1 CGHC010225742026 2026:CGHC:36549-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPCR No. 337 of 2026 1 - Rupesh Kumar Jaishwar S/o Lalchand Jaishwar Aged About 31 Years Resident Of- Ward No. 58 Near New Sai Temple, Ambedkar Nagar, Urla, Police Station Mohan Nagar, Tahsil And District- Durg (C.G.) Occupation- Employed 2 - Uma Jaishwar W/o Lalchand Jaiswar Aged About 57 Years Resident Of- Ward No. 58 Near New Sai Temple, Ambedkar Nagar, Urla, Police Station Mohan Nagar, Tahsil And District- Durg (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Protection Officer, Domestic Violence (Nava Bihan) Women And Child Development Department, District- Durg (C.G.) 2 - Abhilasha W/o Rupesh Kumar Jaishwar, D/o Late Shri Dhirju Ram Aged About 29 Years Resident Of Panchsheel Nagar Zone 01, Sector 11, Khursipar Bhilai, Tahsil And District- Durg (C.G.), Occupation- Working With Bajaj Group Of Companies ... Respondent(s) (cause title taken from CIS) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sandeep Jha, Advocate (through virtual mode) SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.08.18 16:23:27 +0530 2 For State For Respondent No. 2 : : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate Mr. Abhinav Tiwari, Advocate Division Bench: Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice, 17 .08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Sandeep Jha, learned counsel for the petitioners appearing through virtual mode. Also heard Mr. S.S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate for the Respondent/ State and Mr. Abhinav Tiwari, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2. 2. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner with the following relief:- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records in relation to the case of the petitioners from the possession of respondent's for its kind perusal. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a Writ/Order/Direction of the appropriate writ directing the quashing of the impugned consequential proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, initiated as per complaint dated 02.02.2026 for the offence u/s 12 read with section 23 of the D.V. Act and undated Domestic Incident Report submitted by respondent no. 01 before learned JMFC, Durg in Case No. MJC Cri./491/2026 as well as quash any and all proceedings and actions arising there from on the ground of abuse of process of law; 3 10.3 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper, may also be passed in favour of the petitioner together with cost of the petition.” 3. The present petition arises out of a matrimonial dispute between the petitioners and respondent No.2, who got married on 01.06.2023 according to Hindu rites and rituals. Respondent No.2 has alleged dowry-related harassment, cruelty and domestic violence against the petitioners and, on 02.02.2026, filed an application under Sections 12 and 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, seeking interim maintenance of ₹22,400/-. The petitioners contend that the allegations are vague, omnibus and unsupported by any specific date, time, place or independent material, and that the Protection Officer did not properly conduct the proceedings or prepare the DIR after visiting the shared household or interacting with the concerned persons. It is further contended that the allegations made in the DV proceedings substantially reiterate those contained in FIR No.0071/2025 dated 07.11.2025, for quashing of which the petitioners have already approached this Court. The matrimonial dispute is also the subject matter of proceedings under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, initiated by petitioner No.1 for restitution of conjugal rights, as well as proceedings under Section 144 of the BNSS before the Family Court, Durg. The petitioners further allege that respondent No.2 has suppressed material facts regarding her employment, income and financial investments while seeking monetary relief under the DV Act. Thus, according to the petitioners, the impugned proceedings are founded upon vague and repetitive allegations, suppression of material facts and an attempt to exert pressure in the matrimonial dispute, thereby warranting interference by this Court. 4 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned proceedings arising out of the application filed by respondent No.2 under Sections 12 and 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are based upon vague, omnibus and unsubstantiated allegations, without disclosure of any specific date, time, place, nature of incident or particular role attributable to either of the petitioners. It is further submitted that the Domestic Incident Report is undated and appears to have been prepared merely on the basis of the statements of respondent No.2, without proper verification, investigation, consultation with the parties or recording the version of the petitioners, and therefore fails to serve the statutory purpose contemplated under Section 9(1)(b) of the Act. Learned counsel further submits that the allegations contained in the application and DIR substantially repeat the allegations already made in the FIR and other matrimonial proceedings and that material facts regarding the employment and financial resources of respondent No.2 were not disclosed before the learned Trial Court. It is also submitted that the proceedings under the DV Act were initiated after petitioner No.1 had instituted proceedings under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights, which demonstrates the mala fide nature of the subsequent proceedings and their use as a pressure tactic in the matrimonial dispute. According to learned counsel, continuation of such proceedings, founded on vague allegations and an improperly prepared DIR, would amount to abuse of the process of law and cause unnecessary hardship to the petitioners, therefore, the impugned proceedings deserve to be quashed in the interest of justice. 5. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 submits that during the pendency of the present petition, the dispute between petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2 was referred to the Mediation Centre of this Court in CRMP 5 No.1615/2026, pursuant to which the parties amicably resolved their matrimonial dispute and executed a Mediation Agreement bearing No. M/789/2026 dated 10.07.2026. It is submitted that under the settlement, a total sum of Rs. 4,25,000/- was agreed to be paid towards full and final permanent alimony, out of which Rs. 1,00,000/- was deposited and received by respondent No.2, and the remaining amount is being paid in terms of the agreed instalment schedule, including the payments made on 24.07.2026 and 28.07.2026. It is further submitted that petitioner No.1 has also returned all the Stridhan, household articles and other items of respondent No.2 in terms of Clause 5 of the settlement, for which respondent No.2 has duly acknowledged receipt. Learned counsel further submits that, in furtherance of the settlement, the parties have jointly instituted proceedings under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Durg, seeking dissolution of their marriage by mutual consent. In view of the complete and amicable settlement between the parties and the compliance of the material terms thereof, respondent No.2 has no objection to the present petition being disposed of and the impugned proceedings being quashed in terms of the mediation settlement, subject to the parties complying with the remaining terms and conditions of the settlement agreement. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the petition. 7. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the dispute between the parties is essentially matrimonial in nature and has now been amicably resolved through the process of mediation. The parties, after due deliberation, have voluntarily entered into a settlement agreement dated 10.07.2026 before the Mediation Centre of this Court, whereby the terms 6 relating to permanent alimony, return of Stridhan and household articles and other connected disputes have been settled. The parties have also taken steps for dissolution of their marriage by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the learned Family Court, Durg. Thus, the settlement reflects the genuine intention of the parties to put an end to their matrimonial dispute and to lead their respective lives peacefully. 8. Learned counsel for the parties placing reliance on the case of Jitendra Raghuvanshi and others vs. Babita Raghuwanshi and another, 2013 (4) SCC 58, Jagdish Channa and others vs. State of Haryana and another, AIR 2008 SC 1968, Madan Mohan Abbot vs. State of Punjab, AIR 2008 SC 1969, Shiji vs. Radhika and another, (2011) 10 SCC 705, Narinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab, - (2014) 6 SCC 466 and Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and others reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303, submitted that criminal proceedings arising out of matrimonial disputes can be quashed by the Court, if the Court is satisfied that the matter has been settled between the parties amicably. 9. In Narinder Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down guidelines for quashing of criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise, holding that where the offences are predominantly private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, the proceedings can be quashed to secure the ends of justice. 10. In the case of Jitendra Raghuwanshi (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- “10. Learned counsel for the parties, by drawing our attention to the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi and Others vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, submitted that in an identical circumstance, this Court held that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 can quash 7 criminal proceedings in matrimonial disputes where the dispute is entirely private and the parties are willing to settle their disputes amicably. 11. It is not in dispute that the facts in B.S. Joshi (supra) are identical and the nature of the offence and the question of law involved are almost similar to the one in hand. 12. After considering the law laid down in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 and explaining the decisions rendered in Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551, Surendra Nath Mohanty & Anr. vs. State of Orissa, (1999) 5 SCC 238 and Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court held: “8. … …. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.” Considering matrimonial matters, this Court also held: “12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes.” 13. As stated earlier, it is not in dispute that after filing of a complaint in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 406 of IPC, the parties, in the instant case, arrived at a mutual settlement and the complainant also has sworn an affidavit supporting the stand of the appellants. That was the position before the trial Court as well as before the High Court in a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code. A perusal of the impugned order of the High Court shows that because the mutual settlement arrived at 8 between the parties relate to non-compoundable offence, the court proceeded on a wrong premise that it cannot be compounded and dismissed the petition filed under Section 482. A perusal of the petition before the High Court shows that the application filed by the appellants was not for compounding of non-compoundable offences but for the purpose of quashing the criminal proceedings. 14. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are wide and unfettered. In B.S. Joshi (supra), this Court has upheld the powers of the High Court under Section 482 to quash criminal proceedings where dispute is of a private nature and a compromise is entered into between the parties who are willing to settle their differences amicably. We are satisfied that the said decision is directly applicable to the case on hand and the High Court ought to have quashed the criminal proceedings by accepting the settlement arrived at. 15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly, when the same are on considerable increase. Even if the offences are non-compoundable, if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings.” 11. In the case of Gian Singh (supra) Apex Court held as under:- 57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline 9 engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to 10 secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding. 12. In the present case, respondent No.2, who is the complainant/aggrieved person, has specifically stated that she has no objection to the present petition being allowed and the proceedings arising out of the impugned complaint being quashed in terms of the settlement arrived at between the parties. Since the dispute is predominantly personal and matrimonial in nature and the parties have voluntarily resolved their differences, continuation of the proceedings would not serve any fruitful purpose and may rather frustrate the settlement arrived at between them. In such circumstances, permitting the criminal proceedings to continue despite the settlement would amount to an abuse of the process of law and would not advance the cause of justice. 13. Considering the nature of the allegations, the voluntary settlement arrived at between the parties before the Mediation Centre of this Court, the compliance of the material terms of the settlement and the categorical no- objection expressed by respondent No.2, this Court is of the considered view that the continuation of the impugned proceedings would serve no useful purpose. 14. Therefore, considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra), Jitendra Raghuwanshi (supra), Gian Singh (supra), the further proceedings in MJC(Cri) No. 491/2026 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg (CG), arising out of the complaint dated 02.02.2026 filed under Sections 12 and 23 of the Protection of 11 Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, insofar as they relate to the petitioners, are quashed. 15. The instant writ petition is allowed, subject to fulfillment of the terms and conditions of the settlement arrived at between the parties before the Mediation Centre. 16. No order as to costs.- 17. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Sagrika