1 CGHC010226292026 2026:CGHC:36549-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1615 of 2026 1 - Uma Jaishwar W/o Lalchand Jaishwar Aged About 57 Years R/o Ward No. 58 Near New Sai Temple Ambedkar Nagar Urla Police Station Mohan Nagar Tehsil And District Durg C.G. 2 - Rupesh Kumar Jaishwar S/o Lalchand Jaishwar Aged About 31 Years R/o Ward No. 58 Near New Sai Temple Ambedkar Nagar Urla Police Station Mohan Nagar Tehsil And District Durg C.G. (Occupation Employed Name Correctly Mentioned ) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Sho Officer Incharge Police Station Mahila Thana Sector 06, Bhilai District Durg C.G. 2 - Abhilasha W/o Rupesh Kumar Jaishawar Aged About 29 Years R/o Panchasheel Nagar Zone 1, Sector 11, Khursipar Bhilai Tehsil And District Durg C.G. (Occupation Working With Bajaj Group Of Companies) ... Respondent(s) (cause title taken from CIS) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sandeep Jha, Advocate (through virtual mode) For State : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.08.18 16:23:27 +0530 2 Division Bench: Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice, 17 .08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Sandeep Jha, learned counsel for the petitioners appearing through virtual mode. Also heard Mr. S.S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate for the Respondent/ State. 2. This petition under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Surakhsa Sanhita, 2023, has been filed by the petitioners with the following relief:- “It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow this petition and set-aside/quash the impugned first information report (0071/2025), charge sheet no. 75/25 dated 24.11.2025, cognizance order passed by learned JMFC, Durg (C.G.) on dated 03.12.2025 in RCC/38610/2025 (State of Chhattisgarh v/s Rupesh Kumar Jaishwar & Others) and entire criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioners pursuant to impugned first information report 0071/2025 dated 07.11.2025 for the offence punishable under section 85 and 3(5) of BNS, 2023 registered at P.S. Mahila Thana, Sector-06, Bhilai (Durg), in the interest of justice.” 3. The present petition arises out of FIR No. 0071/2025 registered against the petitioners under Sections 85 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, on the complaint of respondent No.2, who married petitioner No.2 on 01.06.2023 and thereafter resided in the matrimonial home. The complainant alleged that after an initial period of peaceful matrimonial life, the petitioners 3 subjected her to taunts, harassment and demands for money and ultimately compelled her to leave the matrimonial house on 07.06.2024. The petitioners contend that the allegations are vague, general and omnibus, without any specific incident, date, overt act, demand of dowry or specific role attributed to each petitioner, and that the complaint is also inconsistent with her earlier applications. It is further contended that petitioner No.2 had already instituted proceedings under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act before the Family Court, Durg on 08.05.2025 for restitution of conjugal rights, and the impugned FIR was lodged thereafter as a retaliatory measure upon the complainant receiving notice in the said proceedings. The petitioners therefore seek quashing of the FIR, charge-sheet and consequential criminal proceedings on the ground that the allegations, even if taken at their face value, do not satisfy the essential ingredients of the alleged offence and that continuation of the prosecution would amount to abuse of the process of law. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned FIR No. 0071/2025 dated 07.11.2025 and the consequential charge-sheet No. 75/2025 are liable to be quashed, as the allegations levelled against the petitioners are vague, omnibus, self-contradictory and unsupported by any specific material or independent evidence. It is submitted that the FIR was lodged only after respondent No.2 received notice in the proceedings under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act initiated by petitioner No.2 on 08.05.2025 and, therefore, appears to be a retaliatory measure arising out of matrimonial discord. Learned counsel further submits that the earlier complaint dated 05.06.2025 and the subsequent complaint dated 06.11.2025 contain material inconsistencies regarding the persons allegedly involved and the nature of allegations, while the charge-sheet itself does not disclose any specific date, incident, overt act, demand of dowry or distinct role 4 attributable to the petitioners. It is further submitted that the complainant herself did not produce any medical document in support of the alleged physical violence and, as reflected from the material collected during investigation, declined medical examination. The counselling proceedings also indicate that the dispute essentially arose out of differences relating to the matrimonial arrangement, employment and separate residence, including the non-celebration of the marriage anniversary, rather than any conduct satisfying the statutory ingredients of cruelty. Thus, even if the allegations contained in the FIR and charge-sheet are taken at their face value, no prima facie offence under Section 85 read with Section 3(5) of the BNS, 2023 is made out against the petitioners. It is therefore contended that continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law and would cause unnecessary harassment and hardship to the petitioners, and hence the impugned FIR, charge-sheet and all consequential proceedings deserve to be quashed in the interest of justice. 5. Learned State counsel would submit that, in compliance with the order dated 01.07.2026 passed by this Court, the present matter was referred to the Mediation Centre of this Court. On 10.07.2026, the parties appeared before the Mediation Centre and amicably settled their dispute. The mediation report of the Mediation Centre is also on record. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the petition. 7. The terms and conditions of the mediation report is reproduced hereinbelow:- 1. यह कि, श्री रूपे श मा र जयशवा र वा श्रीमाती अभिला षा भिवावा ह 01.06.2023 भिमाला ई भिजला - दुर्ग मा भिहन्दु रिरभिती- रिरवा ज से से पेन्न हुआ था , यह कि उयपेक्ष सेमाझौ(ती अनुसे र श्री रूपे श मा र जयशवार द्वा र श्रीमाती अभिला षा एमास्ती 5 रण- पेष्ण / स्था य जवानु भिनुवा ह त्ता रूपे मा 4,25,000/- ( चा र ला ख पेच्चीसे हज र मा त्र) प्रदु नु रनु ह ती सेहमाती ह5, भिजसेमा से मा नुनुय उच्ची न्य य लाय आदु श किदुनु 01.07.2026 पेरिरपे लानु मा उत्तारवा दु . 2 श्रीमाती अभिला षा 1,00,000/- ( ए ला ख रूपेय मा त्र) प्रदु नु किय ज चा6 ह5 उपेरक्त र भिश सेमा यभिजती किय ज र श षा र भिश 3,25,000/- ( तीनु ला ख पेच्चीसे हज र रूपेय मा त्र) किदुनु 24.07.2026 प्रथामा किश्ती अनु वा किदु मा -2 श्रीमाती अभिला षा भिपेती - भि9रजर मा ख ती से ख्य क्रमा -42384049300 (IFSC Code:- SBIN0013297 मा आवा दु क्रमा -2 श्री रूपे श मा र जयशवा र द्वा र स्था नु तीरिरती किय ज एर्ग 2. उयपेक्ष माध्य सेक्षमा न्य य लाय मा ला भि=ती प्ररण भिनुम्ना नुसे र ह5:- (अ) मा . टुम्= न्य य लाय, दुर्ग (छ०र्ग०) सेमाक्ष Civil Suit-A/452/2025 रूपे श मा र भिवारुद्ध अभिला षा । (=) मा . टुम्= न्य य लाय, दुर्ग (छ०र्ग०) सेमाक्ष 144 रतीय नु र्गरिर सेरक्ष से भिहती भिजसे प्ररण क्रमा -MJC Criminal No. 278/2026 अभिला षा भिवारुद्ध रूपे श मा र। (से) माख्य न्य भिय दुण्डा भि9 र, दुर्ग (छ०र्ग०) सेमाक्ष 9 र अ तीर्गती 85. 3(5) रतीय नु र्गरिर सेरक्ष से भिहती प्ररण मा - RCC/38610/2025 ह5 उपेरक्त से प्ररण उयपेक्ष वा पेसे ला नु ह ती सेहमाती ह5। तीथा उयपेक्ष माध्य किसे अन्य न्य य लाय मा ला भि=ती वा दु य प्ररण आपेसे सेहमाभिती से वा पेसे ला ला र्ग तीथा भिवाष्य मा उयपेक्ष ए- दु6सेर भिवारूद्ध किसे प्र र वा दु, प्ररण वा किसे प्र र दु वा प्रस्तीती नुहH र र्ग। इसे अभितीरिरक्त अर्गर अन्य ई प्ररण किसे न्य य लाय मा था भिवा र्ग से स्था मा ला भि=ती ह ती इसे सेमाझौ(ती आ9 र पेर वाह स्वातीJ सेमा प्त मा नु ज एर्ग । 3. यह कि, अभिला षा एवा रूपे श मा र जयशवा र द्वा र मा नुनुय टुम्= न्य य लाय, दुर्ग सेमाक्ष 9 र 13 (ख) भिहन्दु भिवावा ह अभि9भिनुयमा तीहतीL आवा दुनु प्रस्तीती रर्ग एवा वा दु व्यय आवा दु क्रमा -2/ रूपे श मा र जयशवा र वाहनु र र्ग । 6 4. यह कि, उयपेक्ष भिवाष्य मा ए- दु6सेर भिवारूद्ध ई भिसेभिवाला अथावा दु भिण्डा प्ररण प्रस्तीती नुहH रर्ग तीथा ए- दु6सेर जभिवाती अथावा माNत्य आ9 र पेर ए- दु6सेर चाला- अचाला सेम्पेभित्ता भिलाय ई दु वा प्रस्तीती नुहH रर्ग एवा और नु ह ए- दु6सेर भिवारूद्ध किसे प्र र आरपे- प्रत्य रपे रर्ग । 5. यह कि, आवा दु मा 2 अनु वा किदु मा -2 उनु द्वा र भिवावा ह मा किदुय र्गए उपेह र-फीRज, सेफी , अलामा र. किदुवा नु (पेला र्ग), वा रिंरर्ग माशनु, डा यनिंनुर्ग टु =ला, स्टुला =तीनु स्टु5ण्डा, टु टु =ला, ट्रं (पे टु), =तीनु, लार, ड्रे निंसेर्ग टु =ला भिमाक्सेर ग्रा इ डार एवा दु ला घोटुनु मा नुनुय टुम्= न्य य लाय, दुर्ग (छ०र्ग०) सेमाक्ष प्रदु नु र दुर्ग । 8. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the dispute between the parties is essentially matrimonial in nature and has now been amicably resolved through the process of mediation. The parties, after due deliberation, have voluntarily entered into a settlement before the Mediation Centre of this Court, whereby they have agreed upon payment of Rs. 4,25,000/- towards full and final permanent alimony, return of the Stridhan and household articles of respondent No.2, withdrawal of the pending civil and criminal proceedings and not to initiate any further proceedings or claims against each other in future. The parties have further agreed to seek dissolution of their marriage by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the learned Family Court, Durg. Thus, the settlement reflects the genuine intention of the parties to put an end to all their matrimonial disputes and to lead their respective lives peacefully. 9. Learned counsel for the parties placing reliance on the case of Jitendra Raghuvanshi and others vs. Babita Raghuwanshi and another, 2013 (4) SCC 58, Jagdish Channa and others vs. State of Haryana and another, AIR 2008 SC 1968, Madan Mohan Abbot vs. State of Punjab, 7 AIR 2008 SC 1969, Shiji vs. Radhika and another, (2011) 10 SCC 705, Narinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab, - (2014) 6 SCC 466 and Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and others reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303, submitted that criminal proceedings arising out of matrimonial disputes can be quashed by the Court, if the Court is satisfied that the matter has been settled between the parties amicably. 10. In Narinder Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down guidelines for quashing of criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise, holding that where the offences are predominantly private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, the proceedings can be quashed to secure the ends of justice. 11. In the case of Jitendra Raghuwanshi (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- “10. Learned counsel for the parties, by drawing our attention to the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi and Others vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, submitted that in an identical circumstance, this Court held that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 can quash criminal proceedings in matrimonial disputes where the dispute is entirely private and the parties are willing to settle their disputes amicably. 11. It is not in dispute that the facts in B.S. Joshi (supra) are identical and the nature of the offence and the question of law involved are almost similar to the one in hand. 12. After considering the law laid down in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 and explaining the decisions rendered in Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551, Surendra Nath Mohanty & Anr. vs. State of Orissa, (1999) 5 SCC 238 and Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court held: 8 “8. … …. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.” Considering matrimonial matters, this Court also held: “12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes.” 13. As stated earlier, it is not in dispute that after filing of a complaint in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 406 of IPC, the parties, in the instant case, arrived at a mutual settlement and the complainant also has sworn an affidavit supporting the stand of the appellants. That was the position before the trial Court as well as before the High Court in a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code. A perusal of the impugned order of the High Court shows that because the mutual settlement arrived at between the parties relate to non-compoundable offence, the court proceeded on a wrong premise that it cannot be compounded and dismissed the petition filed under Section 482. A perusal of the petition before the High Court shows that the application filed by the appellants was not for compounding of non-compoundable offences but for the purpose of quashing the criminal proceedings. 14. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are wide and unfettered. In B.S. Joshi (supra), this Court has upheld the powers of the High Court under Section 482 to quash criminal proceedings where dispute is of a private nature and a compromise is entered into between the parties who are willing to settle their differences 9 amicably. We are satisfied that the said decision is directly applicable to the case on hand and the High Court ought to have quashed the criminal proceedings by accepting the settlement arrived at. 15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly, when the same are on considerable increase. Even if the offences are non-compoundable, if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings.” 12. In the case of Gian Singh (supra) Apex Court held as under:- 57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in 10 relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding. 13. In the present case, respondent No.2, who is the complainant/aggrieved person, has voluntarily entered into the settlement with petitioner No.1 before the Mediation Centre and has expressed her consent to the terms of the settlement. The parties have agreed to settle all their inter se disputes, including payment of Rs.4,25,000/- towards full and final permanent alimony, return of the Stridhan and household articles, withdrawal of the 11 pending civil and criminal proceedings and not to raise any further claim or initiate any proceeding against each other in future. The parties have also agreed to seek dissolution of their marriage by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Since the dispute is predominantly personal and matrimonial in nature and the parties have voluntarily and amicably resolved their differences, continuation of the impugned proceedings would serve no fruitful purpose and may rather frustrate the settlement arrived at between them. 14. Considering the nature of the dispute, the voluntary settlement arrived at between the parties before the Mediation Centre of this Court, the terms agreed upon by both sides and the consent of respondent No.2, this Court is of the considered view that continuation of the impugned proceedings would serve no useful purpose. Rather, permitting the proceedings to continue despite the amicable settlement between the parties would defeat the object of the settlement and amount to an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, in order to secure the ends of justice, the impugned proceedings deserve to be quashed in terms of the settlement arrived at between the parties. 15. Therefore, considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra), Jitendra Raghuwanshi (supra), Gian Singh (supra), the FIR (0071/2025), Charge-sheet No. 75/25 dated 24.11.2025, cognizance order passed by learned JMFC, Durg (CG) on dated 03.12.2025 in RCC/38610/2025 (State of Chhattisgarh Vs. Rupesh Kumar Jaishwar & Others) and entire criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioners pursuant to impugned first information report 0071/2025 dated 07.11.2025 for the offence punishable under Section 85 and 3(5) of BNS, 2023 registered at P.S. Mahila Thana, Section 06, Bhilai (Durg) are hereby quashed. 12 16. The instant petition is allowed, subject to fulfillment of the terms and conditions of the settlement arrived at between the parties before the Mediation Centre. 17. No order as to costs.- Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Sagrika