1 CGHC010022652016 2026:CGHC:38771-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 371 of 2016 Shiv Kumar Yadav S/o Dewari Lal Yadav, Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Parsada Post Bharni, Tahsil, Takhatpur, P.S. Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Water Resources Department, Mahanadi Bhawan Naya Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, P.S. Mandir Hasaud Raipur Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh 2 - Chief Engineer, Hasdeo Bango Pariyojana Bilaspur Chhattisgarh, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bilapsur Chhattisgarh, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr.S.P. Kale, Advocate For Respondents No.1 and 2/State : Mr.P.K.Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 2.9.2026 1. Heard Mr.S.P.Kale, learned counsel for the appellant as well as BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2026.09.02 17:15:38 +0530 2 Mr.P.K.Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for respondents No.1 and 2/State. 2. The present writ appeal has been preferred by the appellant challenging the order dated 20.06.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPL No.169/2012, whereby the writ petition filed by the State authorities against the award dated 15.03.2012 passed by the learned Labour Court, Bilaspur, was partly allowed and, instead of reinstatement granted by the Labour Court, monetary compensation was directed to be paid to the appellant. 3. Facts of the case, in brief, are that the appellant was engaged by the Water Resources Department as a labour. He was initially engaged in the year 1993 and continued to work until his services were discontinued in the year 1997. According to the appellant, he had continuously worked for more than 240 days during the period preceding his termination. His services were discontinued without compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the ID Act'). 4. Aggrieved by his termination, the appellant approached the competent authority/conciliation officer under the provisions of the ID Act. As the dispute could not be settled during conciliation proceedings, a failure report was submitted to the appropriate Government. The State Government thereafter referred the industrial dispute raised by the appellant to the learned Labour Court, Bilaspur, for adjudication. 3 5. Upon receipt of the reference, the learned Labour Court registered the matter and issued notice to the parties. The appellant filed his statement of claim, specifically pleading that he had been continuously working as a daily-wage employee; that he had completed more than 240 days of service in the twelve months preceding his termination; and that his services had been terminated without complying with the mandatory requirements of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the ID Act. 6. The respondent-authorities appeared before the learned Labour Court and filed their reply denying the allegations made by the appellant. The parties led their respective evidence and placed the relevant material before the Labour Court. 7. After considering the pleadings, evidence and material available on record, the learned Labour Court, vide award dated 15.03.2012, recorded a categorical finding that the appellant had continuously worked and had completed more than 240 days of service during the preceding twelve months before his termination. The Labour Court further found that before terminating the services of the appellant, the respondent-authorities had not complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 25-F of the ID Act and had also failed to follow the principle embodied in Section 25-G of the ID Act. 8. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Labour Court held the termination of the appellant to be illegal and directed his 4 reinstatement in service, though without back-wages. 9. The State authorities challenged the said award by filing WPL No.169/2012 before the learned Single Judge of this Court. The learned Single Judge, vide order dated 20.06.2016, considered the fact that the appellant was a daily-wage employee and, relying upon the judgments then holding the field, came to the conclusion that instead of reinstatement, monetary compensation would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, the award of reinstatement was modified and the State authorities were directed to pay compensation to the appellant at the rate of Rs.25,000/- per annum for the period for which he had worked as a daily wager. 10.The appellant has assailed the aforesaid order principally on the ground that the learned Single Judge exceeded the limited scope of jurisdiction available under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the learned Labour Court. It is submitted that the Labour Court, upon appreciation of the evidence, had categorically recorded a finding that the appellant had completed more than 240 days of service and that the mandatory provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the ID Act had not been complied with. There was, therefore, no justification for interfering with the award of reinstatement. 11.Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the learned Single Judge erred in proceeding on the assumption that 5 reinstatement of a daily-wage employee is impermissible or that compensation must invariably be substituted for reinstatement. According to learned counsel, the question of relief has to be decided upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case. The Labour Court had exercised its discretion after considering the material before it and had already denied back-wages to the appellant. Therefore, there was no justification for further modifying the relief. He also submits that the subsequent decision of the Full Bench of this Court in WA No.355/2014 and connected matters, decided on 29.08.2025, has now authoritatively answered the very questions which arise for consideration in the present appeal, including the scope of interference under Articles 226 and 227, the question whether reinstatement is automatic, the circumstances in which compensation can be substituted for reinstatement and the effect of delay. 12.Per contra, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State/respondents No.1 and 2 supports the order passed by the learned Single Judge. He submits that the appellant was engaged only as a daily-wage employee and had no right to hold any sanctioned or substantive post. According to him, the learned Single Judge rightly considered the nature of engagement and the fact that considerable time had elapsed since the appellant's termination. It is submitted that, in view of the settled legal position concerning daily-wage employees, compensation in lieu of reinstatement would meet the ends of justice. He, therefore, prays 6 for dismissal of the appeal. 13.We have considered the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record of the case, including the award dated 15.03.2012 passed by the learned Labour Court, Bilaspur and the order dated 20.06.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPL No.169/2012. 14.Before considering the individual claim of the appellant, it would be appropriate to notice that the questions concerning the scope of judicial review in matters arising from awards of Labour Courts, the nature of relief to be granted upon finding the termination to be illegal, the circumstances in which reinstatement or compensation should be granted, the entitlement to back-wages and the effect of delay were subsequently considered by a Full Bench of this Court in WA No.355/2014, Surit Ram and connected matters, decided on 29.08.2025. 15.The Full Bench, after considering the various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, answered the reference and held that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is wide, but it is not an appellate jurisdiction. The High Court does not ordinarily re-appreciate evidence as if it were sitting in appeal over the decision of the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. Interference is justified in cases of jurisdictional error, perversity, error apparent on the face of the record, violation of principles of natural justice, arbitrariness or other circumstances 7 showing that the Tribunal or Labour Court has acted beyond the bounds of its authority. 16.The Full Bench further held that when retrenchment is found to be violative of the provisions of the ID Act, reinstatement is not an automatic consequence in every case. At the same time, there can also be no inflexible rule that every daily-wage or casual employee must necessarily be denied reinstatement and granted monetary compensation. The relief has to be determined on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 17.The Full Bench has indicated relevant factors for determining the appropriate relief, including the nature of employment, length of service, delay in raising the dispute, conduct of the workman, feasibility of reinstatement, availability of the post, closure or reorganisation of the establishment and the overall balance of equities. 18.The aforesaid principles have to be applied to the case of the present appellant. The learned Labour Court, after recording evidence and considering the material placed before it, specifically found that the appellant had completed more than 240 days of service during the twelve months preceding his termination and that the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the ID Act had not been complied with by the respondent-authorities. The said finding of the learned Labour Court has not been shown to be perverse or based on no evidence. 8 19.The learned Single Judge has also not recorded any specific finding demonstrating that the conclusion reached by the Labour Court regarding completion of 240 days of service or non- compliance with Section 25-F was contrary to the evidence on record. Thus, the foundational findings recorded by the Labour Court remained undisturbed. 20.It is also significant that the learned Labour Court, while finding the termination illegal, did not grant the appellant full back-wages. The relief was confined to reinstatement without back-wages. Thus, the Labour Court had already moulded the relief after considering the circumstances of the case. 21.The question before us, therefore, is not whether the appellant's termination was illegal. That finding had already been recorded by the competent Labour Court on the basis of the evidence before it and has not been demonstrated to suffer from perversity or jurisdictional error. The question is whether, in the facts of the appellant's individual case, the learned Single Judge was justified in substituting the relief of reinstatement granted by the Labour Court with monetary compensation. 22.In our considered opinion, the answer has to be in the negative. The mere fact that the appellant was engaged on daily-wage basis could not, by itself, be treated as an absolute bar against reinstatement. The Full Bench has specifically held that there is no straitjacket formula governing the grant of reinstatement or 9 compensation and that each case has to be considered on its own facts. 23.In the present case, the appellant had worked continuously for about four years. His termination was found to be illegal by the learned Labour Court on account of non-compliance with the mandatory statutory requirements. There is no finding of misconduct against the appellant. There is also no material noticed in the impugned order demonstrating that the establishment had closed down, that the work for which the appellant had been engaged had ceased to exist, or that reinstatement of the appellant had become wholly impracticable. 24.The learned Single Judge principally proceeded on the basis that the appellant was a daily-wage employee and, therefore, compensation would be an appropriate substitute for reinstatement. In view of the subsequent authoritative pronouncement of the Full Bench, such approach cannot be sustained as an inflexible proposition of law. The nature of employment is undoubtedly a relevant factor, but it is only one of the factors to be considered while determining the appropriate relief. 25.It is also necessary to keep in view the distinction between the existence of a right to reinstatement and the question of regularization. The fact that the appellant was a daily-wage employee and had no vested right to regularization does not, by 10 itself, mean that the Labour Court was precluded from granting reinstatement after finding his retrenchment to be illegal. The relief of reinstatement and the question of regularization operate in different fields. 26.The State has also not been able to demonstrate before us any exceptional circumstance warranting interference with the discretionary relief granted by the learned Labour Court. The Labour Court was the primary fact-finding forum. It considered the evidence and concluded that reinstatement without back-wages would meet the ends of justice. In the absence of perversity or any jurisdictional error, the said discretion ought not to have been lightly interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 27.We are conscious of the principle that reinstatement is not an automatic consequence of every illegal retrenchment, particularly in cases involving daily-wage employees. However, that principle does not mean that compensation must invariably be substituted for reinstatement. The Full Bench has made it clear that the Court has to examine the overall facts, including the length of service, the circumstances of termination, delay, feasibility of reinstatement, conduct of the workman and balance of equities. 28.Applying those principles to the facts of the present case, we find that the Labour Court's direction for reinstatement without back- wages was a permissible and reasoned exercise of discretion. No sufficient ground has been demonstrated warranting its substitution 11 by a monetary compensation of Rs.25,000/- per annum. 29.We, therefore, find merit in the present appeal. The order dated 20.06.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPL No.169/2012, insofar as it relates to the present appellant Shiv Kumar Yadav, cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. 30.Consequently, the writ appeal is allowed. The order dated 20.06.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPL No.169/2012 is hereby set aside. The award dated 15.03.2012 passed by the learned Labour Court, Bilaspur, directing reinstatement of the appellant without back-wages, is restored. The respondents shall take consequential steps for implementation of the award dated 15.03.2012 in respect of the present appellant in accordance with law. 31.The present judgment is confined exclusively to the individual case of Shiv Kumar Yadav, appellant in WA No.371/2016, arising out of WPL No.169/2012. No opinion is expressed herein with regard to the entitlement or relief of any other workman. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu