- 1 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF JULY, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 17236 OF 2025 BETWEEN: SRI IRFAN S/O AMANULLA KHAN, AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO. 21, 3RD MAIN, MARENAHALLI KERE, JAYANAGARA, BENGALURU – 560 041. …PETITIONER (BY SRI N.SRIDHAR, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY TILAKNAGARA POLICE, REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT COMPLEX BENGALURU - 01. 2. MURALI RAO V., AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS, S/O VENKOBA RAO, NO.23, 3RD CROSS, 18TH MAIN ROAD, JAYANAGARA, 5TH BLOCK, BENGALURU – 560 041 Digitally signed by PADMAVATHI B K Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 7411631245. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.WAHEEDA M.M., HCGP FOR R-1; SRI NAMAN VANKADARI, ADVOCATE FOR R-2) THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 528 BNSS PRAYING PLEASED TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS PASSED BY THE CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, BENGALURU AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN CC NO. 32308/2025 FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 303(2) OF BNS IN CRIME NO. 248/2024 FILED BY THE THILAKNAGARA POLICE IN THE ENDS OF JUSTICE (ANNEXURE - D). THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioner is before the Court calling in question the proceedings in CC.No.32308/2025 registered for offences punishable under Section 303(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 ('the BNS' for short). 2. Heard Smt. N. Roopa, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner; Smt. Waheeda M.M., learned High Court - 3 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri. Naman Vankadari, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. 3. Facts in brief germane are as follows: A complaint comes to be registered before the Tilak Nagar Police Station by one MuraliRao, which becomes a crime in crime No.248/2024. The fulcrum of the crime is theft, as obtaining under Section 303(2) of the BNS. Long after the registration of the crime, a notice is issued to the petitioner for appearance. After conduct of investigation, on 30.08.2025, the respondent/Police file a charge sheet against the petitioner and others. The concerned Court takes cognizance of the offence and issues summons. Issuance of summons is what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is drawn as accused No.2 only on the voluntary statement of the co-accused, apart from that, there is no corroborative material against the petitioner. Only - 4 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 on the score that the voluntary statement of the co-accused cannot result in drawing a accused into the web of crime. 5. This Court in order to ascertain as to whether there was any corroborative material to draw the petitioner, as an accused No.2 in the proceeding, summoned the records and directed the High Court Government Pleader to secure instructions. Instructions and verification of the records would clearly indicate that there is nothing corroborative against the petitioner to draw him as an accused while filing the charge sheet. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the complainants also is not in a position to place any material that lies in corroboration for drawing the petitioner as an accused. 7. In the light of the said submissions and contra-submissions, the unmistakable inference is that the petitioner/accused No.2 is drawn into the web of proceedings only on the voluntary statement of the co-accused. This is sans countenance in the light of the settled principle of law and this Court in the case of PRAKASH N. Vs. STATE OF - 5 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 KARNATAKA, reported in 2026 SCC ONLINE KAR 1796 has held as follows: 9. With there being no corroboration except the voluntary statements, permitting further proceedings against these petitioners would run foul of plethora of judgments rendered by the Supreme Court on the issue. 9.1. In the case of Prem Prakash v. Enforcement Directorate1, the Supreme Court holds that the prosecution against an accused cannot start with the statement of the co-accused as such statements are not substantive pieces of evidence. The Supreme Court observes as follows: “Statement of Afshar Ali — Co-accused ……………… 44. Being a co-accused with the appellant, his statement against the appellant assuming there is anything incriminating against the present appellant will not have the character of substantive evidence. The prosecution cannot start with such a statement to establish its case. 45. We hold that, in such a situation, the law laid down under Section 30 of the Evidence Act by this Court while dealing with the confession of the coaccused will continue to apply. In Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P. [Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P., (1952) 1 SCC 275 : 1952 SCR 526], this Court neatly summarised the principle as under: (SCC pp. 281-82, para 11) “11. … The proper way to approach a case of this kind is, first, to marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a conviction could safely be - 6 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise where the Judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event, the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept.” (emphasis in original) 46. Hence, insofar as Afshar Ali's statement is concerned, the investigating agency will have to first marshal the other evidence and can at best look at the statement for lending assurance.” 9.2. The Supreme Court in the case of Karan Talwar v. State of T.N.2, holds that a confession statement of the co-accused by itself cannot be the reason for the implication of the accused in a crime. The Supreme Court observes as follows: “10. As is evident from the said Section, the alleged offence is consumption of narcotic drug or psychotropic substance other than those specified in or under clause (a) of Section 27, NDPS Act, and therefore, the question is whether any material is available to charge the appellant thereunder. The contention of the appellant is that he has been arraigned as Accused 13 based on the confession statement of co-accused viz. Accused 1. Certainly, in the absence of any other material on record to connect the appellant with the crime, the confession statement of the co- - 7 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 accused by itself cannot be the reason for his implication in the crime. This view has been fortified by the law laid down in Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra [(1998) 7 SCC 337 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1625 : 1998 INSC 364], wherein it was stated that a co-accused's confession containing incriminating matter against a person would not by itself suffice to frame charge against him. The materials on record would reveal that the investigating agency had not subjected him to medical examination and instead, going by complaint Witness No. 23, he smelt the accused. The less said the better and we do not think it necessary to comment upon adoption of such a course. We need only to say that even if he tendered such evidence, it would not help the prosecution in anyway. There is absolutely no case that any recovery of contraband was recovered from the appellant. As regards the confession statement of the appellant in view of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 there can be no doubt with respect to the fact that it is inadmissible in evidence. In this context it is worthy to refer to the decision of this Court in Ram Singh v. Central Bureau of Narcotics, [(2011) 11 SCC 347 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 181 : 2011 INSC 342]. In the said decision, this Court held that Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act would make confessional statement of accused before police inadmissible in evidence and it could not be brought on record by prosecution to obtain conviction. Shortly stated, except the confessional statement of co-Accused 1 there is absolutely no material available on record against the appellant. ……………… - 8 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 12. As noted hereinbefore, the sole material available against the appellant is the confession statement of the co-accused viz. Accused 1, which undoubtedly cannot translate into admissible evidence at the stage of trial and against the appellant. When that be the position, how can it be said that a prima facie case is made out to make the appellant to stand the trial. There can be no doubt with respect to the position that standing the trial is an ordeal and, therefore, in a case where there is no material at all which could be translated into evidence at the trial stage it would be a miscarriage of justice to make the person concerned to stand the trial.” 9.3. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of A.P.3, while discussing the law on the evidentiary value and admissibility of confessional statements of a co-accused observes as follows: “40. Where a confessional statement is otherwise excluded or inadmissible by virtue of Section(s) 25 or 26 of the Evidence Act, respectively, there can be no question of such confessional statements being made admissible against another co-accused by stretching it with the help of Section 30 of the Evidence Act. Section 25 places a complete ban on the making of such confession by that person whether he is in custody or not. Section 26 lays down that a confession made by a person while he is in the custody of a police officer shall not be proved against him unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. [See: Sahib Singh v. State of Haryana, (1997) 7 SCC 231] Confessional statement contemplated under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, must be both relevant and admissible in terms of the Evidence Act. - 9 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 ……………… 47. This is because a statement of an accused under Section 161 of the CrPC stands on a different footing from a police statement of any ordinary witness. Statements of an accused person under Section 161 of the CrPC by virtue of ordinarily being in the form of either an admission or a confession cannot be looked into qua another co-accused, as to say otherwise would be to ignore the substantive provisions of Section(s) 17, 21, 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act and the well settled cannons of law of evidence. However, the aforesaid does not apply, where the statement of an accused under Section 161 of the CrPC is exculpatory in nature, which we shall discuss later. ……………… 49. As explained in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), a confession is one specie of an admission, this flows from the logic that every confession is an admission but not every admission is a confession, while admissions in itself is a specie or type of a statement. As a natural corollary to the aforesaid, any statement of the accused under Section 161 of the CrPC which is in the form of an admission that admits any incriminating fact or implicates another person by such statement, would be governed by the provisions of Section 17 of Evidence Act, more particularly the prohibition of usage of such admissions against third-persons. An admission by one accused cannot be used against another co-accused. [See: Chintamani Das v. State, 1969 SCC OnLine Ori 17 : AIR 1970 Ori 100, Sohar Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 Pat 448]. The aforesaid may be looked at from one another angle, since the Evidence Act, more particularly, Section(s) 17 and 30 clearly stipulate in well-defined terms, when an - 10 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 admission or a confession, respectively, may be used against another person, the logical sequitur of the aforesaid is that, except for the manner laid down under the said provisions, no admission or confession may be used against another person. Since, Section 17 of the Evidence Act does not postulate the use of an admission by one accused against another, any statement of the accused under Section 161 of the CrPC, implicating such co-accused cannot be looked into by the courts. 50. Even where the police statement of an accused person under Section 161 of the CrPC is neither an admission nor a confession i.e. it is exculpatory in nature and not inculpatory, such statements can be looked into by the courts only for the limited purpose of culling out the stance of the accused person qua the allegations. An exculpatory police statement of an accused person under Section 161 of the CrPC which at the same time implicates another co-accused, cannot be relied upon, merely because such statement is not hit by the safeguards and rigours that apply in respect of inculpatory statements in the form of an admissions or confessions under the Evidence Act. The fundamental cannon of criminal jurisprudence is that a statement of one accused person cannot be used against another co-accused person. The limited exception to this aforesaid general principle are inculpatory confessions, where the accused person in his confessional statement not only admits his own guilt but also implicates another co-accused. The rationale behind this limited exception as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), is that an admission by an accused person of his own guilt affords some sort of credibility or sanction in support of the truth of his confession - 11 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 against others as-well as himself. An exculpatory statement is an affront to the aforesaid principle. Thus, an exculpatory statement of an accused person under Section 161 of the CrPC can only be looked into for the limited purpose of either culling out the stance of the accused person qua the allegations or for contradicting the accused, if the accused chooses to be examined as a witness in terms of Section 315 of the CrPC However, such exculpatory statement insofar as it implicates another co-accused person can in no manner be relied upon by the courts as against such co-accused as such statements by their nature cannot be tested by cross-examination if such accused person declines to be a witness in the trial in terms of Section 315 of the CrPC, and because such exculpatory statement has no credibility. 51. 51. Such statements at best could be said to be helpful to the investigating authorities for the purpose of ascertaining that the investigation is proceeding in the right direction or not, as ordinarily, once the investigation is over, these statements are neither supplied to the accused along with chargesheet nor placed on record. 52. Thus, Section 30 itself makes it clear that the whole legal exercise by virtue of which this provision of law can be made applicable, depends upon the proving of confession before a court which makes it into an admissible one in order to implicate the other accused provided the confession given by such person is established with full strength on the basis of other materials pertaining to the attendant circumstances. It would necessarily mean that mere confession alone will not be adequate or sufficient to implicate other persons. It is incumbent that there are other materials also which - 12 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 would render support or substantiate the case of the confession. However, it is subject to the standard of proving as contemplated by law. If this is the position, the court should look into the statements alleged to have been given by the co-accused and that too before a police officer during the course of investigation with great care and circumspection. The said statements are directly hit by Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Particularly, the statement given by any one of the accused persons and recorded by the police officer during the course of investigation cannot be relied upon by the prosecution, except subject to the limitations provided by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. The statement given by an accused involving himself in the crime and also implicating third person cannot be proved legally in the court. It will be in direct conflict with Sections 25 and 26 respectively of the Evidence Act. If such evidence or confession cannot be proved, then the occasion for utilizing such statement against another person would not arise. 53. From the above exposition of law, the following emerges: (i) A person who is accused of an offence or named in the first information report, can be examined by the police and his statement may be recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC, as held in Nandini Satpathy (supra). (ii) A statement of an accused under Section 161 of the CrPC, would ordinarily be of two kinds, it may be inculpatory in nature or may be exculpatory in nature. - 13 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 (iii) An inculpatory statement again may be in the form of an admission or a confession. If such statement admits either a gravely incriminating fact or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, respectively, as held in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), then it amounts to confession. (iv) Where such police statement of an accused is confessional statement, the rigour of Section(s) 25 and 26 respectively will apply with all its vigour. A confessional statement of an accused will only be admissible if it is not hit by Section(s) 24 or 25 respectively and is in tune with the provisions of Section(s) 26, 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act, respectively. In other words, a police statement of an accused which is in the form of a confession is per se inadmissible and no reliance whatsoever can be placed on such statements either at the stage of bail or during trial. Since such confessional statements are rendered inadmissible by virtue of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, the provision of Section 30 would be of no avail, and no reliance can be placed on such confessional statement of an accused to implicate another co- accused. (v) A confessional statement of one accused implicating another co-accused may be taken into consideration by the court against such co-accused in terms of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, only at the stage of trial, where (1) the confession - 14 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 itself was relevant and admissible in terms of the Evidence Act; (2) was duly proved against the maker; (3) such confessional statement incriminates the maker along with the co-accused and; (4) both the accused persons in question are in a joint trial for the same offence. (vi) Furthermore, because such confessional statements are not “evidence” in terms of Section 3 of the Evidence Act as held in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), such a confession as held in Kashmira Singh (supra) can only be pressed into consideration by the court as a rule of prudence, to lend assurance to the other evidence against such co-accused, provided that aforesaid ingredients or conditions of Section 30 read with Section(s) 24 to 29 of the Evidence Act, are fulfilled. (vii) Where the police statement of an accused is in the form of an admission, such inculpatory statement even if it implicates another co-accused cannot be taken into consideration against such co- accused in terms of Section(s) 17 read with 21 of the Evidence Act, as doing so would militate against the general principle, that an admission may be given as evidence against the maker alone. The exceptions to the aforesaid general principle carved out under the Evidence Act, do not permit the usage of such admission against a co-accused in any scenario whatsoever. - 15 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 (viii) Where the police statement of the accused is an exculpatory statement i.e. it is neither a confession nor an admission, the statement being one under Section 161, would immediately attract the bar under Section 162 of the CrPC, and the same may be used only for the very limited purpose provided in the Proviso for the purpose of contradiction or re- examination of such accused person alone, as held in Mahabir Mandal (supra). Even if such exculpatory statement of one accused, implicates another co-accused, the same cannot be taken into consideration against such co-accused, as there can be no credibility attached to an exculpatory statement of an accused implicating another co-accused, more particularly because it is neither required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the co-accused, the same cannot be tested by cross-examination and the exculpatory nature of such statement militates against the foundational principle that permits taking into consideration a statement of one accused person against another co- accused as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra) i.e. ‘when a person admits guilt to its fullest extent either to a certain incriminating fact or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, and in doing so exposes himself and in the process other co-accused persons to the pain and penalties provided for the guilt, there exists a sincerity and semblance of sanction for the truthfulness of such statement’. - 16 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 (ix) Although a handful of decisions of this Court such as Indresh Kumar (supra) and Salim Khan (supra) have held that statements under Section 161 of the CrPC ought to be looked into by the courts at the stage of anticipatory or regular bail for the purpose of ascertaining whether a prima- facie case has been made out against the accused and the nature and gravity of the allegations, yet the aforesaid rule only applies insofar as such statements under Section 161 were made by witnesses and not accused persons. A statement of an accused under Section 161 of the CrPC stands on a completely different footing from a police statement of a witness. As already discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, if the police statement of an accused is inculpatory in nature, its more in the form of a confession or admission rather than a statement, and the relevant provisions of Section(s) 17 to 30 of the Evidence Act, will apply with all its vigour. Where such statement of the accused is exculpatory in nature, the same can be looked into by the courts only for the limited purpose of either culling out the stance of the accused person qua the allegations or for contradicting the accused, if the accused chooses to be examined as a witness in terms of Section 315 of the CrPC However, such exculpatory statement insofar as it implicates another accused person cannot be looked into by the courts, as such statements by their nature cannot be tested by cross-examination if such accused person declines to be a witness in the trial in terms of Section 315 of the CrPC, and because such exculpatory statement has no credibility as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra). (x) Before the court looks into the police statement of any person under Section 161 of the CrPC for the - 17 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 purpose of anticipatory or regular bail, the court must first ascertain whether such person is actually a witness or an accused person, or likely to be an accused person in respect of the offence(s) alleged. This is because, there may be situations where a person while giving his statement under Section 161 of the CrPC may not be an accused, but later arrayed as one. In such a scenario the courts must be mindful of the fact that because the investigation is still ongoing, it is more likely for a person who was originally a witness to happen to be later arrayed as an accused person. If the court was to blindly place reliance on statement of such a person merely because he is not named in the first information report, without first seeing whether such person is likely to be arrayed as an accused or not, it would lead to an absurd situation where the statement of such a person may be relied upon up until such person is arrayed as an accused. We also caution the courts, where it emerges from the material on record, that such a person is likely to be arrayed as an accused, the courts should refrain from expressing any such opinion so that the investigation is not prejudiced in any manner.” (Emphasis supplied at each instance) In view of the law as elucidated by the Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgments, I deem it appropriate to obliterate the proceedings as against the petitioner. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) The criminal petition is allowed. - 18 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010828242025 NC: 2026:KHC:36233 CRL.P No. 17236 of 2025 (ii) The proceedings in C.C.No.32308/2025 pending on the file of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru stands quashed. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE JY List No.: 2 Sl No.: 41