1 CGHC010303872026 2026:CGHC:37235 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 1036 of 2026 1 - Subhash Chand Soni S/o Late Shri Ghasiram Urf Kunjilal Sonar Aged About 56 Years R/o Village Baloda, Tahsil Baloda District Janjgir-Champa Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Roopchand S/o Late Shri Ghasiram Urf Kunjilal Sonar Aged About 66 Years R/o Village Baloda, Tahsil Baloda District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh 2 - Ajay Soni S/o Roopchand Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Baloda, Tahsil Baloda District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh 3 - Munindra Kumar S/o Hetram Patel R/o Village Deepaka, Qtr No. M Q 1249, Tahsil Katghora District Korba Chhattisgarh 4 - Maalti Soni W/o Shri Purushottam Soni Aged About 69 Years R/o Near Hari Jewelers, Shivrinarayan, District Janjgir-Champa Chhattisgarh 5 - Manik Chand S/o Late Shri Ghasiram Urf Kunjilal Sonar Aged About 65 Years R/o Print Idea, Near Jarhabhata Mandir, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 6 - Sevtibai W/o Shri Toman Lal Soni R/o Brahman Para, Champa, District Janjgir-Champa Chhattisgarh 7 - Praveen Soni S/o Late Gulab Chand Soni Aged About 43 Years R/o Zorapara, Sarkanda, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 8 - Kalpana Soni D/o Late Gulab Chand Soni Aged About 54 Years R/o Zorapara, Sarkanda, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 9 - Kavita Soni D/o Late Gulab Chand Soni Aged About 42 Years R/o Zorapara, Sarkanda, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 10 - Kamini Soni D/o Late Gulab Chand Soni Aged About 38 Years R/o Zorapara, Sarkanda, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh INDRAJEET SAHU Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2026.08.31 12:08:59 +0530 2 11 - Shantilata Soni W/o Late Gulab Chand Soni Aged About 63 Years R/o Zorapara, Sarkanda, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 12 - State of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, Janjgir, District Janjgir- Champa Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Shri Sunil Verma, Advocate. For State : Shri Sidhant Tiwari, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Order on Board 19.08.2026 1. 1. The present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner against the impugned order dated 14.05.2026 passed by IInd District Judge, Janjgir in Misc. Civil Appeal No.24-A/2024 whereby the Misc. Appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed and the order dated 12.09.2024 passed by the Civil Judge Class-I, Akaltara, District Janjgir Champa in Civil Suit No.48-A/2019 has been affirmed. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is the defendant No.2 before the trial court where the present respondent No.5 Manikchand and father of respondents No.7 to 11 namely Gulab Chand Soni were the plaintiffs who were prosecuting the suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction over the suit property shown in Schedule-A&B. After death of the father of plaintiffs, the defendant No.5 fraudulently and with the collusion of the revenue authorities, got his name mutated in the revenue records and tried to dispossess them from the suit land. Along with the suit, the plaintiffs had filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1&2 of CPC for temporary 3 injunction which was decided vide order dated 28.08.2021 by the trial court and the application for grant of temporary injunction filed by the plaintiffs have been rejected holding that the plaintiffs had no prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss in their favour.. Thereafter, the defendant No.5 also filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1&2 CPC for grant of temporary injunction claiming that he is in possession of the suit land and the plaintiffs as well as other defendants are interfering with his peaceful possession over the suit land. The defendant No.5 was claiming that he purchased the suit property through registered sale deed dated 17.12.2018 from the owner of the land namely Ghasi Ram who was the father of plaintiffs and came into possession, but the plaintiffs as well as defendants are interfering in his possession and they may be restrained by temporary injunction. The application filed by the defendant No.5 was also dismissed by the trial court vide order dated 21.12.2022 holding that defendant No.5 failed to prove that he is in actual physical possession of the suit land and there is no prima facie case in his favour nor any irreparable loss. Thereafter, the defendant No.2 has also filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1&2 CPC before the trial court claiming that in the suit land Khasra No.190 Area 0.80 Dismil, he is in possession by virtue of family partition between the parties and cultivating the same and he grown up crop over there, yet, the defendants No.3&5 interfering in his possession and trying to harvest the crop grown by him and if the crop earned by him is being harvested by the defendants No.3&5, he would be in irreparable loss. The application filed by the defendant No.2 has also been dismissed vide 4 order dated 12.09.2024 by imposing cost for causing delay in proceeding. The said order dated 12.09.2024 passed by the trial court was also challenged by the defendant No.2 by filing Misc. Appeal before the IInd District Judge, Janjgir, and the appellate court also dismissed the Misc. Appeal filed by the defendant No.2 vide order dated 14.05.2026 affirming the order passed by trial court which is under challenge in the present writ petition. 3. He would further submit that the petitioner/defendant No.2 is in actual physical possession of the suit land by virtue of family partition arrived at between the parties and he is cultivating his part of the land. If the defendants are not being restrained from interfering in his possession over the suit land, he would be in irreparable loss. Therefore, till the final adjudication of the suit, the other defendants and plaintiffs may be restrained by a temporary injunction from interfering in the peaceful possession of the defendant No.2 over the suit land Khasra No.190 Area 0.80 Dismil. 4. I have heard the counsel for the petitioner and perused the documents annexed with the petition. 5. From perusal of documents annexed with the petition, it transpires that the petitioner has filed three orders passed by the trial court deciding the applications for grant of temporary injunction filed by the either parties. The first order is dated 28.08.2021 passed by the trial court on an application filed by the plaintiffs under Order 39 Rule 1&2 CPC by which the application has been rejected. The second order dated 21.12.2022 has been passed by the trial court by which the application under Order 39 Rule 1&2 CPC filed by the defendant No.5 has been 5 rejected and the third order dated 12.09.2024 has been passed by the trial court on an application filed by the defendant No.2 under Order 39 Rule 1&2 CPC. In all these applications the respective parties are claiming their own possession over the suit property or part of the suit property. The trial court rejected all these applications holding that no prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss could be established by the parties concerned in support of their case as there are various facts which are to be established during trial with respect to respective claims of the parties. The trial court has also considered the orders passed by the revenue authorities. The execution of sale deed by Ghasi Ram is also under cloud as to whether he was having right or title to execute the sale deed or not? Further, the claim of the petitioner/defendant No.2 also requires proof by evidence that he obtained the suit property of Khasra No.190 Area 0.80 dismil in family partition as there is no any deed of partition or any other documents regarding the same and only on the basis of pleadings made in the plaint the right and title could not be decided and thereby rejected the application filed by the petitioner. The rejection of application filed by the defendant No.2/petitioner has been affirmed by the appellate court by the impugned order dated 14.05.2026. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, rejection of all these applications filed by the respective parties it clearly transpires that there exist a composite factual dispute between the parties which requires examination of witnesses on their respective claims. The claim of the defendant No.2/petitioner has been concurrently decided by the trail court as well as appellate court by observing that he has no any document of family 6 partition and no any revenue record that it was allotted to him in any transaction and except the pleading there is no other document. Therefore, this court is also unable to accept the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner that if other defendants or plaintiffs would not be restrained from interfering with the possession, he would be in irreparable loss. 6. In case of Shalini Shyam Setty & Another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, 2010(8)SCC329, the Supreme Court has observed as under: “40. Same principles have been followed by this Court in Mani Nariman Daruwala v. Phiroz N. Bhatena1 , wherein it has been held that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the court or tribunal has come to. This Court made it clear that except to this "limited extent" the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact (see SCC pp. 149- 50, para 18). In coming to the above finding, this Court relied on its previous decision rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram2. The decision in Chandavarkar is based on the principle of the Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh3 and Nagendra Nath4 discussed above. 41. To the same effect is the judgment rendered in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi5. In SCC para 9 at pp. 579-80 of the Report, this Court clearly reminded the High Court that under Article 227 that it cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice. 42. Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227 in Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi6 (AIR pp. 222-34, para 5 of the Report) and the decision of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre v. Pathankhan7. The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh8 about the scope of Article 227 was again followed in Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ram Tahel Ramnand9. 1 (1991) 3 SCC 141 2 (1986) 4 SCC 447 3 Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215 4 Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. Of Hills Division and Appeals, AIR 1958 SC 398 5 (1995)6 SCC 576 6 AIR 1968 SCC 222 7 (1970)2 SCC 717 8 Waryam singh v. Amarnath AIR 1954 SC 215 9 (1972)1 SCC 898 7 4310*. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai11 a two-Judge Bench of this Court discussed the principles of interference by the High Court under Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai this Court held that a writ of certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil court, subordinate to the High Court (SCC p. 688, para 19 of the Report). The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath12 and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench is pending. But insofar as the formulation of the principles on the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no divergence of views. 44. In para 38 sub-para (4) at SCC p. 695 of the Report, the following principles have been laid down in Surya Dev Rai and they are set out: "38.(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction." 45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the same lines and extracted below: (Surya Dev Rai case SCC pp. 695-96) "38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (I) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) * * * (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in re appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character." 49.On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: 10 *ED: Para 43 Corrected vide official Corrigendum No. F.3/ED.B.J./84/2010 dated 26-08-2010. 11 (2003)6 SCC 675 12 (2009)5 SCC 616 8 (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e)According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their authority". (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India13 and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. 13 (1997)3 SCC 261: 1997 SCC (L&S) 577 9 (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 7. In view of the disputed question facts involved in the present case, the composite and contradictory claims made by the plaintiffs, defendant No.2 and defendant No.5, further that the applications filed by these plaintiffs and defendants for grant of temporary injunction have been rejected by the trial court in different stage of trial, the petitioner has not filed any copy of plaint or written statement and only the orders passed by the trial court have been filed, also in view of aforesaid judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Setty (Supra), I do not find any perversity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order passed by the appellate court. 8. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge inder