1 CGHC010313002026 2026:CGHC:38032-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPCR No. 502 of 2026 1 - Rani Bai W/o Lallu Lodhi, Aged About 47 Years, R/o Village Birejhar, Police Station Bori, District- Durg (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh, Through The Secretary, Department Of Home/ Jail, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Secretary, Department of Law, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Director General (Jail), The Jail and Correctional Services, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 4 - Chhattisgarh Rajya Dandadesh Punarvilokan Board Through Its Secretary, Office At Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 5 - Superintendent of Police, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 6 - District Magistrate/ Collector Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 7 - Jail Superintendent, Central Jail Durg, District Durg (C.G.) ---- Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.08.25 22:27:34 +0530 2 For Petitioner : Mr. Anshuman Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondents/State : Mr. Saumya Rai, Deputy Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J. 25.08.2026 1. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the legality and validity of the order dated 06.04.2026 (Annexure P/1), whereby the application preferred by the petitioner for grant of remission/premature release has been rejected by the respondent authorities, primarily on the basis of an adverse opinion furnished by the District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police, without assigning cogent reasons and without due consideration of the relevant factors governing such exercise. 2. The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking the following relief(s):- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue writ of certiorari setting aside the impugned order dated 06-04-2026 (Annexure P-1) passed by the respondent No.1 and may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent state authority to prematurely release the petitioner, in accordance with law, in the interest of Justice. 3 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief, as it may deems fit and appropriate.” 3. The facts of the case in brief are that, the petitioner is a life convict and is presently serving her sentence as Convicted Prisoner No.448/22 at Central Jail, Durg, District Durg (C.G.). The petitioner was prosecuted in connection with the murder of one Lalli Bai and for assault in relation to a demand of dowry, and was charged for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 302 read with Section 34 and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. After a detailed trial, the learned trial Court, vide judgment dated 31.03.2014 passed in Sessions Trial No.62/2011, convicted the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced her to undergo life imprisonment with fine of Rs.1,000/-, and further convicted and sentenced her under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code to undergo three years' imprisonment. The petitioner was arrested on 14.01.2011 and has remained in custody since then. The conviction and sentence have attained finality, as the criminal appeal preferred by the petitioner before this Court bearing CRA No.359/2024 was dismissed vide judgment dated 19.02.2019, and the Special Leave Petition preferred thereafter before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was also dismissed vide order dated 23.02.2022. It is the case of the petitioner that she has undergone about 19 years of incarceration and, upon completion of the requisite 4 period, her case was considered for remission/premature release in terms of Rule 358 of the Chhattisgarh Prisoners Rules, 1968 and Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. During such consideration, the respondent No.7/Jail Superintendent forwarded a favourable recommendation for remission to the competent authority and sought the opinion of the learned Presiding Judge vide memo dated 06.05.2025. The learned Sessions Judge, Durg, also furnished a favourable opinion vide memo dated 22.05.2025. However, thereafter, the matter was placed before the competent Board, which, on the basis of the opinions of the District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police, expressed an adverse view on the ground that there was an apprehension of breach of peace in the event of the petitioner’s release. Relying upon the said adverse opinion, the respondent No.1, vide impugned order dated 06.04.2026, rejected the petitioner’s case for remission. It is, therefore, the grievance of the petitioner that the impugned order has been passed mechanically, without proper and independent consideration of the relevant factors governing remission, which has necessitated filing of the present writ petition. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that, the impugned order dated 06.04.2026 is wholly arbitrary, cryptic and suffers from non-application of mind, inasmuch as the application for remission has been rejected solely on the basis of an adverse opinion furnished by the District Magistrate and the Senior 5 Superintendent of Police, without independent consideration of relevant factors as mandated under law. It is contended that the petitioner has undergone more than the requisite period of incarceration and has earned remission, and her case was duly recommended by the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Durg. However, the respondent authorities have failed to consider the petitioner’s conduct in jail, her reformation, likelihood of recidivism, and the object of premature release. In this regard, reliance is placed on Laxman Naskar v. Union of India, (2000) 2 SCC 595, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that while considering premature release, the appropriate Government must examine factors such as (i) whether the offence affects society at large, (ii) the probability of the crime being repeated, (iii) the potential of the convict to commit crimes in future, (iv) whether any fruitful purpose would be served by keeping the convict in prison, and (v) the socio-economic condition of the convict’s family. ******* It is further submitted that the respondent authorities have failed to adhere to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Chander v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr., AIR 2022 SC 2017 : (2022) 4 SCR 1103, wherein it has been reiterated that the opinion of the Presiding Judge must reflect objective consideration of the aforesaid factors and cannot be a mere reiteration of the nature of the offence. Further reliance is placed on Rajo v. State of Bihar, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1068, 6 wherein it has been held that the opinion of the Presiding Judge is only one of the inputs and cannot be given primacy if it merely reiterates the circumstances of conviction, and that the appropriate Government is required to take a holistic view including post-conviction conduct of the prisoner. Learned counsel has also relied upon State of Haryana v. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216 and Union of India v. V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors., (2016) 7 SCC 1 to contend that remission powers must be exercised in a fair, reasonable and non-arbitrary manner. It is thus submitted that the impugned order, being contrary to the settled principles of law, deserves to be set aside and the matter be remitted for fresh consideration in accordance with law. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State/ respondents while opposing the petition, submits that the impugned order dated 06.04.2026 has been passed strictly in accordance with law and after due consideration of the relevant materials available on record. It is contended that the petitioner has been convicted for a heinous and grave offence under Sections 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, involving a well-planned conspiracy to commit murder, and therefore, the nature and seriousness of the offence are relevant considerations while examining a case for remission. It is further submitted that the competent authority has considered the opinion of the District Magistrate, the Senior Superintendent of Police, as well as the Presiding Judge, as required under Section 432(2) of 7 Cr.P.C., and upon due evaluation of such inputs, has arrived at a conscious decision to reject the application for premature release. Hence, no interference is warranted in exercise of writ jurisdiction. ******* It is further argued that grant of remission is not a matter of right, but lies within the discretionary domain of the appropriate Government, to be exercised on the basis of relevant considerations including public interest and societal impact. In this regard, reliance is placed on State of Haryana v. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216 and Union of India v. V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors., (2016) 7 SCC 1, to contend that the power of remission must be exercised cautiously, keeping in view the gravity of the offence and its impact on society. Learned State counsel would submit that merely because the petitioner has completed a certain period of incarceration or earned remission, she does not become entitled to premature release as a matter of right. It is thus submitted that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the present petition deserves to be dismissed. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the pleadings, annexures and the material available on record. 7. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds that the impugned order dated 06.04.2026 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The rejection of the petitioner’s application for 8 premature release is founded primarily on adverse opinions of the District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police, without any independent application of mind by the competent authority to the relevant statutory and judicially settled parameters governing remission. 8. It is well-settled that while exercising powers under Sections 432 and 433 Cr.P.C., the appropriate Government is required to take a holistic and reasoned decision. The law on the subject has been succinctly laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laxman Naskar (supra), wherein the Court identified the guiding factors for grant of premature release. The relevant portion reads: “The following factors are required to be considered: (i) whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large; (ii) whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing crime; (iii) whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime; (iv) whether any fruitful purpose is being served by keeping the convict in prison; and (v) socio- economic condition of the convict’s family.” 9. In the present case, there is no discussion whatsoever of the aforesaid parameters in the impugned order. The authority has failed to evaluate the petitioner’s conduct during incarceration, her reformation, or the likelihood of recidivism. 9 10. Further, in Ram Chander (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphasized that the opinion sought under Section 432(2) Cr.P.C. must be based on objective assessment and not merely on the nature of the offence. The Court observed: “The opinion of the Presiding Judge must reflect due application of mind to the relevant factors and cannot be a mere reiteration of the nature of the offence or the findings recorded at the time of conviction.” 11. Similarly, in Rajo (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the opinion of the Presiding Judge or other authorities is only one of the inputs and cannot be treated as determinative. It was held: “The appropriate Government is required to take an independent decision based on all relevant considerations including post- conviction conduct; the opinion of the Presiding Judge cannot be given primacy if it merely reiterates the circumstances of conviction.” 12. In the present case, the impugned order reflects a mechanical reliance on adverse opinions without independent evaluation. Such an approach defeats the very purpose of remission, which is rooted in the reformative theory of punishment. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagdish (supra) has held: 10 “The policy of remission is a reformative measure and should be applied in a fair and reasonable manner. The decision must not be arbitrary but based on relevant considerations.” 14. Likewise, in V. Sriharan (supra), it has been observed: “Though the power of remission is discretionary, it must be exercised in a just, fair and reasonable manner, and cannot be exercised arbitrarily or on extraneous considerations.” 15. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the respondent authorities have failed to discharge their statutory obligation. The impugned order is cryptic, non-speaking, and suffers from non-application of mind, as it does not reflect consideration of the petitioner’s long incarceration, jail conduct, reformation, or other relevant factors. 16. It is also pertinent to note that the petitioner has undergone more than the requisite period of incarceration and her case was duly recommended by the Jail Superintendent. There is nothing on record to indicate any adverse conduct during incarceration or any likelihood of threat to society upon release. 17. In view of the foregoing analysis and the settled legal position, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 06.04.2026 (Annexure P/1) is arbitrary, unsustainable and liable to 11 be set aside. 18. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 06.04.2026 is hereby quashed. 19. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has undergone substantial period of incarceration, has earned remission, has maintained satisfactory conduct in jail, and there is no material indicating likelihood of recidivism, this Court deems it appropriate to direct the respondent authorities to grant the benefit of premature release to the petitioner. 20. The respondents are, therefore, directed to release the petitioner forthwith, if not required in any other case, in accordance with law. 21. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Aadil