the meaning of clause (c). A three- Judge Bench of this Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat [Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat, (1971) 2 SCC 376 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 548] after examination of the controversy in considerable detail observed that as a general rule the courts consider it expedient in the interest of justice to 14 start prosecutions as contemplated by Section 476 (of the old Code which now corresponds to Section 340CrPC) only if there is a reasonable foundation for the charge and there is a reasonable likelihood of conviction. The requirement of a finding as to the expediency is understandable in case of an offence alleged to have been committed either in or in relation to a proceeding in that court in case of offences specified in clause (b) [of the old Code corresponding to clause (b)(i) CrPC] because of the close nexus between the offence and the proceeding. In case of offences specified in clause (c), they are required to be committed by a party to a proceeding in that court with respect to a document produced or given in evidence in that court. The court approved the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Kushal Pal Singh [Emperor v. Kushal Pal Singh, 1931 SCC OnLine All 45 : AIR 1931 All 443] and held as under in para 7 of the Report : (Patel Laljibhai Somabhai case [Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat, (1971) 2 SCC 376 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 548] , SCC pp. 376-77) “(i) The underlying purpose of enacting Sections 195(1)(b) and (c) and Section 476 seems to be to control the temptation on the part of the private parties to start criminal prosecution on frivolous, vexatious or insufficient grounds inspired by a revengeful desire to harass or spite their opponents. These offences have been selected for the court's control because of their direct impact on the judicial process. It is the judicial process or the administration of public justice which is the direct and immediate object or the victim of these offences. As the purity of the proceedings of the court is directly sullied by the crime, the court is considered to be the only party entitled to consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty party. The private party who might ultimately suffer can persuade the civil court to file complaint. … *** 18. The other case which is the sheet anchor of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh [Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh, (1996) 3 SCC 533 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 521] . The 15 facts as stated in paras 1 and 11 of the Report show that a criminal complaint was filed by the respondent under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120-BIPC alleging that the appellants had conspired and fabricated an agreement dated 26-7-1978 and had forged the signature of Smt Dalip Kaur and on the basis thereof, they had made a claim to remain in possession of a house. The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on 27-9-1983. The appellants thereafter filed a civil suit on 9-2-1984 wherein they produced the agreement. It may be noticed that the cognizance by the criminal court had been taken much before filing of the civil suit wherein the agreement had been filed. During the course of discussion, the Court not only noticed Gopalakrishna Menon [Gopalakrishna Menon v. D. Raja Reddy, (1983) 4 SCC 240 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 822] but also quoted extensively from Patel Laljibhai [Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat, (1971) 2 SCC 376 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 548] . Reference was then made to Sanmukhsing v. R. [Sanmukhsing v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC 47 : (1949-50) 77 IA 7] and Sushil Kumar v. State of Haryana [Sushil Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1987 Supp SCC 654 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 136] wherein it has been held that the bar of Section 195 would not apply if the original document had not been produced or given in evidence in court. Then comes the passage in the judgment (para 10 of the Report) which we have reproduced in the earlier part of our judgment. The observations therein should not be understood as laying down anything contrary to what has been held in Patel Laljibhai [Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat, (1971) 2 SCC 376 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 548] but was made in the context that bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) would not be attracted unless the original document was filed. It is for this reason that in the very next paragraph, after observing that the cognizance had been taken prior to filing of the civil suit and the original agreement in court, the view taken by the High Court that the Magistrate could proceed with the trial of the criminal case was upheld and the appeal was dismissed. *** 20. Since the object of deletion of the words “by a party to any proceeding in any court” occurring in Section 195(1)(c) of the old Code is to afford protection 16 to witnesses also, the interpretation placed on the said provision in the earlier decisions would still hold good. *** 33. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion that Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] has been correctly decided and the view taken therein is the correct view. Section 195(1)(b)(ii)CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis.” (emphasis supplied) 16. Curiously, though the facts of Iqbal Singh Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] also required a determination as to the applicability of Section 195(1)(b)(i), the Constitution Bench did not express any specific finding on this point. This was perhaps because the limited point for consideration before the Bench was the apparent conflict between Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] and Surjit Singh [Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh, (1996) 3 SCC 533 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 521] . However, it can nevertheless be seen that the Constitution Bench did not interpret Section 195(1)(b)(ii) in isolation, but linked its construction with the overall scheme under Sections 195(1)(b) and 340CrPC. The Court reiterated the test laid down in Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] i.e. that the offence in respect of which only the Court can make a complaint must be one which has a direct correlation to, or a direct impact on, proceedings before a court of justice. It is for this reason that only the relevant court is vested with the right to consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty party. …. …. …. II. Import of the words “in relation to” in Section 195(1)(b)(i)CrPC 17 19. This brings us to the phrase “in relation to any proceeding in any court”, which appears in Section 195(1)(b)(i)CrPC but is absent in Section 195(1)(b)(ii). It may be argued that this phrase makes the scope of Section 195(1)(b)(i) wider than Section 195(1)(b)(ii). The words “in relation to” under Section 195(1)(b)(i) appear to encompass situations wherein false evidence has been fabricated prior to being produced before a court of law, for the purpose of being used in proceedings before the Court. Therefore, it may not be possible to apply the ratio of Iqbal Singh Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] by way of analogy to Section 195(1)(b)(i) in every case. 20. For further elucidation on this point, we may turn to the recent decision of this Court in Bandekar Bros. [Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni, (2020) 20 SCC 1 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 626] The appellants in that case claimed that the respondent-accused had given false evidence and forged debit notes and books of accounts in civil court proceedings between the parties. They had initially filed application under Section 340CrPC before the relevant Judicial Magistrate. However, they later sought to convert this into private complaints, in reliance upon Iqbal Singh Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] . The respondents objected on the ground that the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) could not be circumvented. Subsequently, the appellants took the plea that the offences under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) were also made out : (Bandekar case [Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni, (2020) 20 SCC 1 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 626] , SCC p. 18, para 17) “17. The point forcefully argued by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellants is that his clients, being victims of forgery, ought not to be rendered remediless in respect of the acts of forgery which are committed before they are used as evidence in a court proceeding, and that therefore, a private complaint would be maintainable in the fact circumstance mentioned in the two criminal complaints referred to hereinabove. The Court has thus to steer between two opposite poles of a spectrum—the “yin” being the protection of a person from frivolous criminal 18 complaints, and the “yang” being the right of a victim to ventilate his grievance and have the Court try the offence of forgery by means of a private complaint. In order to appreciate whether this case falls within the category of avoiding frivolous litigation, or whether it falls within the individual's right to pursue a private complaint, we must needs refer to several decisions of this Court.” (emphasis in original) 20.1. This Court thereafter proceeded to distinguish between the offence of fabricating false evidence under Sections 192 and 193IPC and the offence of forgery. It noted that the averments made by the appellants in their complaints pertained exclusively to giving of false evidence and did not disclose the ingredients of forgery as defined under the IPC. Hence, this Court in Bandekar Bros. [Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni, (2020) 20 SCC 1 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 626] upheld the respondents' contentions, and opined that Iqbal Singh Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] would not benefit the appellants in that case. Even though the false evidence was created outside of the Court, it was by the appellants' own admission, created “in relation to” proceedings before the Court. Thus, this Court held that : (Bandekar case [Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni, (2020) 20 SCC 1 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 626] , SCC pp. 23 & 25, paras 23 & 26) “23. At this stage, it is important to understand the difference between the offences mentioned in Section 195(1)(b)(i) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii)CrPC. Where the facts mentioned in a complaint attract the provisions of Sections 191 to 193IPC, Section 195(1)(b)(i)CrPC applies. What is important is that once these sections of IPC are attracted, the offence should be alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court. Thus, what is clear is that the offence punishable under these sections does not have to be committed only in any proceeding in any court but can also be an offence alleged to have been committed in relation to any proceeding in any court. 19 *** 26. Contrasted with Section 195(1)(b)(i), Section 195(1)(b)(ii)CrPC speaks of offences described in Section 463, and punishable under Sections 471, 475 or 476IPC, when such offences are alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court. What is conspicuous by its absence in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) are the words “or in relation to”, making it clear that if the provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) are attracted, then the offence alleged to have been committed must be committed in respect of a document that is custodia legis, and not an offence that may have occurred prior to the document being introduced in court proceedings. Indeed, it is this distinction that is vital in understanding the sheet anchor of the appellant's case, namely, this Court's judgment in Iqbal Singh Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] .” (emphasis supplied) 20.2. We fully agree with the aforementioned reasoning. The presence of “in relation to” under Section 195(1)(b)(i) means that Iqbal Singh Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] would not have blanket application to every case where a complaint is lodged in respect of an offence specified under that section. However, on the facts of Bandekar Bros. [Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni, (2020) 20 SCC 1 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 626] , this was not a situation in which the offence complained of did not have a “reasonably close nexus” with the court proceedings. The offence of giving false evidence was committed by the respondents, who were party to the court proceedings, for the purpose of leading the Court to form an erroneous opinion on a point material to the result of the proceedings. Hence it could be said that though the offence was not committed during the course of the court proceedings, it was certainly committed “in relation to” such proceedings. 20 21. Similar circumstances were present in Kailash Mangal v. Ramesh Chand [Kailash Mangal v. Ramesh Chand, (2015) 15 SCC 729 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 372] and Narendra Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar [Narendra Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar, (2019) 3 SCC 318 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 221] , which were the decisions relied upon by this Court in Bandekar Bros. [Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni, (2020) 20 SCC 1 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 626] In Kailash Mangal [Kailash Mangal v. Ramesh Chand, (2015) 15 SCC 729 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 372] , it was alleged that the appellant in that case had filed a false affidavit before the civil court for getting a civil suit decreed in his favour. The respondent filed a private complaint under Section 340CrPC alleging the offence punishable under Sections 193 and 419IPC. The Division Bench observed that : (Kailash Mangal case [Kailash Mangal v. Ramesh Chand, (2015) 15 SCC 729 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 372] , SCC p. 734, para 10) “10. In the instant case, the false affidavit alleged to have been filed by the appellant was in a proceeding pending before the civil court and the offence falls under Section 193IPC and the proceeding ought to have been initiated on the complaint in writing by that court under Section 195(1)(b)(i)IPC. Since the offence is said to have been committed in relation to or in a proceeding in a civil court, the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] is not applicable to the instant case.” (emphasis supplied) Therefore, this Court expressly observed in Kailash Mangal [Kailash Mangal v. Ramesh Chand, (2015) 15 SCC 729 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 372] that since the document was filed during the course of a proceeding which was already pending before the court, the offence could be said to have been committed “in relation to” such proceeding for the purpose of Section 195(1)(b)(i)CrPC. The requirement of reasonable nexus between the offence and the proceeding before the Court was clearly satisfied in that case. 21 22. In Narendra Kumar Srivastava [Narendra Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar, (2019) 3 SCC 318 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 221] , the appellant had filed a private complaint contending that the respondent officials had produced a false show-cause affidavit in the contempt petition filed by the appellant. Resultantly, the High Court dropped [Narendra Kumar Srivastava v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Pat 4777] the contempt case. The Division Bench held that Section 195(1)(b)(i)CrPC covers a different category of offence and is therefore distinct from Section 195(1)(b)(ii). Hence Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] would not be applicable, and cognizance could not have been taken on the basis of a private complaint. However, on the facts of that case, this was again a situation wherein at the first instance, the Court was allegedly persuaded to form an opinion based on certain false evidence which was produced by persons who were already party to the proceedings. This is a completely different factual matrix from the present case. 23. Indeed, at this juncture it must be noted that even Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] and Iqbal Singh Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] were rendered in the context of balancing the right of private parties to initiate complaints in respect of forged documents, with protecting parties to civil suits from frivolous or vexatious prosecutions. In neither of the abovementioned decisions has this Court authoritatively considered the specific issue of preserving the right of an investigating agency, such as the respondent in the present case, to initiate complaints against persons who have fabricated false evidence during the course of criminal proceedings. 24. The moot point therefore, as mentioned in paras 10 & 10.1, is whether the offence committed under Section 193IPC during the stage of investigation, prior to commencement of proceedings before the trial court, by a person who is not yet party to proceedings before the trial court, is an offence committed “in relation to” such 22 proceedings for the purpose of the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i)CrPC? 25. The construction of the words “in relation to” must be controlled by the overarching principle applicable to Section 195(1)(b)CrPC as stated in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai [Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat, (1971) 2 SCC 376 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 548] and Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] , which was affirmed by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] . That is, even if the offence is committed prior to giving of the fabricated evidence in court, it must have a direct or reasonably close nexus with the court proceedings. 26. Looking to the decision in Bandekar Bros. [Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni, (2020) 20 SCC 1 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 626] , is true to say that Section 195(1)(b)(i)CrPC may be attracted to the offence of fabricating false evidence prior to its production before the Court, provided that such evidence is led by a person who is party to the court proceedings, for the purpose of leading the Court to form a certain opinion based on such evidence. The bar against taking of cognizance under Section 195(1)(b)(i) may also apply where a person who is initially not a party to the court proceedings fabricates certain evidence, and (1) subsequently becomes a party and produces it before the Court; or (2) falsely deposes as a witness before the Court on the strength of such evidence, for the purpose of causing the Court to form an erroneous opinion on a point material to the result of the proceedings. 27. However, where a person fabricates false evidence for the purpose of misleading the investigating officer, this may not have any direct nexus with the subsequent court proceedings. There is an indirect nexus inasmuch as if the investigating agency does not suspect 23 any wrongdoing, and the Court commits the case for trial, the evidence will be produced for the Court's perusal and impact the judicial decision-making process. However, it may be equally possible that even if the fabricated evidence appears sufficiently convincing, the investigating agency may drop proceedings against the accused and divert its time and resources elsewhere. Therefore, the offence may never reach the stage of court proceedings. Further, if it subsequently comes to light that the evidence was falsely adduced, it will be the investigating agency which will suffer loss of face and be forced to conduct a fresh investigation. Hence, though the offence is one which affects the administration of justice, it is the investigating agency, and not the Court, which is the aggrieved party in such circumstance. 28. In this regard, we consider it beneficial to refer to the portion of the opinion expressed by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] as to why a narrow interpretation of Section 195(1)(b)(ii)CrPC was necessary to avoid impracticality or injustice in its implementation : (SCC pp. 386-88, paras 23-24 & 26) “23 … Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint. The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by the learned 24 counsel for the appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged document remediless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remediless, has to be discarded. 24. There is another consideration which has to be kept in mind. Sub-section (1) of Section 340CrPC contemplates holding of a preliminary enquiry. Normally, a direction for filing of a complaint is not made during the pendency of the proceeding before the court and this is done at the stage when the proceeding is concluded and the final judgment is rendered. Section 341 provides for an appeal against an order directing filing of the complaint. The hearing and ultimate decision of the appeal is bound to take time. Section 343(2) confers a discretion upon a court trying the complaint to adjourn the hearing of the case if it is brought to its notice that an appeal is pending against the decision arrived at in the judicial proceeding out of which the matter has arisen. In view of these provisions, the complaint case may not proceed at all for decades specially in matters arising out of civil suits where decisions are challenged in successive appellate fora which are time-consuming. It is also to be noticed that there is no provision of appeal against an order passed under Section 343(2), whereby hearing of the case is adjourned until the decision of the appeal. These provisions show that, in reality, the procedure prescribed for filing a complaint by the court is such that it may not fructify in the actual trial of the offender for an unusually long period. Delay in prosecution of a guilty person comes to his advantage as witnesses become reluctant to give evidence and the evidence gets lost. This important consideration dissuades us from accepting the broad interpretation sought to be placed upon clause (b)(ii). *** 26. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged to have committed an offence of the type enumerated in clause (b)(ii) is either not placed for trial on account of non-filing of a complaint or if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to its logical end. Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with the principle 25 that an unworkable or impracticable result should be avoided.” (emphasis supplied) 29. It is possible that courts may be more proactive in making complaints under Section 195(1)(b)(i)CrPC upon application made by the investigative agencies concerned, than in those preferred by private parties. The former being public authorities would enjoy more credence in seeking inquiry into their claims. Therefore, the aforementioned reasons assigned by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] for adopting a narrow construction of Section 195(1)(b)(ii)CrPC may not be strictly applicable in the present case. However, the general principles of statutory interpretation laid down by the Constitution Bench should not be disregarded. This is especially given that the Court did not consider Section 195(1)(b)(ii) separately but provided a holistic view of the scheme under Section 195(1)(b). 30. Just like a private party who has been a victim of forgery committed outside the precincts of the Court, the investigating agency should not be left remediless against persons who have been producing false evidence for the purpose of interfering with the investigation process. Moreover, the present case concerns offences alleged to have been committed under the PC Act. Public interest and the reputation of the State will suffer significant harm if corrupt public servants are facilitated by third parties in hiding their assets from scrutiny. Hence any interpretation which negates against the speedy and effective trial of such persons must be avoided. 31. The application of the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i)CrPC to situations such as the present case can lead to two scenarios. The first is one in which the investigating agency, on the basis of false/fabricated material drops the case. Subsequently, it is brought to their notice that the evidence was falsified. Second, the investigating agency at that very stage suspects that the material produced before them is bogus or forged in nature. In both scenarios, the Court has not had an opportunity to consider the allegedly fabricated evidence, 26 as trial has not yet commenced in respect of the offence. Hence it would not be possible for the Court to independently ascertain the need for lodging a complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(i) read with Section 340CrPC when the evidence alleged to have been falsified is not even present on its records. Rather, it is the investigating agency which is best placed to verify and prove whether such falsification has taken place, through what means and for what purpose. 32. In case the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) is applied to offences committed during the course of investigation, the Court may think it fit to wait till the completion of trial to evaluate whether a complaint should be made or not. Subsequently, the Court may be of the opinion that in the larger scheme of things the alleged fabrication of evidence during investigation has not had any material impact on the trial, and decline to initiate prosecution for the same. The investigation agency cannot be compelled to take a chance and wait for the trial court to form its opinion in each and every case. This may give the offender under Section 193IPC sufficient time to fabricate more falsehoods to hide the original crime.Further, irrespective of the potential impact that such false evidence may have on the opinion formed by the trial court, the investigating agency has a separate right to proceed against the accused for attempting to obstruct fair and transparent probe into a criminal offence. Thus, we are of the view that it would be impracticable to insist upon lodging of written complaint by the Court under Section 195(1)(b)(i)CrPC in such a situation. 33. It must be clarified that the aforementioned opinion expressed by us is limited to factual situations such as the present case wherein the fabricated evidence has been detected prior to commencement of the trial, or without such trial having been initiated in the first place. The same may not apply, for example, where the investigation agency on the basis of false evidence given by a third party happens to wrongfully implicate a person, other than the real perpetrator, for a particular offence.Subsequently, the Court during the course of trial proceedings may take 27 judicial notice of such defect in the investigation process and make a complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(i)CrPC. Since by this stage, the evidence has been produced before the Court, and contains potential for directly impacting the formation of the Court’s opinion on the innocence or guilt of the accused person, invoking the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) may not give rise to much difficulty. However, at this juncture, we decline to make any conclusive finding on this aspect, as the facts of the present appeal do not require us to consider the same. It is left open to future Benches of this Court to settle this issue if it so arises before them. …. …. …. Conclusions 47. The questions of law formulated in para 10 (supra) are answered as follows : Section 195(1)(b)(i)CrPC will not bar prosecution by the investigating agency for the offence punishable under Section 193IPC, which is committed during the stage of investigation. This is provided that the investigating agency has lodged complaint or registered the case under Section 193IPC prior to commencement of proceedings and production of such evidence before the trial court. In such circumstance, the same would not be considered an offence committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court for the purpose of Section 195(1)(b)(i)CrPC.” The Apex Court holds that the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C. should not be extended to provide protection to a person who has been accused of tendering false evidence during the investigative stage prior to becoming a party to the court proceedings and producing such evidence before the Court. The Apex Court further holds that the words “in relation to” under Section 195(1)(b)(i) encompass situations wherein false evidence 28 has been fabricated prior to being produced before a court of law, for the purpose of being used in proceedings before the Court. The complaint given by the petitioner in the present case was closed upon conduct of an enquiry, prior to the registration of the FIR, and was never forwarded to the Magistrate. In that light, the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C. would not become applicable to the case at hand. Issue No.2: Whether the ingredients of offences under Sections 193, 200 and 211 of the IPC are made out in the case at hand? 9. To consider this issue, it is necessary to notice the statutory frame work. The relevant provisions of the IPC read as follows: “191. Giving false evidence.—Whoever, being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject, makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false evidence. Explanation 1.—A statement is within the meaning of this section, whether it is made verbally or otherwise. 29 Explanation 2.—A false statement as to the belief of the person attesting is within the meaning of this section, and a person may be guilty of giving false evidence by stating that he believes a thing which he does not believe, as well as by stating that he knows a thing which he does not know. Illustrations (a) A, in support of a just claim which B has against Z for one thousand rupees, falsely swears on a trial that he heard Z admit the justice of B's claim. A has given false evidence. (b) A, being bound by an oath to state the truth, states that he believes a certain signature to be the handwriting of Z, when he does not believe it to be the handwriting of Z. Here A states that which he knows to be false, and therefore gives false evidence. (c) A, knowing the general character of Z's handwriting, states that he believes a certain signature to be the handwriting of Z; A in good faith believing it to be so. Here A's statement is merely as to his belief, and is true as to his belief, and therefore, although the signature may not be the handwriting of Z, A has not given false evidence. (d) A, being bound by an oath to state the truth, states that he knows that Z was at a particular place on a particular day, not knowing anything upon the subject. A gives false evidence whether Z was at that place on the day named or not. (e) A, an interpreter or translator, gives or certifies as a true interpretation or translation of a statement or document, which he is bound by oath to interpret or translate truly, that which is not and which he does not believe to be a true interpretation or translation. A has given false evidence. 192. Fabricating false evidence.—Whoever causes any circumstance to exist or makes any false entry in any book or record, or electronic record or makes any document or electronic record containing a false statement, intending that such circumstance, false entry or false statement may appear in 30 evidence in a judicial proceeding, or in a proceeding taken by law before a public servant as such, or before an arbitrator, and that such circumstance, false entry or false statement, so appearing in evidence, may cause any person who in such proceeding is to form an opinion upon the evidence, to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result of such proceeding, is said “to fabricate false evidence”. Illustrations (a) A, puts jewels into a box belonging to Z, with the intention that they may be found in that box, and that this circumstance may cause Z to be convicted of theft. A has fabricated false evidence. (b) A makes a false entry in his shop-book for the purpose of using it as corroborative evidence in a Court of Justice. A has fabricated false evidence. (c) A, with the intention of causing Z to be convicted of a criminal conspiracy, writes a letter in imitation of Z's handwriting, purporting to be addressed to an accomplice in such criminal conspiracy, and puts the letter in a place which he knows that the officers of the police are likely to search. A has fabricated false evidence. 193. Punishment for false evidence.—Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any other case, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation 1.—A trial before a Court-martial is a judicial proceeding. Explanation 2.—An investigation directed by law preliminary to a proceeding before a Court of Justice, is a stage 31 of judicial proceeding, though that investigation may not take place before a Court of Justice. Illustration A, in an enquiry before a Magistrate for the purpose of ascertaining whether Z ought to be committed for trial, makes on oath a statement which he knows to be false. As this enquiry is a stage of a judicial proceeding, A has given false evidence. Explanation 3.—An investigation directed by a Court of Justice according to law, and conducted under the authority of a Court of Justice, is a stage of a judicial proceeding, though that investigation may not take place before a Court of Justice. Illustration A, in an enquiry before an officer deputed by a Court of Justice to ascertain on the spot the boundaries of land, makes on oath a statement which he knows to be false. As this enquiry is a stage of a judicial proceeding, A has given false evidence. … … … 199. False statement made in declaration which is by law receivable as evidence.—Whoever, in any declaration made or subscribed by him, which declaration any Court of Justice, or any public servant or other person, is bound or authorised by law to receive as evidence of any fact, makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, touching any point material to the object for which the declaration is made or used, shall be punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence. 200. Using as true such declaration knowing it to be false.—Whoever corruptly uses or attempts to use as true any such declaration, knowing the same to be false in any material point, shall be punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence. Explanation.—A declaration which is inadmissible merely upon the ground of some informality, is a declaration within the meaning of Sections 199 and 200. 32 … … … 211. False charge of offence made with intent to injure.—Whoever, with intent to cause injury to any person, institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding against that person, or falsely charges any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge against that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; and if such criminal proceeding be instituted on a false charge of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for seven years or upwards, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” Sections 191 and 192 of the IPC are the ingredients that are found for an act to become an offence under Section 193 of the IPC. Whoever legally bound by oath or by express provision of law to state truth declares upon any subject, makes any statement which is false or gives false evidence, exposes himself for offence punishable under Section 193 of the IPC. Sections 191 and 192 of the IPC deal with giving false evidence and fabricating false evidence. The interpretation of Section 193 of the IPC need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. A 3 Judge 33 Bench of the Apex Court in JAMES KUNJWAL v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND2, holds as follows: “…. …. …. “12. The proper approach in cases where Section 193 is in play, it has been held by this Court in Dr. S.P. Kohli, Civil Surgeon, Ferozepur v. High Court of Haryana Through Registrar as under: “16. It is true that what the courts have to see before issuing the process against the accused is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations made by the complainant to justify the initiation of proceedings against the accused and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant his conviction, but this does not mean that the courts should not prima facie be of the opinion that there are sufficient and reasonable grounds for setting the machinery of criminal law in motion against the accused. The moment this guiding principle is overlooked, the prosecution degenerates itself into persecution which often is fraught with evil consequences.” (Emphasis supplied) Referred to in Himanshu Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh 13. When prosecution should be sanctioned under this Section by Courts has been expounded on by a Bench of three learned Judges in Chajoo Ram v. RadheyShyam “7. The prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by courts only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. No doubt giving of false evidence and filing false affidavits is an evil which must be effectively curbed with a strong hand but to start prosecution for perjury too readily and too frequently without due care and caution and on inconclusive and doubtful material defeats its very purpose. Prosecution should be ordered when it is 2 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1943 34 considered expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent and not merely because there is some inaccuracy in the statement which may be innocent or immaterial. There must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge…” (Emphasis supplied) Referred to in Himanshu Kumar (supra); Narendra Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar 14. In this regard we may also notice the pronouncement in R.S. Sujatha v. State of Karnataka, referred to in AarishAsgar Qureshi v. Fareed Ahmad Qureshi wherein it was observed: “9. Both these judgments were referred to and relied upon with approval in R.S. Sujatha v. State of Karnataka [R.S. Sujatha v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 5 SCC 689: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 757] (at paras 15 and 16). This court, after setting down the law laid down in these two judgments concluded: (SCC pp. 694-95, para 18) “18. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the inquiry/contempt proceedings should be initiated by the court in exceptional circumstances where the court is of the opinion that perjury has been committed by a party deliberately to have some beneficial order from the court. There must be grounds of a nature higher than mere surmise or suspicion for initiating such proceedings. There must be distinct evidence of the commission of an offence by such a person as mere suspicion cannot bring home the charge of perjury. More so, the court has also to determine as on facts, whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence which appears to have been committed.” (Emphasis supplied) 15. The three essential factors which can be said to be sine qua non for the application of Section 193 IPC as held in Bhima Razu Prasad v. State Rep. by Deputy Supdt. of Police, CBI/SPE/ACU-II are:— 35 (1) false statement made on oath or in affidavits; (2) that such statements be made in a judicial proceeding; or (3) such statement be made before an authority that has been expressly deemed to be a ‘Court’. 16. What we may conclude from a perusal of the above- noticed judicial pronouncements is that:— (i) The Court should be of the prima facie opinion that there exists sufficient and reasonable ground to initiate proceedings against the person who has allegedly made a false statement(s); (ii) Such proceedings should be initiated when doing the same is “expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent” and not merely because of inaccuracy in statements that may be innocent/immaterial; (iii) There should be “deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance”; (iv) The Court should be satisfied that there is a reasonable foundation for the charge, with distinct evidence and not mere suspicion; (v) Proceedings should be initiated in exceptional circumstances, for instance, when a party has perjured themselves to beneficial orders from the Court.” The Apex Court holds three essential factors are sine qua non for an offence under Section 193 of the IPC; it should be a false statement made on oath or in affidavits; such statements must be made in a judicial proceeding or before an authority that has been expressly 36 deemed to be a Court; and proceedings for offence under Section 193 must be initiated in exceptional circumstances where a party has perjured himself to beneficial orders from the Court. 10. If the facts obtaining in the case at hand are considered on the bedrock of the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment, what would unmistakably emerge is, the offence is not made out even to its semblance. The complaint is filed by the petitioner before the Commissioner of Police. The Commissioner of Police communicates it to the ACP, Cubbon Park Police Station to conduct an enquiry and not to register an FIR. It is closed by a report of the Police. Therefore, a closed complaint can never reach the stage of a beneficial order obtained by the petitioner from a Court of law by giving false evidence. Therefore, the ingredients of Sections 191 and 192 of the IPC are not met in the case at hand for it to become an offence under Section 193 of the IPC. This relates to offence under Section 193 of the IPC. 11. It is necessary to notice whether the offence under Section 200 of the IPC can be laid in the case at hand. Section 199 37 of the IPC deals with making a false statement in a declaration which is receivable as evidence and Section 200 of the IPC deals with using the said statement as true, knowing such declaration to be false. In order to attract Section 200 of the IPC, the declaration should not only be false, but also one which any Court of law or a public servant is bound or authorized by law to receive as evidence. In the case at hand, the complaint is received and it is closed. There is no registration of an FIR or an investigation that happens and then the complainant is declared to be innocent. The mere fact that the person makes a contradictory statement cannot mean that it would attract the offence under Section 200 of the IPC. Jurisprudence is replete with the judgment of the Apex Court interpreting Sections 199 and 200 of the IPC. 12. The Apex Court in CHANDRAPAL SINGH v. MAHARAJ SINGH3 has held as follows: “…. …. …. 14. That leaves for our consideration the alleged offence under Section 199. Section 199 provides punishment for making a false statement in a declaration which is by law receivable in evidence. We will assume that the affidavits 3 (1982) 1 SCC 466 38 filed in a proceeding for allotment of premises before the Rent Control Officer are receivable as evidence. It is complained that certain averments in these affidavits are false though no specific averment is singled out for this purpose in the complaint. When it is alleged that a false statement has been made in a declaration which is receivable as evidence in any Court of Justice or before any public servant or other person, the statement alleged to be false has to be set out and its alleged falsity with reference to the truth found in some document has to be referred to pointing out that the two situations cannot co- exist, both being attributable to the same person and, therefore, one to his knowledge must be false. Rival contentions set out in affidavits accepted or rejected by courts with reference to onus probandi do not furnish foundation for a charge under Section 199 IPC. To illustrate the point, Appellant 1 Chandrapal Singh alleged that he was in possession of one room forming part of Premises No. 385/2. The learned Additional District Judge after scrutinising all rival affidavits did not accept this contention. It thereby does not become false. The only inference is that the statement made by Chandrapal Singh did not inspire confidence looking to other relevant evidence in the case. Acceptance or rejection of evidence by itself is not a sufficient yardstick to dub the one rejected as false. Falsity can be alleged when truth stands out glaringly and to the knowledge of the person who is making the false statement. Day in and day out in courts averments made by one set of witnesses are accepted and the counter-averments are rejected. If in all such cases complaints under Section 199 IPC are to be filed not only there will open up floodgates of litigation but it would unquestionably be an abuse of the process of the court. The learned counsel for the respondents told us that a tendency to perjure is very much on the increase and unless by firm action courts do not put their foot down heavily upon such persons the whole judicial process would come to ridicule. We see some force in the submission but it is equally true that chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by cheaply invoking jurisdiction of the criminal court. Complainant herein is an advocate. He lost in both courts in the rent control proceedings and has now rushed to the criminal court. This itself speaks volumes. Add to this the fact that another suit between the parties was pending from 39 1975. The conclusion is inescapable that invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court in this background is an abuse of the process of law and the High Court rather glossed over this important fact while declining to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC.” 13. Later, the Apex Court in AMARSANG NATHAJI v. HARDIK HARSHADBHAI PATEL4 has held as follows: “…. …. …. 6. The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”); but it must be shown that the defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and offences against public justice and more specifically referred to in Section 340(1) CrPC, having regard to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a prosecution. (See K.T.M.S. Mohd. v. Union of India [K.T.M.S. Mohd. v. Union of India, (1992) 3 SCC 178: 1992 SCC (Cri) 572]). The court must be satisfied that such an inquiry is required in the interests of justice and appropriate in the facts of the case.” The Apex Court, in the afore-quoted judgments, clearly holds that a false statement has been made in a declaration, which is receivable as evidence in any Court of Justice would mean that the alleged 4 (2017) 1 SCC 113 40 false evidence should be accepted or rejected while recording evidence. Day in and day out in Courts averments are made by one set of witnesses and counter averments are made by other set. If, in all such cases complaints under Section 199 of the IPC are to be registered, it would open floodgates of litigation and become an abuse of the process of law. This, the Apex Court way back in 1982 had held so. If the elucidation of law is pitted against the complaint, where from the offence under Section 200 of the IPC would spring is a mystery. 14. The third offence is under Section 211 of the IPC. Section 211 punishes a person who falsely charges another with an intent to injure. The essential ingredients thus of an offence under Section 211 is to institute or cause to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him harm or injury shrouded with falsity. The interpretation of Section 211 again need not detain this Court for long or delve 41 deep into the matter. The Apex Court in HIMANSHU KUMAR v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH5 holds as follows: “…. …. …. 94. In the aforesaid context, we have something else in mind. We propose to look into Section 211IPC. Section 211IPC is extracted hereunder: “211. False charge of offence made with intent to injure.—Whoever, with intent to cause injury to any person, institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding against that person, or falsely charges any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge against that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; and if such criminal proceeding be instituted on a false charge of an offence punishable with death, [imprisonment for life], or imprisonment for seven years or upwards, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 95. The essential ingredients for invoking Section 211IPC are that the complaint must have falsely charged a person with having committed an offence. The complainant, at the time of giving the complaint must have known that there is no just or lawful ground for making a charge against the person. This complaint must have been given with an intention to cause injury to a person. 96. CrPC does not define what constitutes the making of a “charge” of an offence or what amounts to the “institution of criminal proceedings”. But, in our opinion, a false “charge” in this Section must not be understood in any restricted or technical sense, but in its ordinary meaning, of a false accusation made to any 5 (2023) 12 SCC 592 42 authority bound by law to investigate it or to take any steps in regard to it, such as giving information of it to the superior authorities with a view to investigation or other proceedings, and the institution of criminal proceedings includes the setting of the criminal law in motion. The nature of both expressions, and the difference between them has been explained in lucid terms in the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Karim Buksh v. Queen Empress [Karim Buksh v. Queen Empress, 1888 SCC OnLine Cal 5: ILR (1890) 17 Cal 574]. It points out that there may be a charge which does not amount to the institution of criminal proceedings “and there may be criminal proceedings which do not necessarily involve a charge” of any offence. As an illustration of the former it points out that a charge made to the Judge of a civil court or to public officers of other kinds, in order to obtain sanction to prosecute may well be a charge “but is not the institution of criminal proceedings”. It further points out that an aggrieved person may seek to put the criminal law in motion either by making a charge or in the language of the Code giving information to the police (Section 154 CrPC) “or he may” lay a charge, or as the Code calls it, a complaint (Section 190 CrPC) before a Magistrate. 97. We are referring to Section 211IPC as above keeping in mind the fact that the first information reports lodged by the writ petitioners at the different police stations were investigated and at the end of the investigation, the investigating agency reached to the conclusion that the police force had no role to play, rather Naxals were responsible for the massacre. Prima facie, it could be said that false information was given by the first informants to the police as regards the alleged massacre by the police force. 98. The essential to be satiated in order to attract the offence under Section 211IPC was elucidated by this Court in Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain [Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain, (1973) 2 SCC 406: 1973 SCC (Cri) 828]. The relevant paragraph is extracted hereinunder: (SCC pp. 411-12, para 10) “10. … This section as its marginal note indicates renders punishable false charge of offence with intent to 43 injure. The essential ingredient of an offence under Section 211IPC is to institute or cause to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing to institute false criminal proceedings assume false charge but false charge may be preferred even when no criminal proceedings result. It is frankly conceded by Shri Kohli that the appellant cannot be said to have instituted any criminal proceeding against any person. So that part of Section 211IPC is eliminated. Now, the expression “falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial. To “falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when speaking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible of analogous meaning should be understood to have been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were their colour and content from each other. They seem to have been used in a technical sense as commonly understood in our criminal law. The false charge must, therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or to someone who is in a position to get the offender punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words, it must be embodied either in a complaint or in a report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or an officer having authority over the person against whom the allegations are made. The statement in order to constitute the “charge” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion.” 99. Thus, as explained by this Court in Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain [Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain, (1973) 2 SCC 406: 1973 SCC (Cri) 828] , the essential ingredient of an offence under Section 211IPC is to institute or cause, to be instituted any criminal 44 proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing to institute false criminal proceedings assume false charge but false charge may be preferred even when no criminal proceedings result. 100. Now, the expression “falsely charges” in Section 211IPC, in our opinion, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial. “To falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when seeking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be, read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible of analogous meaning should be understood to have been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were their colour and content from each other. They seem to have been used in a technical sense as commonly understood in our criminal law. The false charge must, therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or to someone who is in a position to get the offender punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words, it must be embodied either in a complaint or in a report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or to an officer having authority over the person against whom the allegations are made. The statement in order to constitute the “charges” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion.” Section 211 of the IPC has some of the ingredients in the complaint. The essential ingredients thus of Section 211 is to falsely charge and to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation system. It would have been a different circumstance if the FIR had 45 been registered against the complainant on the complaint made by the petitioner. The complaint is communicated internally, enquiry is conducted internally and is closed, again, internally. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner has indulged in a false charge against the complainant, which would become the offence under Section 211 of the IPC. Issue No.3: Whether the proceedings contained ingredients of offence of defamation? 15. The aforesaid observation goes with the offence punishable under Sections 499 and 500 of the IPC for defamation. If the complaint so communicated had resulted in registration of a crime it becomes a public document or the complaint was made public, which had resulted in lowering the image of the complainant in the eyes of the general public or right thinking by the right- minded people which would have been ingredients of Sections 499 and 500 of the IPC. In the case at hand, as observed hereinabove, internal communications would not mean that they can become 46 publications as obtaining under Sections 499 and 500 of the IPC. Therefore, those offences also are not met in the case at hand. 16. The Apex Court in the case of M.A. RUMUGAM v. KITTU6, has held as follows: "…. …. …. 4. On 3-6-2003, when the appellant allegedly visited his land, he found that 9 coconut trees were dead. Upon enquiry, he allegedly came to know that one Namasivayam, son of Rajagopal and Kaliappan, son of Ramu of Naluvedapathi Village had damaged the said coconut trees by pouring acid mixed with kerosene thereon allegedly on the advice of the respondent herein. 5. On 4-6-2003, the appellant filed a complaint before the Sub-Inspector of Police, Thalaignayar Police Station, contending: “… On 30-4-2003, the Panchayat Union Committee member and Panchayat Board President approached me and wanted land on south side of my coconut grove to lay road through the grove. I did not give consent for the proposal. In these circumstances when I visited the grove on 3-6-2003 about 9 coconut yielding trees on the south side were found slide down. When I enquired about this I came to know that Namasivayam, son of Rajagopal and Kaliappan, son of Ramu of Naluvedapathi Village were standing on the south side of my coconut grove some time back with tins in their hands. I met them and told that they were responsible for the sliding of tender coconut trees as they were seen near the trees by some people of the village. They confessed that they on the advice of Kittu alias Krishnamurthy, son of Vedaiya Gounder of Naluvedapathi Village along with him poured acid mixed 6 (2009) 1 SCC 101 47 kerosene into the coconut trees and that they have done it since I did not give consent to lay road through my coconut grove.” In the said complaint, the appellant requested the Sub- Inspector of Police to take action against those persons and sought protection for himself and his property. 6. On 5-6-2003, the appellant filed a suit before the learned District Munsif Court at Nagappattinam against the President, Union Council member and other persons for grant of permanent injunction against the defendants restraining them from causing damage to the footpath in his property under the pretext of widening and laying road. In the said suit, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed to find out whether any coconut trees were found dead. The Advocate Commissioner submitted its report on 15-6-2003 stating: “Adjacent to the path on east end 9 coconut trees were found dead with loss of chlorophyll. There were 10 bunches carrying 100 to 150 coconuts. There were in an average 20 branches in each tree. There were heaps of coconut under the 9 trees.” 7. On 25-6-2003, a first information report was lodged on the basis of the complaint given by the appellant. In the said FIR, the names of the respondent herein and two others were mentioned in the column of “doubtful persons” portion. As the police authorities neither filed any charge-sheet within six months nor sought for extension of time for the purpose of conducting further investigation, the learned Magistrate ordered stopping of further investigation and consequently closure of the matter. 8. On 6-9-2005, the respondent herein filed a private complaint, which was marked as CC No. 179 of 2006, in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Tiruthuraipoondi against the appellant for commission of the offence of defamation under Section 500 of the Penal Code. Taking cognizance of the said complaint, the learned Magistrate issued summons to the appellant. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, he filed a Crl. OP No. 10819 of 2006 before the High 48 Court of Judicature at Madras praying to call for the records pertaining to the complaint petition filed by the respondent being CC No. 179 of 2006 and quashing the same. 9. Before the High Court, a contention was raised that the backdrop of events and the manner in which the complaint petition had to be filed by the appellant would clearly establish that the action on his part was not in good faith. The said contention was negatived by the High Court stating: “5. The accusation have been made the accused (sic) and there are prima facie materials to proceed against the petitioner. When there are specific allegations made in the complaint against the accused, such allegation may have to be rebutted during the course of trial. In such circumstances by invoking the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC the pending proceedings cannot be quashed at the threshold, I do not find any merit in the case, hence the petition is dismissed. Consequently, connected Crl. MPs are closed. However, the petitioner is at liberty to establish that the statement has been made in good faith, during the course of trial.” …. …. …. 16. The complaint petition filed by the respondent herein contained a statement that he was implicated allegedly on the basis of an information received by the appellant from one Namasivayam, son of Rajagopal and Kaliappan, son of Ramu of Naluvedapathi Village that they had damaged nine coconut trees by pouring acid mixed kerosene on the respondent's advice. The aforementioned allegation against the respondent was published in various newspapers viz. Maalai Murusu, Maalai Malar, Dhina Boomi, Dhina Karan, Dhina Malar as well as in some weeklies. 17. On the aforementioned backdrop, he alleged to have been defamed as thereby, “false propaganda among the village people and implication of his name in the complaint against the enemies Kakliappan and Namasivayam besides publishing the same in the dailies and weeklies” was made against him. It was furthermore stated: 49 “Since there was no basic evidence in the complaint, it was given with the sole intention of defaming the petitioner herein and the complainant did not cooperate for the investigation, the case registered in Thalaignayiru Police Station in Crime No. 360 of 2003 could not be proceeded further and the charge-sheet could not be filed. Therefore, the case on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Tiruthuraipoondi was closed on 7-4- 2005. Because of the illegal activities of the respondent, the petitioner complainant herein is unable to make his foreign trips and suffered heavy financial loss and lost his status among his relatives and the people of the village and suffered enormous mental agony.” 18. Allegations made in the said complaint petition, thus, in our opinion, make out a case for proceeding against the appellant under Section 500 of the Penal Code as thereby imputation concerning the respondent had been made intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation would harm his reputation. 19. For the purpose of bringing his case within the purview of the Eighth and the Ninth Exception appended to Section 499 of the Penal Code, it would be necessary for the appellant to prove good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good. 20. It is now a well-settled principle of law that those who plead exception must prove it. The burden of proof that his action was bona fide would, thus, be on the appellant alone. 21. At this stage, in our opinion, it would have been premature for the High Court to consider the materials placed by the appellant before it so as to arrive at a definite conclusion that there was no element of bad faith on the part of the appellant in making the said complaint before the police authorities." 50 17. The Apex Court in KISHORE BALKRISHNA NAND v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA7 holds as follows: “…. …. …. 3. It appears from the materials on record that the appellant herein lodged a complaint in writing addressed to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (for short “the SDM”) stating that Respondent 2 herein (original complainant) had put up a shop by encroaching upon some land. In the complaint. the appellant is said to have further stated that such shop put up by the complainant was creating nuisance, as many anti-social elements and road romeos had started visiting the said shop and were creating all sorts of problems. 4. The SDM upon receipt of the complaint dated 25-1- 2002 filed by the appellant issued notice to the complainant. While the proceedings before the SDM were pending, the complainant thought fit to lodge a private complaint in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Worora, Chandrapur, State of Maharashtra for the offence of defamation. The learned Magistrate took cognizance on the said complaint and issued process. The cognizance for the offence of defamation was taken by the Magistrate on the basis of the averments said to have been made by the appellant in his written complaint addressed to the SDM, referred to above. 5. As the record reveals, the appellant thereafter moved an application before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate with a prayer that the order of issue of process be recalled. The Magistrate concerned recalled the order. The complainant being aggrieved by such order of recall passed by the Magistrate, challenged the same before the Sessions Court by filing a revision application. The revision application was allowed and the order recalling the order of issue of process was quashed. In such circumstances, the appellant went before the High Court. In the High Court, the appellant thought fit not to press his petition and withdrew the same. … … … 7 (2023) 8 SCC 358 51 Analysis 11. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the allegations made in the complaint addressed to the SDM make out the offence under Section 500IPC or not? 12. Section 499IPC reads, thus: “499. Defamation.—Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person.” 13. Eighth Exception to Section 499, to which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel, reads as under: “Eighth Exception.—Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person.—It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation.” 14. The word “good faith” has been defined in Section 52IPC to mean: “52. “Good faith”.—Nothing is said to be done or believed in “good faith” which is done or believed without due care and attention.” 15. We are of the view that no case is made out to put the appellant to trial for the alleged offence. There is no defamation as such. 16. Exception 8 to Section 499 clearly indicates that it is not a defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with regard to the 52 subject-matter of accusation. Even otherwise by perusing the allegations made in the complaint, we are satisfied that no case for defamation has been made out. 17. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the appeal deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The impugned order [Kishor v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 2406] passed by the High Court is hereby set aside. As a consequence of the same, the original order passed by the Magistrate issuing summons, is also hereby quashed and set aside. The criminal proceedings in the form of Criminal Case No. 247 of 2002 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Worora, Chandrapur, Maharashtra stand terminated.” (Emphasis supplied at each instance) The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgments holds merely because a complaint is made, it would not become an offence of defamation. In M.A. RUMUGAM supra, an FIR was registered but the proceedings were closed by the Magistrate but no charge sheet was filed. However, on the basis of the complaint so made, there were publications made in the newspaper regarding the respondent/complainant. Therefore, it had harmed his reputation. If the elucidation of law qua the aforesaid offences alleged is noticed qua the facts obtaining in the case at hand, none of those would lead this Court to permit further trial for the aforesaid offences in the case at hand. 53 18. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: O R D E R (i) Criminal Petition is allowed. (ii) The proceedings initiated against the petitioner in C.C.No.14809 of 2024 pending before the VIII Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru stand quashed qua the petitioner. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE Bkp CT:MJ