R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/CRIMINAL APPEAL (AGAINST ACQUITTAL) NO. 1867 of 2026 ========================================================== JIGAR PRAKASHBHAI RAJAI Versus STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. ========================================================== Appearance: MR VILAV K BHATIA(5338) for the Appellant(s) No. 1 MS JIRGA JHAVERI ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1 ========================================================== CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK Date : 08/09/2026 ORAL ORDER 1. The present appeal is filed by the appellant – original complainant under Section 413 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita of 2023 (hereinafter be referred to as the “BNSS”) against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 15.07.2026 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar (hereinafter be referred to as “the Appellate Court) in Criminal Appeal No.201 of 2025 whereby the Appellate Court has quashed and set aside the judgment and order of conviction dated 8.9.2025 passed by the learned 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhavnagar (hereinafter be referred to as “the Trial Court”) and acquitted the respondent - accused for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as “NI Act” for short). 2. The facts giving rise to present appeal are that the R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 complainant is engaged in the business of purchase and sale of four-wheeler vehicles under the name and style of Mahadev Consultant, Bhavnagar. The respondent-accused approached the appellant through one P.M. Patel for the sale of an Ertiga motor car bearing Registration No. GJ-03-JC-5985, owned by the father of the accused. The appellant inspected the vehicle, negotiated the transaction, and the sale consideration was finally settled at Rs. 4,38,000/-. 2.1 Pursuant to the said transaction, the appellant made various payments towards the sale consideration, including an amount of Rs. 20,000/- through G-Pay directly to the respondent-accused and other amounts as instructed by the respondent through intermediaries connected with the transaction. Subsequently, further payments were also made towards completion of the transaction. 2.2 Upon disputes arising regarding completion of the sale transaction, the respondent-accused acknowledged his liability and, towards discharge of the amount payable to the appellant, voluntarily issued Cheque No. 030619 dated 01.08.2023, drawn on the Bank of India, Ghatiya Prachi Branch, for a sum of Rs. 2,20,600/- in favour of the appellant. 4.4 The appellant presented the said cheque for encashment within its period of validity. However, the cheque was dishonoured and returned unpaid with the endorsement “Payment Stopped by Drawer.” 2.3 Thereafter, the appellant issued a statutory demand notice dated 21.08.2023, calling upon the respondent-accused to make payment of the cheque amount within the prescribed R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 period. The said notice was duly served upon the respondent. However, despite service of the notice, the respondent neither replied thereto nor complied with the demand by making payment within the statutory period. Consequently, the appellant instituted Criminal Case No. 12844 of 2023 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before the learned 2nd Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhavnagar. The respondent-accused appeared before the Trial Court, pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. To prove his case the appellant has examined himself at Exh.22 and led five documentary evidence. 2.4 Upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence and after considering the statutory presumptions under the NI Act, the Trial Court, by judgment and order dated 08.09.2025, held the respondent guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and to pay fine/compensation in accordance with law. 2.5 Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction, the respondent preferred Criminal Appeal No. 201 of 2025 before the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court after going through the record and after hearing both the parties, passed an order dated 15.07.2026 acquitting the respondent accused from the charges under Section 138 of the NI Act. Against the said of acquittal order passed by the Appellate Court, the appellant- original complainant has preferred present appeal. 3. Heard Mr.Vilav K. Bhatia, learned counsel for the appellant and Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, learned APP for the respondent State. Page 3 of 14 R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 Today, learned counsel for the appellant has produced on record the paper book which is taken on record. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the impugned judgment and order passed by the Appellate Court is contrary to law, contrary to the evidence on record and contrary to the settled principles governing prosecutions under Section 138 of the NI Act. He has submitted that the Appellate Court failed to appreciate that the respondent- accused had never disputed his signature on the cheque. Once the execution of the cheque is admitted, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act arise in favour of the complainant. The Appellate Court has completely ignored the mandatory statutory presumptions. 4.1 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Appellate Court committed a serious error in holding that the statutory presumption stood rebutted merely on the basis of suggestions put to the complainant in cross-examination and allegations made against one P.M. Patel. Such suggestions and allegations, in the absence of cogent evidence, do not constitute sufficient material to rebut the statutory presumption. He has submitted that the Appellate Court failed to appreciate that the accused did not examine himself on oath, nor did he produce any independent documentary evidence establishing that no legally enforceable debt or liability existed. 4.2 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Appellate Court materially erred in shifting the burden of proof back upon the complainant without first recording a R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 finding that the accused had discharged his initial burden of rebutting the statutory presumption by cogent and acceptable evidence. He has submitted that the Appellate Court travelled beyond the pleadings and evidence on record by relying upon alleged criminal complaints against P.M. Patel and other collateral circumstances, although none of such proceedings determines or disproves the liability arising from the dishonoured cheque issued by the accused. He has also submitted that the Appellate Court completely ignored the settled proposition of law that, even if there is a dispute regarding the underlying transaction, the issuance of a signed cheque gives rise to a statutory presumption that the cheque was issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability, unless such presumption is rebutted by acceptable and probable evidence. 4.3 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Appellate Court failed to appreciate that the complainant duly proved the issuance of the cheque, the cheque dishonour memo, the statutory notice, service of the notice and failure of the accused to make payment within the prescribed statutory period. Thus, all the essential ingredients of Section 138 of the NI Act stood duly established before the Trial Court. He has submitted that the Appellate Court erred in re- appreciating the evidence in a manner contrary to settled principles of law and substituted conjectures and surmises for proved facts while reversing the well-reasoned judgment of conviction recorded by the Trial Court. The Appellate Court further ignored the material admissions of the accused regarding the transaction and issuance of the cheque, while R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 giving undue importance to insignificant discrepancies which do not go to the root of the complainant's case. He has submitted that the Appellate Court has failed to appreciate the material evidence and admissions on record and has given undue importance to minor discrepancies which do not affect the core of the complainant's case or dislodge the statutory presumptions operating in favour of the complainant. 4.4 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Appellate Court failed to appreciate that the respondent- accused neither initiated any proceedings for cancellation or recovery of the cheque nor issued any contemporaneous notice alleging misuse of the cheque prior to its presentation. Such conduct supports the case of the complainant and is inconsistent with the defence subsequently raised by the accused. 4.5 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Appellate Court failed to appreciate the detailed and cogent reasoning recorded by the Trial Court while convicting the accused after proper appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence. There was no perversity, illegality or material irregularity in the judgment of the Trial Court warranting interference by the learned Appellate Court. 4.6 It is submitted that the impugned judgment suffers from errors of law, misapplication of the statutory presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act and improper appreciation of the evidence on record and, therefore, calls for interference by this Hon'ble Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Page 6 of 14 R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 4.7 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that impugned judgment and order passed by the Appellate Court acquitting the respondent-accused is contrary to law and evidence on record and deserves to be quashed and set aside, and the judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court deserves to be restored. 4.8 Learned APP appearing for the respondent State has adopted the argument advanced by learned counsel appellant and submitted that impugned judgment and order passed by the Appellate Court is contrary to law and deserves to be quashed and set aside, and the judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court deserves to be restored. 5. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order, as well as the submissions advanced by the learned advocate for the appellant, the issues that arises for consideration before this Court are as under:- Whether the Trial Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal? Whether the Trial Court, while appreciating the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, has committed any error of law or fact? Whether the impugned judgment and order of acquittal suffers from any illegality or perversity? 6. In view of the above-stated submissions and upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, as well as the evidence recorded by the Appellate Court, it is appropriate to first examine the facts of the case. The R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 complainant is engaged in the business of purchase and sale of four-wheelers under the name and style of Mahadev Consultant, Bhavnagar. The respondent-accused agreed to sell an Ertiga car bearing Registration No. GJ-03-JC-5985 for Rs. 4,38,000/-, towards which the complainant made various payments. Towards the outstanding liability, the accused issued Cheque No. 030619 dated 01.08.2023 for Rs. 2,20,600/-. The cheque was dishonoured with the endorsement “Payment Stopped by Drawer.” Despite service of the statutory notice dated 21.08.2023, the accused failed to make payment, resulting in the filing of Criminal Case No. 12844 of 2023 under Section 138 of the NI Act. The Trial Court, by judgment dated 08.09.2025, convicted the accused. However, in Criminal Appeal No. 201 of 2025, the Appellate Court, by order dated 15.07.2026, acquitted the accused. 7. It appears that the documents produced before this Court by way of paper book were also produced before the Appellate Court and the Appellate Court has ignored the said facts though the same were available on record. Even the complainant, in his cross-examination, admitted that several complaints had been lodged against Shri P. M. Patel, who, according to the complainant himself, was his consultant/dealer. Despite being aware of such allegations, the complainant entered into the transaction and paid Rs.50,000/- to Makrani Aveshkhan Firozkhan and Rs.2,50,000/- to Shri P. M. Patel. 8. These admissions render the alleged legally enforceable debt or liability of Rs.2,20,600/- against the accused highly R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 improbable. Consequently, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act stood rebutted on a preponderance of probabilities. 9. The Appellate Court referred to and relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418, and observed that the accused is not required to enter the witness box and may rebut the statutory presumption on the basis of the complainant’s own evidence and admissions. Upon evaluating the evidence on record and undertaking a close scrutiny of the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Court arrived at the conclusion that the order of conviction passed by the Trial Court suffered from manifest errors of law and fact warranting interference. Accordingly, the Appellate Court rightly interfered with the judgment and order passed by the Trial Court and reversed the judgment and order of conviction. No illegality, perversity, or infirmity can be found in the impugned judgment and order passed by the Appellate Court. 10. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, and considering the fact that the subject cheque was issued by the respondent under compulsion, no legally enforceable debt or liability was proved against the respondent. Thus, the essential ingredients of Section 138 of the NI Act, were not established. Consequently, the Appellate Court rightly reversed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and acquitted the respondent. Page 9 of 14 R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 11. On perusal of the record of the appeal, it transpires that the respondent-accused has established his innocence before the Appellate Court and that, after due appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence and other material placed on record, the Appellate Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The findings recorded by the Appellate Court are just, proper and in accordance with the settled principles of law and, therefore, no interference is warranted by this Court. 12. At this stage, it is appropriate to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dattatraya vs. Sharanappa reported in (2024) 8 SCC 573, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:- “33.1 Criminal jurisprudence emphasises on the fundamental essence of liberty and presumption of innocence unless proven guilty. This presumption gets emboldened by virtue of concurrent findings of acquittal. Therefore, this court must be extra-cautious while dealing with a challenge against acquittal as the said presumption gets reinforced by virtue of a well-reasoned favourable outcome. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution side becomes more burdensome pursuant to the said double presumption. 33.3 Where two views are possible, then this Court would not ordinarily interfere and reverse the concurrent findings of acquittal. However, where the situation is such that the only conclusion which could be arrived at from a comprehensive appraisal of evidence, shows that there has been a grave miscarriage of justice, then, notwithstanding such concurrent view, this Court would not restrict itself to adopt an oppugnant view. 33.4 To adjudge whether the concurrent findings of acquittal are ‘perverse’ it is to be seen whether there has been failure of justice. This Court in Babu v. State of Kerala clarified the ambit of the term ‘perversity’ as: “20…...if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/admissible material. The finding may also be said R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 to be perverse if it is ‘against the weight of evidence’, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality.” 33.6 Furthermore, such interference is necessitated to safeguard interests of justice when the acquittal is based on some irrelevant grounds or fallacies in re- appreciation of any fundamental evidentiary material or a manifest error of law or in cases of non- adherence to the principles of natural justice or the decision is manifestly unjust or where an acquittal which is fundamentally based on an exaggerated adherence to the principle of granting benefit of doubt to the accused, is liable to be set aside. Say in cases where the court severed the connection 12 (2023) 10 SCC 148. between accused and criminality committed by him upon a cursory examination of evidences. [Vide State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh and Others and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar] 34. Upon perusal of the aforementioned principles and applying them to the facts and circumstances of the present matter, it is evident that there is no perversity and lack of evidence in the case of the respondent- accused. The concurrent findings have backing of detailed appraisal of evidences and facts, therefore, do not warrant interference in light of above enlisted principles. In a similar set of facts as in the present case, involving criminal liability arising out of dishonour of cheque, this Court in M/s Rajco Steel Enterprises v. Kavita Saraff dejected from reversing the concurrent findings of acquittal of the accused therein and underscored the principle of non-interference, unless such findings are perverse or bereft of evidentiary corroboration or lacks question of law.” 13. It is appropriate to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajco Steel Enterprises vs. Kavita Saraff and another reported in (2024) 9 SCC 390, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:- “12. We are dealing with a case where the First Appellate Court exercising its jurisdiction under Section 374(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, ongoing through the analysis of evidence, acquitted the accused/respondent no.1. The acquittal was further upheld by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the 1973 Code. The whole question involved in this proceeding is as to whether the cheques were issued in discharge of a debt and if it was so, then whether the accused/respondent no.1 was able to rebut the presumption in terms of Section 118 read with Section 139 of the 1881 Act. In the light of the judgment of this Court in the case of Narendra Pratap Narain Singh -vs- State of U.P. the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 Constitution of India to interfere with concurrent findings of fact is not in question, when such findings are based on no evidence or are perverse. The question, we have to address thus, is as to whether the findings of the First Appellate Court and the High Court are on no evidence or perverse. Both these Courts have examined the evidence threadbare and in the opinion of these two fora, go against the complainant/petitioner.” 14. It is also appropriate to have a glance of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa reported in (2019) 5 SCC 418, Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan reported in (2010) 11 SCC 441. 15. Further, in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 = (2024) 8 SCC 149, the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to 40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the Appellate Court. 16. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20 and 21 as under:- “20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka , regarding the power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus: “42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal, resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.” R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026) ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026 17. Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused have committed the alleged crime. Therefore, the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence on record. 18. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it clearly transpires that the Appellate Court has not committed any error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against him. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence, it clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of the Appellate Court is sustainable and the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. 19. In view of the above, the present appeal is devoid of merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Appellate Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Court forthwith. (HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J) SURESH SOLANKI Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge. Digitally signed by: SURESHKUMAR MOTIBHAI SOLANKI(HC00208), PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 09/09/2026 15:40:39