1 CGHC010310492026 2026:CGHC:38275-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 797 of 2026 Bagar Say S/o Shri Ramdev Ram Aged About 57 Years Occupation- Principal At Higher Secondary School Girls Ramanujganj Block- Ramchandrapur District- Balrampur -Ramanujganj (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary School Education Department Mahanadi Bhawan Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) 2. The Director Public Instruction Department Directorate Indrawati Bhawan Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar, District- Raipur (C.G.) 3. The District Education Officer District- Balrampur Ramanujganj (C.G.) 4. Maniram Yadav Principal At Government Higher Secondary School Vimda Block- Bagicha District - Jashpur Now In-Charge District- Education Officer Balrampur District- Balrampur- Ramanujganj (C.G.) ...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Sandeep K. Sharma, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government Advocate. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2026.08.31 17:34:45 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 31 .08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Sandeep K. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, and Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State. 2. This intra-Court appeal has been preferred by the appellant assailing the order dated 29.07.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 5727 of 2026, Bagar Say vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, whereby the writ petition preferred by the appellant/writ petitioner has been dismissed. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is the senior-most employee in the respondent Department and was promoted to the post of Principal at Government Higher Secondary School (Girls), Ramanujganj, Block Ramchandrapur, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj, vide order dated 06.10.2018. Pursuant thereto, the appellant was transferred from Government Boys Higher Secondary School, Ramanujganj, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj, to the aforesaid post of Principal. He further submits that respondent No.4 was promoted from the post of Head Master to the post of Principal, Government Higher Secondary School, Vimda, District Jashpur, vide order dated 29.08.2025. Thereafter, by order dated 29.09.2025 issued by respondent No.1, respondent No.4 was transferred from the post of 3 Principal, Government Higher Secondary School, Vimda, Block Bagicha, District Jashpur, and was posted as In-charge District Education Officer, Balrampur, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 29.09.2025, the appellant, despite being senior to respondent No.4, was required to work under respondent No.4, who was junior to him in the Department. According to the appellant, such arrangement is contrary to the circulars issued by the State Government dated 04.08.2011, 16.05.2012, 07.02.2013 and 14.07.2014, whereby the departments have been directed not to entrust the charge of a higher post to a junior officer by ignoring the senior officer available in the Department. He further submitted that subsequently, the Director of Public Instruction, vide order dated 25.06.2026, pursuant to the meeting held on 23.06.2026, directed all District Education Officers and Divisional Joint Directors of Education to relieve the Research Coordinators (Lecturers) who were performing duties as In-charge Block Education Officers and to send them back to their respective original places of posting. The said subsequent development gave rise to a fresh and immediate cause for the appellant to approach this Hon’ble Court. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that immediately thereafter, the appellant filed WPS No. 5727 of 2026 before this Hon’ble Court on 23.07.2026. However, the learned Single Judge dismissed the said writ petition on the ground of delay and laches, 4 observing that the appellant had challenged the order dated 29.09.2025 after a lapse of more than nine months. According to learned counsel, while dismissing WPS No. 5727 of 2026, the learned Single Judge failed to properly appreciate that the appellant had approached this Hon’ble Court immediately after the subsequent order dated 25.06.2026 passed by the Director of Public Instruction. It is argued that the appellant did not remain inactive after the said order and approached the Court without any further delay. 6. Learned counsel further submits that Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not prescribe any fixed statutory period of limitation for filing a writ petition. The principle of delay and laches is a rule of discretion and not a rigid rule of limitation. Therefore, the Court is required to examine the facts and circumstances of each case, including the explanation for the delay, the nature of the grievance and the prejudice, if any, caused to the opposite parties. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley & Ors., reported in 2024 INSC 314, wherein it has been reiterated that writ proceedings are not governed by the Limitation Act, 1963 and that the question of delay and laches is required to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is, therefore, submitted that the writ petition could not have been dismissed solely by taking into account the period elapsed from the date of the original order, without examining the subsequent developments and the nature of the grievance raised by the appellant. 5 7. Learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tridip Kumar Dingal & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., reported in (2009) 1 SCC 768, particularly paragraph 58 thereof, to contend that there is neither an upper limit nor a lower limit prescribed for approaching the Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction and that the question of delay is essentially a matter of judicial discretion, to be determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. 8. It is also submitted that the grievance of the appellant is not confined merely to his transfer or posting. The principal grievance is that the charge of the higher post of District Education Officer, Balrampur, has been entrusted to respondent No.4, who is junior to the appellant, resulting in the appellant being required to work under his junior. According to learned counsel, such an arrangement is contrary to the aforesaid Government circulars, which were issued with the specific object of ensuring that the charge of a higher post is not entrusted to a junior officer by overlooking the senior officer. He has further relied upon the judgment of this Hon’ble Court in Harishankar Joshi v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors., WPS No. 5429 of 2026, decided on 17.07.2026, wherein, considering the same Government circulars dated 04.08.2011, 16.05.2012, 07.02.2013 and 14.07.2014, this Hon’ble Court held that where the charge of District Education Officer had been entrusted to a person much junior to the petitioner, such arrangement was contrary to the aforesaid circulars and the impugned order was not sustainable. 6 9. It is contended that the aforesaid judgment was directly relevant to the grievance raised by the appellant, as the controversy in the present case also relates to entrustment of the charge of District Education Officer to an officer who is junior to the appellant. It is, therefore, argued that the learned Single Judge ought to have considered the said judgment while examining the legality of the arrangement questioned by the appellant. He submits that the learned Single Judge, while dismissing WPS No. 5727 of 2026 on the ground of delay, has not considered the subsequent order dated 25.06.2026, the immediate filing of WPS No. 5727 of 2026 on 23.07.2026, the continuing nature of the grievance and the judgment rendered in Harishankar Joshi (supra). According to him, these aspects were material for determining whether the appellant’s challenge deserved consideration on merits. 10. It is thus submitted that the impugned order dated 29.07.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from an erroneous appreciation of the facts and the settled principles governing delay and laches under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The appellant, having approached this Hon’ble Court immediately after the subsequent order dated 25.06.2026, ought not to have been non-suited merely on the ground that the original order dated 29.09.2025 was more than nine months old. 11. In view of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the appellant prays that the impugned order dated 29.07.2026 passed in WPS No. 5727 of 2026 be set aside and the grievance of the appellant 7 be considered on its merits, particularly in the light of his seniority, the Government circulars governing entrustment of higher charge and the judgment rendered by this Hon’ble Court in Harishankar Joshi (supra). 12. Per contra, learned State counsel supports the order passed by the learned Single Judge and submits that no error has been committed in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. It is contended that the appellant was admittedly challenging the order dated 29.09.2025, whereby respondent No.4 was transferred and posted as In-charge District Education Officer, Balrampur, whereas WPS No. 5727 of 2026 was filed only on 23.07.2026, after a lapse of more than nine months. He further submits that the appellant has not furnished any satisfactory or cogent explanation for not challenging the order dated 29.09.2025 within a reasonable period. The subsequent order dated 25.06.2026 cannot, by itself, revive the stale challenge to the original order dated 29.09.2025. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly exercised the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by declining to entertain the petition on account of unexplained delay and laches. 13. It is further contended by the learned State counsel that the reliance placed by the appellant upon the Government circulars and the judgment in Harishankar Joshi (supra) does not assist his case, particularly when the writ petition itself was not entertained on merits due to the unexplained delay. Learned State counsel, therefore, submits that the impugned order does not call for any interference in the present 8 intra-court appeal. 14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record, including the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 15. The undisputed facts indicate that the appellant is essentially aggrieved by the order dated 29.09.2025, whereby respondent No.4 was transferred from the post of Principal, Government Higher Secondary School, Vimda, Block Bagicha, District Jashpur, and posted as In-charge District Education Officer, Balrampur, District Balrampur- Ramanujganj. The appellant filed WPS No. 5727 of 2026 only on 23.07.2026, i.e. after more than nine months from the date of the impugned order. 16. The learned Single Judge, while considering the writ petition, specifically noticed that the challenge was directed against the order dated 29.09.2025 and that no sufficient explanation had been furnished for the delay in approaching the Court. Relying upon the settled principle that unexplained and inordinate delay may constitute a ground for declining discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. 17. We find no infirmity in the aforesaid approach. It is true that Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not prescribe any fixed period of limitation. However, the absence of a statutory period of limitation does not mean that a litigant can approach the Court at any point of time as a 9 matter of right. The extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary, and the Court is entitled to decline relief where the petitioner approaches the Court after an unexplained or unreasonable delay. 18. The subsequent order dated 25.06.2026, relied upon by the appellant, does not alter the fact that the substantive challenge in WPS No. 5727 of 2026 was directed against the order dated 29.09.2025. The mere fact that the appellant approached the Court shortly after the subsequent order cannot, in the facts of the present case, satisfactorily explain why the original order dated 29.09.2025 was not challenged for more than nine months. 19. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant upon Mrinmoy Maity (supra) and Tridip Kumar Dingal (supra) does not advance the case of the appellant. The said decisions recognise that there is no prescribed statutory period for invoking Article 226 and that the question of delay and laches depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. They do not lay down that an unexplained delay must necessarily be condoned in every case. 20. We are also of the view that the appellant’s attempt to characterise the controversy as one relating to seniority does not alter the nature of the challenge. The order under challenge before the learned Single Judge was the transfer and posting order dated 29.09.2025 by which respondent No.4 was posted as In-charge District Education Officer, Balrampur. The appellant has sought to challenge the 10 said arrangement on the ground that respondent No.4 is junior to him and that the Government circulars prohibit entrustment of higher charge to a junior officer. Thus, the immediate relief sought by the appellant arises out of the transfer/posting arrangement of respondent No.4 and not from any independent order determining or altering the seniority of the appellant. 21. The judgment relied upon by the appellant in Harishankar Joshi (supra) was rendered in the facts of that case and does not dilute the well-settled principle that a person seeking discretionary relief under Article 226 must approach the Court within a reasonable time and satisfactorily explain any substantial delay. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has found that no sufficient explanation for the delay was furnished, and we see no reason to take a different view. 22. In the totality of the circumstances, we find that the learned Single Judge has rightly exercised the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and has dismissed WPS No. 5727 of 2026 on the ground of delay and laches. The order dated 29.07.2026 does not suffer from any illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference in the present appeal. 23. Consequently, the writ appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan