1 CGHC010330272026 2026:CGHC:38272-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2263 of 2026 1. Roshni Sahu D/o Tikaram Sahu Aged About 28 Years R/o Village Raykona, P.S. Sarsiwa, District- Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, (Chhattisgarh) 2. Sunita Sahu D/o Tikaram Aged About 26 Years R/o Village Raykona, P.S. Sarsiwa, District- Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, (Chhattisgarh) 3. Hemlal Sahu S/o Dinbandhu Sahu Aged About 50 Years R/o Village Raykona, Police Station And Tahsil Sarsiwa, District- Sarangarh Bilaigarh (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Sarsiva, District- Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.) 2. Sourabh Agrawal S/o Anil Agrawal Aged About 30 Years R/o Ward No. 6 Sakti, District- Sakti, (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners : Mr. Amit Kumar, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Additional Advocate General. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2026.08.31 17:34:45 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 31.08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Amit Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Ashish Shukla, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondent No. 1. 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioners with the following prayer: “It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS, may kindly be pleased to allow this petition and to quashing of the FIR No. 131/2024 as well as charge-sheet filed before the learned trial Court which is registered as Depositor interest act/1/2024 on 07.06.2026 and cognizance order dated 11.06.2026, for offence punishable under Section 406, 420, 409, 120B, 34 of IPC and Sections 6 & 10 of the C.G. Depositors Interest Protection Act, 2005 by the Police Station Sarsiwa, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.), cognizance order (first order-sheet) dated 11.06.2026 in Depositor interest act/1/2024 which is pending before the First Additional Session Judge for/session Judge Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.).” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the prosecution case, in brief, is that the petitioners, along with the other co-accused persons, contacted the complainants, namely Saurabh Agrawal, Vishwajit 3 Khandekar, Tarun Sahu, Deepak Agrawal and Karnal Pradhan, and informed them about a purported scheme under which co-accused Shiva Sahu was allegedly accepting deposits and promising to return double the deposited amount within eight months, along with monthly returns at the rate of 30%. It is alleged that, relying upon such representation, the complainants approached Shiva Sahu and, pursuant to the alleged WhatsApp communications, handed over a total amount of approximately Rs.2 Crores in cash to Jhagesh Sahu. Subsequently, on allegedly realizing that they had been cheated, the complainants lodged the report, pursuant to which investigation was conducted and charge-sheet has been filed. The learned Court below thereafter proceeded to take cognizance of the alleged offences vide order dated 11.06.2026. 4. At the outset, it is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the allegations against the present petitioners are primarily based upon an alleged association with the principal accused persons and the prosecution has failed to place any cogent material demonstrating that the petitioners themselves induced the complainants to part with the alleged amount of Rs.2 Crores or that the said amount was ever received by, or dealt with, by the petitioners. The essential link between the alleged representations, the payment of money and the present petitioners is conspicuously absent from the material collected during investigation. Significantly, the material placed with the charge-sheet does not disclose recovery of any part of the alleged cheated amount from the petitioners. The seizure attributed to petitioner Nos.1 and 2 is confined to their personal mobile phones and passbooks, which are ordinary personal articles and, by themselves, do not constitute incriminating material so as 4 to establish commission of the alleged offences. There is no material demonstrating that the said articles were used for committing the alleged offence or that any alleged proceeds of crime were found in possession of the petitioners. Insofar as petitioner No.3 is concerned, the prosecution has seized one motorcycle and one mobile phone, both being his personal belongings. Mere seizure of such ordinary personal articles, without any further incriminating circumstance connecting them with the alleged transaction, cannot constitute sufficient material to establish the participation of petitioner No.3 in the alleged offence. 5. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the entire material collected during investigation, even if accepted at its face value and without entering into any disputed question of fact, does not disclose the necessary ingredients of the offences alleged against the present petitioners. There is no specific and substantive allegation showing the role individually attributable to each of the petitioners, particularly with regard to the alleged inducement, receipt of money, misappropriation or dishonest intention from the inception. The prosecution cannot proceed merely on the basis of omnibus allegations or on the assumption that the petitioners were involved because of their alleged association with the other accused persons. He also stated that the case of petitioner Nos.1 and 2 stands on an even different footing, as they are unmarried women and their implication was made by the concerned police authorities after a considerable lapse of approximately two years from registration of the FIR. Such delayed implication, in the absence of any specific overt act or independent incriminating material, assumes significance and indicates that the petitioners have been subsequently 5 implicated on the basis of mere suspicion and presumption rather than substantive evidence. 6. Learned counsel further submits that even the circumstances surrounding the investigation raise serious doubts regarding the manner in which the principal accused and his family members have been implicated. A complaint was made by the son of petitioner No.3 alleging that the concerned police authorities were falsely implicating the principal accused Shiva Sahu and his family members in the present case by arresting them one after another. Though the said circumstance by itself may require appreciation at the appropriate stage, it assumes relevance while examining whether there exists sufficient independent material connecting the present petitioners with the alleged commission of the offences. Thus, it is contended that the prosecution material, even if taken in its entirety, does not establish the necessary nexus between the petitioners and the alleged transaction, nor does it disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged against them. Continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioners, in the absence of specific, cogent and legally admissible material demonstrating their individual involvement, would therefore amount to an abuse of the process of law. The impugned order taking cognizance, insofar as it relates to the present petitioners, is consequently liable to be set aside. 7. Per contra, learned State counsel has vehemently opposed the petition and submits that the allegations made in the FIR, the statements of the complainants and witnesses, as well as the material collected during investigation, disclose the involvement of the present petitioners in the 6 alleged offence. It is further submitted that the defence raised by the petitioners regarding the nature of the seized articles, their alleged non- involvement and the manner of their implication are matters of appreciation of evidence and cannot be conclusively examined in exercise of the limited inherent jurisdiction of this Court. The charge-sheet has already been filed on the basis of the material collected during investigation and, therefore, no ground for quashing the criminal proceedings is made out at this stage. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9. The legal position on the issue of quashing of criminal proceedings is well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, FIR or a charge- sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases and Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However, where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the FIR or the charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS). 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill reported in (1995) SCC (Cri) 1059, Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi reported in (1999) 3 SCC 259 and Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E Ltd. & Ors reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 615, the Supreme Court clearly held that if a prima facie case is made out 7 disclosing the ingredients of the offence, Court should not quash the complaint. However, it was held that if the allegations do not constitute any offence as alleged and appear to be patently absurd and improbable, Court should not hesitate to quash the complaint. The note of caution was reiterated that while considering such petitions the Courts should be very circumspect, conscious and careful. Thus, there is no controversy about the legal proposition that in case a prima facie case is made out, the FIR or the proceedings in consequence thereof cannot be quashed. 11. In Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has authoritatively settled the scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528 of the BNSS). The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the power to quash criminal proceedings is required to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and only in the rarest of rare cases. It has been categorically observed that while considering a prayer for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings, the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry into the reliability, genuineness or otherwise of the allegations contained in the FIR, nor can it appreciate the evidence or conduct a mini trial. The Court is only required to examine whether the allegations, if taken at their face value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The Supreme Court further emphasized that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the threshold, that investigation into cognizable offences should ordinarily be permitted to proceed unhindered, and that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised with great caution and self-restraint, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would 8 result in manifest miscarriage of justice. 12. Very recently, in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid principles and further held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS), the High Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact or evaluate the evidentiary worth of the material collected during investigation. The Court reaffirmed the test laid down in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor and observed that criminal proceedings can be quashed at the threshold only when the material relied upon by the accused is of sterling and impeccable quality, completely demolishes the prosecution case, remains incapable of being refuted by the prosecution, and continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of Court. Unless all these parameters are cumulatively satisfied, the High Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, leaving the parties to establish their respective cases before the trial Court in accordance with law. 13. Having considered the rival submissions and upon perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds that the allegations contained in the FIR, read with the material collected during investigation, cannot, at this stage, be said to be so inherently improbable or patently absurd that the criminal proceedings against the petitioners warrant interference in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. The investigation has culminated in filing of the charge-sheet before the competent Court and the allegations against the petitioners are required to be considered in 9 the light of the material collected by the Investigating Agency. 14. The principal contention of the petitioners is that no part of the alleged amount of Rs.2 Crores has been recovered from them and that the articles seized during investigation, namely, mobile phones, passbooks and motorcycle, are merely their personal belongings. However, the question as to whether the said articles have any connection with the alleged transaction, whether the petitioners had any role in inducing the complainants or facilitating the alleged transaction and whether the material collected during investigation is sufficient to establish their involvement are matters which cannot be conclusively determined in the present proceedings. Such issues necessarily require appreciation of the material and evidence in its proper perspective. 15. Similarly, the contention that petitioner Nos.1 and 2 were implicated after a considerable lapse of time and that their implication is based upon suspicion or presumption cannot, by itself, be a ground for quashing the proceedings when the prosecution relies upon other material collected during investigation. The effect of the alleged delay, the absence of recovery from the petitioners and the nature of their alleged role are matters which can appropriately be considered by the learned Trial Court at the stage of appreciation of evidence. 16. The contention regarding the complaint made by the son of petitioner No.3 alleging false implication of the principal accused and his family members also does not, by itself, demolish the prosecution case. The said circumstance, as well as the defence version sought to be projected by the petitioners, would require examination in the context of 10 the entire evidence. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, cannot undertake such an evidentiary exercise or test the correctness and credibility of the rival versions. 17. On a cumulative consideration of the material available on record and the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Neeharika (supra) and Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the present case does not fall within the exceptional category warranting interference under Section 528 of the BNSS. The material relied upon by the petitioners cannot, at this stage, be said to be of such sterling and impeccable quality as would completely demolish the prosecution case. The disputed questions regarding the individual role of the petitioners, the relevance of the seized articles, the circumstances of their implication and the evidentiary value of the material collected during investigation are matters to be examined by the learned Trial Court in accordance with law. 18. It is, therefore, made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the ultimate merits of the allegations against the petitioners. The observations made herein are confined only to the question as to whether the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS ought to be exercised at this stage. The petitioners shall remain at liberty to raise all such factual and legal defences as may be available to them before the learned trial Court, which shall consider the same independently and in accordance with law. 19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners in exercise of 11 its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS. The material available on record discloses matters which require adjudication on the basis of evidence and the case does not satisfy the exceptional parameters for quashing of the proceedings at the threshold. 20. Accordingly, the present petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. It is, however, clarified that the observations made herein are only for the purpose of deciding the present petition and shall not influence the learned Trial Court while deciding the case on its own merits and in accordance with law. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan