1 CGHC010246512019 2026:CGHC:38002 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPT No. 114 of 2019 M/s J K Lakshmi Cement Through The Sr. Vice President, Village Malpurikhurd, Khasadih, Post- Ahiwara, Tahsil Dhamdha, Durg, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Water Resources, Mahanadi Bhavan, Naya Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Collector District- Durg, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Executive Engineer Tandula Water Resources Division, Opp. Rajendra Park Chowk, Durg, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) with WPT No. 48 of 2020 M/s J K Lakshmi Cement Through - The Sr. Vice President, Village Malpurikhurd, Khasadih, Post Ahiwara, Tahsil - Dhamdha, Durg Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Water Resources, Mahanadi Bhavan, Naya Raipur, Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Collector, District Durg Chhattisgarh., District : Durg, Chhattisgarh 3 - Executive Engineer, Tandula Water Resources Division, Opp. - Rajendra Park Chowk, Durg, District Durg Chhattisgarh., District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. N. Naha Roy, Advocate For Respondent(s)/State : Ms. Anuradha Jain, Deputy Government Advocate Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE 2 Date of hearing : 10.07.2026 Date of order : 25.08.2026 Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey C A V Order 1. Since common facts and law are involved in these petitions, therefore, they are being heard and decided together by this common order. 2. The petitioner, a cement manufacturing company, has approached this Court by way of two writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In W.P.(T) No. 114 of 2019, the petitioner has challenged the demand notices dated 06.06.2019 and 18.07.2019 issued by the respondent-State, whereby water charges amounting to Rs.38,57,459/- were levied for the period from 27.09.2016 to 31.03.2019, purportedly under the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Irrigation Act, 1931 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1931") and the Chhattisgarh Irrigation Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules of 1974"), in respect of groundwater extracted through borewells situated within the petitioner's premises. 3. In W.P.(T) No. 48 of 2020, the petitioner has further challenged the demand notice dated 14.02.2020, raising a fresh demand of Rs.61,58,707/- for the period 2016-17 to 2019-20, issued pursuant to the Notification dated 16.01.2020 revising the applicable rates of water charges. 4. The facts of the present case, as pleaded by the petitioner, are as under:- A. The petitioner is a large integrated cement manufacturing company operating its unit within the State of Chhattisgarh. In connection with its industrial operations, the petitioner requires water for multiple purposes. For industrial requirements, the petitioner had separately executed an agreement dated 14.09.2018 with the Water Resources Department of the State 3 Government for supply of surface water from Sahgaon Anicut of the Shivnath River, pursuant to which the petitioner has maintained a deposit of over Rs.8 crores with the State Government. B. In addition to the aforesaid surface water supply, the petitioner has been extracting groundwater through seven borewells situated within its premises. For the purpose of this extraction, the petitioner obtained an NOC from the CGWA under the provisions of the EP Act, initially on 19.12.2012, which was subsequently renewed on 26.09.2016 for a period of three years and thereafter renewed again on 30.01.2020 for a further period of five years from 26.09.2019. The said NOCs were granted for the stated purposes of domestic, drinking, and greenbelt use. C. On 10.05.2019, a District Level Underground Water Co- ordination Committee conducted an inspection of the petitioner's premises and recorded in its inspection report that the petitioner was extracting groundwater through seven borewells without having executed the prescribed agreement with the State Government under the Rules of 1974. Consequently, the respondents issued a letter dated 06.06.2019 demanding water charges of Rs.38,57,459/- for the years 2016- 17, 2017-18, and 2018-19, which was followed by a clarificatory letter dated 18.07.2019 informing the petitioner for the first time that the demand had been raised in terms of Sections 26, 37, and 40 of the Act of 1931, read with the Notification dated 24.02.2016 prescribing rates of taxes. D. Being aggrieved, the petitioner challenged the said demand in W.P.(T) No. 114 of 2019, whereupon this Court issued notice on merits as also on the application for interim relief. However, the respondents, instead of filing their reply and contesting the 4 matter on merits, proceeded to issue a fresh demand notice dated 14.02.2020, raising an enhanced demand of Rs.61,58,707/- for the period 2016-17 to 2019-20, inclusive of the earlier period, pursuant to the revised Notification dated 16.01.2020. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed W.P.(T) No. 48 of 2020 raising substantially the same challenge. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit as under:- A. The impugned demand of water charges is wholly without authority of law and is violative of Article 265 of the Constitution of India. B. He would further submit that there exists no law enacted by the State Legislature specifically governing the extraction of underground water by any entity, and the subject of groundwater regulation is governed exclusively by the EP Act, a Central legislation, under which the petitioner has been duly issued NOCs by the CGWA. C. He would further submit that in the absence of any State legislation on the subject, the respondent-State cannot levy any tax or charge merely by executive action, as the power to levy a tax is a legislative function and cannot be exercised otherwise. D. He would also submit that respondent-State has erroneously and arbitrarily sought to apply the provisions of Sections 26, 37, and 40 of the Act of 1931 to the extraction of underground water by the petitioner. E. He would also submit that the Act of 1931 is an enactment primarily designed to promote the interests of cultivators and to regulate the supply of water through Government canals for agricultural and irrigation purposes. The preamble 5 and the objects and reasons of the Act clearly establish that it was not intended to govern the extraction of underground water by an industrial undertaking. F. He would submit that Section 26, which vests rights of the Government in water, refers specifically to rivers, natural streams, natural drainage channels, natural lakes, and other natural collections of water, and does not include underground water therein. Consequently, the respondents cannot stretch its applicability to underground water by invoking a generic and textually alien expression such as "natural resources," a term which does not appear anywhere in the Act of 1931. G. He would argue that the conditions for the levy of charges under Sections 37 and 40 of the Act are premised upon the State having "supplied" water to the petitioner for industrial purposes, which is an inescapable prerequisite. H. He would contend that in the present case, there is no "supply" of underground water by the respondent-State to the petitioner; the petitioner independently extracts the same through its own borewells pursuant to the CGWA NOC. In the absence of any supply by the State, neither Section 37 nor Section 40 can be attracted, and the impugned demand is therefore ex facie unsustainable. I. He would further contend that the petitioner has been singled out in a colourable exercise of power, inasmuch as, as admitted by the respondents themselves in response to an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005, there is no agreement executed for withdrawal of underground water between the State Government and any 6 other institution or industry in the entire State; thus, he would pray to allow these petitions. J. In support of its submissions, he has placed reliance upon the following decisions: Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2018) 12 SCC 107; Commissioner of Income Tax, Udaipur v. McDowell and Company Limited, (2009) 10 SCC 755; Jindal Stainless Ltd. & Another v. State of Haryana & Others, 2016 (11) Scale 1; Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC 641; Spences Hotel (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B., (1991) 2 SCC 154 6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents/State would make the following submissions:- a. Learned counsel for the respondent-State would submit that the challenge raised by the petitioner is wholly misconceived and proceeds on a fundamental misreading of the constitutional scheme, the Act of 1931, and the Rules of 1974. b. She would submit that Entry 17 of List II (State List) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India confers upon the State Legislature the widest possible legislative competence in respect of water, including water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments, water storage and water power. The legislative entry is not confined to canals or Government irrigation systems but empowers the State to enact comprehensive laws regulating the utilisation, distribution, conservation, management, and control of water resources within the State. c. She would also submit that the constitutional authority of the State is reinforced by the Public Trust Doctrine, which has 7 been consistently recognised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as forming part of Indian environmental jurisprudence. Natural resources, including water are held by the State in trust for the benefit of the public and cannot be subjected to unrestricted private exploitation without regulation. The State, as trustee, bears a continuing obligation to protect and regulate natural resources in the public interest. d. She would contend that the petitioner's contention with regard to the Act of 1931 applies only to water supplied through Government canals is based on a fundamentally erroneous interpretation of the statutory scheme. It was argued that a statute must be read as a whole and every provision must be construed harmoniously so as to give effect to the legislative intent. Section 26 of the Act vests rights in the waters of rivers, natural streams, natural drainage channels, natural lakes, and other natural collections of water in the Government, and constitutes the statutory foundation of the entire regulatory framework. Section 40, unlike Section 37, does not employ the expression "canal" and is not confined to canal water; it governs the conditions and charges for supply of water for industrial, urban, and other non-agricultural purposes and operates independently of the canal-specific provisions of Section 37. e. She emphasized upon Rule 71-A of the Rules of 1974, which expressly prescribes separate rates for industrial utilisation of water "From Natural/Created Own Source" at 30 paise per cubic metre. Learned counsel submitted that groundwater extracted through borewells squarely falls within the expression "Natural/Created Own Source" in Entry No. 2 of 8 Rule 71-A. The petitioner has not challenged the validity of Rule 71-A, and the same continues to operate with full force. Had the Act been confined only to canal water, there would have been no necessity for the rule-making authority to prescribe separate rates for utilisation of water from Natural/Created Own Sources; the petitioner's interpretation would render Entry No. 2 of Rule 71-A wholly redundant and nugatory. f. She would further contend that the NOC issued by the CGWA under the EP Act operates in an entirely different sphere, namely the environmental and conservation regulation of groundwater extraction. Clause 9 of the CGWA NOC itself expressly provides that the permission granted thereunder shall remain subject to all applicable Central, State, and local laws. The CGWA NOC neither confers any proprietary right over groundwater nor exempts the holder from compliance with the Act of 1931 or the Rules of 1974. The two regimes are complementary and not inconsistent. g. She would also contend that the petitioner's claim that the groundwater extracted through the seven borewells was utilized exclusively for drinking and greenbelt purposes is wholly untenable. The CGWA NOC permits extraction of approximately 320 cubic metres (3,20,000 litres) per day through seven borewells, a quantity grossly disproportionate to any conceivable drinking-water requirement of the petitioner's workforce. The petitioner has produced no contemporaneous records to substantiate its claim of exclusive use for drinking purposes and has in fact taken inconsistent stands in the two writ petitions regarding the actual end-use of extracted groundwater. 9 h. She would argue that the precise question now raised by the petitioner has been conclusively settled by a consistent line of judicial authority. The Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and the Division Bench in the matter of Orient Paper & Industries Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh have both affirmed the applicability of the statutory scheme to industrial users drawing water from natural sources including borewells, and the said interpretation has been followed by this Hon'ble Court itself in the matter of ACC Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh, which was thereafter affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The matter is, therefore, no longer res integra. i. In support of her submissions, learned counsel for the respondent-State placed reliance upon the following decisions: M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 SCC 388; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, W.P. No. 1516 of 1999, decided on 30.04.2002, (2002 SCC OnLine MP 842); Orient Paper & Industries Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2009 SCC OnLine MP 71; ACC Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh, WPC No. 774 of 2015, decided on 02.08.2019; ACC Limited v. State of Chhattisgarh, Civil Appeal No. 316 of 2022, decided on 11.01.2022 (Supreme Court); M.P. Rambabu v. District Forest Officer, AIR 2002 AP 256; & Orient Paper Industries & Ors. v. State of M.P., AIR 2009 MP 143. 10 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused with care the pleadings, documents, and annexures placed on record in both the writ petitions. 8. Before proceeding to examine statutory schemes & rival contentions in the light thereof, it would be appropriate to consider the judgments relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner and respondent-State. The Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on the following judgments:- a. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2018) 12 SCC 107:- The Hon'ble Supreme Court in this decision, while examining a demand of water charges, reaffirmed the foundational constitutional position that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law as mandated under Article 265 of the Constitution. The Court, relying upon its earlier pronouncement in Commissioner of Income Tax, Udaipur v. McDowell and Company Limited, (2009) 10 SCC 755, reiterated that taxation, in its widest sense including every form of impost, can be levied and collected only pursuant to legislative sanction. An executive order or rule devoid of express statutory backing cannot by itself constitute "law" within the meaning of Article 265. The nine-Judge Constitution Bench decision in Jindal Stainless Ltd. & Another v. State of Haryana & Others, 2016 (11) Scale 1 was also noted with approval to the effect that even a "fee" falls within the expression "tax" for the purpose of Article 265 and equally requires the backing of a legislative enactment. 11 b. In the matter of Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC 641: The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in this recently reported decision, reiterated and followed the aforementioned principles governing Article 265 of the Constitution of India, affirming that any Impost, by whatever name called, requires legislative sanction and cannot be sustained in the absence thereof. The reliance placed by the petitioner on this decision is in support of the broader proposition that the impugned demand, being devoid of legislative backing, is violative of Article 265. c. In the matter of Spences Hotel (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B., (1991) 2 SCC 154: the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this decision, while examining the question of equal protection in the context of taxation, laid down the principle that although Article 14 does not prohibit special legislation or unequal taxation, it forbids singling out of any person or class of persons as a special subject for discrimination and hostile legislation. The Court observed that the rule of equality requires that all persons subjected to legislation shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions. 9. The aforesaid authorities, therefore, principally lay down the settled principle that a levy must have the authority of law and that its enforcement must not result in discrimination. The applicability of these principles to the present case would, however, depend upon the statutory source of the impugned levy & factual & legal foundation of plea of discrimination. 10. On the other hand, the judgments relied upon by the counsel for the respondent/State are as under:- 12 i. In the matter of M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 SCC 388:- the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in this landmark decision, recognised and entrenched the Public Trust Doctrine as part of Indian environmental jurisprudence. The Court held that natural resources, including water, are held by the State in trust for the benefit of the public, and that the State is under a legal obligation to protect and preserve them for public use and benefit. Private exploitation of such resources beyond what is permitted by law and public interest is impermissible. ii. In the matter of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772: the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the Public Trust Doctrine and observed that natural resources are national assets. Having regard to Articles 48-A and 51-A(g) of the Constitution, the Court held that the Public Trust Doctrine has become an integral part of the law of the land, and that the State, as trustee, bears a continuing obligation to protect and regulate natural resources in the public interest. iii. In the matter of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, W.P. No. 1516 of 1999, decided on 30.04.2002, (2002 SCC OnLine MP 842): the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, while considering the very statutory scheme of the Irrigation Act and the Rules framed thereunder, held that Section 40 cannot be construed as confined only to canal water but must be read harmoniously with Section 26, which vests rights in natural waters in the State Government. The Court upheld the validity of Rule 71-A and held that the statutory scheme is applicable to industrial utilisation of water drawn from natural 13 sources, including borewells. Significantly, this decision itself concerned an industrial undertaking utilising water from its own sources including borewells. iv. Orient Paper & Industries Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2009 SCC OnLine MP 71: another Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, after examining the statutory scheme of Sections 26, 37, and 40 of the Irrigation Act, expressly held that the interpretation adopted in Century Textiles (supra) did not require reconsideration and affirmed that the provisions had been correctly construed. The Court upheld the applicability of the Act and Rule 71-A to industrial users drawing water from natural sources. v. In the matter of ACC Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh, WPC No. 774 of 2015, decided on 02.08.2019: this Hon'ble Court, after a thorough consideration of the statutory scheme of the Chhattisgarh Irrigation Act, 1931 and the Chhattisgarh Irrigation Rules, 1974, together with the decisions in Century Textiles (supra) and Orient Paper (supra), held that Section 40 read with Rule 71-A governs the levy of water charges in respect of industrial utilisation of water drawn from Natural/Created Own Sources. The Court upheld the validity of Rule 71-A and Rule 73(1) and expressly rejected the contention that the Act's applicability is confined to water supplied through Government canals. vi. In the matter of ACC Limited v. State of Chhattisgarh, Civil Appeal No. 316 of 2022, decided on 11.01.2022 (Supreme Court): the Hon'ble Supreme Court affirmed the reasoning of this Hon'ble Court in ACC Ltd. (supra), finding no error in the High Court's upholding of the legality of the Rules. The Supreme Court confined its interference only to the computation of charges, thereby affirming the legal framework on which the impugned demands rest. 11. The aforesaid decisions thus recognize the regulatory obligations of the state in relation to natural resources, including water. The decisions in the 14 matter of Century Textile (supra), Orient Paper (supra) & ACC Ltd (supra), are in particular, relied upon in support of the applicability of the statutory framework governing industrial utilization of water from natural & own source. The effect and applicability of the aforesaid decisions to the facts of present case shall be considered hereinafter. 12. Having considered the authorities relied upon by both sides, it would now be appropriate to examine the statutory scheme governing the levy. 13. The Article 265 of the Constitution of India reads as under: - 14. "265. Taxes not to be imposed save by authority of law. -- No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law." 15. As interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the expression "law" in Article 265 means an Act of the legislature and cannot comprise a mere executive order. The expression "tax" in Article 265 has been interpreted in its widest sense to include every form of impost, duty, cess, or fee, and the requirement of legislative sanction is equally applicable to all such levies. 16. Entry 17 of List II (State List) in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India confers legislative competence upon the States in respect of water, i.e. water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments, water storage, and water power, subject to the provisions of Entry 56 of List I (Union List). 17. Further, Articles 48-A and 51-A(g) of the Constitution of India, embodying a Directive Principle of State Policy and a Fundamental Duty respectively, cast an obligation to protect and improve the environment. These constitutional provisions are relied upon in conjunction with the Public Trust Doctrine. 18. Section 3 of the Chhattisgarh Irrigation Act, 1931 defines the expression 'Canal'. The said provision defines the particular expression for the purposes of the Act. 19. Section 26 of Chhattisgarh Irrigation Act, 1931, deals with rights of the Government in water and refer to the water of rivers, natural streams, 15 natural drainage channels, natural lakes, and other natural collections of water. The provision thus forms part of statutory scheme concerning the rights & control of the Government in respect of water resources. 20. Section 37 of Chhattisgarh Irrigation Act, 1931 deals with purposes of for which water may be supplied. Sub-Section (1) enumerates the purposes for which such water may be supplied, and clause (d) specifically refers to industrial, urban or other purposes not connected with agriculture. Significantly, while industrial purposes are expressly included in Section 37(1)(d), the rate-fixation mechanism contained in sub-section (2) does not include clause (d) amongst the purposes for which rates are prescribed thereunder, which specifically is being governed by section 40. The statutory scheme thus separately recognises industrial utilisation of water. 21. Section 40 of Chhattisgarh Irrigation Act, 1931 deals with the conditions and charges for supply of water for industrial, urban and other purposes; interpreted as not being confined to canal water and applicable to water drawn from Natural/Created Own Sources. 22. Section 92 of Chhattisgarh Irrigation Act, 1931 deals that power to make rules, including the power to give retrospective effect to rules. The effect of said provision upon notification dated 16.01.2020 shall be considered separately. 23. Rule 71 of the Chhattisgarh Irrigation Rules, 1974 deals with charges & agreement relating to supply of water for industrial and other purposes. The specifically 71-A assures particular significance in the present controversy, as it prescribe rates for industrial utilization of water from government sources as well as from Natural/created own sources. 24. Rule 73 of the Rule, 1974 further prescribes the charges/levy for the unauthorized use of water. 25. Sections 2(b), 3, and 4 of Chhattisgarh Regulation of Waters Act, 1949 - also reaffirm the Government's right over every natural source of supply 16 and restrict the appropriation of water by industrial concerns without the permission of the State Government. 26. It is in the backdrop of the aforesaid constitutional and statutory scheme that the principal contention of the petitioner falls for consideration. 27. The petitioner's invocation of Article 265 of the constitution, read with the decisions in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2018) 12 SCC 107; Commissioner of Income Tax, Udaipur v. McDowell and Company Limited, (2009) 10 SCC 755; Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana, 2016 (11) Scale 1, and Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC 641, proceeds on the premise that there is no law authorising the levy of water charges upon the petitioner. However, on a proper examination of the statutory scheme, this premise is demonstrably incorrect. 28. The Act of 1931 is a law duly enacted by the legislature, and Rule 71-A of the Rules of 1974 has been framed in exercise of the rule-making power conferred under Sections 92 and 93 of said Act. The Notification dated 16.01.2020 has also been issued in exercise of the rule-making power under the Act. The impugned levy is, therefore, backed by legislative authority and does not, on that account, violate Article 265 of the Constitution. The decisions relied upon by the petitioner on the Article 265 therefore have no application, as here, a statutory framework enacted by the legislature exists and the levy has been sought to be imposed pursuant to an existing statutory framework. 29. The decisions relied upon by the petitioner are all directed at situations where there is a complete absence of legislative sanction for a levy. In the present case, however, the Act of 1931 and the Rules of 1974 constitute the requisite legislative and subordinate legislative framework governing the levy. Section 40 of the Act, read with Rule 71-A of the Rules, expressly governs the imposition of water charges in respect of industrial utilisation of water drawn from Natural/Created Own Sources. The principle enunciated in Tata Iron and Steel (supra), and the other cited decisions, 17 while unexceptionable in the abstract, has no bearing upon a case where the levy is clearly referable to an existing legislative enactment. The reliance placed upon these decisions is, accordingly, wholly misconceived and is liable to be rejected on the facts of the present case. 30. The petitioner's further reliance upon Spences Hotel (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B., (1991) 2 SCC 154, on the ground of discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution is also liable to be rejected. The RTI response relied upon by the petitioner merely discloses that no agreement for the withdrawal of underground water has been executed between the State Government and any other industry. However, this fact, even if accepted at face value, does not establish hostile discrimination against the petitioner. 31. It is settled law that the failure of the State to proceed against others in the same position does not confer upon the petitioner a vested right to escape its statutory obligations. The State is not obliged to condone a breach of law merely because it has not detected or proceeded against similar breaches elsewhere. The obligation to comply with the Act of 1931 and the Rules of 1974 arises from the statute itself and is not contingent upon the execution of any agreement. 32. Coming now to the principal contention of the petitioner regarding the applicability of section 37 and 40 of the Act read with Rule 71-A of the Rules 1974, it is pertinent to note that the consistent line of authority commencing from Century Textiles (supra) through Orient Paper (supra) to ACC Ltd.(supra) has upheld the legality and applicability of the levy. The petitioner, therefore, cannot successfully claim immunity from a levy that has been judicially sustained. 33. The petitioner's case that there is no "supply" of water by the State for industrial purposes and, therefore, neither Section 37 nor Section 40 can be invoked is further untenable when examined in the context of Section 40 and Rule 71-A read together. Section 40 of the Act does not use the word supply from a canal; it speaks of the "conditions for the supply of 18 water for industrial, urban or other purposes not connected with agriculture and the charges therefor”. The expression "supply" in Section 40 cannot be construed in isolation and must be read broadly in the context of the sovereign right of the State vested in all natural waters under Section 26, and includes permitting or allowing an industrial undertaking to extract and appropriate water from natural sources within the State's territory. The fact that the State does not physically convey the water to the petitioner's premises does not negate the State's sovereign right to impose charges for the appropriation of a natural resource over which it holds statutory jurisdiction. Rule 71-A itself makes this explicit by prescribing separate rates for water utilized "From Natural/Created Own Source," thereby specifically contemplating situations where the industrial user draws water from its own wells and not through Government infrastructure; thus, the decisions relied upon by the petitioner, while laying down principles of unquestionable validity in their respective contexts, have no application to the facts of the present case given the existence of a clear statutory framework in the Act of 1931 and the Rules of 1974, the consistent judicial interpretation of that framework, and the binding decision of this Court affirmed by the Supreme Court in the matter of ACC Ltd. (supra). 34. 34. The attempt to distinguish ACC Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh (WPC No. 774 of 2015) on the ground that the water in that case had collected in open mine pits, which are surface features, whereas in the present case the water concerns underground extraction through borewells, does not carry the matter further. The Division Bench decision in ACC Ltd (supra) did not rest solely upon the surface character of mine-pit water but examined and affirmed the wider statutory scheme of the Act of 1931 and the Rules of 1974, including the ambit of Rule 71-A, which expressly provides for charging of water drawn from "Natural/Created Own Source." The Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 316 of 2022 has affirmed the 19 correctness of this legal framework. The distinction sought to be drawn by the petitioner goes to factual nuance, not to the underlying legal principle, and cannot displace the binding authority of those decisions. 35. The petitioner's attempt to confine the applicability of Section 26 of the Act of 1931 by arguing that underground water is not expressly enumerated therein is equally unpersuasive. The expression "other natural collection of water" occurring in Section 26 is not a term of limitation but a residual and expansive expression designed to include all natural water resources not specifically enumerated. 36. A strict literal and ejusdem generis reading that excludes underground water from the ambit of "other natural collection of water" would run contrary to the legislative scheme and object of the Act. The definition of "Canal" in Section 3 of the Act governs the specific and limited context of supply of water through Government irrigation systems and does not operate to restrict the State's sovereign right over natural water resources as declared in Section 26. 37. The constitutional foundation of the impugned levy is beyond doubt. Entry 17 of List II of the Seventh Schedule confers upon the State Legislature the widest legislative competence in respect of water and water supplies, and the Act of 1931 enacted in exercise of that competence constitutes valid law. The Public Trust Doctrine, as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (supra) and reaffirmed in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay (supra), further reinforces the State's sovereign and trusteeship obligation to regulate the utilisation of natural water resources including groundwater. The petitioner cannot contend that the extraction of a natural resource of such significance proceeds in a vacuum, regulated only by a Central enactment concerned with the environmental aspects of extraction and not by the State's comprehensive water law. 20 38. The statutory framework is equally clear. Section 26 of the Act of 1931 vests rights in all natural water resources, including underground water as a natural collection of water, in the State Government. Section 40, read with Rule 71-A of the Rules of 1974, expressly governs the conditions and charges for industrial utilisation of water from natural and own sources, and Rule 71-A's Entry No. 2 specifically addresses "Natural/Created Own Source," which squarely encompasses groundwater extracted through the petitioner's borewells. The petitioner has not challenged the validity of Rule 71-A, and that Rule therefore operates with full force. An interpretation that confines Section 40 to canal water would render the entirety of Entry No. 2 of Rule 71-A a dead letter and strip the statutory scheme of its efficacy, a result that no canon of construction permits. 39. The consistent and binding line of judicial authority, commencing from the Division Bench decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Century Textiles (supra) and Orient Paper (supra), and culminating in the decision of this Court in ACC Ltd (supra) affirmed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 316 of 2022, conclusively settles the issue against the petitioner. The question of the applicability of the Act of 1931 and Rule 71- A to industrial users extracting groundwater from natural or own sources is, therefore, no longer res integra. The petitioner's effort to reopen this settled question is not countenanced by law. 40. Further, the CGWA NOC relied upon by the petitioner is, as Clause 9 of the NOC itself expressly recognises, is subject to all applicable Central, State, and local laws. It operates exclusively in the domain of environmental regulation and conservation of groundwater, and confers upon the petitioner neither a proprietary right over the extracted groundwater nor any exemption from the payment of water charges under the Act of 1931. The two statutory regimes are complementary and operate in distinct spheres. Compliance with one does not dispense with compliance with the other. 21 41. The petitioner's assertion that the extracted groundwater was utilized exclusively for domestic drinking and greenbelt purposes cannot be accepted in the face of material on record. The CGWA NOC permits extraction of approximately 3,20,000 litres per day through seven borewells, a quantity wholly disproportionate to any conceivable domestic or greenbelt requirement. No contemporaneous records have been placed on record to substantiate this claim. Moreover, the petitioner itself has taken inconsistent positions in the two writ petitions regarding the actual end-use of the extracted water, which substantially undermines the credibility of its case. The inspection report of the District Level Committee, which is an official document, specifically records extraction through seven borewells without compliance with the agreement requirement, and the material cumulatively points clearly to industrial utilisation. 42. The argument of discrimination under Article 14 based on the RTI response must equally fail. The mere fact that the State has not yet proceeded against other industries in a similar position does not entitle the petitioner to escape a statutory obligation that has been duly fastened upon it. The State has jurisdiction and obligation to enforce the law, and cannot be compelled to overlook breaches of law merely because similar breaches elsewhere have not yet been detected or acted upon. The petitioner's case does not disclose any mala fide, colourable exercise of power, or hostile discrimination of the kind that would attract Article 14; at best it reflects a grievance about selective enforcement, which, standing alone, is insufficient to invalidate the impugned demand. 43. The revision of rates by the Notification dated 16.01.2020 and the consequential fresh demand issued on 14.02.2020 are equally valid. Section 92 of the Act of 1931 expressly empowers the State Government to give retrospective effect to rules, and the revised demand for the assessed period, therefore, has full statutory sanction. 22 44. In the result, this Court finds that the impugned demands dated 06.06.2019, 18.07.2019, and 14.02.2020 are well within the statutory authority of the respondent-State, are fully supported by the legislative framework of the Act of 1931 and the Rules of 1974 as judicially interpreted, and do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity under Articles 14 or 265 of the Constitution of India. 45. In view of the foregoing discussion and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, both the writ petitions are devoid of merit and are hereby dismissed. 46. The petitioner shall comply with the impugned demand. 47. No order as to costs. Sd/- Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judge Nadim