- 1 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF JULY, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA WRIT PETITION NO. 5057 OF 2023 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: 1. MR. A.D. RAMANANDA S/O LATE A.G. DORAISWAMY AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS R/A NO.232, 3RD BLOCK, 53RD B CROSS, SRI SIVANANDA NILAYA, RAJAJINAGAR, BENGALURU - 560 010. 2. MANJU BYRAL R S/O RUDRAPPA AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS R/A NO.232, 3RD BLOCK 53RD B CROSS, SRI SIVANANDA NILAYA RAJAJINAGAR, BENGALURU - 560 010. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI. A.D. RAMANANDA, PETITIONER NO.1 PARTY-IN- PERSON; SRI. PRASIDDARAJ, ADVOCATE FOR P2) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDI M.S. BUILDING Digitally signed by PADMAVATHI B K Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 BANGALORE - 560 001. 2. THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER HALSURGATE POLICE STATION REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU - 560 010. 3. MRS. MANJULA W/O RAGHAVENDRA AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS R/AT NO.-204, 2ND FLOOR "DASTHA", NORTH AVENUE 2ND CROSS, DOLLARS COLONY RMV 2ND STAGE, BENGALURU - 560 094. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. DEEPTHI ALVA, HCGP FOR R1 AND R2; SRI. JEEVAN K, ADVOCATE FOR R3) THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA AND R/W SEC. 482 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASHING THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS PENDING ON THE FILE OF 1ST A.C.M.M. COURT IN C.C. NO. 38211/2022 FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE U/S 325, 323, 354, 341, 509, 504, 506, AND READ WITH SECTION 35 OF IPC VIDE ANNX-O IN RESPECT OF THE PETITIONER AND ETC., THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN 'B' GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: - 3 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioners are accused Nos.1 and 2 are before the Court calling in question the proceedings in CC.No.38211/2022 registered for offences punishable under Sections 325, 323, 354, 341, 509, 504, 506 read with Section 35 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('the IPC' for short). 2. Heard Sri. A.D. Ramananda, petitioner No.1, party- in-person; Sri. Prasiddaraj, learned counsel appearing for petitioner No.2; Smt. Deepthi Alva, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondents No.1 and 2 and Sri. Jeevan K., learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3. 3. Facts in brief germane are as follows: The petitioners are practicing advocates. The third respondent is the complainant. On 16.07.2022, it is the allegation of the petitioners that they were blocked by the third respondent and her associates in entering the Magistrate's Court unit at about 10.45 a.m. The son of the third respondent is said to have begun certain altercation with the petitioners - 4 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 and large gathering of advocates happened in the Court premises. The third respondent is said to have apologized to the first petitioner on account of his behaviour, which led to the aforesaid altercation. The second petitioner after parking the car and attended the Court proceedings, moved away. Four days later, the third respondent registers a complaint before the jurisdictional Police alleging the incident that took place on 16.07.2022 against first petitioner and the junior of first petitioner that they had tried to outrage the complainant's modesty and has also assaulted the complainant. Simultaneously, a complaint is registered before the Karnataka State Bar Council, even. The complaint becomes a crime in crime No.182/2022. The Police then conduct investigation and file a charge sheet against the petitioners for all the aforesaid offences. The concerned Court takes cognizance of the offence and therefore, the petitioners are before this Court in the subject petition. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would vehemently contend that the incident is said to have happened in the Court premises, which is highly improbable. - 5 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 The wound certificate is issued on 22.09.2022 for an incident that took place on 16.07.2022. Therefore, there was no examination on the said day itself. At every step, the complainant has improved the version. The learned counsel would further submit that the charge sheet witnesses i.e., the material witnesses said to be CW3 has rendered inconsistent statements, which are discernable in the charge sheet and the medical record. The charge sheet omits the addresses and the mobile number that the medical certificate discloses. On all these counts, he would submit that there is no ingredient of the offence that is said to have occurred on the said date, as no prudent person can conclude that the offence has committed in the Court premises. There is no CCTV footage collected of the incident. The incident was just an altercation. The documents are all generated at a later point in time. 5. The learned counsel representing the third respondent/complainant would refute the submission in contenting that the Police have conducted a detailed investigation and have filed a charge sheet. The inconsistencies in the incident, if any, should be projected only before the - 6 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 concerned Court, as it would be a matter of trial for the petitioners to come out clean in its full-blown form. He would further submit that the incident did happen on the said day, but the wound certificate is taken after two months, owing to certain problems that the complainant faced for about two months. The learned counsel would thus submit that the proceedings must not be obliterated, but trial must be permitted to be continued. 6. The learned High Court Government Pleader would also toe the lines of the learned counsel appearing for the complainant in contending that the trial must be permitted to be continued, as the Police after investigation have filed a charge sheet and prima facie the offences are met. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 8. The afore-narrated facts, dates and the link in the chain of event are all a matter of record. What drives the petitioners to this Court in the subject petition is the - 7 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 proceedings in CC.No.38211/2022. Since the entire issue has triggered from the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. The complaint reads as follows: "ರವೆ, ೕ ಇನ ೆಕ ಹಲಸೂರು ೇ ೕ ಾೆ ೆಂಗಳರು ನಗರ ಇಂದ, ಮಂಜುಳ w/o ರಘ#ೇಂದ$ 52 ವಷ& #ಾಸ ನಂ 204, 2'ೇ ಮಹ( ')ಾ*ಾ+' 'ಾ,& ಅ.ನೂ/ 2'ೇ 0ಾ$ 1ಾಲ & 0ಾ2ೋ3 RMV 2'ೇ ಹಂತ, ೆಂ-94, Ph-9902264647 5ಾನ/6ೇ. .ಷಯ: ನನ8 9ಾಗೂ ನನ8 ಮಗ'ಾದ ಹಷ& 9ಾಗೂ ನಮ: 1ೆ;ವ #ೆಂಕ<ೇಶ ರವರ >ೕ2ೆ, ಹ2ೆ? 5ಾ(ರುವ ವ@ೕಲರುಗAಾದ ರ5ಾನಂB 9ಾಗೂ ಅವರ ಜೂ3ಯ ರವರುಗಳ .ರುದC 3ೕ(ದ ದೂರು. >ೕ2ೆ DEFದ .Aಾಸದ? 'ಾನು ನನ8 ಸಂ*ಾರ ಸ>ೕತ#ಾG #ಾಸ#ಾGದುH ಸ5ಾಜ *ೇ#ೆಯ? IೊಡGF0ೊಂ()ೆHೕ#ೆ. 'ಾನು ಮತು+ ನನ8 ಮಗ ಹಷ&ರವರು K'ಾಂಕ 16/07/ M ರಂದು ೆEೆL ಸು5ಾರು 10-45 ಗಂ<ೆ ಸಮಯದ? 5ಾನ/ 24'ೇ A C M M 'ಾ/Mಾಲಯದ? C.C.No 17501/13 ರ? .Nಾರೆೆ 9ಾಜ6ಾಗಲು ನೃಪತುಂಗ ರ*ೆ+ಯ? 5ಾ/Q*ೆRೕ 'ಾ/Mಾಲಯದ ೇ ಬE ನಮ: - 8 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 ಎ2ೆಂಟ$ 0ಾನ? ಬಂKದುH ೇ ಬE ಇದH #ಾV 5ಾ/W 0ಾೆ ಒಳೆ ಪ$#ೇಶ.ಲ? ಎಂದು DEFದHಂದ 'ಾನು 0ಾ3ಂದ ಇEಯುDದುH ಅ)ೇ ಸಮಯದ? KA170419 1 20 0ಾನ? Yಂ)ೆ ಬಂದ ವ@ೕಲ6ೊಬZರು ಪ)ೇ ಪ)ೇ 9ಾರW 5ಾಡುD+ದುH ಅದ0ೆ[ ಮಗ ಒಂದು 3\ಷ 0ಾಯುವಂIೆ 0ೈIೋF)ಾಗ ವ@ೕಲರು 0ಾ3ಂದ ಇEದು ಬಂದು ನಮ:ನು8 ಅಡ^ಗ_ ಏ0ಾ ಏ@ೕ ಅ#ಾಚ/ ಶಬHಗEಂದ ಅಮ:W ಎಂದು ೈಯುIಾ+ ನನೇ 0ೈ IೋಸುD+ೕMಾ ಅನು8Iಾ+, ಇದH@[ದHಂIೆ ನನ8 ಮಗ3ೆ bೋ6ಾG 9ೊ1ೆದು ಪcನಃ 0ಾ 1ೋ Iೆೆದು ನನ8 ಮಗನನು8 ಎAೆದು0ೊಂಡದHಲ?)ೆ 0ಾನ?ದH ಇತರ 2-3 ಜನ ವ@ೕಲರುಗಳe ಸಹ *ೇ0ೊಂಡು ನನ8 ಮಗ3ಗ 0ೈfಂದ 9ೊ1ೆಯುIಾ+ ಹ2ೆ? 5ಾ(ರುIಾ+6ೆ. ಈ ಗ2ಾ<ೆಯನು8 h(ಸಲು 'ಾನು 9ೋ)ಾಗ ಸು5ಾರು 50 ವಷ&ದ ವ@ೕಲರು ನನ8 ಬಲೈ ೆರಳeಗಳನು8 Dರುi, ನನ8ನು8 9ೊ1ೆದು ನನ8 >ೕಲೂ ಸಹ ಹ2ೆ? 5ಾ(ರುIಾ+6ೆ. ನಂತರ 0ಾ3ಂದ bೋ6ಾG ಒKHರುIಾ+6ೆ ಮತು+ ಅ#ಾಚ/ ಶಬHಗEಂದ ನನ8ನು8 ೈKರುIಾ+6ೆ. ನಮ: ಗ2ಾ<ೆ h(ಸಲು ಬಂದ ನಮ: 0ಾ 1ೆ;ವ #ೆಂಕ<ೇj ರವೆ ಇ)ೇ ವ@ೕಲರುಗಳe ಹ2ೆ? 5ಾ(ದುH ಅವೆ ಮೂಗು 9ಾಗೂ @.ಗEಂದ ರಕ+ ಬಂKತು. ಇಷಕೂ[ ಸುಮ:'ಾಗದ ವ@ೕಲರುಗಳe ನಮ:ನು8 ನನ8 ಮಗನನು8 ಎAೆ)ಾ( 0ಾ3ಂದ ಒKHರುIಾ+6ೆ. ಆಗ ಅ2ೆ? ಇದH *ಾವ&ಜ3ಕರು 9ಾಗೂ ೕೕಸರು ಗ2ಾ<ೆಯನು8 h(F ಕEF0ೊ_ದುH ನಂತರ 'ಾನು ಮತು+ ನನ8 ಮಗ ಹಷ& 'ಾ/Mಾಲಯದ? .Nಾರೆಯನು8 ಮುGF0ೊಂಡು ಬರು#ಾಗ 5ಾನ/ 'ಾ/Mಾlೕಶಗೂ ವ@ೕಲರು ಹ2ೆ? 5ಾ(ದ .Nಾರವನು8 DEFರುIೆ+ೕ#ೆ. ಆಗ 'ಾ/Mಾlೕಸರು ೕ ಾೆೆ 9ೋG ದೂರು 3ೕಡುವಂIೆ 9ೇEದರು ನಂತರ 'ಾನು ನನ8 ಮಗ'ಾದ ಹಷ&. 0ಾ 1ೆ;ವ #ೆಂಕ<ೇj ಎಲ?ರೂ .0ೋMಾ ಆಸmIೆ$ೆ IೆರE i@Iೆ ಪ1ೆದು0ೊಮ(ದುH *ೈನn 0ಾo& ೆ ೆ<ಾGದHಂದ #ೈದ/ರು .pಾ$ಂD Iೆೆದು0ೊಳqಲು DEFರುIಾ+6ೆ. - 9 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 ನಂತರ .pಾ$ಂD ಪ1ೆದು0ೊಂಡು ಬಂದು ೕ ಾೆಯ? ಈ Kನ ದೂರು 3ೕಡುDದುH ನನ8 ಮಗ ನಮ: >ೕ2ೆ ಹ2ೆ? 5ಾ(ರುವ ವ@ೕಲರುಗಳ ಬೆL 0ೋ& ಬE .Nಾಸ2ಾG ಅವರ 9ೆಸರು ಛ ಗಳe ಎಂದು DEದು ಬಂKರುತ+)ೆ. ಆದHಂದ 'ಾವc ಮೂರು ಜನರ >ೕ2ೆ ಹ2ೆ? 5ಾ( ಎAೆ)ಾ(ದHಲ?)ೆ ಾ$ಣ ೆದ0ೆ ಕೂಡ 9ಾ@ರುವ ರ5ಾನಂB 9ಾಗೂ ಅವರ ಜೂ3ಯ ಗಳ >ೕ2ೆ 0ಾನೂನು ೕD ಸೂಕ+ ಕ$ಮ 0ೈೊಳqೇ0ೆಂದು 0ೇE0ೊEqIೆ+ೕ#ೆ." The incident is said to have happened on 16.07.2022. The incident depicts injuries being caused to the complainant. The wound certificate is issued not immediately, but on 16.09.2022 on the score that the complainant had been seen on 16.07.2022, itself. The wound certificate depicts certain injuries to be simple in nature. The Police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet against the petitioners. The summary of the charge sheet as obtaining in clause No.17 reads as follows: "17. 0ೇFನ 0ೇFನ 0ೇFನ 0ೇFನ ಸಂtಪ+ ಸಂtಪ+ ಸಂtಪ+ ಸಂtಪ+ *ಾ6ಾಂಶ *ಾ6ಾಂಶ *ಾ6ಾಂಶ *ಾ6ಾಂಶ )ೋuಾ6ೋಪಾ ಪ_ 0ಾಲಂ-12ರ? ನಮೂKFರುವ ಆ6ೋvಗಳe K'ಾಂಕ:-16.07.2022 ರಂದು ೆEೆL, ಸು5ಾರು 10.45 ಗಂ<ೆಯ ಸಮಯದ?, *ಾt-01 w$ೕಮD ಮಂಜುAಾರವರು *ಾt-02 ಮತು+ *ಾt- 03 ರವರ bೊIೆಯ? 5ಾನ/ 24'ೇ ಎFಎಂಎಂ 'ಾ/Mಾಲಯದ? FF ನಂ-1750/2013 ರ .Nಾರೆೆ 9ಾಜ6ಾಗಲು ತಮ: ಎ2ೆಂ<ಾ$ 0ಾನ? ನೃಪತುಂಗ ರ*ೆ+ಯ?ರುವ 5ಾ/Q*ೆRೕ 0ೋ& ನ ೇ ಬE ಬಂ)ಾಗ ೇ ಬE ಪ$#ೇಶ.ಲ?#ೆಂದು DEFದHಂದ *ಾt-01 ರವರು - 10 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 0ಾ3ಂದ ಇEಯುD+)ಾHಗ Yಂ)ೆ 0ಾನ?ದH ಎ1 ಮತು+ ಎ2 ಆ6ೋvಗಳe 9ಾರW 5ಾಡುD+ದುH *ಾt-02 ರವರು ಒಂದು 3\ಷ 0ಾಯುವಂIೆ 0ೈ ಸ'ೆ8 5ಾ()ಾಗ ಎ1 ಆ6ೋvಯು 0ಾ3ಂದ ಇEದು ಬಂದು ಏ0ಾಏ@ ಅ#ಾಚ/ ಶಬHಗEಂದ ೈಯ/ದ?)ೆ 0ೈಗEಂದ ಹ2ೆ? 5ಾ(ರುIಾ+6ೆ. 9ಾಗೂ *ಾt-02 ರವರನು8 h(ಸಲು ಬಂದ *ಾt-01 ರವೆ 0ೈ-0ಾಲುಗEಂದ ಹ2ೆ? 5ಾ(ದHಲ?)ೆ ಎ1 ಆ6ೋv *ಾt-01ರವರ 0ೈಯನು8 Y(ದು DರುiರುIಾ+6ೆ. 9ಾಗೂ *ಾt-03 ರವಗೂ ಕೂಡ ಎ1 ಮತು+ ಎ2 ಆ6ೋvಗಳe ಅ#ಾಚ/ ಶಬHಗEಂದ ೈದು 3ಂKF ಾ$ಣ ೆದ0ೆ 9ಾ@ ಹ2ೆ? 5ಾ(ರುವcದು *ಾxಾyಾರಗEಂದ 9ಾಗೂ #ೈದ/ರು 3ೕ(ರುವ ಾಯದ ಪ$5ಾಣ ಪತ$ದ ವರKfಂದ ಧೃಡಪ_ರುತ+)ೆ." The issue is completely shrouded with improbabilities, as the incidents are said to have happened in the Court premises. 9. The offences alleged are the ones punishable under Section 325 of the IPC. The Apex Court in the case of AVINASH SHETTY Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA, reported in (2004) 13 SCC 375, considers what could be a grievous hurt, as compared to a simple injury. The Apex Court has held as follows: "6. By going through the description of the wound certificate, it is not correct to say that the injury was a grievous one, as there was no fracture to the bone either of the middle finger or of the index finger of the left hand. There is also no case that the victim would have suffered severe body pain during the space of twenty days or would have - 11 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 been unable to follow his ordinary pursuits for that period. There is also no case that there was permanent privation of sight of either eye, permanent privation of hearing of either ear or privation of any member or joint or destruction or permanent impairing of the power of any member or joint. On a plain description of the wound, it would not be grievous hurt coming under Section 320 IPC. The opinion of the doctor that Injury 1 was grievous in nature was erroneous and it is only to be ignored. 7. Therefore the offence committed by the appellant would only come under Section 324 IPC. An application for compounding the offence under Section 320 CrPC is filed. The counsel for the complainant, PW 1 stated that he has no objection to compounding the offence." If the elucidation of law by the Apex Court is considered on the facts obtaining in the case at hand, reverse the conviction from Section 326 of the IPC to Section 324 of the IPC. The Apex Court observes what is grievous hurt and in the case at hand does not depict any kind of grievous hurt being caused, as the wound certificate itself is that the wounds inflicted are simple in nature. 10. The other offences are Sections 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC. The Apex Court in the case of MOHD. WAJID V. STATE OF U.P., reported in (2023) 20 SCC 219 has - 12 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 interpreted Sections 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC and has held as follows: "28. An offence under Section 503 has the following essentials: (1) Threatening a person with any injury; (i) to his person, reputation or property; or (ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested. (2) The threat must be with intent; (i) to cause alarm to that person; or (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or (iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat. 32. A bare perusal of Section 506 IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant." (emphasis supplied) 11. What remains is the offence under Section 509 of the IPC. What should be the ingredients of Section 509 of the IPC is explained by the Apex Court in the case of - 13 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 MADHUSHREE DATTA Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA, reported in (2025) 3 SCC 612. The Apex Court has held as follows: "Section 323 IPC 17. To determine what are the ingredients of the offence under Section 323 IPC, it is important to read Sections 319, 321 and 323 together. 18. What emerges on a conjoint reading of the aforementioned provisions is that, for a conviction under Section 323IPC, there must be a voluntary act of causing hurt i.e. bodily pain, disease, or infirmity, to another person. Therefore, it is essential that actual hurt is caused. 19. Turning to the facts of the case, the complaint merely states that the complainant was forcibly ejected from the Company's office by security personnel, who allegedly attempted to assault, physically harass, and threaten her with dire consequences. Therefore, the complaint does not directly attribute any voluntary act of causing hurt to the complainant by any of the two accused. 20. Furthermore, the charge-sheet reiterates the similar version set forth in the complaint, stating that the complainant was forcibly thrown out of the office by the security personnel. While the actions of the security personnel could potentially constitute an offence of causing hurt, they are neither named in the complaint nor figure as accused in the charge-sheet. Having said that, the appellants cannot be said to have foreseen or anticipated the actions of the security personnel in such a manner that would render them co-perpetrators of the offence. Hence, there is no basis for the prosecution to set forth the concept of liability of the employer or for the overt acts of its employees in this matter. - 14 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 21. In the light of the abovementioned discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the ingredients of offence under Section 323IPC have not been made out, prima facie, either in the complaint or the charge- sheet. Sections 504 and 509 IPC 22. The next question for determination is, whether the mere assertion of “filthy language” allegedly used by the appellants in scolding the complainant, is sufficient to establish commission of offences under Sections 504 and 509IPC. 23. In the above context, it would be apt to consider the provisions contained in Section 504IPC. 24. A perusal of Section 504IPC reveals that a mere act of insulting someone does not fulfil its requirements; the insult must be of such a nature that it provokes the person insulted to breach the public peace or engage in criminal conduct. Therefore, to establish the ingredients of Section 504IPC, it must be demonstrated, based on the available material, that there was intentional insult with the intent or knowledge that such insult would provoke either disturbance of the public peace or the commission of any other offence. 25. We may, at this juncture, profitably refer to the decision of this Court in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715 : AIR 2014 SC 957] , wherein Section 504IPC came up for interpretation and it was held as under : (SCC pp. 49-50, paras 13-14) “13. Section 504IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. : (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult - 15 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504IPC. 14. We may also indicate that it is not the law that the actual words or language should figure in the complaint. One has to read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult so as to provoke any person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, that is sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section 504IPC. It is not the law that a complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking the other person to commit any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which they are used, the person or persons to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504IPC.” (emphasis supplied) - 16 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 26. In the instant case, the charge-sheet states that the appellants used “filthy language” while scolding the complainant; however, no such allegation is made against the appellants in the complaint. Furthermore, it is nowhere alleged that this act of using filthy language and insulting the complainant by the appellants, has provoked the complainant to commit breach of public peace or to commit any other offence. Therefore, from the materials on record, the ingredients of the offence under Section 504IPC, as explained in the abovesaid decision, are not satisfied. 27. For ascertaining whether, prima facie, the provision of Section 509IPC was attracted, it is essential to first understand the meaning of the term “modesty”, to determine whether modesty has been insulted. While modesty is not explicitly defined in IPC, this Court has addressed the essence of a woman's modesty in the decision in Ramkripal v. State of M.P. [Ramkripal v. State of M.P., (2007) 11 SCC 265 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 674] Excerpts from the decision read as under : (SCC pp. 266-67, para 7) “7. … ‘12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined in IPC. The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this Section is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex.’ ” (emphasis supplied) 28. Further, this Court while discussing the test for outraging the modesty of a woman under Section 509IPC in Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, (1995) - 17 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] , observed as under : (SCC p. 206, para 15) “15. In State of Punjab v. Major Singh [State of Punjab v. Major Singh, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 51 : AIR 1967 SC 63] a question arose whether a female child of seven-and-a-half months could be said to be possessed of “modesty” which could be outraged. In answering the above question Mudholkar, J., who along with Bachawat, J. spoke for the majority, held that when any act done to or in the presence of a woman is clearly suggestive of sex according to the common notions of mankind that must fall within the mischief of Section 354IPC. Needless to say, the “common notions of mankind” referred to by the learned Judge have to be gauged by contemporary societal standards. The other learned Judge (Bachawat, J.) observed that the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex and from her very birth she possesses the modesty which is the attribute of her sex. From the above dictionary meaning of “modesty” and the interpretation given to that word by this Court in Major Singh case [State of Punjab v. Major Singh, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 51 : AIR 1967 SC 63] it appears to us that the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged, is the action of the offender such as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman.” (emphasis supplied) 29. The conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that it will be essential for this Court to carefully assess the evidence presented, in order to determine whether there is sufficient material to establish the intention and knowledge on the part of the appellants, to insult the modesty of the complainant or, to put it pithily, whether any act was intended to shock the sense of decency of the complainant being a woman. - 18 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 30. The term “filthy language”, when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant's modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section 509IPC. Had there been references to specific words used, contextual details, or any gestures—whether preceding, succeeding, or accompanying these words—that could demonstrate a criminal intent to insult the modesty, and it might have assisted the prosecution in establishing the case against the appellants. 31. In considering the term “filthy language” objectively, in the overall conspectus of the case, we are of the view that the appellants' actions do not demonstrate the requisite intent or knowledge that would reasonably lead to the conclusion that their conduct could provoke such a severe emotional response as to constitute an insult to a woman's modesty. 32. Be that as it may, it goes without saying that each case must be assessed having regard to the specific facts and circumstances, not only of the case itself, but also of the individuals involved in the alleged incident. It is undisputed that the complainant and the appellants were positioned as an employee and senior officials, respectively. Moreover, it is evident from the case presented by both parties that a dispute existed between them with regard to the employment in question. 33. To reiterate, in the present case, the complaint does not indicate that the appellants used language towards the complainant that would warrant an offence under Section 509IPC. However, the charge-sheet alleges that the appellants scolded the complainant - 19 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 using “filthy language”. Notably, this allegation is also absent in the FIR. 34. In light of the employer-employee relationship between the appellants and the complainant; the existing dispute between them relating to the employment; the absence of any references to specific words used, contextual details, or accompanying gestures—whether preceding or succeeding the alleged words—the failure to mention the use of any “filthy language” in the complaint; and the fact that this allegation is only found in the charge-sheet : there are serious concerns regarding the claim of insulting modesty of the complainant by the appellants. Considering the materials available on record, we are of the view that prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509IPC have not been disclosed." 12. Insofar as the offence under Section 341 of the IPC is concerned, it requires ingredients under Section 339 of the IPC to be present. The Apex Court in the case of KEKI HORMUSJI GHARDA Vs. MEHERVAN RUSTOM IRANI reported in (2009) 6 SCC 475 interprets Section 341 of the IPC and observes as follows: "12. “Wrongful restraint” has been defined under Section 339 IPC in the following words: “339. Wrongful restraint.—Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person. - 20 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 Exception.—The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this section.” The essential ingredients of the aforementioned provision are: (1) Accused obstructs voluntarily; (2) The victim is prevented from proceeding in any direction; (3) Such victim has every right to proceed in that direction. 13. Section 341 IPC provides that: “341. Punishment for wrongful restraint.— Whoever wrongfully restrains any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.” 14. The word “voluntary” is significant. It connotes that obstruction should be direct. The obstructions must be a restriction on the normal movement of a person. It should be a physical one. They should have common intention to cause obstruction." In the light of none of the allegations meeting the ingredients necessary to drive home the offences, permitting further proceedings would become an abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) Writ petition is allowed. - 21 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010112772023 NC: 2026:KHC:38573 WP No. 5057 of 2023 (ii) The proceedings in C.C.No.38211/2022 pending on the file of I A.C.M.M at Bangalore stands quashed. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE JY List No.: 2 Sl No.: 48