1 CGHC010303172026 2026:CGHC:36705 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 1046 of 2026 1 - Abdul Halim Khan (Died And Deleted) Through Lrs. Smt. Sayra Khan W/o Late Abdul Halim Khan Aged About 61 Years R/o House No. 19/46 Mission Hospital Road, Akbar Chal Masanganj Bilaspur Tahsil And District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 2 - Mohammad Fahim Khan S/o Late Abdul Halim Khan Aged About 37 Years (Now 38 Years R/o House No. 19/46 Mission Hospital Road, Akbar Chal Masanganj Bilaspur Tahsil And District- Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Gram Panchayat Bhadha Through Sarpanch Gram Panchayat Bhadha Panchpedi Mod, Tahsil Masturi, Police Station Panchpedi, District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 2 - Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Collectorate Office Bilaspur, Tahsil And District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 4 - Gram Panchayat Bhadha, Through Secretary Gram Panchayat 2 Bhadha, Pachpedi Mod Tahsil Masturi Police Station Panchpedi, District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 5 - Chief Executive Officer Chhattisgarh Rajya Waqf Board Raipur, Tahsil And District- Raipur (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal and Mr.Sourav Agrawal, Advocates For Respondent/State : Mr. Siddhant Tiwari,PL For Respondent No.5 : Ms.Shraddha Mishra, Advocate (Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Order on Board 17/08/2026 The present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioners/plaintiffs assailing the order dated 27.07.2026 passed by the learned 4th Additional Judge to the First Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bilaspur, in Civil Suit No. 367-A/2012, whereby the application preferred by the petitioners under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘the CPC’) has been rejected. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners are the plaintiffs before the learned trial Court and have instituted the suit seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of land admeasuring 182.79 acres comprised in various Khasra numbers situated at Village Badha, R.I. Circle and Tahsil Masturi, District Bilaspur. It is submitted that in the plaint, the petitioners have stated 3 that the total area comprised in the relevant Khasra numbers is 241.22 acres, out of which 182.79 acres has been shown as the suit land. In paragraph 4 of the plaint, the petitioners have specifically pleaded their right and title over the suit property. It is further submitted that the defendants, in their written statement, have denied the right and title of the plaintiffs over the suit property. Consequently, the plaintiffs moved an application seeking deletion of a particular portion of paragraph 2 of the plaint, ie. “इस स खस . 1,12,65/1 क 33.39.37.75.111.65 एक, क ल क 182.79 एक ।” 3. He submits that the proposed deletion would not alter the nature or character of the suit; rather, it would result in inclusion of the entire land admeasuring 241.22 acres, which, according to the plaintiffs themselves, constitutes the property in question. It is also submitted that no prejudice would be caused to the defendants, who are already aware of the plaintiffs’ claim and have specifically denied their right and title over the property. 4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5 has opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners and submits that the impugned order does not suffer from any jurisdictional error or perversity. It is contended that the suit was instituted in the year 2012 and the written statement was filed as far back as in the year 2013. Despite having knowledge of the factual position from the very inception of the litigation, the plaintiffs chose not to seek amendment of the plaint at the appropriate stage. The application has been filed only after the evidence of the parties has concluded and the matter has 4 been fixed for final arguments. It is, therefore, submitted that the application is nothing but an attempt to alter the pleadings at the fag end of the trial and has rightly been rejected by the learned trial Court. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court. 6. The issue that arises for consideration in the present writ petition is whether the plaintiffs could have been permitted to amend their pleadings at the stage of final arguments, particularly by deleting a specific portion of paragraph 2 of the plaint, whereby the plaintiffs had sought to include another parcel of land as part of the suit property. 7. From a perusal of the record, it is evident that the suit was instituted by the plaintiffs on 24.08.2012, whereas the written statement was filed by defendant No. 5 on 28.06.2013. In the written statement, the defendant No. 5 had specifically denied the right of the plaintiffs over the suit property and the pleadings contained therein. It is also evident that the evidence of the parties had already been concluded and the matter had been fixed for final arguments. 8. From the order passed by the learned trial Court, it is further apparent that the application for amendment was filed by the plaintiffs only at the fag end of the suit. It has rightly been observed that once the trial had concluded and the matter had reached the stage of final arguments, the plaintiffs could not claim, as a matter of right, an opportunity to alter their pleadings. The filing of an application for amendment at such an advanced stage necessarily required the 5 plaintiffs to satisfy the statutory requirement of due diligence contemplated under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. By way of the proposed amendment, the plaintiffs seek to delete a particular portion of paragraph 2 of the plaint, which relates to the inclusion of the entire 241.22 acres of land as the suit property. It has been pleaded that “इस स खस . 1,12,65/1 क 33.39.37.75.111.65 एक, क ल क 182.79 एक ।” 10. The said fact was admittedly within the knowledge of the plaintiffs from the very inception of the suit and, in any event, from the date of filing of the written statement. The plaintiffs, however, did not choose to seek the proposed amendment at the appropriate stage and waited until the conclusion of the trial and commencement of final arguments. It is well settled that although the Court possesses wide powers under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC to permit amendment of pleadings for determining the real controversy between the parties, such power, after commencement of trial, is circumscribed by the proviso thereto. 11. Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC empowers the Court, at any stage of the proceedings, to allow either party to alter or amend its pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments as may be necessary for determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. However, the proviso appended thereto places a specific restriction upon the exercise of such power 6 after commencement of the trial. The provision reads thus: “17. Amendment of pleadings.—The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.” 12. The proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC was inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002 and is couched in mandatory terms. The Supreme Court, in Vidyabai and Others v. Padmalatha and Another, (2009) 2 SCC 409, has held that the proviso places an embargo upon the jurisdiction of the Court to allow an amendment after commencement of trial unless the Court records a satisfaction that, despite due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before commencement of trial. 13. In paragraph 19, the Supreme Court observed that while considering the scope of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC, has held that the proviso is mandatory in nature and places an embargo on the Court’s jurisdiction to allow an amendment after commencement of the trial, unless the Court records a finding that, despite due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before commencement of the trial. The Court further held that the question of due diligence assumes significance where an amendment is sought at a belated stage of the 7 proceedings. In the present case, no satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the plaintiffs as to why the proposed amendment, despite being based on facts admittedly within their knowledge, was not sought at an earlier stage. The delay is therefore not merely procedural; rather, it assumes significance in view of the stage at which the amendment has been sought. The principles governing exercise of jurisdiction under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC have been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Vidya Devi (supra), wherein the mandatory nature of the proviso requiring due diligence after commencement of trial has been emphasized. 14. The party seeking amendment must establish that, despite due diligence, the matter could not have been raised before commencement of the trial. The requirement of due diligence cannot be dispensed with merely because the proposed amendment is sought to be projected as formal or innocuous. 15. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, and keeping in view the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Vidya Devi (supra), the fact that the application for amendment has been filed at the fag end of the suit, and further considering that the facts sought to be incorporated/altered were within the knowledge of the plaintiffs from the inception of the proceedings, I am of the considered view that the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the requisite due diligence. The proposed amendment, at this belated stage, therefore, cannot be said to be bona fide. 8 16. Consequently, I find no illegality, perversity or jurisdictional infirmity in the order impugned passed by the learned trial Court warranting interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The writ petition, accordingly, fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge SUGUNA DUBEY Digitally signed by SUGUNA DUBEY Date: 2026.08.19 17:37:55 +0530