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2026 DAILYLAW 3371 (JHR)

MANJAR HAKIM v. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND

Acq. App.(C)/18/2026 · 2026-04-02

Rajesh Kumar

body2026

Judgment text

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2026:JHHC:9308 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Acq. Appeal (C) No.18 of 2026 ---- Manjar Hakim, Son of Kutbul Hassan, aged about 60 years, resident of Village-Chitarpur, Kathal Tola, P.O. Chitarpur, P.S Rajrappa, District Ramgarh, Jharkhand …. …. Appellant(s) -Versus- 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. Nurullah Ansari, Son of Jamil Ahmad, resident of Village & P.O Maganpur, P.S. Gola, District Ramgarh, Jharkhand …. …. Respondent(s) ---- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR ---- For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Nehru Mahto, Adv. For the Respondent(s) : Mr. Shiv Shankar Kumar, A.P.P ---- 05/Dated: 02nd April, 2026 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. The present acquittal appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 21.05.2025 passed in Complaint Case No.373 of 2019 by the learned Sub- Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ramgarh whereby and whereunder the learned trial court has acquitted the respondent No.2 for the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 3. An interlocutory application being I.A No.9823 of 2025 has been filed for seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal in terms of Section 419(4) of the BNSS, 2023. 4. In view of judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through Legal Representatives vrs. The State of Karnataka & Ors, reported in 2019 (2) SCC 752, no leave to appeal is required to the victim. Paragraph Nos.34, 35 and 76 of the said judgment are quoted herein- below:- “34. On the third question, the Full Bench noted that if the victim restricts the appeal to the grievance to inadequacy of the compensation or 2026:JHHC:9308 2 Acq. Appeal (C) No.18 of 2026 punishment for a lesser offence, it does not become an appeal against acquittal but the appeal is really directed against “any other sentence or order not being an order of acquittal” within the meaning of Article 115(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and thus, no question of taking special leave arises. The Full Bench took the view that for the purposes of Section 378(4) CrPC a victim who is not a complainant will not come within the purview of that section and would not be required to take recourse to the provision of special leave as provided therein. It was held : (Bhavuben Dineshbhai case, SCC OnLine Guj para 33). “33. Therefore, in the case before us, the legislature while conferring the right of appeal upon the victim, who is not a complainant, not having imposed any condition of taking leave or special leave, we cannot infer such condition and impose the same upon the victim, although, the legislature was quite conscious of existence of such provision in case of an appeal by a complainant and has retained that provision without consequential amendment thereby making its intention clear that the provision of special leave is not applicable to an appeal preferred by a victim against acquittal if he is not the complainant.” The third question was then answered in the following words : (SCC OnLine Guj para 36 “36. … If the victim also happens to be the complainant and the appeal is against acquittal, he is required to take leave as provided in Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code but if he is not the complainant, he is not required to apply for or obtain any leave. For the appeal against inadequacy of compensation or punishment on a lesser offence, no leave is necessary at the instance of a victim, whether he is the complainant or not.” 35. In our opinion, the Gujarat High Court made an artificial and unnecessary distinction between a victim as a victim and a victim as a complainant in respect of filing an appeal against an order of acquittal. The proviso to Section 372 CrPC does not introduce or incorporate any such distinction. … 76. As far as the question of the grant of special leave is concerned, once again we need not be overwhelmed by submissions made at the Bar. The language of the proviso to Section 372 CrPC is quite clear, particularly when it is contrasted with the language of Section 378(4) CrPC. The text of this provision is quite clear and it is confined to an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted upon a complaint. The word ‘complaint’ has been defined in Section 2(d) CrPC and refers to any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate. This has nothing to do with the lodging or the registration of an FIR, and therefore it is not at all necessary to consider the effect of a victim being the complainant as far as the proviso to Section 372 CrPC is concerned.” 2026:JHHC:9308 3 Acq. Appeal (C) No.18 of 2026 5. Thus, in the present case the so called appellant is the victim himself and as such no leave to appeal is required. Further, judgment of acquittal has been passed by the Magisterial Court and as such the appeal will lie before the court below itself. 6. In that view of the matter, the present acquittal appeal is hereby, disposed of giving liberty to the appellant to work out his remedy in accordance with law. 7. I.A No.9823 of 2025 stands disposed of. (Rajesh Kumar, J.) Dated: 02nd April, 2026 Raja/- Uploaded on 07.04.2026