1 2026:CGHC:4576-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 318 of 2018 State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Police Station Balod, District- Balod, Chhattisgarh. --- Appellant versus Sunil Sahu @ Sunil Sarva S/o Shri Nutan Sahu Aged About 23 Years R/o- Village Bhediyanawangaon, P.S. And District- Balod, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent ACQA No. 502 of 2018 Ku. Sonali Rawte D/o Sukhnandan Rawte Aged About 20 Years R/o Village- Bhediya Nawagaon, Police Station-Balod, Distirct- Balod, Chhattisgarh. --- Appellant Versus 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through- The Station House Officer, Police Station, Balod, District- Balod, Chhattisgarh. 2 2. Sunil Sahu @ Sunil Sarwa S/o Nootan Sahu Aged About 23 Years R/o Bhediyanawapara, Police Station-Balod, District-Balod, Chhattisgarh. --- Respondents For Appellant/State : Mr. Atanu Ghosh, Dy. Govt. Advocate. For Appellant/victim : Mr. Anil Tripathi, Advocate. For Respondent/accused : Mr. B.P. Singh, Advocate. Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal, JJ Judgment on Board (28th January, 2026) Per Rajani Dubey, J Since both these appeals arise out of the judgment dated 20.2.2018 passed by Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Balod, in Special Case No.43/2017 acquitting the respondent/accused of the charges under Section 450, 376(2)(n) of IPC, Sections 5(n)/6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 3(2)(v) of Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 02. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the prosecutrix was living in the house of her maternal grandparents with her brother and sisters and the accused was also living in the same village Bhediyanavagaon, Distt. Balod. He used to follow her saying that he is in love with her. The prosecutrix also started talking to him on mobile phone. On 3 6.4.2016 when all the other family members were asleep, the accused came to the house of the prosecutrix at around 10-11 pm and had forcible sexual intercourse with her on the pretext of marriage. Thereafter he continued to have physical relation with her. When the family members of the prosecutrix came to know about this relationship, they asked the accused for marrying her but he refused. Though in the police station the accused gave an undertaking in writing to marry her but later on refused. On report being made, offence under Sections 450, 376, 506/34 of IPC, 5(l)/6 of POCSO Act and Sections 3(1)(b) and 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act were registered against the accused. After completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused before the concerned jurisdictional Magistrate. 03. Learned trial Court framed charges under Sections 450, 376(2) (n) of IPC, Sections 5(n)/6 of POCSO Act and Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act, against the accused which were abjured by him and he prayed for trial. 04. After hearing counsel for the respective parties and appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court acquitted the respondent/accused of all the charges by the impugned judgment. Hence these appeals. 05. Learned counsel for the appellant/State and learned counsel for the appellant/victim jointly submit that the impugned judgment is per se illegal and contrary to the material available on record. Learned trial 4 Court was not justified in disbelieving the statement of the prosecutrix whereas she categorically stated that on false assurance of marriage, the accused committed sexual intercourse with her for a long time and ultimately refused to marry her. Learned trial Court ought to have seen that even if there was any consent by the prosecutrix, the same was obtained by way of fraud and giving false assurance of marriage, as such it cannot be construed to be a free consent. They further submit that it is well settled that in cases of sexual assault, delay in lodging the report cannot be said to be fatal. Learned trial Court also failed to consider that the prosecutrix was minor on the date of incident and as such, even if consented to the act of the accused, such consent was inconsequential. Learned trial Court without appreciating the overall evidence on record properly, acquitted the respondent/accused of all the charges which is not legally sustainable. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and the respondent/accused is liable to be held guilty of the charges leveled against him and sentenced accordingly. Reliance is placed on the decisions in the matters of Mohd. Imran Khan Vs. State, 2012 CrLJ 693 (SC); State of HP Vs. Raghubir Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 622 and Vishnu Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283. 06. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/accused supporting the impugned judgment submits that 5 the learned trial Court having minutely examined the oral and documentary evidence rightly recorded a finding of acquittal in favour of the accused and there is nothing on record to suggest that the said finding is unjust or perverse. He submits that the prosecution has not proved in accordance with law that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age at the relevant time and from the evidence it is clear that she was a consenting party. Both these appeals being devoid of substance are liable to be dismissed. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State, (2024) 17 SCC 684. 07. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 08. It is clear from the record of learned trial court that the respondent/accused was charged under Sections 450, 376(2)(n) of IPC, Sections 5(n)/6 of POCSO Act and Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act, and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence learned trial Court acquitted him of all the charges by the impugned judgment on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age on the date of incident and it is proved that she was a consenting party to the act of the accused. 6 09. It is an admitted position that the prosecution has not filed any document regarding age of the prosecutrix and only conducted her ossification test in this regard. PW-9 Dr. DR Dhruv who conducted radiological test of the prosecutrix opined that her age may be between 17 and 19 years. His report is Ex.P/7. In cross-examination he admits that there may be variation of two years on either side of this estimated age. 10. In the matter of P. Yuvaprakash (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in para 23 of its judgment as under: “23. As held earlier, the documents produced i.e. a transfer certificate and extracts of the admission register, are not what Section 94(2)(1) mandates; nor are they in accord with Section 94(2)(ii) because DW 1 clearly deposed that there were no records relating to the birth of the victim, 'M'. In these circumstances, the only piece of evidence, accorded with Section 94 of the JJ Act was the medical ossification test, based on several x-rays of the victim, and on the basis of which PW 9 made her statement. She explained the details regarding examination of the victim's bones, stage of their development and opined that she was between 18-20 years; in cross-examination she said that the age might be 19 years. Given all these circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the result of the ossification or bone test was the most authentic evidence, corroborated by the examining doctor, PW 9.” 11. In the present case also, there is no documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove age of the prosecutrix. The only 7 evidence available on record is the medical evidence i.e. ossification test. PW-9 Dr. GR Dhurve upon x-ray of the prosecutrix found her to be in between the age group of 17 to 19 years and further, in cross admitted that there may be variation of two years on either side of the estimated age. It is thus clear that the prosecution has not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that she was below 18 years of age on the date of incident. 12. PW-1 prosecutrix states that the accused is of her village and he used to call her on her mobile phone and say that he likes her but she refused. She states that on 6th April, 2016 at around 10-11 pm when her brother and sisters were asleep and her parents were not present, the accused came there and made forcible sexual relation with her on assurance of marrying her. She states that thereafter they started meeting and had physical relations. Their love affair continued for a period of about one year. She states that when her parents came to know about this relationship, they enquired from the accused who admitted love affair with her and also assured of marrying her but his father objected to this marriage saying that she belongs to other caste. In para 3 she states that when she came to know that the accused is going to marry someone else, she went to Police Station Balod and told that if the accused does not marry her, she wants action against him. Thereafter, the accused gave an undertaking in writing at the police station that he is ready to marry her. She states that all this 8 happened on 11th December, 2016. In para 4 she states that three days thereafter the family members of the accused called her at the Balod Court for performing court marriage and she along with her family went there but they did not come and also did not receive her call. Three days thereafter father of the accused called her at his house where mother, father and maternal uncle of the accused told her that as she belongs to different caste, this marriage is not possible but she insisted on marrying the accused only. In cross-examination she admits that she used to talk to the accused over mobile and gradually they started loving each other. She never disclosed her affair with the accused either to her parents or her siblings. She also admits that on 6th April, 2016 she was waiting for the accused and was awake and on his arrival she opened the door. 13. PW-7 Dr. Smt. Rashmi Glad who medically examined the prosecutrix did not find any external or internal injury on her body. As per her medical report Ex.P/23, no definite opinion regarding forcible sexual intercourse could be given, therefore, she advised for chemical examination. 14. From the aforesaid oral and documentary including the medical evidence it is clear that the prosecutrix was a consenting party to the act of the accused. As observed above, the prosecution has utterly failed to prove that she was below 18 years of age on the date of incident. 9 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024 (Criminal Appeal No 1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka, has held in para 36 as under:- “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:- “(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive--inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” 16. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgment, considering the oral and documentary evidence including the medical evidence on record, we 10 are of the opinion that the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court is based on proper appreciation of the overall evidence on record and as such, we do not find any good reason to interfere with this finding. Accordingly, both the appeals being devoid of any substance are liable to be and are hereby dismissed. Sd/ Sd/ (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge Khan MOHD AKHTAR KHAN Digitally signed by MOHD AKHTAR KHAN Date: 2026.01.29 16:36:41 +0530