21.08.2026 Item No.16 Ct. No. 652 RP CO 4122 OF 2025 SATYAJIT CHAKRABORTY VS SUMEDHA CHAKRABORTY Mr. Niladri Khanra Mr. Dipranjan Mukhopadhyay …… For Petitioner 1. The plaintiff/petitioner/husband has challenged an order dated 14.8.2025, of the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Serampore, passed in Misc. Case No.25 of 2022 (under Section-36 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954), in connection with the Matrimonial Suit No MAT 106 of 2022. 2. In the said order, the Court has directed for service of the wife’s application under Section-36 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, upon the plaintiff/petitioner/husband, by serving a copy of the said application directly to the learned advocate appearing for the plaintiff/petitioner/husband, in the said Matrimonial Suit. 3. Being aggrieved with the said order the husband has filed the instant revision. Learned advocate appearing for the petitioner/husband has contended that the Misc. Case is an independent proceeding though arising in connection with the said Matrimonial Suit. That, therefore de-novo service thereof to the party concerned is 2 imperative in law. In this regard he has relied on provisions in the Civil Procedure Code under Order-V, Rules-10 and 12, to submit that law requires direct service to be made to the concerned opposite party (in this case, the husband). He submits that service done upon the learned advocate would not suffice and be valid as per law in so far as the advocate acts in his professional capacity and cannot be said to have status of an agent of his client. He submits that even different advocates may be entrusted to conduct the Matrimonial Suit and the Misc. Case. 4. For the reasons cited above, the learned advocate for the petitioner has sought for setting aside the impugned order dated 14.8.2025 in Misc. Case No.25 of 2022, arising in connection with the Matrimonial Suit No MAT 106 of 2022. 5. Having heard the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner and upon consideration of the materials placed before this Court, this Court is of the considered view that the present revision proceeds upon a wholly misconceived premise and does not disclose any jurisdictional error, material irregularity or failure of justice warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction. The order impugned is an order passed in the course of the matrimonial proceeding directing service of an application under Section 36 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 upon the petitioner through the learned advocate who is already representing him in the connected Matrimonial Suit. The challenge to such an 3 order, in the facts of the present case, appears to be entirely disproportionate to the nature and consequence of the order under challenge. The principal submission of the petitioner is that the proceeding under Section 36 of the Special Marriage Act, though arising out of the matrimonial suit, constitutes an independent miscellaneous proceeding and, therefore, the petitioner must necessarily be served personally and afresh. Reliance has been placed upon Order-V Rules-10 and 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The submission, however, proceeds by reading the provisions relating to service of summons in isolation, without giving due regard to the scheme of Order-III of the Code, which specifically deals with appearances, recognised agents and pleaders. Order-III Rule-1 CPC expressly recognises that an appearance, application or act in Court may, subject to the exceptions contemplated by law, be made by the party in person, by his recognised agent or by a pleader acting on his behalf. More importantly, Order-III Rule-5 embodies a specific procedural principle concerning service of process upon the pleader duly appointed to act for a party. The Rule provides that process served upon such pleader is presumed to have been duly communicated and made known to the party whom the pleader represents and, unless the Court otherwise directs, is as effectual as service upon the party himself. 4 6. The distinction sought to be drawn by the petitioner between a “professional advocate” and an “agent” for the purpose of service, therefore, does not advance his case. The question is not whether an advocate is a recognised agent within the meaning of Order III Rule 2 CPC. He is not. The relevant question is whether a duly appointed pleader, who is already acting for a party in the proceeding, can receive a process so as to constitute communication to that party. Order III Rule 5 answers that question in the affirmative, subject always to any contrary direction of the Court. The statutory scheme thus itself recognises that service upon a duly appointed pleader has procedural efficacy independent of the wider concept of agency. The Supreme Court has also recognised the legal effect of service upon a duly appointed pleader under Order III Rule 5. In Nilkant v. Kashinath Samanna, reported at AIR 1962 SC 666, the principle embodied in the Rule was recognised, namely, that service upon the pleader duly appointed to act for a party, carries with it the presumption that the process has been communicated to the party. Order-V Rules-10 and 12 cannot be construed as creating an absolute and inflexible requirement that every interlocutory application arising in an already pending proceeding must invariably be served afresh upon the party personally, irrespective of the representation already existing before the Court. Order V Rule 12 itself is concerned with service of summons and begins with the expression “wherever it is practicable”; it does 5 not obliterate the specific procedural regime contained in Order III Rule 5. Indeed, the very existence of Order-III Rule-5 demonstrates that service of judicial process upon a duly appointed pleader is, in appropriate circumstances, legally sufficient. 7. Procedural rules are intended to facilitate the adjudication of rights and not to furnish a litigant with technical devices for obstructing the progress of the proceeding. Service is essentially a means of securing notice and an opportunity to respond; it is not an end in itself. Where the party is already before the Court through a duly appointed advocate and the Court directs that the relevant application be served upon that advocate, no prejudice can ordinarily be presumed merely because service has not additionally been effected upon the party at his personal address. 8. The revisional jurisdiction of this Court cannot ordinarily be invoked for correcting every alleged procedural irregularity, much less a procedural objection which has caused no demonstrable prejudice. Revision is not a forum for substituting the preferred procedural course of a litigant for the course adopted by the Court below, unless the order suffers from jurisdictional error, perversity, material irregularity or results in manifest failure of justice. No such infirmity has been established in the present case. Rather, the Court is constrained to observe that the present revision appears to be founded upon an extremely tenuous and technical objection. The petitioner seeks to elevate a routine 6 direction regarding service of an interlocutory application into a substantial jurisdictional controversy. Such an approach, if encouraged, would enable proceedings to be prolonged by raising successive objections regarding the manner of service even when the party is already represented before the Court and no real prejudice is demonstrated. 9. Rather, the Court is constrained to observe that the present revision appears to be founded upon an extremely tenuous and technical objection. The petitioner seeks to elevate a routine direction regarding service of an interlocutory application into a substantial jurisdictional controversy. Such an approach, if encouraged, would enable proceedings to be prolonged by raising successive objections regarding the manner of service even when the party is already represented before the Court and no real prejudice is demonstrated. The doctrine that the process of a Court must not be permitted to become an instrument of vexation or oppression is well settled. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that frivolous or vexatious proceedings, particularly proceedings which are absolutely groundless, may constitute an abuse of the process of Court, and that the Court is entitled to prevent its machinery from being utilised for such collateral purposes. In K.K. Swaminathan versus Srinivasagam [2003 Supreme (Mad) 1568] the principle was recognised that the categories of conduct constituting abuse of process are not closed and that public policy and the interests of 7 justice are relevant considerations. Likewise, the Supreme Court has emphasised that frivolous litigation consumes the time and resources of the Court and the opposite party and that the judicial process cannot be permitted to be misused by litigants for purposes unrelated to genuine adjudication of rights. The principle is not merely punitive; it is founded upon the institutional obligation of the Court to preserve its process for the adjudication of genuine controversies. The present revision comes perilously close to the category of proceedings which ought not to have been brought before the revisional Court at all. This Court would, therefore, have been justified in considering imposition of appropriate terms upon the petitioner. It must nevertheless be recorded, by way of admonition rather than punishment, that litigants and their advisors are expected to exercise a greater degree of restraint before invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The petitioner is cautioned that the revisional jurisdiction ought not to be invoked for raising objections of such insubstantial character, particularly when the grievance does not disclose any actual denial of notice or prejudice. 10. This Court is of the view that service of the revisional application upon the opposite party is not necessary for an effective adjudication of the present revision. Such service is, accordingly, waived. 11. The impugned order dated 14.8.2025, of the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, 8 Serampore, passed in Misc. Case No.25 of 2022 (under Section-36 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954), in connection with the Matrimonial Suit No MAT 106 of 2022, neither suffers from jurisdictional infirmity nor causes any prejudice to the petitioner. The entire revision is, therefore, devoid of merit. 12. Accordingly, C.O. No. 4122 of 2025 is dismissed. 13. Urgent certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities. (Rai Chattopadhyay, J.)