1 2026:CGHC:12057 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 631 of 2024 Kamlesh S/o Anupchand Jain Aged About 31 Years R/o Village Arjunda, Tahsil Gundardehi, Present R/o Devri, Tahsil Daondilohara, District Balod, Chhattisgarh. (Defendant No. 1) Appellant(s) versus 1 - Pankaj Kumar S/o Anupchand Jain Aged About 29 Years R/o Village Singarpur, Tahsil Daondilohara, District Balod, Chhattisgarh. (Plaintiff) 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, Balod, District Balod, Chhattisgarh. (Defendant No. 2) Respondent(s) And SA No. 8 of 2025 Kamlesh S/o Anupchand Jain Aged About 31 Years R/o Village Arjunda, Tahsil Gundardehi, Present R/o Devri, Tahsil Daondilohara, District- Balod ( C.G.) Appellant(s) Versus 1 - Pankaj Kumar S/o Anupchand Jain Aged About 29 Years R/o Village Singarpur, Tahsil Daondilohara, District- Balod ( C.G. ). RAHUL JHA Digitally signed by RAHUL JHA Date: 2026.03.16 17:56:20 +0530 2 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- District- Magistrate, Balod, Distt- Balod ( C.G. ). Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Rajkumar Pali, Advocate For Resp No.1 : Mr. Shikhar Bhaktiyar, Advocate on caveat For Resp. No.2. : Mr. Malay Jain, PL Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board 13/03/2026 1. Since both the Second Appeals arise out of the same civil suit and involve common facts, they were heard analogously and are being decided by this common judgment. Second Appeal No. 631/2024 arises out of the judgment and decree affirming the preliminary decree, whereas Second Appeal No. 08/2025 arises out of the judgment and decree affirming the final decree passed in the same suit. 2. The present Second Appeals have been preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by the defendant, who is the appellant herein, challenging the common judgment and decree dated 19/11/2024 passed in Civil Appeal No. 40A/2019 and Civil Appeal No. 8A/2020 (Kamlesh Kumar v. Pankaj Kumar & Others) by the learned Principal District Judge, Balod. By the impugned judgment and decree, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeals preferred by the defendant/appellant and affirmed the preliminary judgment and decree dated 12/09/2019 as well as the final decree dated 12/02/2020 passed by the learned Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 9A/2016 (Pankaj Kumar v. 3 Kamlesh Kumar & Others). 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court. 4. (a) Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffs instituted Civil Suit No. 9A/2016 before the learned Trial Court seeking partition and separate possession of their half share in the suit land bearing Khasra No. 985/4 admeasuring 0.02 hectare situated at Village Arjunda, Tahsil Gundardehi, District Balod. It was pleaded that the respective fathers of the plaintiff and defendant No.1, namely Anupchand and Gulabchand, are real brothers. The suit property was purchased by their grandfather Bhanwarlal Jain from one Prakash S/o Surajmal Jain in the names of the plaintiff and defendant No.1 when they were minors. According to the plaintiffs, the property was purchased for the benefit of both parties so that they may carry on business in future and the same constituted their joint property. (b) It was further pleaded that the respective fathers of the parties later started residing separately and the plaintiff has been residing with his father at Village Singarpur, whereas defendant No.1 has been residing with his father at Village Arjunda. It was alleged that defendant No.1, without the consent of the plaintiff, constructed a house over the suit land and started carrying on business therefrom. When the plaintiff demanded partition of the suit property, defendant No.1 refused to do so. The plaintiff thereafter approached the Tahsildar, Gundardehi for partition; however, it was orally informed that since a house had already been constructed over the suit land, the revenue authorities had no 4 jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. On these grounds, the plaintiff sought partition of the suit property and delivery of vacant possession of his half share. (c) Defendant No.1 filed a written statement denying the plaint allegations. It was contended that the suit land was purchased when the respective fathers of the parties had separated due to family disputes and that the house constructed over the land was built by the father of defendant No.1 from his own funds. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff and his father had taken goods worth about Rs. 8,00,000/- from the shop of defendant No.1 and his father between the years 2005 to 2008 for their business at Village Singarpur and had not returned the said amount. According to the defendant, it was mutually agreed between the elders of the family that the share of the plaintiff in the suit land would be adjusted towards the said amount, and therefore the plaintiff had no subsisting right or share over the suit property. On these grounds, dismissal of the suit was prayed for. (c) After considering the pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court framed as many as five issues for determination. The learned Trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff has successfully established that the suit land bearing Khasra No. 985/6 admeasuring 0.02 hectare situated at Village Arjunda is jointly owned by the plaintiff and defendant No.1 and that the plaintiff is entitled to ½ share in the suit property. The Trial Court further held that the plaintiff is entitled to obtain separate possession of his half share from defendant No.1. It was 5 also held that although the suit was not properly valued, the defect was curable in nature, and the suit was found to be within limitation. Accordingly, by judgment and decree dated 12/09/2019, the Trial Court passed a preliminary decree declaring the half share of the plaintiff in the suit property. Thereafter, in the final decree proceedings, the learned Trial Court, by judgment and decree dated 12/02/2020, proceeded to effectuate the preliminary decree and passed the final decree by directing partition of the suit property in accordance with the shares already declared, thereby granting consequential relief to the plaintiff. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, defendant No.1 preferred Civil Appeal No. 40A/2019 against the preliminary judgment and decree dated 12/09/2019 and Civil Appeal No. 8A/2020 against the final judgment and decree dated 12/02/2020 before the learned Principal District Judge, Balod. The learned First Appellate Court, by the common judgment and decree dated 19/11/2024, dismissed both the appeals and affirmed the judgment and decrees passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, these Second Appeals have been preferred by the defendant/appellant. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant No.1 would submit that the judgments and decrees passed by the learned both the Courts are contrary to law and the evidence available on record. It is contended that the learned First Appellate Court committed an error in treating the preliminary decree and final decree as separate judgments despite the final decree having been passed during the pendency of the appeal. It is further submitted that the application filed by the appellant under Order 6 VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure was wrongly rejected. Learned counsel would also contend that both the Courts failed to properly appreciate the pleadings and evidence on record, particularly the documents (Ex.P/51 to Ex.P/55) and the alleged family settlement, and erred in holding that only the plaintiff and defendant No.1 are entitled to share in the suit property. It is further argued that the suit was not maintainable as other family members were not impleaded as parties and that the Courts have erroneously held the suit to be within limitation. On these grounds, it is submitted that the impugned judgments and decrees suffer from serious legal infirmities and are liable to be set aside. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission and have carefully perused the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts as well as the material available on record. 8. At the outset, it is to be noted that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is confined to the examination of substantial questions of law. Interference with concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts is permissible only where such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or founded on an erroneous application of law. Upon consideration of the submissions advanced, this Court does not find that the present appeal satisfies the aforesaid parameters. 9. A careful perusal of the record would show that the plaintiff has 7 produced the registered sale deed dated 11/05/1994 (Ex.P/1), which demonstrates that the suit land was purchased in the joint names of the plaintiff and defendant No.1 during their minority through their guardians. The documentary evidence further indicates that the property stood recorded in their names in the revenue records. Both parties, in their cross-examination, have admitted that the property was purchased when they were minors and that the transaction was executed through their guardians. 10. The defence set up by the defendant was that the plaintiff and his father had taken grocery goods worth about Rs.8,00,000/- from the shop of the defendant and his father between the years 2005 and 2008, and that the share of the plaintiff in the suit property was later adjusted towards the said alleged dues. However, the material placed on record does not substantiate such plea. The documents relied upon by the defendant (Ex.D/51 to Ex.D/55) are merely entries in private account papers without signatures of the plaintiff or his father and do not constitute reliable proof of the alleged liability. In view of Section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act, such entries in books of account by themselves are insufficient to fasten liability in the absence of independent corroboration. 11. Further, no written acknowledgment or registered document has been produced to show that the plaintiff had relinquished or agreed to adjust his share in the suit property in lieu of the alleged dues. In absence of any registered instrument evidencing relinquishment of rights in immovable property, the plea raised by the defendant cannot be 8 accepted in law. The evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf of the defendant also does not satisfactorily establish the alleged settlement or adjustment. 12. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Court recorded a finding that the plaintiff and defendant No.1 are co-owners of the suit property and that the plaintiff is entitled to half share therein. The First Appellate Court re-examined the entire evidence on record and concurred with the said findings. 13. These findings are essentially findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence. Nothing has been pointed out to demonstrate that such findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or have been recorded in disregard of settled principles of law so as to warrant interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 14. It is well settled, as reiterated by the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan and Others v. Shiv Dayal and Another, (2019) 8 SCC 637, that interference in second appeal with concurrent findings of fact is permissible only when such findings are shown to be based on misreading of material evidence, contrary to pleadings, or such as no reasonable judicial mind could have arrived at. The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the findings recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court suffer from any such infirmity. 15. Accordingly, the findings that the plaintiff and defendant No.1 are co- owners of the suit property and that the plaintiff is entitled to half share 9 therein are findings of fact based on proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record. The said findings have been concurrently recorded and do not suffer from perversity or any misapplication of law so as to give rise to any substantial question of law. 16. Consequently, no substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present appeals. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed at the admission stage itself. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Rahul/Gowri