1 CGHC010030722022 2026:CGHC:38035-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 216 of 2022 1 - Smt. Kaushilya Yadav W/o Sunil Kumar Yadav @ Damodar Yadav Aged About 28 Years R/o Devarpara, Baloda, Police Station Baloda, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh. 2 - Sunil Kumar @ Damodar Yadav S/o Late Shri Radhelal Yadav Aged About 39 Years R/o Devarpara, Baloda, Police Station Baloda, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh. ... Appellants versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Baloda District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Shri Manoj Paranjpe ,Sr. Advocate and Shri Rishabh Gupta, Advocates. For State : Shri S.S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, CJ Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Judgment on Board 25.08.2026 Per, Ramesh Sinha, CJ. 1 The present appeal under Section 374(2) CrPC has been filed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 24.12.2021 passed by the Sessions Judge Janjgir Champa in Sessions Case No.9/2020 whereby the appellants have been convicted for the INDRAJEET SAHU Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2026.08.31 17:34:34 +0530 2 offence under Section 302/34 IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for life with fine of Rs.200/- to each of the appellants, in default of payment of fine amount, additional RI for 10 days to both the appellants. 2 The case of prosecution in brief is that, on 29.04.2019 the deceased Sudama Bai received burn injury in her house and she was being taken to Community Health Centre, Baloda for her treatment from where she was referred to Chhattisgarh Institute of Medical Science (in short, CIMS), Bilaspur. During treatment, a memo was sent to Executive Magistrate, Bilaspur by City Kotwali police, Out Post CIMS, Bilaspur for recording dying declaration of the deceased. Pursuant to the memo dated 29.04.2019, the Executive Magistrate, Bilaspur, recorded dying declaration of the deceased vide Ex.P/8 after obtaining fitness certificate of the patient from the treating doctor vide Ex.P/9. In the dying declaration, the deceased disclosed that she was set ablaze by the accused persons by pouring kerosene oil. During treatment, the deceased died on 02.05.2019 at CIMS Bilaspur and a police memo about his death intimation was sent by the doctor to City Kotwali police Bilaspur which is Ex.P/10. The dead body of the deceased was sent for its postmortem to CIMS Bilaspur where PW-11, Dr. N. Varun conducted postmortem of the deceased and gave his report Ex.P/15. While conducting postmortem, the doctor noticed following injuries: • deep second degree burn over upper back • deep burn over both side upper limbs of second degree • deep burn over face, chest and over neck of second degree • deep burn over upper abdomen and around umbilicus second degree • deep second degree burn over lower right thigh and right leg • genital region and lower part of abdomen are intact. • Both side feet are intact • peeling of skin over both side hands abdomen and over face. 3 The total percentage of burn found is of 80 percent which was antemortem burn injury and he opined that cause of death is due to cardio respiratory arrest as a result of extensive burn injuries (75 to 80%) and its complications. 3 Merg intimation was sent to jurisdictional police station Baloda, District Janjgir Champa where FIR Ex.P/11 & P/13 was registered against the appellants for the offence under Section 302/34 IPC. Spot map Ex.P/1 was prepared by the Patwari whereas P/7 by the Police. One Plastic jerrican, half burnt matchstick box and pieces of blouse and Sari of the deceased was seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/6. The accused persons were arrested on 23.10.2019 and memorandum statement of appellant Sunil @ Damodar Yadav was recorded which is Ex.P/3. Plastic jerrican, burnt matchstick box, burnt pieces of blouse and Sari of the deceased, scalp hair, skin sample and blood sample of deceased were sent for its chemical examination to regional FSL Bilaspur from where FSL report Ex.P/24 was received, according to which, in the plastic jerrican kerosene oil contents were found. In the burnt matchstick box and burnt pieces of Sari and Blouse of the deceased, kerosene contents were found. 4 The statement under Section 161 CrPC of the witnesses were recorded and after completion of usual investigation charge sheet was filed against the appellants before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Akaltara for the offence under Section 302/34 IPC. The case was committed to the court of Sessions Judge Janjgir Champa for its trial. The sessions judge framed charge against the appellants for the 4 offence under Section 302/34 IPC. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. 5 To prove the guilt of appellants, the prosecution has examined 12 witnesses. The statement of appellants under Section 313 CrPC were recorded in which they denied the circumstances that appears against them, pleaded innocence and have submitted that they have been falsely implicated in the offence. Three defence witnesses have been examined by the appellants in their defence. 6 After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence, the Trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellants for the offence as stated in the earlier paragraph of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 7 Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses which cannot be made basis for conviction of the appellants. The case of prosecution is based on dying declaration whereas dying declaration has not been proved in accordance with law. In the dying declaration, the deceased disclosed that when she was burning, her son Kesh Yadav (Keshav Yadav) came there and extinguished the fire. Keshav Yadav, who is the son of the deceased, have been examined as DW-1. He deposed that his mother has committed suicide by setting herself ablazed after pouring kerosene oil. Even the husband of the deceased Bhagirathi Yadav, DW-3 deposed that the deceased was suffering from some mental illness and she herself committed suicide by pouring kerosene oil and set her ablazed. He further states that while extinguishing the fire, he also received burn 5 injuries in both his hands. There is no reason to disbelieve their evidence as they are also closely related with the deceased. The present appellants are brother in law and sister in law of the deceased. No motive have been proved by the prosecution. The appellants and deceased were residing separately and there was no incident soon before death causing initiation of quarrel. Except dying declaration, all other witnesses have deposed that victim has committed suicide. He would further submit that dying declaration is not supported by her mental fitness though in document Ex.P/9 the fitness certificate was given by the doctor, but it has been obtained subsequently only to support that victim was in fit mental state to give statement. The trial court has misappreciated the evidence produced by the prosecution as well as the defence. Therefore. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is liable to be set aside and the appellants are entitled for acquittal. 8On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions made by the counsel for the appellants and would submit that prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, but for minor omissions or contradictions, the evidence of prosecution witnesses with respect to dying declaration of the deceased recorded by the Executive Magistrate fully satisfies the allegation against the appellants. There is no reason of false implication or preparing false dying declaration by the Executive Magistrate. The Executive Magistrate being independent witness fully supported the case of prosecution that she recorded dying declaration Ex.P/8 after obtaining mental fitness certificate from the treating doctor. He would further 6 submit that though the son and husband of the deceased have not deposed the true version and supported the appellants, but in view of their relationship with the appellants and their family background, the evidence with respect to dying declaration cannot be discarded. From the defence taken by the appellants that during extinguishing fire he also received burn injuries and was treated at hospital supported the prosecution case that appellant No.2 Sunil Kumar @ Damodar was present on the spot when deceased received burn injuries. Had she not received burn injuries, she would not have implicated the appellants in the offence in question. Dying declaration is quite clear and independently proved by the prosecution witnesses. Therefore, the trial court has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellants for the alleged offence of murder of the deceased Sudama Bai and their appeal is liable to be dismissed. 9We have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the records of the trial court. 10 The prosecution’s case is based on dying declaration Ex.P/8 recorded by the Executive Magistrate Smt. Shweta Yadav, PW-6. It is relevant here to reproduce dying declaration of the deceased Ex.P/8 which reads as under: **iz’u&eS tks iwN jgh gWw lqukbZ o le> ik jgh gks ? mRrj&gkWA iz’u&dgkW vkSj dc tyh gks ? mRRkj&llqwjky ?kj cykSnk esa fnukad 29-04-2019 ds djhc 'kke 3 cts fnu lkseokj dks tyh gWaA iz’u&dSls tyh gks ? mRrj&fnukad 29-04-2019 ds 'kke djhc 3 cts tcju nsoj lqfuy ;kno] nsojkuh dkSf'kY;k ;kno nksuks eq>s ekjihV ds xsyu ds feV~Vh rsy dks Mkydj vkSj jLlh esa ckW/kdj ekfpl ls vkx tykdj eq>s tykbZ gSA 7 iz’u&vkx dkSu cq>k;s ? mRRkj&tc fpYYkk;s rc cM+s csVk ds'k ;kno us vkokt dks lqudj esjs ikl vk, vkSj tyrk ns[kdj diM+k ds <ddj vkx dks cq>k;sA iz’u&Lo;a ls ugh tyh gks ? mRrj&ughA iz’u&fdlh us tyk;s ugh ? mRrj&gkW nsoj lqfuy vkSj nsojkuh dkSf'kY;k ;kno nksuks tyk;s gSA iz’u&fdlh ds ncko ls rks ugh cksy jgh gks ? mRrj&ughA iz’u&’kknh dc gqvk gS vkSj cPps gS ? mRRkj&djhc 14&15 o"kZ 'kknh gqvk gS vkSj pkj cPps gSA iz’u&vkSj dqN dguk pkgrs gks ? mRRkj&ughA iz’u&nLr[kr djksxs ? mRrj&lqnkek ;kno (vaxwBs dk fu’kku)” xokg fceys’k dk;Zikyd n.Mkf/kdkjh fcykliqj (N0x0)” 11 At this stage, it is relevant to notice Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads thus: “32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.— Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:— (1) when it relates to cause of death.—When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question. xxx xxx xxx” 12 The general ground of admissibility of the evidence mentioned in Section 32(1) is that in the matter in question, no better evidence is to be had. The provisions in Section 32(1) constitute further exceptions to 8 the rule which exclude hearsay. As a general rule, oral evidence must be direct (Section 60). The eight clauses of Section 32 may be regarded as exceptions to it, which are mainly based on two conditions: a necessity for the evidence and a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. Hearsay is excluded because it is considered not sufficiently trustworthy. It is rejected because it lacks the sanction of the tests applied to admissible evidence, namely, the oath and cross- examination. But where there are special circumstances which gives a guarantee of trustworthiness to the testimony, it is admitted even though it comes from a second-hand source. The Supreme Court emphasized on the principle enumerated in the famous legal maxim of the Law of Evidence, i.e., nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire which means a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth. Our Indian Law also recognizes this fact that “a dying man seldom lies” or in other words “truth sits upon the lips of a dying man”. The relevance of this very fact, is an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence. 13 Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is famously referred to as the “dying declaration” section, although the said phrase itself does not find mention under the Evidence Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered the scope and ambit of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, particularly, Section 32(1) on various occasions including in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1 in which their Lordships have summarised the principles enumerated in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, including relating to “circumstances of the transaction”: 1 (1984) 4 SCC 116 9 “21. Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above and the clear language of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the following propositions emerge:- (1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is a homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, as indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse nature and character of our people, has thought it necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice. (2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut-and-dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a straitjacket. Distance of time would depend or vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a logical culmination of a continuous drama long in process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the context. Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage or the distance of time is not spread over more than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under Section 32. (3) The second part of clause (1) of Section 32 is yet another exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a person who was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because the place of cross-examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of death is not likely to make a false statement unless there is strong evidence to show that the statement was secured either by prompting or tutoring. (4) It may be important to note that Section 32 does not speak of homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all the circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicide would be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide. (5) Where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statement would clearly fall within the four corners of Section 32 10 and, therefore, admissible. The distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statement irrelevant.” 14 Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes it clear that when a statement, written or verbal, is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question, such statement is relevant. The Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) clearly held that Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible, the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death or deals with circumstances leading to the death. The decision of the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) has further been followed by the Supreme Court in the matter of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab2 reviewing the earlier authorities. 15 Thereafter, in the matter of Devinder alias Kala Ram and others v. State of Haryana3, wherein the deceased, who sustained burn injuries while cooking meals on stove, had made a statement to the doctor, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that statement of the deceased recorded by the doctor is relevant under Section 32 of the Evidence Act and observed as under: - “14. In the facts of the present case, we find that PW 7, the Medical Officer of the Civil Hospital, examined the case of the deceased on 6-8-1992 at 6.30 a.m. and he has clearly stated in his evidence that on examination she was conscious and that there were superficial to deep burns all over the body except some areas on feet, face and perineum and there was smell of kerosene on her body. He also stated in his evidence that the deceased was brought to the hospital by her husband Kala Ram (Appellant 1). He has proved the bed-head ticket pertaining to 2 AIR 2000 SC 2324 3 (2012) 10 SCC 763 11 the deceased in the hospital (Ext. DD) as well as his endorsement at Point ‘A’ on Ext. DD, from which it is clear that he was told by the patient herself that she sustained burns while cooking meals on a stove. This statement of the deceased recorded by PW 7 is relevant under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 which provides that statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, are themselves relevant facts when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question.” 16 In the matter of Purshottam Chopra and another v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi)4, principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability were summed up in paragraph 21 as under: - “21. For what has been noticed hereinabove, some of the principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability could be usefully summed up as under:- 21.1. A dying declaration could be the sole basis of conviction even without corroboration, if it inspires confidence of the court. 21.2. The court should be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement; and that it was a voluntary statement, which was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. 21.3. Where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. 21.4. When the eyewitnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the statement, the medical opinion cannot prevail. 21.5. The law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration nor there is any prescribed format or procedure for the same but the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making the statement. 21.6. Although presence of a Magistrate is not absolutely necessary for recording of a dying declaration but to ensure authenticity and credibility, it is expected that a Magistrate be requested to record such dying declaration and/or attestation be obtained from other persons present at the time of recording the 4 (2020) 11 SCC 489 12 dying declaration. 21.7. As regards a burns case, the percentage and degree of burns would not, by itself, be decisive of the credibility of dying declaration; and the decisive factor would be the quality of evidence about the fit and conscious state of the declarant to make the statement. 21.8. If after careful scrutiny, the court finds the statement placed as dying declaration to be voluntary and also finds it coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in recording conviction on its basis even without corroboration.” 17 Further, in the matter of Irfan @ Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh5 the Supreme Court has held that the dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence to be relied on provided it is proved that the same was voluntary and truthful and the victim was in a fit state of mind and observed in Para-63 as under: “63. It is the duty of the prosecution to establish the charge against the accused beyond the reasonable doubt. The benefit of doubt must always go in favour of the accused. It is true that dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence to be relied on provided it is proved that the same was voluntary and truthful and the victim was in a fit state of mind. It is just not enough for the court to say that the dying declaration is reliable as the accused is named in the dying declaration as the assailant.” 18 Recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Rajendra v. State of Maharashtra6 has clearly held that once a dying declaration is found to be authentic inspiring confidence of the court, then the same can be relied upon and can be the sole basis for conviction without any corroboration and observed in Para-25 as under: “25. The law relating to dying declaration is now well settled. Once a dying declaration is found to be authentic inspiring confidence of the court, then the same can be relied upon and can be the sole basis for conviction without any corroboration. However, before accepting such a dying declaration, court must be satisfied that it was rendered voluntarily, it is consistent and credible and that it is devoid of any tutoring. Once such a 5 2023 SCC Online SC 1060 6 2024 SCC Online SC 941 13 conclusion is reached, a great deal of sanctity is attached to a dying declaration and as said earlier, it can form the sole basis for conviction.” 19 PW-6, Shweta Yadav, Executive Magistrate, have stated in her evidence that on 30.04.2019, by order of the Executive Magistrate, Bilaspur, she recorded dying declaration of the deceased Sudama Yadav. A copy of memo received by her is in this regard is Ex.P/9 and dying declaration is Ex.P/8. While recording dying declaration of the deceased she asked her about the incident and whatever she disclosed, she wrote it in dying declaration. In cross examination she reiterated that the Sub Divisional Magistrate have fixed the roster of Tehsildar and Naib Tehsildars and in that sequence as per roster she went for recording dying declaration. She admits that at the time of recording dying declaration she called the police personnel from CIMS outpost. She was accompanied by her Reader. Though dying declaration Ex.P/8 is not in her own handwriting, but it is written on her instructions. In the document Ex.P/9 she obtained the mental fitness certificate from the doctor though it has not been mentioned in the document Ex.P/8. The memo for recording dying declaration was issued at 10 AM and she reached hospital at 12:10 PM. She denied that parents of deceased informed her that before receiving burn injuries the deceased was suffering from mental illness since long. In dying declaration Ex.P/8, thumb impression of deceased is there. In dying declaration it has been mentioned that her son has extinguished the fire. It is no there that her husband has extinguished the fire. She personally not known the deceased. She denied that she voluntarily prepared dying declaration Ex.P/8. She also denied the suggestion that 14 at the time of recording dying declaration, the deceased was in unconscious condition. 20 PW-8, Dr. U.K. Behra, was the Assistant Professor at CIMS Bilaspur. He gave fitness certificate in document Ex.P/9. In cross examination he has stated that the deceased was not admitted by him in the hospital. He further states that in case of 80 percent burn injuries the patient usually went to Koma and then he relied that the patient usually went to toxemia. He also stated that none of her family members disclosed before him that deceased was suffering from mental illness. This witness is relevant only with respect to the mental fitness condition of the deceased at the time of recording her dying declaration which he duly proved in his evidence. 21 While examining other witnesses available on record, this court finds that those witnesses are the family members of appellants. PW-2, Ram Kumar Yadav, is brother in law of the deceased who turned hostile and not supported the case of prosecution. Though in cross examination he too have deposed that deceased committed suicide by pouring kerosene oil on herself. 22 PW-5, Bimlesh Yadav, is witness to the dying declaration Ex.P/8, but he turned hostile and not supported the case of prosecution. He stated in his evidence that deceased committed suicide by pouring kerosene oil as she was suffering from mental illness. 23 PW-9, Pawan Yadav, is the brother of the deceased. He also stated that he was being informed by his brother in law about the incident that the deceased committed suicide by setting herself ablaze and when he 15 reached to the hospital, his sister was already dead. He too was declared hostile in the case. 24 The other witnesses are defence witnesses. DW-1 Keshav Yadav, son of the deceased, DW-2 Vinita Yadav, daughter of the deceased and DW-3 Bhagirathi Yadav, husband of the deceased, have clearly stated that deceased committed suicide by pouring kerosene oil on herself as she was suffering from mental illness. 25 DW-1& DW-2 have stated that their mother was cooking food in kitchen and when they went to Kitchen and asked about food, their mother started pouring kerosene oil upon her and then they called their father. Till their father reached at Kitchen, their mother already ignited matchstick and set herself on fire. DW-1, Keshav Yadav and DW-3 his father Bhagirathi Yadav tried to extinguish the fire and called the other persons of the family. Thereafter, their uncle were called and they took the deceased to Baloda Hospital from where she was shifted to Bilaspur. They denied recording of dying declaration and stated that their mother herself committed suicide. In cross examination, they admit that at the time when their mother pouring kerosene oil on herself, they did not stop doing so, but called their father. 26 Likewise DW-3, Bhagirathi Yadav, has stated that the deceased was being treated for her mental illness since 1997. Her treatment book is Ex.D/1 which has been issued by the Balco Limited Korba. During extinguishing the fire, he also received burn injuries on his hand. In cross examination, he deposed that the incident was being informed by his children and at that time he was sleeping in another room of the house. 16 27 From the comparative analysis of the evidences with respect to dying declaration Ex.P/8 and the evidence of these defence witnesses, recording of dying declaration by the Executive Magistrate is found proved who is an independent witness whereas DW-1,DW-2 and DW-3 are close relative of the deceased as well as the appellants whose evidence appear to be interested witness. When dying declaration of the deceased is found to be proved, the evidence of interested witnesses can be discarded and the appellants can be convicted on the basis of dying declaration made by the deceased. Though DW-3, the husband of the deceased stated that he too received injuries while extinguishing the fire, but no medical document has been produced by him with respect to injuries and treatment. In dying declaration, Ex.P/8 it has been clearly mentioned by the deceased that after committing Marpeet by the appellants, they poured kerosene oil, tied her by rope and set her ablaze. When she shouted, her elder son Keshav Yadav came there and tried to extinguish the fire. There is no mention that her husband also came there and extinguished the fire. 28 From the overall evidence produced by the prosecution regarding dying declaration which has been proved by PW-6, Executive Magistrate and PW-8 who certified mental condition of the deceased to give statement, this court is of the considered opinion that the trial court has rightly considered the dying declaration Ex.P/8 given by the deceased and discarded the evidence of defence witnesses. The conviction and sentence of the appellants for the alleged offence is found to be based on proper appreciation of evidence and does not suffer from any infirmity or perversity. 17 29 Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellants fails and is hereby dismissed. The appellants are reported to be in jail since 23.10.2019. They shall serve the entire sentence as awarded by the trial court. 30 Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellants are undergoing their jail sentence to serve the same on the appellants informing them that they are at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 31 The Trial court records along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court, concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice inder