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2026 DAILYLAW 34375 (CHH)

SITARAM v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

WPCR/506/2026 · 2026-08-30

Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal

Transfer Petitionbody2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

1 CGHC010332482026 2026:CGHC:38291-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPCR No. 506 of 2026 Sitaram S/o Shri Chaitram @ Rambagas Yadav, Aged About 59 Years (About 26 Years At The Time Of Entry Into Jail), R/o Village -Bandha, Police Station - Takhatpur, District -Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through -The Secretary, Home (Jail) Department Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Raipur (C.G.) 2 - The Under Secretary, State Of Chhattisgarh, Jail Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Raipur (C.G.) 3 - The Director General, Prisons And Correctional Services Chhattisgarh, Head Quarter- Prisons And Correctional Services Chhattisgarh, Raipur (C.G.) 4 - The Jail Superintendent, Central Jail Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from CIS) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Soumya Rai, Dy. Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 31.08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Soumya Rai, Dy. Govt. Advocate for the Respondent/ State. SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.09.01 10:28:58 +0530 2 2. The petitioner has filed the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking following relief(s):- “10.1 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for entire records pertaining to the case of the petitioner for it's kind perusal; 10.2 The Hon,ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a suitable writ, order or direction and quash/set-aside the order dated 12.06.2026 (Annexure P/1) issued/passed by the respondent no.2; 10.3 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a suitable writ, order or direction commanding the respondent authorities to grant the petitioner remission under 473 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita 2023/432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 and under Rule 358 of C.G. Prisons Rule 1968 and to release the petitioner by granting remission of rest part of the sentence imposed upon the petitioner vide judgment of conviction and sentence dated 15.10.1999 passed by the Learned 2nd Additional Session Judge Bilaspur in Session Trial No. 200/1997; and 10.4 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, may also kindly be granted in favour of the petitioner.” 3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is a convicted prisoner presently lodged in Central Jail, Bilaspur (C.G.), having been convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced to imprisonment for life by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, vide judgment dated 15.10.1999 passed in Sessions Trial No. 200/1997. His criminal appeal was dismissed by this Court on 29.08.2016 and the Special Leave Petition filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was also dismissed on 20.05.2022. The petitioner has undergone actual incarceration for more than 16 years and 05 months and, as on 29.07.2026, has earned remission of 05 years, 07 months and 21 days, thereby completing more than 22 years of imprisonment 3 including remission. The petitioner applied for premature release/remission of the unexpired portion of his sentence, pursuant to which the opinion of the sentencing Court was obtained, wherein no objection was expressed to granting remission considering his conduct and good behaviour. Thereafter, the requisite jail reports and other documents were prepared and the petitioner’s case was processed under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. However, vide order dated 12.06.2026, the respondent No.2 rejected the petitioner’s case for premature release, mainly on the basis of the negative recommendation/opinion of the State Sentence Review Board. Hence, the present petition has been preferred challenging the said order and seeking appropriate relief in respect of his premature release. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order dated 12.06.2026 (Annexure P/1), whereby the petitioner’s case for premature release by way of remission of the unexpired portion of sentence has been rejected, is arbitrary, mechanical, non-speaking and suffers from complete non-application of mind, as the respondent authority has merely relied upon the negative recommendation of the State Sentence Review Board without independently considering the relevant facts and circumstances of the petitioner’s case. It is submitted that the petitioner has already undergone more than 16 years of actual incarceration and, together with earned remission of 05 years, 07 months and 21 days as on 29.07.2026, has completed more than 22 years of imprisonment; his conduct in jail has remained satisfactory, the Jail Superintendent has recommended his premature release, and even the learned sentencing 4 Court expressed no objection to grant of remission considering his good conduct and behaviour. It is further submitted that the adverse opinions of the District Magistrate, Superintendent of Police and State Sentence Review Board have primarily proceeded on the nature and gravity of the offence, without properly examining the petitioner’s post- conviction conduct, reformation, possibility of recurrence, present circumstances, and the other factors governing premature release as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand & Others, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 865. Learned counsel would further submit that the nature or gravity of the offence cannot, by itself, constitute the sole ground for denial of remission, particularly when the petitioner has undergone a substantial period of incarceration and there is no adverse material regarding his conduct while in custody. Reliance is also placed upon Rajo @ Rajwa @ Rajendra Mandal v. State of Bihar & Others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1068 and Rajkumar v. State of U.P., (2024) 9 SCC 598, to contend that remission has to be considered in accordance with the applicable policy, uniformly, transparently and on relevant considerations, keeping in view the reformative object of punishment. It is also submitted that similarly situated prisoners, including persons convicted in multiple murder cases, have been granted premature release, whereas the petitioner has been denied the same on the basis of irrelevant and extraneous considerations. The petitioner has also availed parole on two occasions without any complaint regarding his conduct during such period. Thus, having regard to the petitioner’s prolonged incarceration, satisfactory jail conduct, earned remission, recommendation of the Jail Superintendent, favourable opinion of the sentencing Court and the 5 reformative principles governing remission, the impugned order dated 12.06.2026 deserves to be quashed and the petitioner’s case for premature release deserves to be reconsidered/granted in accordance with law. 5. Learned State counsel, opposing the petition, would submit that the petitioner has been convicted for the serious offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, and therefore, the mere completion of a particular period of incarceration or earning of remission does not confer any indefeasible right upon the petitioner to seek premature release. It is submitted that remission or premature release is a matter falling within the discretion of the competent authority and is required to be considered in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions, rules and remission policy, after taking into account the nature and gravity of the offence, its impact on society and the possibility of recurrence of crime. Learned State counsel would further submit that the petitioner’s case was duly considered by the competent authorities and the State Sentence Review Board, after considering the relevant reports and materials, including the opinion/report of the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police, did not recommend his premature release. The impugned order dated 12.06.2026 has, therefore, been passed after due consideration of the material available on record and cannot be said to be arbitrary or mechanical merely because the decision is adverse to the petitioner. It is further submitted that a favourable jail conduct report or the opinion of the sentencing Court does not create an absolute right in favour of the petitioner, as the ultimate decision regarding remission rests with the competent 6 authority. The fact that some other prisoners may have been granted premature release in their respective cases also cannot entitle the petitioner to claim parity, as each case has to be examined on its own facts, including the nature of the offence, antecedents, conduct and other relevant circumstances. It is thus submitted that there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned order warranting interference by this Court and, accordingly, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the pleadings, annexures and the material available on record. 7. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds that the impugned order dated 12.06.2026 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The petitioner has undergone a substantial period of incarceration, having completed more than 16 years of actual imprisonment and more than 22 years of imprisonment together with earned remission, and his case for premature release was duly processed under the applicable provisions of law. It is also evident from the record that the Jail Superintendent had furnished a favourable recommendation in favour of the petitioner and the learned sentencing Court had also expressed no objection to grant of remission, having regard to his conduct and good behaviour. However, the competent authority, while rejecting the petitioner’s case, has principally relied upon the negative recommendation/opinion of the State Sentence Review Board, which in turn was founded upon the reports of the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police, without demonstrating any independent, objective and meaningful consideration of the relevant factors governing premature release. The petitioner’s conduct during incarceration has been reported to be 7 satisfactory and there is no material on record indicating any adverse conduct on his part during the period of imprisonment or during the two occasions when he was released on parole. The mere gravity of the offence, for which the petitioner has already been convicted and sentenced by the competent criminal Court, cannot by itself constitute the sole basis for denying the benefit of remission, particularly when the question at the stage of premature release is required to be examined from the standpoint of the petitioner’s present conduct, reformation, likelihood of recurrence, prospects of rehabilitation and other relevant factors. The apprehension expressed by the authorities, without reference to any specific and cogent material demonstrating the likelihood of recurrence of the offence or disturbance of public peace, cannot be treated as conclusive. Thus, the rejection of the petitioner’s case merely on the basis of adverse opinions, without proper consideration of his prolonged incarceration, satisfactory jail conduct, earned remission, favourable recommendation of the Jail Superintendent and opinion of the sentencing Court, reflects non- application of mind and warrants interference by this Court. 8. It is well-settled that while exercising powers under Sections 432 and 433 CrPC, the appropriate Government is required to take a holistic and reasoned decision. The law on the subject has been succinctly laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laxman Naskar v. Union of India, (2000) 2 SCC 595, wherein the Court identified the guiding factors for grant of premature release. The relevant portion reads: “The following factors are required to be considered: (i) whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large; 8 (ii) whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing crime; (iii) whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime; (iv) whether any fruitful purpose is being served by keeping the convict in prison; and (v) socio-economic condition of the convict’s family.” 9. In the present case, there is no discussion whatsoever of the aforesaid parameters in the impugned order. The authority has failed to evaluate the petitioner’s conduct during incarceration, his reformation, or the likelihood of recidivism. 10. Further, in Ram Chander v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr., AIR 2022 SC 2017 : (2022) 4 SCR 1103, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphasized that the opinion sought under Section 432(2) CrPC. must be based on objective assessment and not merely on the nature of the offence. The Court observed: “The opinion of the Presiding Judge must reflect due application of mind to the relevant factors and cannot be a mere reiteration of the nature of the offence or the findings recorded at the time of conviction.” 11. Similarly, in Rajo v. State of Bihar, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1068, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the opinion of the Presiding Judge or other authorities is only one of the inputs and cannot be treated as determinative. It was held: “The appropriate Government is required to take an independent decision based on all relevant considerations including post-conviction conduct; the opinion of the Presiding Judge cannot be given primacy if it merely reiterates the circumstances of 9 conviction.” 12. In the present case, the impugned order reflects a mechanical reliance on adverse opinions without independent evaluation. Such an approach defeats the very purpose of remission, which is rooted in the reformative theory of punishment. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216 has held: “The policy of remission is a reformative measure and should be applied in a fair and reasonable manner. The decision must not be arbitrary but based on relevant considerations.” 14. Likewise, in Union of India v. V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors., (2016) 7 SCC 1, it has been observed: “Though the power of remission is discretionary, it must be exercised in a just, fair and reasonable manner, and cannot be exercised arbitrarily or on extraneous considerations.” 15. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the respondent authorities have failed to discharge their statutory obligation. The impugned order is cryptic, non-speaking, and suffers from non-application of mind, as it does not reflect consideration of the petitioner’s long incarceration, jail conduct, reformation, or other relevant factors. 16. It is also pertinent to note that the petitioner has undergone more than the requisite period of incarceration. There is nothing on record to indicate any adverse conduct during incarceration or any likelihood of threat to society upon release. 17. In view of the foregoing analysis and the settled legal position, this 10 Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 12.06.2026 (Annexure P/1) is arbitrary, unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 18. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 12.06.2026 is hereby quashed. 19. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has undergone a substantial period of incarceration, has earned remission and maintained satisfactory conduct during his custody, coupled with the fact that he has been acquitted in the main case in which the deceased had appeared as a witness and deposed against him, and there being no material on record indicating any likelihood of recidivism or disturbance of public peace upon his release, this Court deems it appropriate to direct the respondent authorities to reconsider and grant the benefit of premature release to the petitioner in accordance with the applicable remission policy and law. 20. The respondents are, therefore, directed to release the petitioner forthwith, if not required in any other case, in accordance with law. 21. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice sagrika