1 CGHC010330232026 2026:CGHC:38265-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2252 of 2026 Vinayak Tamrakar S/o Girja Shankar Tamrakar, Aged About 58 Years Presently Confined Jail, Through His Wife - Lalita Tamrakar W/o. Vinayak Tamrakar Aged About 52 Years, R/o Temer Para, Killa Mandir, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Home Affairs, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Nava Raipur Atal Nagar, District Raipur (C.G.) 2 - The Station House Officer, Police Station / Chowki Jevra Sirsa, Police Station Pulgaon, District Durg (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Add. A.G. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 31.08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, learned counsel for the petitioner. MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2026.09.01 11:14:02 +0530 2 Also heard Mr. Ashish Shukla, learned Additional Advocate General for respondents / State. 2. The petitioner has filed this petition with following prayer: “a). Quash and set-aside the FIR bearing Crime No. 247/2026 dated 07.03.2026, registered at Police Station- Pulgaon, Chowki- Jewra Sirsa, District- Durg (C.G.), insofar as the present petitioner Vinayak Tamrakar is concerned, for the alleged offences under Sections 8 and 18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. b). Quash the consequential Final Report/Charge- sheet bearing Final Report No. 540/2026 dated 29.07.2026, insofar as the present petitioner is concerned, whereby the petitioner has been charge-sheeted for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 8, 18, 29 and 27-A of the NDPS Act and the other provisions mentioned therein. c). Quash and set aside the order dated 30.07.2026 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pulgaon, District Durg, whereby cognizance has been taken against the petitioner for the aforesaid offences. d). Quash and set aside the subsequent order dated 08.08.2026 passed by the learned Court below whereby charges have been framed against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 8, 18, 29 and 27-A of the NDPS Act, and discharge the petitioner from the said 3 criminal case. e). Consequently, quash all consequential proceedings arising out of Crime No. 247/2026, including the criminal case pending before the learned Court below, insofar as they relate to the present petitioner. f). Pass any other order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem just, fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice.” 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on receipt of secret information on 06.03.2026 that illegal cultivation of opium was being carried out in a field adjoining the field of Vinayak Tamrakar near the Shivnath River at Village Jhejhri, Police Outpost Jevra Sirsa, the police party, after recording the information and completing the requisite preliminary formalities in the presence of independent witnesses and informing the concerned authorities, proceeded to the spot along with officials of the FSL, Revenue, Excise and NCB Departments. Upon inspection, accused Vikas Bishnoi was found present at the field and the cultivation of suspected narcotic plants was noticed; owing to insufficient light, the proceedings were initially deferred and the spot was secured. On the following day, i.e., 07.03.2026, the proceedings were resumed and, upon examination by the FSL officer, the plants were found to be opium plants. After complying with the procedural requirements under the NDPS Act, the opium plants 4 were counted, uprooted along with their roots, stems, leaves, flowers and fruits, and on weighing were found to be 62,424.4 kilograms, comprising approximately 1,430,100 plants, valued at about Rs.7,88,00,000/-. The contraband was seized and sealed in accordance with law, and accused Vikas Bishnoi was arrested. During his memorandum statement, he allegedly disclosed the involvement of Vinayak Tamrakar, Manish Thakur, Shravan Bishnoi and Achala Ram in the illegal cultivation. Accordingly, Dehati Nalishi was registered for the offence punishable under Sections 8 and 18 of the NDPS Act and was thereafter forwarded to Police Station Pulgaon, where the regular crime was registered and investigation was taken up. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the learned trial Court has committed a grave error in taking cognizance and thereafter framing charges against the petitioner, as the very foundation of the prosecution case does not attribute the alleged cultivation of opium to him. It is contended that the secret information dated 06.03.2026 specifically named co-accused Vikas Bishnoi as the person engaged in cultivating and looking after the alleged opium crop, whereas the petitioner was not named therein at all. Referring to the contemporaneous spot panchnama, learned counsel would further submit that the alleged cultivation was found in Khasra Nos.309 and 310, which, according to the prosecution documents themselves, belonged to Madhumati Tamrakar and Preetibala Tamrakar, and therefore the 5 land on which the alleged narcotic crop was found was not owned by the petitioner. It is further argued that Vikas Bishnoi was physically found present at the spot when the police party reached there and the initial proceedings were directed against him, whereas no narcotic substance was recovered from the person or immediate possession of the petitioner. Learned counsel would submit that even the memorandum statement of Vikas Bishnoi does not specifically state that the petitioner himself cultivated the alleged opium crop and, at the highest, the allegation against the petitioner is that water, electricity or certain agricultural facilities were allegedly made available from his adjoining agricultural premises, which, by itself, cannot establish conscious possession, knowledge or intentional participation in the cultivation of narcotic substances. It is contended that there is no independent witness or other material to show that the petitioner was ever seen planting, tending, harvesting, collecting or possessing the alleged opium crop. According to learned counsel, the case against the petitioner was subsequently developed during investigation, particularly on the basis of material and memorandum allegedly recorded after the initial discovery, whereas the foundational documents, including the secret information, spot proceedings and search proceedings, do not attribute the subsequently alleged role to him. Serious doubt has also been raised regarding the chronology of the petitioner’s alleged memorandum, which is stated to have been recorded on 10.03.2026 but bears the 6 signature of the Investigating Officer dated 12.03.2026, without any satisfactory explanation. Learned counsel would further submit that the articles subsequently seized from the petitioner’s premises, including bank passbooks, CCTV cameras, submersible pumps, sprinklers and other agricultural or electrical equipment, are ordinary articles and neither constitute narcotic substances nor independently establish conscious possession or participation in the alleged cultivation. The statements of the prosecution witnesses Ganesh Chandrakar and Hemchand Sahu, as well as those of the landowners and other witnesses, according to learned counsel, merely refer to the agricultural arrangements and police proceedings and do not specifically establish that the petitioner cultivated opium or knowingly permitted such cultivation. It is also contended that no lease deed, agreement, receipt, written authorization or other independent documentary evidence has been produced to demonstrate that the petitioner had taken the disputed land for the purpose of cultivating opium. Learned counsel would further argue that the essential ingredients of Sections 29 and 27-A of the NDPS Act are wholly absent, as there is no independent material showing any conspiracy between the petitioner and the other accused persons, nor is there any financial transaction, bank trail, payment or other evidence suggesting that the petitioner financed illicit trafficking or harboured any offender. It is thus submitted that mere proximity of the petitioner’s land, alleged availability of agricultural facilities or 7 electricity, or agricultural dealings cannot substitute the statutory requirements of conscious possession, knowledge, intentional participation, conspiracy or financing. Learned counsel would submit that the learned Court below has failed to distinguish between mere suspicion and legally sufficient material, particularly when the prosecution case itself contains discrepancies regarding the ownership, possession and cultivation of the disputed land and the role of the various accused persons. According to learned counsel, the subsequent material collected during investigation cannot retrospectively cure the absence of incriminating material against the petitioner in the foundational documents dated 06.03.2026 and 07.03.2026. It is, therefore, submitted that even if the entire prosecution material is accepted at its face value, it does not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioner under Sections 8, 18, 29 and 27-A of the NDPS Act, and consequently the order dated 30.07.2026 taking cognizance and the order dated 08.08.2026 framing charges, having been passed without proper consideration of these material circumstances, are liable to be quashed in exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS, as continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. 5. Learned State counsel, for the petitioner would submit that the learned trial Court has committed a grave error in taking cognizance and thereafter framing charges against the petitioner, 8 as the very foundation of the prosecution case does not attribute the alleged cultivation of opium to him. It is contended that the secret information dated 06.03.2026 specifically named co- accused Vikas Bishnoi as the person engaged in cultivating and looking after the alleged opium crop, whereas the petitioner was not named therein at all. Referring to the contemporaneous spot panchnama, learned counsel would further submit that the alleged cultivation was found in Khasra Nos.309 and 310, which, according to the prosecution documents themselves, belonged to Madhumati Tamrakar and Preetibala Tamrakar, and therefore the land on which the alleged narcotic crop was found was not owned by the petitioner. It is further argued that Vikas Bishnoi was physically found present at the spot when the police party reached there and the initial proceedings were directed against him, whereas no narcotic substance was recovered from the person or immediate possession of the petitioner. Learned counsel would submit that even the memorandum statement of Vikas Bishnoi does not specifically state that the petitioner himself cultivated the alleged opium crop and, at the highest, the allegation against the petitioner is that water, electricity or certain agricultural facilities were allegedly made available from his adjoining agricultural premises, which, by itself, cannot establish conscious possession, knowledge or intentional participation in the cultivation of narcotic substances. It is contended that there is no independent witness or other material to show that the petitioner was ever seen 9 planting, tending, harvesting, collecting or possessing the alleged opium crop. According to learned counsel, the case against the petitioner was subsequently developed during investigation, particularly on the basis of material and memorandum allegedly recorded after the initial discovery, whereas the foundational documents, including the secret information, spot proceedings and search proceedings, do not attribute the subsequently alleged role to him. Serious doubt has also been raised regarding the chronology of the petitioner’s alleged memorandum, which is stated to have been recorded on 10.03.2026 but bears the signature of the Investigating Officer dated 12.03.2026, without any satisfactory explanation. Learned counsel would further submit that the articles subsequently seized from the petitioner’s premises, including bank passbooks, CCTV cameras, submersible pumps, sprinklers and other agricultural or electrical equipment, are ordinary articles and neither constitute narcotic substances nor independently establish conscious possession or participation in the alleged cultivation. The statements of the prosecution witnesses Ganesh Chandrakar and Hemchand Sahu, as well as those of the landowners and other witnesses, according to learned counsel, merely refer to the agricultural arrangements and police proceedings and do not specifically establish that the petitioner cultivated opium or knowingly permitted such cultivation. It is also contended that no lease deed, agreement, receipt, written authorization or other independent 10 documentary evidence has been produced to demonstrate that the petitioner had taken the disputed land for the purpose of cultivating opium. Learned counsel would further argue that the essential ingredients of Sections 29 and 27-A of the NDPS Act are wholly absent, as there is no independent material showing any conspiracy between the petitioner and the other accused persons, nor is there any financial transaction, bank trail, payment or other evidence suggesting that the petitioner financed illicit trafficking or harboured any offender. It is thus submitted that mere proximity of the petitioner’s land, alleged availability of agricultural facilities or electricity, or agricultural dealings cannot substitute the statutory requirements of conscious possession, knowledge, intentional participation, conspiracy or financing. Learned counsel would submit that the learned Court below has failed to distinguish between mere suspicion and legally sufficient material, particularly when the prosecution case itself contains discrepancies regarding the ownership, possession and cultivation of the disputed land and the role of the various accused persons. According to learned counsel, the subsequent material collected during investigation cannot retrospectively cure the absence of incriminating material against the petitioner in the foundational documents dated 06.03.2026 and 07.03.2026. It is, therefore, submitted that even if the entire prosecution material is accepted at its face value, it does not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioner under Sections 8, 18, 29 and 27-A of the 11 NDPS Act, and consequently the order dated 30.07.2026 taking cognizance and the order dated 08.08.2026 framing charges, having been passed without proper consideration of these material circumstances, are liable to be quashed in exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS, as continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with petition. 7. The legal position on the issue of quashing of criminal proceedings is well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, FIR or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases and Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However, where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the FIR or the charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of the B.N.S.S.). 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill reported in (1995) SCC (Cri) 1059, Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi reported in (1999) 3 SCC 259 and Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E Ltd. & Ors 12 reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 615, the Supreme Court clearly held that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence, Court should not quash the complaint. However, it was held that if the allegations do not constitute any offence as alleged and appear to be patently absurd and improbable, Court should not hesitate to quash the complaint. The note of caution was reiterated that while considering such petitions the Courts should be very circumspect, conscious and careful. Thus, there is no controversy about the legal proposition that in case a prima facie case is made out, the FIR or the proceedings in consequence thereof cannot be quashed. 9. In Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has authoritatively settled the scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). The Apex Court has held that the power to quash criminal proceedings is required to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and only in the rarest of rare cases. It has been categorically observed that while considering a prayer for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings, the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry into the reliability, genuineness or otherwise of the allegations contained in the FIR, nor can it appreciate the evidence or conduct a mini trial. The Court is only required to examine whether the allegations, if taken at their face 13 value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The Supreme Court further emphasized that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the threshold, that investigation into cognizable offences should ordinarily be permitted to proceed unhindered, and that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised with great caution and self- restraint, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in manifest miscarriage of justice. 10. Very recently, in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid principles and further held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS), the High Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact or evaluate the evidentiary worth of the material collected during investigation. Unless all these parameters are cumulatively satisfied, the High Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, leaving the parties to establish their respective cases before the trial Court in accordance with law. 11. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, and upon considering the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties as well as the material available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case for exercise of the extraordinary and inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S. is made out. The submissions advanced on 14 behalf of the petitioner essentially relate to the nature and sufficiency of the evidence collected during investigation, the alleged discrepancies regarding ownership and possession of the land, the evidentiary value of the memorandum statements and seizure proceedings, and the question as to whether the petitioner had knowledge of or conscious participation in the alleged cultivation of opium. All these issues involve disputed questions of fact and appreciation of evidence, which cannot be undertaken in proceedings seeking quashing of cognizance and charge. At this stage, this Court is not required to examine whether the prosecution will ultimately be able to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt, but only whether the material available on record, taken at its face value, discloses a prima facie case against the petitioner. The material collected during investigation cannot be discarded or subjected to a meticulous examination at this preliminary stage merely on the basis of the defence put forth by the petitioner. The contention regarding the absence of conscious possession, knowledge, conspiracy or financing, as also the alleged contradictions and discrepancies in the prosecution case, are matters which the petitioner would be at liberty to raise and establish before the learned trial Court on the basis of evidence adduced during trial. This Court, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, cannot conduct a mini trial or record findings on the probative value and admissibility of the material relied upon by the prosecution. 15 12. In view of the foregoing discussion and considering the limited scope of interference under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S., this Court finds that the material available on record cannot, at this stage, be said to be so patently absurd, inherently improbable or wholly insufficient as to warrant quashing of the criminal proceedings. The impugned order taking cognizance and the subsequent order framing charge do not suffer from any such manifest illegality or perversity which calls for interference by this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The petitioner shall have full opportunity to raise all permissible defences before the learned trial Court during the course of trial, which shall consider the matter independently and in accordance with law, without being influenced by any observation made hereinabove. 13. Accordingly, the present petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet