1 CGHC010328752026 2026:CGHC:37781-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2216 of 2026 Md. Sabir S/o Siddhiqui Aged About 63 Years R/o Mominpura , Ambikapur, P.S.- Ambikapur, District -Surguja Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer Police Station - Ambikapur Kotwali, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh. 2 - District Magistrate, Ambikapur, Dist Sarguja, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Mateen Siddiqui, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Waquar Naiyer, Advocate For Respondents/State : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 24/08/2026 1. Heard Mr. Mateen Siddiqui, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Waquar Naiyer, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Govt. Advocate appearing for the State. VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.08.25 22:08:19 +0530 2 2. The petitioner has preferred the present petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of FIR dated 07.10.1992 registered as Crime No.694/1992 at Police Station Ambikapur Kotwali, District Surguja, the charge-sheet dated 23.06.2026, the order dated 25.06.2026 taking cognizance passed by the learned Special Judge (PC Act), Surguja, Ambikapur, and the order dated 06.05.2026 directing further investigation and filing of charge- sheet, in connection with offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 34 of the IPC and Sections 13(1)(D) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 3. The petitioner has filed the present petition with the following prayer:- "It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to allow this petition and quash the F.I.R. Dated 07.10.1992 & Charge-sheet Dated 23.06.2026 in crime No.694/92 for the offence under section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B, 34 of Indian Penal Code & Section 13(1)(D) read with section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 at Police Station Kotawali, Ambikapur, Sarguja, further to quash the cognizance order Dated Dated 25.06.2026 passed by the Special Judge (PC Act), Sarguja, Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh in Special Criminal case no. 03/2026, and further to quash the Impugned Order Dated 06.05.2026 passed in different criminal case no. 34/2025 by the Special Judge (PC Act), Sarguja, Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh so far as it relates to the petitioner herein, in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice." 3 4. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the petitioner was posted as Grade-II Clerk in the Land Acquisition Department, Ambikapur, while co-accused Amir Ali was posted as Joint Collector/Land Acquisition Officer. Pursuant to land acquisition proceedings concerning land bearing Khasra No.478 at Village Rewapur, compensation of Rs.12,840.55/- was awarded to the landowner Amarsai. It is alleged that, in the year 1992, the cheque prepared by the petitioner was retained by co-accused Amir Ali, who allegedly altered the amount from Rs.12,840.55/- to Rs.5,12,840.55/-, deposited the same in a fictitious savings account opened in the name of Amarsai at the Post Office, Court Branch, Ambikapur, and withdrew the enhanced amount. 5. On the basis of the alleged fraudulent withdrawal, FIR was registered on 07.10.1992 as Crime No.694/1992 at Police Station Ambikapur Kotwali for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 120-B of the IPC and Sections 13(1)(D) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The petitioner contends that no prosecution sanction was granted against him and that a closure report was filed in his favour; however, the learned Special Judge did not accept the closure report and directed further investigation, pursuant to which the charge-sheet dated 23.06.2026 was filed against him and cognizance was taken on 25.06.2026. The petitioner has, therefore, approached this Court seeking quashing of the FIR, charge-sheet and consequential orders. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the present case and that no prosecution 4 sanction was ever granted against him. It is contended that the sanction order dated 08.06.2016 specifically sanctioned prosecution only against co-accused Amir Ali and Anup Kumar Kashyap, and the petitioner was not named therein. Further, the police had earlier informed the authorities that no charge-sheet had been filed against the petitioner and that a closure report had been submitted in his favour. 7. Learned counsel would further submit that this Court, vide order dated 23.07.2025 passed in Cr.M.P. No.2228/2025, had already taken note of the State's submission that a closure report had been filed in respect of the petitioner. Despite the same, the investigating agency subsequently filed a charge-sheet against him and the learned trial Court did not accept the closure report and directed further investigation. It is argued that the subsequent proceedings are contrary to the earlier order of this Court and that, in the absence of any prima facie material connecting the petitioner with the alleged offence, the FIR, charge-sheet and consequential orders deserve to be quashed in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023. 8. Learned State counsel would oppose the petition and submit that the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of cognizable offences involving fraudulent preparation and withdrawal of the land acquisition compensation amount. It is contended that the matter relates to an incident of the year 1992 and, after investigation, the charge-sheet has now been filed against the petitioner for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 34 of the IPC and the relevant 5 provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The disputed questions regarding the petitioner's role and the evidentiary material cannot appropriately be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS at this stage. He would further submit that the earlier order dated 23.07.2025 passed in Cr.M.P. No.2228/2025 was based upon the submission then made that a closure report had been filed in respect of the petitioner. Subsequently, the investigating agency has filed the charge-sheet dated 23.06.2026 pursuant to further proceedings, and cognizance has been taken by the learned Special Judge. Therefore, the State would submit that the petitioner may raise all his factual and legal objections before the learned trial Court and that no ground for exercising the inherent jurisdiction of this Court for quashing the entire criminal proceedings is made out. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution against the petitioner cannot be permitted to continue. The FIR relates to an occurrence of the year 1992, whereas the charge-sheet has been filed only in the year 2026, after approximately 34 years. The petitioner has not been shown to have contributed to such extraordinary delay. The constitutional principle recognised by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225, requires the Court, while determining whether there has been undue delay, to consider all the attendant circumstances, including the length of the 6 delay, the reasons therefor, the responsibility for such delay and the prejudice caused to the accused. The following observations are relevant to the controversy involved in the present case:— 86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are: * * * (2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view. (3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are: * * * (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise. 7 * * * (5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on what is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one. (6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker 22 "it cannot be said how long a delay is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate". The same idea has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell 38 in the following words: '... the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its essential ingredients; and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the 8 fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case. 11. The principle laid down in Mahendra Lal Das v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 149 and Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 16 SCC 117, also reinforces that unreasonable delay attributable to the prosecution cannot be ignored while examining whether continuation of criminal proceedings would be consistent with the guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The present case involves a delay of approximately three and a half decades, and there is no material demonstrating that such delay was occasioned on account of any conduct of the petitioner. The petitioner continued in Government service and subsequently superannuated, while the investigation remained pending for several decades. 12. The recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R.L. Chongthu v. State of Bihar 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2511, assumes particular significance. The Supreme Court recognised that timely completion of investigation is intrinsically connected with Article 21 and that an accused cannot be subjected indefinitely to the uncertainty and anxiety arising from a prolonged criminal investigation. The Court also recognised the availability of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS/Section 482 of the CrPC in an appropriate case where investigation has continued for an unduly long period without adequate justification. The said judgment 9 further demonstrates that delay is to be examined cumulatively with the other circumstances of the case and is not required to be treated in isolation. 13. Similarly, in Sahil Abdulsattar Mansuri v. Safimahamad Fafirbhai Mansuri, 2026 SCC Online 1073, the Supreme Court has reiterated the constitutional significance of timely investigation and its connection with Article 21. The Court emphasised that the right to speedy trial encompasses timely completion of investigation and that an unexplained and inordinate delay cannot be permitted to continue merely because the investigating agency ultimately proposes to complete the investigation. Though the factual matrix of the said case is different, the constitutional principle laid down therein is clearly attracted to the present case, where the investigation remained pending for approximately 34 years. 14. We are conscious that the aforesaid judgments do not lay down that delay, by itself and irrespective of other circumstances, automatically results in quashing of every criminal prosecution. However, the present case does not rest upon delay alone. The extraordinary period of approximately 34 years has to be considered along with the absence of any demonstrated contribution by the petitioner to such delay, the prejudice caused by the passage of time, the absence of prosecution sanction against the petitioner, the earlier representation made before this Court regarding filing of a closure report in his favour, and the absence of clear material disclosing his conscious participation in the alleged offences. 15. The submission of the State that the petitioner should face trial merely 10 because a charge-sheet has been filed also cannot be accepted as an absolute proposition. As recognised in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu (supra), the eventual filing of a charge-sheet does not, by itself, render the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court unavailable. Section 528 of the BNSS continues to empower this Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice. The question, therefore, is not merely whether a charge-sheet has been filed, but whether, in the peculiar facts of the present case, continuation of the prosecution would itself result in manifest injustice. 16. In the present case, the prosecution alleges manipulation of the compensation amount payable to Amarsai and fraudulent withdrawal of the enhanced amount. The petitioner was posted as a Grade-II Clerk in the Land Acquisition Department. The material placed before this Court, however, does not disclose any clear and specific act demonstrating that the petitioner himself altered the cheque, participated in the alleged impersonation, withdrew the disputed amount or derived any benefit therefrom. The distinction between an official act or alleged procedural irregularity and conscious participation in a criminal conspiracy or fraudulent transaction cannot be lost sight of. 17. The issue relating to prosecution sanction further strengthens the case of the petitioner. The sanction order dated 08.06.2016 specifically sanctioned prosecution against co-accused Amir Ali and Anup Kumar Kashyap, but did not grant sanction for prosecution of the present petitioner. The Station In-charge, Kotwali Ambikapur, subsequently informed the Additional Collector that no sanction order had been 11 passed for prosecuting the petitioner. Thus, the statutory safeguard of sanction, which assumes particular significance in a prosecution against a public servant in respect of acts connected with official duties, was not shown to have been complied with in relation to the petitioner. 18. The earlier order dated 23.07.2025 passed by this Court in Cr.M.P. No.2228/2025 also cannot be ignored. In those proceedings, the State had submitted that prosecution sanction had been granted against two other co-accused persons, whereas no sanction had been granted against the present petitioner and that a closure report had been filed in respect of him. On the basis of the said submission, the petition was disposed of as having become infructuous. The subsequent filing of the charge-sheet against the petitioner, therefore, has to be examined in the backdrop of the aforesaid position earlier placed before this Court. 19. The Court is also conscious that the alleged occurrence dates back to the year 1992. As observed in Abdul Rehman Antulay (supra), the question of prejudice caused by delay is an important consideration in determining whether the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial has been violated. After approximately 34 years, the availability of witnesses, preservation of records and recollection of events inevitably become matters of serious concern. The petitioner cannot be compelled to face the rigours of a criminal trial after such an extraordinary lapse of time where the delay is not shown to be attributable to him and where the material against him itself does not disclose clear and specific criminal participation. 20. Thus, considering the principles laid down in Abdul Rehman Antulay (supra), Mahendra Lal Das (supra), Pankaj Kumar (supra), Robert 12 Lalchungnunga Chongthu (supra) and Sahil Abdulsattar Mansuri (supra), we are of the considered opinion that the present case falls within the exceptional category warranting exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS. The extraordinary and unexplained delay, the constitutional prejudice arising therefrom, the absence of prosecution sanction against the petitioner, the earlier representation regarding closure of the case in his favour, and the absence of specific material demonstrating his conscious and intentional participation in the alleged offences, when considered cumulatively, constitute sufficient grounds for interference. 21. Before parting, it is appropriate to observe that investigation is not an open-ended statutory exercise. The power of the State to investigate an offence carries with it a corresponding constitutional obligation to conduct and conclude the investigation with reasonable expedition. As recognised by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, the right to speedy investigation and trial forms an integral part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The sword of criminal prosecution cannot be permitted to remain hanging over an individual for decades on account of unexplained institutional delay. In an appropriate case, the High Court is competent to intervene under Section 528 of the BNSS to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of law. 22. Consequently, FIR registered as Crime No.694/1992 at Police Station Ambikapur Kotwali, District Surguja, charge-sheet No.255-A/2026 dated 23.06.2026 and the consequential order dated 25.06.2026 taking cognizance passed by the learned Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Surguja, Ambikapur, in Special Criminal Case 13 No.03/2026, insofar as they relate to the present petitioner, are hereby quashed and set aside. The proceedings arising therefrom against the petitioner for the alleged offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 13(1)(D) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, shall accordingly stand quashed. 23. It is made clear that the present order is confined to the prosecution of the present petitioner and shall not affect the proceedings, if any, against the other accused persons, which shall proceed in accordance with law and on their own merits. 24. The petition is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid terms. All pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice ved