1 CGHC010308112026 2026:CGHC:38523 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 160 of 2026 Tirathram Banerjee S/o Ramratan Banerjee Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Hardi Vishal, P.S. Baloda District Janjgir Champa C.G. ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Police Station Azak, District Janjgir Champa C.G. 2 - Matwar Yadav S/o Late Atmaram Aged About 70 Years R/o Village Hardi Vishal, P.S. Baloda, District Janjgir Champa C.G. 3 - Smt, Lilamati W/o Matwar Aged About 67 Years R/o Village Hardi, Vishal, P.S. Baloda, District Janjgir Champa C.G. 4 - Smt, Rajni Yadav W/o Sukhen Yadav Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Hardi Vishal, P.S. Baloda, District Janjgir Champa C.G. ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Suresh Kumar Verma, Advocate. For State : Mr. Vivek Sharma, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Judgment on Board 31/08/2026 1. The present acquittal appeal has been filed by the appellant against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 20.07.2026 ALOK SHARMA Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2026.09.02 18:40:12 +0530 2 passed by the learned Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in Special Sessions Trial No. 49/2025, whereby the respondent/accused persons have been acquitted of the offences under Sections 296, 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Sections 3(2)(va), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short, ‘SC/ST Act’). 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 13.07.2025, there was an altercation between the complainant and the respondent/accused persons with respect to the putting up of fencing in the field of the complainant. At about 04:30 PM, the accused persons, namely, Matwar Yadav, his wife and daughter-in-law, came there, raised a quarrel with him and abused him in filthy language in the name of his caste. The matter was reported to the police on 14.07.2025, whereupon the FIR was registered, the accused persons were arrested, and after investigation, the charge-sheet was filed. 3. The learned trial Court framed charges against the accused persons for the offences under Sections 296, 130 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of the ‘SC/ST Act’, which the accused persons denied and claimed trial. 4. In order to prove the charge against the accused persons, the prosecution examined as many as 09 witnesses, and one defence witness was also examined. The statements of the accused persons under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. have also been recorded, in which they denied the circumstances appearing against them, 3 pleaded innocence, and submitted that they have been falsely implicated in the offence. 5. After appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondent/accused persons from all the offences, holding that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, this acquittal appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that there are sufficient material ingredients in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses which clearly satisfy the ingredients for the offences under the ‘SC/ST Act’ and also under Section 296 of the BNS, 2023, as the complainant was annoyed with the abuse made by the accused persons. He would further submit that the learned trial Court has erroneously considered that the word used by the accused is normally used in the village when a quarrel takes place between any of the parties, which does not satisfy the ingredients either under Section 296 of the BNS and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of the ‘SC/ST Act’. He would further submit that the complainant duly proved his case by raising allegations against the accused persons and, by misappreciation of the evidence, the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondent/accused persons. There is sufficient evidence led by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused persons, yet the learned trial Court has acquitted them. Therefore, the impugned judgment of acquittal is liable to be set aside and the accused persons are liable to be convicted. 4 7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant, perused the record of the trial Court, and gone through the judgment passed by the learned trial Court. 8. From perusal of the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, it transpires that the learned trial Court, after considering the evidence of the complainant PW-1, observed in its judgment that the particular word allegedly used by the accused persons was not used intentionally by the accused persons to cause annoyance to the complainant. The complainant does not belong to that particular caste, but he belongs to the Satnami caste. Therefore, it cannot be said that the accused persons intentionally insulted and intimidated the person belonging to the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes community and, by giving the benefit of doubt, the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondent/accused persons. 9. From perusal of the evidence of PW-1, the complainant, it is admitted by him that in the year 2004, the accused was his surety in the offence registered against him at Police Station Baloda. He also admitted that for the last 2-3 years, the accused Matwar Yadav has been paralysed. He further admitted that in his written complaint, he had not mentioned that the quarrel took place on the basis of the particular word. He admitted that he does not belong to that particular caste and that he had gone to stop the excessive way of the accused persons. 5 10. PW-2 is the person who claimed to be an eye-witness to the incident, but in cross-examination, he admitted that he saw the incident from a distance of 50 mtrs. He did not intervene in the altercation between both the parties, who were in an altercation with each other. 11. From perusal of the evidence of PW-3, who was the person engaged in fencing the field of the complainant, it transpires that the accused persons came there and pointed towards complainant PW-1 and abused him, stating that it was on account of this person that all the incidents and activities were taking place. When the altercation started, he, along with the other witnesses, walked away from that place. He too has stated that accused Matwar is paralysed and that he himself had not lodged any report with the police. He was an accused in an offence of murder, and the accused persons were in support of the victim party. 12. From the evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that there was sufficient and clinching evidence to convict the accused persons, however, by giving them the benefit of doubt, they have been acquitted by the impugned judgment. The view taken by the trial court is one of the plausible view which cannot be said to be perverse or illegal under the facts and circumstances as well as evidence available on record. 13. Applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal acquittal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “State of 6 Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram” reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984, has held as follows:- “8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all.” 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and Ors Vs. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440, has considered the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal in judgment at Para 25 which reads as under: “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 Cr.P.C. the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court’s view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such as double presumption that ensures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 15. After considering the material available on record as well as well reasoned judgment passed by learned trial Court and being very much conscious of the said legal position is held in the case of 7 State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram (Supra) and Jafarudheen and Ors Vs. State of Kerala, (Supra) that in appeal against the acquittal if two views are possible on the basis of evidence led by the prosecution and the trial Court taking one view in favour of the accused, reversal of the findings of the acquittal by the appellate Court taking the other possible view into consideration, is not permissible in law. I ,therefore, of the considered opinion that the judgment impugned acquitting the accused respondent is just and proper and does not call for any interference. 16. For the foregoing reasons, the acquittal appeal being devoid of merits and the same is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Alok