1 CGHC010296692026 2026:CGHC:38220-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2014 of 2026 State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Police Station Batauli, District Surguja (C.G.) --- Petitioner(s) versus Mukesh Kumar Yadav S/o Muneshwar Yadav Caste Ahir, R/o Village Murtadand, Police Station Batauli, District Surguja (C.G.) --- Respondent(s) ACQA No. 241 of 2025 XYZ (Father Of The Victim ) ---Appellant Versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Police Station-Batauli, District- Sarguja ( C.G. ). 2 - Mukesh Kumar Yadav S/o Muneshwar Yadav Aged About 23 Years Caste-Ahir, R/o Murtadand, Station- Batauli, District- Sarguja ( C.G.). -- Respondent(s) For Petitioner- State : Ms.Anusha Naik, Deputy Government Advocate in CRMP No.2014/2026 For Appellant For Respondent No.1-State For Respondent- : : : Ms.Seema Verma, Advocate in ACQA No.241/2025 Ms.Anusha Naik, Deputy Government Advocate in ACQA No.241/2025 Ms.Hamida Siddiqui, Senior Advocate BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2026.08.26 14:38:40 +0530 2 Mukesh Kumar Yadav assisted by Mr.Harsh Verma, Advocate in CRMP No.2014/2026 and ACQA No.241/2025 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice and Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board P er Ramesh Sinha, CJ 25/08/2026 1. The present CRMP No. 2014/2026, seeking grant of leave to appeal and Acquittal Appeal No. 241/2025 arise out of the judgment of acquittal dated 07.02.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court (POCSO Act), Ambikapur, District Surguja, in Special POCSO Case No. 57/2023. Since both matters arise out of the same judgment of acquittal, they were clubbed together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The CRMP No. 2014/2026 has been filed by the State with a delay of 442 days. However, Acquittal Appeal No.241/2025 filed by the father of the victim was admitted for hearing. 3. Acquittal Appeal No. 241/2025, filed by the father of the victim, arises out of the judgment of acquittal dated 07.02.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court (POCSO Act), Ambikapur, District Surguja, in Special POCSO Case No. 57/2023, whereby respondent No. 2 has been acquitted of the charges punishable under Sections 363, 366, 3 376(2)(n), and 376(AB) of the IPC and Sections 3/4(2), 5(l)(m)/6, and 5(J-ii)/6 of the POCSO Act. 4. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the complainant/father of the victim made written complaint on 06.11.2023 (Ex.P-4) stating that his minor daughter, victim, studies in 7th grade at the village school, near the school is the home of Mukesh Yadav, son of Muneshwar Yadav, who belongs to the same caste. He had been visiting their house for a long time, interacting with his daughter. He was a member of the family, so no one interfered. His wife told him that the victim was not having menstruation cycle since 6-7 months. When his wife asked her, she revealed that Mukesh Yadav, a resident of the village, had been harassing her since April 2023, threatening her with the promise of marriage, which resulted in her having no periods and a swollen belly. When Mukesh Yadav found out, he kidnapped his minor daughter from his home on 04.11.2023 and kept her at his home. 5. On the basis of the written compliant and after due investigation, an FIR was registered on 06.11.2023 with FIR No. 113/2023 under Section 363,366, 376(AB) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act against respondent No.2 vide Ex.P-2. The victim was recovered from the house of respondent No.2 vide Ex.P-1. Spot map was prepared by the investigating officer vide Ex.P-2. Statement of the victim under Section 164 CrPC was recorded vide Ex.P-3. Consent was obtained from the father of the victim 4 for medical examination vide Ex.P-6. Dakhil kharij register was seized vide Ex.P-7. Patwari also prepared the spot map vide Ex.P-8. Consent was also obtained from mother of the victim vide Ex.P-8. Certified copy of dakhil kharij register in which date of birth of the victim was mentioned as 8.5.2011 was seized vide Ex.P-10C. Respondent No.2 was arrested on 06.11.2023 vide arrest memo Ex.P-16. 6. After completing investigation, the charge-sheet was filed and charges were framed against respondent No.2 for offence under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n), 367(AB) of the IPC and Section 3/4 (2), 5(l)(m)/6, 5( j-(ii)/6 of the POCSO Act, and the trial begin before the learned Additional Session Judge, Fast Track Special Court (POCSO ACT), Ambikapur, District - Sarguja, (C.G.). 7. The prosecution examined as many as 13 prosecution witnesses including the victim and the parents of the victim. It is pertinent to mention here that respondent No.2 in his defence has not produced any defence witness or documents. 8. Learned trial Court framed as many as 5 issues for determination and after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record, by the impugned judgment, acquitted respondent No.2 from the charges levelled against him. Hence, this acquittal appeal. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment dated 07.02.2025 is bad in law, contrary to the evidence 5 available on record, and suffers from material errors in appreciation of the evidence. The learned Trial Court, while recording the finding of acquittal in favour of respondent No. 2/accused, has failed to appreciate the prosecution evidence in its proper perspective and has attached undue importance to circumstances which, when considered cumulatively with the testimony of the victim and other material available on record, do not justify the acquittal. She further submits that though the scope of interference by an Appellate Court with the judgment of acquittal is circumscribed by settled principles, the Appellate Court undoubtedly possesses the power to re-appreciate and re- assess the evidence on record. Where, upon such re- appreciation, the finding of acquittal is found to be manifestly erroneous, unreasonable, perverse, or contrary to the evidence on record, the Appellate Court is competent in law to interfere with such finding in accordance with law. 10. Learned counsel also submits that the learned Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the prosecution. The evidence was required to be examined as a whole and in its proper factual context rather than by isolating individual portions of the testimony. The impugned judgment, therefore, suffers from an erroneous appreciation of material evidence and has consequently resulted in an unjustified acquittal of the accused. The testimony of the victim assumes considerable significance in 6 the present case. The victim consistently disclosed the material facts concerning the conduct of the accused during the course of the investigation and judicial proceedings. Her testimony was required to be examined on the touchstone of its intrinsic consistency, naturalness and overall reliability. That the victim being a child witness cannot be discarded merely on account of her age. The settled principle is that the testimony of a child witness can form the basis of conviction if, upon careful scrutiny, the Court finds the testimony to be reliable, truthful and of sufficient quality. In the present case, the learned Trial Court failed to accord due consideration to the victim's own account of the occurrence and the surrounding circumstances disclosed by the prosecution evidence. The victim had disclosed to her mother that she had not been menstruating for approximately six to seven months and that she had been subjected to sexual acts by Mukesh Yadav since April 2023 on the pretext of marriage and under threats. These circumstances were material pieces of evidence and required a careful and holistic evaluation. 11. It is submitted that insofar as the age of the victim is concerned, the learned Trial Court ought to have considered the entire material available on record relating to her age and the statutory framework applicable to determination of age. The question of age determination ought to be considered on the basis of the evidence actually available on record and the applicable statutory provisions. The absence of a specific challenge by the accused, 7 by itself, may not dispense with the Court's duty to determine the legally relevant age where age constitutes an ingredient of the offence; however, the Court must consider the prosecution's age- related evidence in accordance with the governing law. The prosecution had specifically pleaded that the victim was a minor girl studying in Class VII. The said circumstance, along with the documentary and oral evidence available on record concerning her age, required proper judicial consideration. If the learned Trial Court had any doubt regarding the age of the victim, such doubt was required to be dealt with by applying the legally prescribed method and by appreciating the evidence in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions. The prosecution case is further supported by the contemporaneous conduct of the victim's family. The father, upon receiving information regarding the victim's disappearance and the disclosure allegedly made by her concerning the accused, approached the police and lodged the written complaint. The complaint, registration of the FIR and subsequent investigation are relevant circumstances which ought to have been considered along with the substantive evidence led before the Trial Court. The minor discrepancies, omissions or variations which do not go to the root of the prosecution case cannot, by themselves, constitute a sufficient ground for rejecting otherwise reliable testimony. In a case involving a child victim, the evidence must be evaluated with due regard to the circumstances 8 in which the events occurred and without expecting mathematical precision in every detail. 12. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Trial Court has adopted an approach which has resulted in material evidence being overlooked or inadequately appreciated. The impugned judgment, therefore, warrants interference by this Court, particularly where the conclusions recorded by the Trial Court are not supported by a proper cumulative assessment of the prosecution evidence. The powers of the Appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal are wide enough to re-appreciate the entire evidence, subject of course to the well-settled principles governing interference with an acquittal. The appellant, therefore, prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 07.02.2025, re-appreciate the evidence available on record and pass such appropriate order as may be warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case, in accordance with law. 13. On the other hand, learned learned Senior Advocate appearing for respondent No.2 opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and submits that the learned Trial Court, after considering the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record, has rightly acquitted respondent No. 2. The findings recorded in the impugned judgment dated 07.02.2025 9 are based upon proper appreciation of evidence and do not warrant interference. She further submits that in an appeal against acquittal, although the Appellate Court has power to re- appreciate the evidence, interference is justified only where the findings of the Trial Court are perverse, manifestly erroneous or wholly unsustainable. Where two views are reasonably possible, the view favourable to the accused and recorded by the Trial Court ought not to be disturbed. The prosecution has failed to establish the charges against respondent No. 2 beyond reasonable doubt. The burden throughout remained upon the prosecution, and the accused was entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt arising from the evidence. She further submits that the testimony of the victim, though capable of forming the basis of conviction if found wholly reliable, is not required to be accepted mechanically. The same has to be subjected to careful and cautious scrutiny. In the present case, the learned Trial Court, upon appreciation of the evidence, found that the prosecution case did not inspire the degree of confidence necessary for recording a conviction. The prosecution has also failed to establish the essential ingredients of the offences alleged against respondent No. 2 by reliable and cogent evidence. The allegations in the FIR or the statements made during investigation cannot, by themselves, substitute substantive proof before the Court. The appellant's reliance upon the fact that the victim was a child does not dispense with the fundamental requirement of 10 proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of a child witness may be relied upon where it is found trustworthy and reliable; however, the question whether such testimony meets that standard is a matter for judicial appreciation of the evidence. 14. Learned Senior Advocate submitted that the prosecution has also failed to conclusively establish the age of the victim in accordance with the applicable law and evidence. The question of age was material to the offences alleged, and the prosecution could not seek conviction merely on the basis of an assertion that the victim was studying in Class VII without proving her legally relevant age through admissible and reliable evidence. The learned Trial Court has considered the material circumstances and, on appreciation of the evidence, found that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Such a well-reasoned finding of acquittal is entitled to due weight and should not be interfered with merely because another view of the evidence may be possible. The impugned judgment does not suffer from perversity, illegality or any material infirmity warranting appellate interference. The appeal is, therefore, devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed. 15. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, perused the impugned judgment of acquittal and other material available on record. 11 16. This is appeal against the judgment of acquittal filed by father of the victim. The appellate Courts are required to keep in mind that the trial Court had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of witnesses and observing their conduct in the Court especially in the witness-box and also required to keep in mind that even at that stage, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The doubt should be such as a reasonably person would honestly and conscientiously entertain as to the guilt of the accused. 17. The Supreme Court in the matter of C.Antony v. Raghavan Nair1 has held that unless the High Court arrives at definite conclusion that the findings recorded by trial Court are perverse, it would not substitute its own view on a totally different perspective. 18. The Supreme Court in the matter of Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha2 has held that the appellate Court in considering the appeal against judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. 19. The scope of interference in appeals against acquittal is well settled. In the matter of Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab3, the Supreme Court has held in para 6 as under:- 1 AIR 2003 SC 182 2 AIR 2004 SC 1053 3 AIR 1987 SC 1083 12 “……….the mere fact that the Appellate Court is inclined on a reappreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the Court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally interfere within an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous.” 20. Applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram4, has held as follows:- "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of 4 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984 13 acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all." 21. While exercising the appellate jurisdiction against judgment of acquittal the High Courts or the appellate Courts are fully empowered to appreciate and reappreciate the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties while reversing the judgment of the trial Court. The appellate Court is required to discuss the grounds given by the trial Court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. 22. The trial Court while acquitting respondent No.2 has observed that in the present case, DNA testing was not conducted to determine the paternity of the victim's unborn child, which did not prove that the child born from the victim's womb was of respondent No.2. In this regard, it cannot be assumed from oral evidence alone that the child allegedly born from the victim's womb was of respondent No.2. Furthermore, there is no FSL report in the case that could show the involvement of respondent No.2 in the alleged crime. Therefore, in such a situation, the non- support of the prosecution story by the victim, the victim's father, the victim's mother, the victim's aunt and uncle, and the material on record, makes the prosecution case against respondent No.2 appear doubtful and the investigation conducted by the 14 Investigating Officer is not corroborated by reliable evidence. Therefore, in the prosecution case, the accused / respondent No.2 becomes entitled to the benefit of doubt. Therefore, on the basis of the above evidence, it is concluded that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused / respondent No.2, between 21.04.2023 to 06.11.2023, within the area of the place of occurrence mentioned in the charge sheet, forced the minor victim, aged below 12 years, to have illicit sexual intercourse without the consent of her legal guardian. He abducted her and between 21.04.2023 to 06.11.2023, he took the minor victim below the age of 12 years to the bushes in the fields below Taraidand forest and took her to his house and committed rape by having sexual intercourse more than once and committed penetrative sexual assault by inserting his penis into the vagina of the victim and committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault by establishing sexual relations with the victim more than once, as a result of which she became pregnant. 23. Having considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 07.02.2025, and carefully examined the material available on record, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court has assessed the evidence in its proper perspective and has assigned cogent and plausible reasons for extending the benefit of doubt to respondent No. 2. 15 24. It is well settled that, while an Appellate Court has full power to re- appreciate and re-assess the evidence in an appeal against acquittal, such power is required to be exercised in accordance with the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. The presumption of innocence of the accused is reinforced by an order of acquittal, and interference is warranted only where the findings recorded by the Trial Court are perverse, manifestly erroneous, unreasonable, or are based upon an approach resulting in miscarriage of justice. Where two views are reasonably possible on the evidence available on record, the view taken by the Trial Court in favour of the accused ordinarily deserves to be respected. 25. In the present case, upon examination of the reasons recorded by the learned Trial Court, we find that the Trial Court has considered the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution and has examined the material circumstances appearing in the case. The Trial Court has also considered the testimony of the victim and the other evidence on record and, upon such appreciation, found that the prosecution had failed to establish the charges against respondent No. 2 beyond reasonable doubt. The conclusions so arrived at cannot be said to be perverse, unreasonable or contrary to the evidence available on record. 16 26. The contention that the testimony of the victim was not accorded due weight does not, in our considered view, furnish a sufficient ground for interference. There can be no dispute with the settled proposition that the testimony of a child witness, if found reliable and trustworthy upon careful scrutiny, can form the basis of conviction. At the same time, the testimony of a child witness is required to be evaluated on the touchstone of its consistency, credibility and intrinsic worth, and the Court is not required to accept such testimony mechanically merely on account of the age of the witness. In the present case, the learned Trial Court has scrutinized the testimony of the victim along with the other evidence and has recorded findings which cannot be characterized as manifestly erroneous or perverse. 27. Likewise, the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, including the alleged disclosure made by the victim to her family members, the lodging of the complaint, registration of the FIR and the subsequent investigation, have to be appreciated in the light of the substantive evidence brought on record. The mere existence of such circumstances, by itself, does not dispense with the fundamental requirement of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution was required to establish all the essential ingredients of the offences alleged against respondent No. 2 by cogent and reliable evidence. 17 28. So far as the age of the victim is concerned, the question assumes significance only to the extent it constitutes an essential ingredient of the offences alleged. The prosecution was required to establish the legally relevant age of the victim by reliable and admissible evidence in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions. Having considered the material placed before the Trial Court, we find no manifest illegality or perversity in the manner in which the Trial Court dealt with the issue of age and its effect upon the prosecution case. 29. The submission that certain discrepancies, omissions or variations in the prosecution evidence ought to have been ignored also does not persuade us to interfere with the impugned judgment. It is undoubtedly correct that minor discrepancies which do not affect the core of the prosecution case should not ordinarily be magnified. However, where the cumulative effect of the evidence gives rise to a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case, the accused is entitled to the benefit thereof. The doubt contemplated in criminal jurisprudence is not fanciful or imaginary, but a reasonable doubt which a prudent and conscientious person may entertain upon an objective assessment of the evidence. 30. On a careful consideration of the entire material on record, we are satisfied that the view taken by the learned Trial Court is a possible and plausible view. The reasons assigned by the Trial 18 Court for acquitting respondent No. 2 cannot be said to be such as could not have been arrived at by a reasonable and judicious Court. We do not find that the Trial Court has ignored any material piece of evidence or adopted an approach suffering from manifest illegality or perversity so as to warrant appellate interference. 31. It is also well settled that the Appellate Court, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, is required to bear in mind the double presumption of innocence available to the accused. First, by virtue of the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every accused is presumed innocent until proved guilty, and secondly, by reason of the acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Unless the findings recorded by the Trial Court are shown to be perverse, manifestly illegal or wholly unsustainable, the Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own view merely because another view of the evidence is possible. 32. In view of the foregoing discussion and having regard to the settled principles governing appeals against acquittal, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court has neither committed any illegality or material irregularity nor recorded findings which can be termed perverse or manifestly erroneous. The impugned judgment of acquittal dated 07.02.2025, therefore, does not call for interference by this Court. 19 33. Consequently, Acquittal Appeal No.241/2025 filed by the father of the victim, being devoid of merit, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. The judgment of acquittal dated 07.02.2025 passed by the learned Trial Court acquitting respondent No. 2 is hereby affirmed. 34. Since the appeal against acquittal preferred by the father of the victim has been considered and dismissed on merits after hearing learned counsel for the parties, and the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court has been affirmed, we find no justifiable or sufficient ground to condone the inordinate delay of 442 days in filing the petition by the State seeking leave to appeal. In view thereof, I.A.No.01/2026, application for condonation of delay filed in CRMP No.2014/2026 does not merit acceptance and is, accordingly, rejected. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu