1 CGHC010100082021 2026:CGHC:37547-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 446 of 2021 1 - Purushottam Yadav S/o Dhanesh Yadav Aged About 30 Years R/o Village - Bhatapara, Kurud, Thana- Jamul, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant Versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Jamul, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Shri N.K. Malviya, Advocate. For Respondent : Shri S.S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, CJ Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Judgment on Board 21.08.2026 1. The present appeal under Section 374(2) CrPC has been filed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25.02.2021 passed by the Ist Fast Track Special Judge (Protection of Children From Sexual Offices Act (in short, POCSO Act)/Additional Sessions Judge, District Durg, in Special Sessions Case No.150 of 2019 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner: Sl. No. Conviction U/s Sentence 1 377 IPC Imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default, one month RI INDRAJEET SAHU Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2026.08.29 12:41:02 +0530 2 2 323 IPC Imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs.100/-, in default one month RI 3 506 IPC Imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs.100/-, in default one month RI 4 4 of POCSO Act Imprisonment for life (whole life) and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default, one month RI. All the sentences will run concurrently. 2. Brief facts of the case are that, on 17.10.2019, the victim PW-1, who is minor boy, aged about 12 years and 11 months, lodged a report to the police with the allegation that on 15.10.2019 at about 9 PM when he was returning from his grandmother’s house, on the way, at about 9:30 PM, the appellant met him and asked him to accompany and he will leave him to his house. He took him towards the place of cremation and after removing his clothes, he inserted his penis on his mouth and when he protested, the appellant threatened him with dire consequence. Due to fear, he could not immediately informed the incident to his parents and in the next evening he informed it to his parents and then lodged the report. FIR, Ex.P/1 was lodged against the appellant for the offence under Sections 377 and 506 IPC and Section 4 of POCSO Act. The victim was sent for his medical examination to Govt. Hospital Supela where he was medically examined by PW-6 Dr. Sanjay Kumar who gave his report Ex.P/20. At the time of medical examination, he noticed abrasion on right forearm of victim. Spot map Ex.P/2 was prepared by the police whereas Ex.P/5 by the Patwari. Underwear of the victim was seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/4. With respect to age and date of birth of the victim, the police seized Primary School Marksheet Ex.P/10 vide seizure memo Ex.P/8 in which the date of birth of victim is recorded as 22.10.2006. School record Ex.P/16-C 3 have also been seized by the police vide Ex.P/15 and original record was returned back to school. The appellant was arrested on 17.10.2019 and he too was sent for his mediation examination to Govt. Hospital Supela where he was medically examined by PW-6, Dr. Sanjay Kumar who gave his report Ex.P/18 and found the appellant capable to perform sexual intercourse. 3. The statement under Section 164 CrPC of victim boy was recorded which is Ex.P/6. Underwear of the victim boy as well as appellant sent for its query report to the doctor who gave his query report Ex.P/19 and referred it for its chemical examination. 4. The statement under Section 161 CrPC of the witnesses were recorded and after completion of usual investigation charge sheet was filed before the trial court for the offence under Sections 377 and 506 IPC and Section 4 of POCSO Act. The trial court framed charge against the appellant for the offence under Section 377,323,506 IPC and Section 5(l)/6 of POCSO Act. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. 5. To prove the guilt of appellant, the prosecution has examined 7 witnesses. The statement of appellant under Section 313 CrPC was recorded in which he denied the circumstances appears against him, plead innocence and submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence. 6. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence, the Trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant as stated in the earlier paragraph of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 4 7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses which cannot be made basis for conviction of the appellant. The victim was not consistent in his evidence. The victim is a tutored witness and he deposed on the instance of his parent. There is delay in lodging the report as the victim boy has not informed the incident to his parent immediately and on the second next day he informed the incident. Injuries found on the forearm of the victim boy could to self inflicted only to give colour of corroboration of allegation made by the victim boy. The manner in which the victim boy is said to have been subjected to offence is totally improbable and he was having ample opportunity to flee from the clutches of the appellant when he was being taken to the place of incident and he could raise alarm to call for help. The prosecution has failed to prove the age of victim boy that he was less than 18 years of age as school record has not been proved in accordance with law. Inconsistent evidence are not sufficient to hold the appellant guilty for the alleged offence and he is entitled atleast for benefit of doubt and thereby he may be acquitted from the alleged offences. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant and have submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt but for minor omissions or contradictions, the evidence of prosecution witnesses are fully reliable and sufficient to hold the appellant guilty for the alleged offence. There is no reason of any false implication and the 5 victim has been considered as natural witness as while he was returning from the house of his grand-mother, on the way, he was being taken by the appellant towards the place of cremation where he committed the unnatural offence with the victim boy. The injury found on the forearm of victim boy further corroborates the alleged offence. The un-rebuted evidence of victim boy is further corroborated by the other evidences available on record and therefore there is no scope for interference in the present appeal and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 9. We have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the records of the case. 10. The first question arises for consideration would be the age of the victim boy as to whether the prosecution has proved his age or not. 11. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school record Ex.P/16-C which is sought to be proved by PW-5, Preetam Kumar Sahu, who is the incharge Headmaster of said school. He stated in his evidence that the police has seized the school record with respect to age and date of birth of victim vide seizure memo Ex.P/15. The shool record is Ex.P/16 and its attested true copy is Ex.P/16-C. As per school record, the date of birth of victim boy is 22.10.2006. In cross examination, he stated that the entries with respect to date of birth of the victim has been made by the then Headmaster. Though he admits that there is no document with respect to the basis on which the date of birth of victim was recorded in the school register, but there is no suggestion given by the defence that date of birth of victim boy was wrongly mentioned in the school record and it was not his actual date of birth. Merely saying that the 6 person who recorded the date of birth of victim in school record has not been examined, is not sufficient to disbelieve the school record particularly when the entries have been made much prior to the date of incident. The entries made in school record is further supported by the Primary School Certificate Ex.P/10 which has been seized vide Ex.P/9. 12. PW-1 is the victim boy. He disclosed his age at the time of recording evidence as 14 years though he stated that he could not remember his date of birth. In cross examination, the defence have not given a single suggestion that he has not disclosed his proper age and attains the age of majority. When in the examination in chief the victim have stated that he is aged about 14 years and that has not been challenged in his cross examination, the same should be taken into consideration, coupled with the corroborated facts from the school record Ex.P/16-C that the victim was aged about 14 years on the date of recording his evidence i.e. on 06.03.2020 which is corroborated by the age disclosed at the time of lodging the FIR. 13. PW-2 & 3, the father and mother of victim boy respectively, have disclosed that the age of victim boy is about 13 years. In their cross examination, the defence have not challenged the age disclosed by them and the age of victim, as has been shown in their chief examination, remain unrebuted. All these pieces of evidence clearly demonstrate that the victim boy was aged about 12 years and 11 months as shown in the school record and in absence of any rebuttal, the trial court has rightly considered that victim body was aged about 12 years and 11 months at the time of incident. We do not find any perversity or illegality in the said finding of trial court. 7 14. The admissibility and evidentiary value of the school register have been considered by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, 2013 (7) SCC 263, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Para 22 to 24 held that:- “22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under : “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.? (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining – (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. 8 (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule. (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub- rule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW- PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion. 9 24. Following the scheme of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, it is apparent that the age of the prosecutrix VW - PW6 could not be determined on the basis of the matriculation (or equivalent) certificate as she had herself deposed, that she had studied upto class 3 only, and thereafter, had left her school and had started to do household work. The prosecution in the facts and circumstances of this case, had endeavoured to establish the age of the prosecutrix VW-PW6, on the next available basis, in the sequence of options expressed in Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules. The prosecution produced Satpal (PW4), to prove the age of the prosecutrix VW – PW6. Satpal (PW4) was the Head Master of the Government High School, Jathlana, where the prosecutrix VW - PW6 had studied upto class 3. Satpal (PW4) had proved the certificate Exhibit-PG, as having been made on the basis of the school records indicating, that the prosecutrix VW - PW6, was born on 15.5.1977. In the scheme contemplated under Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules, it is not permissible to determine age in any other manner, and certainly not on the basis of an option mentioned in a subsequent clause. We are therefore of the view, that the High Court was fully justified in relying on the aforesaid basis for establishing the age of the prosecutrix VW – PW6. It would also be relevant to mention, that under the scheme of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, it would have been improper for the High Court to rely on any other material including the ossification test, for determining the age of the prosecutrix VW-PW6. The deposition of Satpal-PW4 has not been contested. Therefore, the date of birth of the prosecutrix VW - PW6 (indicated in Exhibit P.G., as 15.7.1977) assumes finality. Accordingly it is clear, that the prosecutrix VW-PW6, was less than 15 years old on the date of occurrence, i.e., on 25.3.1993. In the said view of the matter, there is no room for any doubt that the prosecutrix VW - PW6 was a minor on the date of occurrence. Accordingly, we hereby endorse the conclusions recorded by the High Court, that even if the prosecutrix VW-PW6 had accompanied the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh of her own free will, and had had consensual sex with him, the same would have been clearly inconsequential, as she was a minor.” 15. So far as the allegation of unnatural sexual offences with the victim by the appellant is concerned, we again examine the evidence of victim PW-1. He has stated in his evidence that on 15.10.2019 at about 9 PM when he was returning from his grandmother’s house, on the way, the appellant met him and asked the victim to accompany and he will leave him to his house. He took him towards the place of cremation where after removing his clothes, he inserted his penis on his mouth. Some how he could save himself and flee from the place. The appellant threatened him not to disclose the incident to anyone or else he will kill him. He disclosed about the incident to his parents on the next day. 10 Thereafter, his father took him to police station and lodged the report which is Ex.P/1. He also gave his statement before the court which is Ex.P/6. In cross examination, he remain firm in saying that at the time when the appellant was taking him by his bicycle, there was no traffic in the road. When the appellant was taking him towards the place of cremation, he jumped from cycle, however the appellant again caught him and dragged towards the place of incident. At the time when the appellant was dragging him, he shouted but no one came there. When the appellant threw him on the floor, he received injury on his hand. In his cross examination he remain firm in saying that appellant inserted his penis on his mouth and there is no infirmity or discrepancy in his evidence with that of FIR. 16. From perusal of FIR Ex.P/1 and also from his statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC, Ex.P/6, the substantive allegation of insertion of penis by the appellant in the mouth of victim boy is corroborative with each other and there is no material discrepancy or contradictions. PW-1 is the victim of the offence and he dully supported the prosecutions case and the quality of evidence which he gave, he can be considered to be the sterling witness upon which conviction can safely be made as held by the Supreme Court in Santosh Prasad @ Santosh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar, 2020 (3) SSC 443, in which it was observed as under: “5.4.2 In the case of Rai Sandeep alias Deepu (supra), this Court had an occasion to consider who can be said to be a “sterling witness”. In paragraph 22, it is observed and held as under: “22 In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value 11 without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross- examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 17. The victim firmly denied that he being the tutored witness deposed on the instance of his parents. He specifically stated that he deposed whatever incident that he suffered. 18. PW-2, the father of victim boy, have stated in his evidence that victim boy (his son) informed him about the incident that appellant took him towards the place of incident and after throwing him on floor, he committed unnatural offence with him. He committed marpeet also. PW-2 further states that thereafter he took his son to police station and lodged the report. Though he is not the witness of any incident, but he 12 deposed on the basis of information given by his son i.e. victim boy, PW-1. 19. Likewise, PW-3, the mother of victim, have also stated that when her son informed her about the incident, they took him to police station and lodged the report. Though, PW-3, on some point, was declared hostile, but she dully supported the case of prosecution that the victim boy suffered with the incident and he disclosed the same to her also. In cross examination she reaffirm that at the time when her son came back to house, he was crying and was unable to inform anything. 20. PW-6, Dr. Sanajy Kumar, who medically examined the victim boy, found abrasion on the forearm of victim which was simple in nature and he proved the MLC report Ex.P/20. In his cross examination he remain firm in saying that he noticed injury on the forearm of victim boy. He also proved his query report Ex.P/21 & 19. 21. Though in FSL report available on record no sperms and semen were found on the underwear of victim boy and underwear of the appellant, but that itself is not sufficient to disbelieve the evidence of victim boy when he specifically alleged that the appellant inserted his penis on his mouth and somehow he could save himself and flee from the place. As per the evidence of victim boy, due to fear he could not inform the incident immediately to his parents and on the next day he informed them and thus absence of sperms and semen in the underwear of victim boy does not extend any benefit to the appellant. 22. The appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 377 IPC. It is necessary to notice here the provisions of Section 377 IPC which reads as under: 13 “377. Unnatural offences.—Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.— Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offence described in this section.” 23. The necessary ingredients for the offence of unnatural offence has been defined in Childline India Foundation & Another Vs. Allan John Waters & Others, 2011 (6) SCC 261 wherein in paragraph 53 to 56 it has been observed as under: “53. A serious argument was projected by learned senior counsel for the accused stating that even if the allegations/statements of prosecution witnesses are acceptable, the same would not constitute an offence under Section 377 IPC. Section 377 reads thus: "377. Unnatural offences.- Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.- Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offence described in this section." 54.To attract the above offence, the following ingredients are required: 1) Carnal intercourse and 2) against the order of nature. Though the High Court has adverted to various dictionary meanings and decisions to hold that the offence has not been made out, we have extracted the exact statements of the victims - PWs 1 and 4. PW-1 has stated before the trial Court as under: i "Duncan had sex with me on many occasions. He used to tell me to hold his penis and also he used to hold my penis." ii. "Allan Waters also had sex with me on many occasions. He also used to tell me to hold his penis and he also used to hold my penis." iii."Duncan Grant and Allan Waters also had a similar relationship with other boys. Accused Duncan and Allan Waters used to ask for fellatio with the other boys Duncan Grant and Allan Waters used to do fellatio with the other boys and not the other way round. I have seen this happened with my own eyes" iv "Accused No.1 William used to beat us on flimsy grounds. He used to do canning. However, he never had sex with me or with other boys. When I made a complaint to William (about Allan and Duncan), he told me not to divulge the said fact to anybody failing which he would beat me." 55. (PW4) has stated before the trial Court as under: 14 i. "Allan Waters used to have sex with the boys. Allan used to have fellatio with me and the other boys. Allan used to take my penis in his mouth" ii. "When I was staying in Anchorage Duncan also did the same thing with me." iii. "When this was done for the first time with me, I felt bad. I then told the said fact to William with respect to the act done by Duncan and Allan. Thereafter William beat me. I was beaten because I told William about the acts done by Duncan and Allan." iv. "William used to tell me to speak before the Court that Allan and Duncan are good people." 56. Those statements show how these accused, particularly, A1 and A2, sexually abused the children at the shelter homes. The way in which the children at all the three places i.e. Colaba, Murud (Janjira) and Cuffe Parade were being used for sexual exploitation, it cannot be claimed that the ingredients of Section 377 have not been proved. The street children having no roof on the top, no proper food and no proper clothing used to accept the invitation to come to the shelter homes and became the prey of the sexual lust of the paedophilia. By reading all the entire testimony of PWs 1 and 4 coupled with the other materials even prior to the occurrence, it cannot be claimed that the prosecution has not established all the charges leveled against them. On the other hand, the analysis of the entire material clearly support the prosecution case and we agree with the conclusion arrived at by the trial Judge.” 24. The appellant has also been convicted for the offence under Section 4 of The POCSO Act. Section 3 of The POCSO Act defines penetrative sexual assault whereas, Section 4 of The POCSO Act defines punishment for penetrative sexual assault. Therefore it is also necessary to notice here the provisions of Section 3 & 4 of POCSO Act which reads as under: “3. Penetrative sexual assault.—A person is said to commit “penetrative sexual assault” if— (a) he penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or (b) he inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of the child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or (c) he manipulates any part of the body of the child so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of the child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or (d) he applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus, urethra of the child or makes the child to do so to such person or any other person. 15 4. Punishment for penetrative sexual assault.—[(1)] Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than 4[ten years] but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. [(2) Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child below sixteen years of age shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life of that person and shall also be liable to fine. (3) The fine imposed under sub-section (1) shall be just and reasonable and paid to the victim to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of such victim.]” 25. From the aforesaid provision as well as the evidence available on record produced by the prosecution, the prosecution has been able to prove the offence under Section 377 IPC and Section 4 of The POCSO Act and all the ingredients of said offences are satisfied by the prosecution. Thus, we do not find any scope for interference in the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 377 IPC and Section 4 of POCSO Act. 26. Likewise, the victim boy has specifically alleged that he was being thrown on the floor by the appellant and he received injury on his forearm which has been supported by the evidence of doctor PW-6, Sanjay Kumar. Thus, the offence under Section 323 IPC is also found proved. Further, it is the evidence of victim boy that when he was fleeing, the appellant threatened not to disclose the incident to anyone otherwise he would kill him, which also remain unrebuted in the cross examination of the witnesses. Thus, the offence under Section 506 IPC also found proved in the present case. 27. From consideration of entire evidence available on record and also from perusal of impugned judgment passed by the trial court, we find that consideration of trial court is based on proper appreciation of 16 evidence which does not require any interference. The trial court has also considered the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Anil @ Anthony Arikswamy Joseph Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2014(4)SCC 69 in support of conviction of the appellant for the alleged offences and therefore the conviction of the appellant for the alleged offences are hereby affirmed. 28. So far as sentences for the offence under Section 377 IPC and Section 4 of POCSO Act is concerned, Section 377 IPC provides punishment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years and fine, whereas, Section 4 of The POCSO Act provides imprisonment of not less than 20 years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life when sexual assault is made upon a child below 16 years of age. In the present case also, the victim boy was found to be 12 years and 11 months on the date of incident i.e. below 16 years. Thus, maintaining conviction under Section 377 IPC, the appellant is sentenced to undergo RI for 10 years with fine amount and default stipulation instead of RI for life. Further, instead of Section 4 of POCSO Act, the appellant is convicted under Section 4(2) of The POCSO Act and sentenced to undergo RI for 20 years with fine amount and default stipulation instead of RI for life. 29. Further, in the matter of Raj Bala Vs. State of Haryana & Others, reported in 2016 (1) SCC 463 in paragraph 1 & 2 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “1. In Gopal Singh v. State of Uttrakahand[(2013) 7 SCC 545 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 608], while focusing on the gravity of the crime and the concept of proportionality as regards the punishment, the Court had observed:- 17 "18. Just punishment is the collective cry of the society. While the collective cry has to be kept uppermost in the mind, simultaneously the principle of proportionality between the crime and punishment cannot be totally brushed aside. The principle of just punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal offence. A punishment should not be disproportionately excessive. The concept of proportionality allows a significant discretion to the Judge but the same has to be guided by certain principles. In certain cases, the nature of culpability, the antecedents of the accused, the factum of age, the potentiality of the convict to become a criminal in future, capability of his reformation and to lead an acceptable life in the prevalent milieu, the effect - propensity to become a social threat or nuisance, and sometimes lapse of time in the commission of the crime and his conduct in the interregnum bearing in mind the nature of the offence, the relationship between the parties and attractability of the doctrine of bringing the convict to the value-based social mainstream may be the guiding factors. Needless to emphasise, these are certain illustrative aspects put forth in a condensed manner.We may hasten to add that there can neither be a straitjacket formula nor a solvable theory in mathematical exactitude. It would be dependent on the facts of the case and rationalised judicial discretion. Neither the personal perception of a Judge nor self- adhered moralistic vision nor hypothetical apprehensions should be allowed to have any play. For every offence, a drastic measure cannot be thought of. Similarly, an offender cannot be allowed to be treated with leniency solely on the ground of discretion vested in a court.The real requisite is to weigh the circumstances in which the crime has been committed and other concomitant factors which we have indicated hereinbefore and also have been stated in a number of pronouncements by this Court. On such touchstone, the sentences are to be imposed. The discretion should not be in the realm of fancy. It should be embedded in the conceptual essence of just punishment." [Emphasis supplied] 2. Seven years prior to that, in Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat [(2006) 2 SCC 359 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 499], it has been held that:- (SCC pp. 361-62, paras 7-8) "7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross-cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and the courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice of "order" should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated that: 18 "State of criminal law continues to be-as it should be-a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society." Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration. 8. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law, and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed, etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N.[(1991) 3 SCC 471 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 724]" [Emphasis supplied] And again: (SCC p. 363, para 13) “13….The court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which the criminal and the victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should "respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal". 30. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, the evidence available on record and also in view of the aforesaid judgment of Raj bala (Supra) we are of the considered opinion that ends of justice would meet if the appellant is sentence for the offence under Section 4(2) of the POCSO Act is being reduced for RI for 20 years with fine of Rs.1000/-instead of RI for life till his natural life. Thus, while maintaining the conviction of the appellant for all the offences, he is now being sentenced in the following manner: 19 Sl. No. Conviction U/s Sentence 1 377 IPC Imprisonment for 10 years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default, one month RI 2 323 IPC Imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs.100/-, in default one month RI 3 506 IPC Imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs.100/-, in default one month RI 4 4 (2) of POCSO Act RI for 20 years with fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine amount, additional RI for one month. All the sentences are directed to run concurrently. 31. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The appellant is stated to be in jail since 17.10.2019. He shall serve out the entire sentence as modified/altered by this court. 32. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 33. The records of the case along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice inder